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By Captain Robert M. Nutwell, U.S. Navy
In adapting to this period of great change, naval aviation must focus on low- (or short-duration medium- or high-) intensity conflicts, while hedging against a renewed Soviet threat. Naval aviation’s future also depends on a closer relationship with the Corps—here, a Marine F/A-18 pilot braces for a cat shot.
The profound changes in the communist world that have occurred in recent years will influence the future missions of all services and branches. Thanks to its unique capabilities and outstanding record in crisis control, the Navy/Marine Corps team is likely to remain the “first team” among general-purpose forces in the post-Cold War world, and naval aviation will continue to be a crucial player on the team. However, as shrinking budgets force painful choices, aviation procurement planning and doctrine must be adjusted to reflect the changing mission.
The principal features of the international security environment that naval (i.e., Navy and Marine) aviation probably will face in the next two decades may be summarized
as follows:
- The virtual dissolution of the Warsaw Pact means that a major European or global war precipitated by a Soviet attack on Western Europe is no longer plausible and will not occur in the foreseeable future.
- Soviet doctrine has become, at least for the near term, more defensive, and relations with the United States have changed dramatically from confrontation to cautious cooperation. Thus the likelihood of a conflict with the Soviets, even outside the context of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, also has receded significantly. To be sure, the Soviets have not yet made meaningful cuts in their navy and general-purpose forces outside Eastern Europe, and Soviet policy could change back to confrontation quickly. However, it is difficult to see how this would be in their interest. Furthermore, the Soviet Union lacks the economic strength and national cohesion to fight a major war, and these weaknesses probably will become aggravated as time goes on.
- The widespread collapse of communism and the thawing of U.S./Soviet relations also have reduced the probability of U.S. intervention in Third World conflicts, such as in Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, by obviating the need to contain communism. Regional conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq War, are likely to
occur periodically because of ethnic, religious, national ri- dairies. As in the ______ present Middle East crisis,
military action sometimes may be required
__ . interests, and the United States may be less
reluctant to use force in such cases if there is no risk of a U.S./^Soviet nuclear confrontation. How-ja^ever, a prolonged conflict on the scale of the Korean War or the Vietnam War is unlikely without the threat of monolithic world communism or the support of a superpower.
- Third World nations and some terrorist groups will acquire increasingly more sophisticated weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
- Drug interdiction will continue to require the assistance of military surveillance assets.
- State-sponsored terrorism may decline somewhat without Soviet support, but state-sponsored and independent terrorist groups will continue to pose a serious threat to U.S. interests and citizens overseas.
The most predictable strategic trend is the drastically shrinking funding for the Department of Defense. In conjunction with the changing threat, this reality will necessitate some reshaping of naval aviation.
The plausible scenarios that remain for the employment of naval forces are mainly the protection of U.S. interests threatened by regional aggression, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or countermeasures against international terrorism and drug trafficking. Specifically, the following scenarios are likely:
- Peacetime presence operations by forward-deployed units to promote U.S. interests in important regions, and to be ready to respond quickly to a crisis.
- Naval/air surveillance assistance to the Coast Guard and other countries to interdict traffic in drugs or other contraband.
- Expeditionary operations of limited duration, such as those conducted in Grenada and Panama, to stabilize a crisis situation or protect U.S. citizens.
- Retaliatory strikes, such as the strikes conducted against Libya in 1986 and against Iranian oil platforms and naval units in 1987 and 1988.
- Local sea control to protect U.S./friendly shipping, such as was conducted in the Persian Gulf during the Iran- Iraq War, or to mount a sea blockade, such as the present international blockade of Iraq.
In sum, we can expect some low-intensity conflicts and an occasional medium- to high-intensity conflict of short to moderate duration. Barring a resurgent Soviet threat, the United States is unlikely to be involved in a sustained multi-theater high-intensity conflict in the foreseeable future. The Third World scenarios always have been more likely than direct military action against the Soviets, even at the height of the Cold War. However, the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation forced us in the past to prepare first for this worst-case scenario. Now the Soviet military threat has receded enough that we can afford to tailor our force structure and doctrine more toward the Third World scenarios, while retaining a significant anti-Soviet capability as a hedge against a Soviet change of heart. The present Middle East crisis demonstrates that we need to make this adjustment.
The Third World threat differs from the Soviet threat both qualitatively and quantitatively. From a qualitative standpoint, there is considerable overlap between the threats, particularly in tactical air forces and air defenses. Indeed, in some cases where Third World nations have imported Western instead of Soviet systems (e.g., Hawk
and Exocet missiles), their capabilities actually exceed those of the Soviets. However, the two Soviet systems most threatening to carrier battle groups—nuclear submarines and bombers firing long-range missiles—are unlikely to appear in the Third World in significant numbers because they provide at great cost a geographical coverage that exceeds the needs of most countries. The Third World equivalents to these threats—diesel submarines and tactical aircraft with short- and medium-range missiles—are dangerous in their own right but require somewhat different countermeasures. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the Third World threat is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; some Third World countries, such as Iraq, may be more likely to use such weapons than the Soviets were.
Quantitatively, the Third World threat is significantly less challenging than the Soviets. Future conflicts are likely to be localized (because we would be fighting one or two countries rather than a superpower-led bloc) and of shorter duration than the hypothetical anti-Soviet war (because none of our likely Third World opponents, including our present antagonist Iraq, has the means to sustain a long war).
To assess the implications of these developments for naval aviation, we will look at their influence on each warfare area.
Antisubmarine Warfare: The emphasis will shift from the nuclear to the diesel threat, and from deep open-ocean to shallow coastal/restricted-water operations. The numbers and geographical scope of the submarine threat will be greatly reduced, but the remaining threat will be challenging in some scenarios. On balance, antisubmarine warfare probably should receive lower priority in the allocation of resources.
Antiair Warfare: The emphasis will shift from defending against long-range air-, surface-, and submarine- launched cruise missiles to defending against tactical aircraft with short-range weapons. The classic, open-ocean, outer air battle scenario will be less likely. Engagements will occur over or near land; surveillance requirements will include detection and identification of small, slow targets, such as drug runners and terrorist aircraft; and positive (not necessarily visual) identification normally will be required prior to engagement.
Antisurface Warfare (ASUW): The emphasis will shift to targets that are significantly smaller and less capable ot offensive action and self-defense than Soviet naval units. Patrol craft (some equipped with missiles), terrorist craft, and drug runners are the most likely surface targets. Most ASUW operations will be conducted in coastal regions, and in the presence of many noncombatant vessels. Positive identification normally will be required prior to engagement. Surveillance requirements will include detection, identification, and observation of vessels as small as speedboats, and boarding and search will be required in conjunction with quarantine operations.
Strike Warfare: The basic strike warfare missions will remain: fixed-target strike, interdiction, close-air support, counter-air, suppression of enemy air defenses, and recon- naissance/battle damage assessment. We will need the ability to kill large numbers of armored vehicles quickly and with acceptably low aircraft attrition. Air defenses may be as dangerous as in the Soviet Union. Target acquisition will continue to be one of the greatest impediments to mission success. Precise weapon delivery accuracy will be required to avoid collateral damage to friendlies and noncombatants. Aircrew loss or capture will be less tolerable, promoting greater reliance by policymakers and tactical commanders on missiles and other unmanned air vehicles where feasible, and enhancing the need for an effective combat search-and-rescue capability.
Electronic Warfare (EW): Two factors will enhance the effectiveness of existing electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems: the deployment of stealth vehicles, and the generally greater vulnerability of Third World weapon systems to countermeasures than their Soviet counterparts. On the other hand, the desire to minimize losses on both sides will reinforce the need for strong ECM capabilities. On balance, we will need sophisticated capabilities across the spectrum of EW—including stealth airframes, radar and communications jamming, antiradiation missiles, decoys, and self-protection equipment—to penetrate Third World air defenses with acceptable (that is, minimal) attrition to manned aircraft. Stealth technology is a powerful form of electronic warfare, and we should assess the effect of this technology on our needs for the more conventional forms of EW. In sum, we need to continue investing in high-end EW, including stealth technology, to ensure adequate manned aircraft and cruise missile survivability in future conflicts.
Mine Warfare: The threat of mines to friendly shipping will grow as potential Third World adversaries acquire more sophisticated mines. Persian Gulf operations demonstrated the potency of this threat, even when based on obsolete mines. In addition to modern, robust countermeasures, we will need a greatly improved surveillance capability to detect and interdict covert minelaying. In this respect, the enhanced surveillance requirements of ASUW and mine warfare converge, and naval aviation will play a key role in providing this surveillance.
Special Warfare: SpecWar forces will play a greater role in an environment of predominantly low-intensity conflicts. Covert insertion/extraction, communications,
and tactical/logistical support of SpecWar forces will become important missions for Navy and Marine aviation.
Logistics: Sustainability requirements will be reduced, since potential adversaries would present fewer targets, and they do not have the firepower or logistical support of the Soviet-bloc armed forces. However, the likelihood of long supply pipelines will remain, and we must be able to outlast a worst-case Third World adversary (Iraq) in a mid- to high-intensity conflict.
This mission area survey suggests the following conclusions regarding naval aviation force structure and required capabilities.
Fighter Attack Squadron (VFA)IMarine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA): The F/A-18 is effective across the spectrum of potential conflicts, and it is particularly well- suited to Third World scenarios. An excellent air superiority and ground attack fighter, its multimission capability and affordability will be vital to retaining air wing effectiveness in an era of shrinking budgets. The planned radar upgrade and greater fuel capacity are the most urgently needed improvements. We also need the advanced tactical aerial reconnaissance system reconnaissance variant to replace the aging F-14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pods.
Fighter Squadron (VF): The F-14D will be highly capable in both the air superiority and fleet air defense missions. To enhance the air wing’s multimission capability, we should give the F-14D an air-to-surface capability. Aging airframes, funding shortfalls, and the recently an-
Potential Third World adversaries are particularly vulnerable to electronic countermeasures (left, an EA-6B prepares for launch from the Forrestal [CV-59]) and to special warfare forces, which can be inserted, extracted, and supported by naval aviation.
nounced delay in developing a replacement may reduce VF force levels starting in the late 1990s. To preclude this, we should attempt to extend F-14D new production. If necessary, Marine F/A-18 squadrons could be used to fill out the air wings.
The follow-on to the F-14D should be a stealthy aircraft capable of supersonic cruise. These two capabilities provide a quantum improvement in tactical effectiveness in both the air superiority and fleet air defense missions, and they are needed to stay ahead of future Soviet and Third World fighter capabilities.
Developing a common aircraft to replace both the F-14 and F/A-18 would enhance air wing flexibility and reduce support costs. However, the F/A-18 follow-on must be affordable in large numbers and have a good ground- attack capability. It is not clear if a single aircraft can meet all of the VF/VFA requirements. Another option would be to replace the F/A-18 and AV-8B with a common advanced short-takeoff-vertical-landing (ASTOVL) aircraft. The attractiveness of this course will depend on the development of STOVL propulsion technology that does not penalize mission performance. We have a few years to decide which option is best.
Marine Attack Squadron (VMA): The A-12 is needed to replace aging A-6 aircraft and to enable the execution of future manned strike missions with acceptable aircrew risk. The A-12 will be particularly effective at night, thus enabling the air wing to maintain round-the-clock pressure on the enemy. The aircraft should be able to use the Maverick missile and the Advanced Interdiction Weapon System (AIWS) for interdiction and close air support; it also needs a stealthy standoff weapon for attacking high-value fixed targets, which can be expected to have strong terminal defenses. If budget constraints preclude procurement of the planned number of A-12s, Marine FA-18D squadrons should be integrated into Navy air wings to fill the gap, albeit with some loss in capability.
Unmanned Vehicles: Cruise missiles and other unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) can make an important contribution to future air operations, particularly in strike and antisurface warfare, by conducting some high-risk missions and supplementing or supporting manned aircraft on other missions. Cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk and the Standoff Land-Attack Missile (SLAM), can strike many fixed targets; UAVs can conduct air-defense suppression and some bomb-damage assessment and reconnaissance missions. We should continue to improve the lethality, targeting flexibility, and survivability of the Tomahawk and SLAM; we should deploy stealthy follow- ons to these weapons; we should proceed with the reconnaissance and targeting UAVs now under development; and we should procure the Tacit Rainbow radar decoy in adequate numbers.
Cruise missiles and other UAVs lack the lethality, tactical flexibility, and sustainability of manned aircraft. However, they will provide an adequate capability for some missions, and they will improve with evolving technologies, such as advanced sensors and artificial intelligence. A mix of manned and unmanned vehicles will provide the best capability for strike and antisurface warfare in the future.
Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VAQ): We should continue the transition of all EA-6B squadrons to the advanced capability (AdvCap) version, which is needed for its expanded jamming capability. The EA-6B follow-up aircraft should employ the A-12 or follow-on VF/VFA airframe for commonality.
Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (VAW): Airborne surveillance will be indispensable in most post-Cold War scenarios. However, VAW aircraft must be given better overland/near-land capability. Sophisticated countercountermeasures and counter-stealth capabilities should
receive less emphasis. A standoff noncooperative target recognition capability is urgently needed. To save funds for more urgent needs, we should consider deferring development of the Advanced Tactical Support (ATS) aircraft and continue E-2 production instead. The E-2 airframe design will provide adequate capability for the VAW mission for many more years.
Air Antisubmarine Squadron (VS): Since the S-3 has excellent surface surveillance capability and a respectable capability against diesel submarines, it will be a key player in Third World contingencies. The S-3 and its successor should be equipped with a sensor that can positively identify surface craft and observe deck activities such as minelaying operations from outside the effective range of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles. VS aircraft also should be equipped with a weapon such as Maverick or Penguin to engage small, low-value surface craft from a safe standoff range. Procurement of the ES-3A should continue in order to provide the battle group commander with an organic electronic support capability. To better reflect the importance of the antisurface as well as antisubmarine mission, the VS squadron’s designation should be changed to sea control squadron. To avoid the cost of developing a new ATS airframe, the S-3 should be replaced with a variant of the V-22, or by reopening the S-3 production line.
Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (HS)ILight Antisubmarine Squadron (HSL): The excellent surface surveillance and antisubmarine capability of the SH-60 and SH-2 will be indispensable in many future scenarios. LAMPS I and III already have proved their worth in low-intensity conflict in the Persian Gulf. For better performance against diesel subs, LAMPS needs a dipping sonar. Both HS and HSL aircraft need the standoff surveillance sensor and air-to-surface weapon proposed earlier for the S-3. We should consider combining the HS and HSL communities, since they will be operating similar aircraft in the same type of missions. The squadrons should be designated hel-
icopter sea control squadrons.
Patrol Squadron (VP): The utility of VP aircraft in anticipated scenarios and the sensor/weapon requirements to perform the surface surveillance mission are essentially the same as stated for VS. Lack of access to in-theater bases may hamper VP operations in some future scenarios. The VP community should shrink somewhat in response to the reduced Soviet threat, and budget constraints may require that the P-7 procurement be deferred. However, patrol aviation will continue to play an important role in peacetime surveillance operations, in many Third World scenarios, and as an insurance policy against a resurgent Soviet submarine threat.
Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ): Like ECM, electronic support will be especially effective against Third World adversaries, many of whom lack sophisticated protection capabilities. Therefore, we should retain the present VQ force structure and maintain a modern mission package in the EP-3 and ES-3 aircraft.
Weapons and Sensors: New systems of limited utility against non-Soviet threats, such as the Advanced Air-to- Air Missile (AAAM) and counter-stealth sensors, should be developed but not procured until they are needed to counter Third World threats. The Advanced Medium- Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) must be procured to provide the F/A-18 with a multitarget, “launch-and- leave” engagement capability. VF/VFA aircraft need the capability to identify positively a noncooperating target beyond maximum weapon engagement range, and they need an advanced dog-fighting missile with significant off-boresight capability coupled to a helmet-mounted sight.
Improved land-attack cruise missiles and unmanned air vehicles for reconnaissance and defense suppression should be developed. An affordable, outside-point-
defense stand-off weapon, such as the Advance Interdiction Weapon System (AIWS), and a modern family of cheap, level-of-effort bombs (guided and unguided) are needed. To enhance survivability and CAS/interdiction/ strike mission effectiveness, strike aircraft must be able to acquire the target and employ air-to-ground weapons from high altitude with surgical precision in all weather. Navy tactical aircraft also need a smart stand-off weapon that can kill several armored vehicles per pass, such as the submunition warhead planned for the joint Army/Air Force Tactical Missile (JTACMS).
A standoff electro-optical surface surveillance sensor and short-range attack weapon are needed for VS, HS, HSL, and VP. New antisubmarine weapons and sensors should be optimized against diesel-electric submarines operating in relatively shallow water.
Self-protection Equipment: All Navy/Marine aircraft should be fitted with an effective radar warning receiver, a missile warning system, and improved decoys that can respond automatically to an approaching missile. We should buy enough EW equipment to ensure its availability for deployments and for training between deployments.
Marine Aviation: The V-22 is urgently needed for Marine assault and special operations. It provides a revolutionary capability that is well-suited for Third World conflicts. Proposals to substitute a mix of existing helicopters for the V-22 would make a major sacrifice in capability for insignificant savings, considering that much of the V-22 development cost already has been paid. The V-22 is also needed for Navy strike rescue and to replace the S-3. The Navy should attempt to reverse the Department of Defense decision to cancel the V-22, and we should be willing to economize in other aircraft replacement and procurement programs in order to buy this uniquely capable aircraft for the Marine Corps and for other applications.
The rest of Marine rotary-wing aviation and the Harrier squadrons are well-suited to likely future scenarios. Improved night/all-weather attack capability for the AH-1W Sea Cobra should receive high priority, and we should sponsor an international project to develop an advanced VSTOL or STOVL to replace the AV-8B. The new aircraft should be supersonic, employ stealth technology, be capable of all-weather (not just clear night) CAS, and have a beyond-visual-range air-to-air capability.
The conventional, land-based Marine tactical air wings are hampered by the lack of airborne surveillance capability and by the uncertain availability of land bases. Nevertheless, these wings are needed to provide adequate, responsive support of the ground combat element when bases have been secured. The Marine Hornet and Prowler squadrons also provide a ready reserve which the commander in chief can use to replace carrier air wing losses, to reinforce an ally, or for other purposes.
The SH-60B LAMPS III helicopter proved its worth during low-intensity conflict in the Persian Gulf. It is time to think about combining the helicopter ASW and light ASW squadrons into a helicopter sea-control squadron.
Air Support for Expeditionary Operations: Traditionally, naval commanders have refused to tether the carriers to a land campaign for fear of sacrificing their mobile striking power and increasing their vulnerability. The traditional policy was sensible in World War II and in a hypothetical global war with the Soviets. However, in the conflicts envisioned in the post-Cold War era, the threat to the battle groups will be much lower, and the carriers are unlikely to be employed in other missions during an expeditionary operation. (This was the case in the Korean and Vietnam wars.) Furthermore, in many scenarios carrier air wing support will be needed for airborne surveillance or because there are no suitable bases for the Marine tactical
air wings. Thus, Navy doctrine should be altered to state that carrier air wing support normally will be provided for a Marine expeditionary operation.
To enhance the ability of Navy air wings (CVWs) to support Marine operations, we should consider designating an augmenting Marine VMFA squadron for each Navy air wing. While not usually deployed on the ship, the VMFA squadron would work up with the air wing, would maintain carrier landing currency, and would join the CV/ CVW during a portion of the deployment. If the need for an actual expeditionary operation arose, the augmenting squadron could be deployed within a few days. Carrier deck space would be made available by temporarily shore- basing those aircraft not needed for the operation.
The association of the augmenting VMFA squadron with its host air wing would enhance the Navy air wing’s proficiency in air support for ground forces. In an actual expeditionary operation, the additional Hornet squadron would increase the fire support available to the ground combat element in the crucial initial phase before land bases have been secured. The augmenting squadron would move ashore once a base became available.
Naval aviation can adapt to the new strategic and fiscal climate by tailoring operational capabilities more toward Third World contingencies (while retaining a significant capability to deal with the less-likely Soviet threat) and by welding a closer marriage between Navy and Marine aviation. The result will be a leaner naval air arm better suited to the challenges, like the recent Iraqi aggression in the Middle East, that certainly await us in the post-Cold War era.
Captain Nutwell is the prospective commanding officer of the USS George Washington (CVN-73), which is under construction in Newport News, Virginia. He has served as commanding officer of VA-105, executive officer of the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), director of an air warfare intelligence assessment team, and commanding officer of the USS Trenton (LPD-14). Captain Nutwell is currently qualified in the F/A-18 Hornet.