Don't Ban the SLCM

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By Lieutenant Commander David Olmstead, U.S. Navy

Last June’s prizewinning article “Ban the SLCM” lit off a debate that now brings out the other side of the issue—reasons for keeping SLCMs, such as this Standoff Land-Attack Missile lighting off during a ship-launch demonstration flight test.

The United States needs its sea-launched cruise mis­siles (SLCMs); banning them would be counter to U.S. interests.

The first thing to be considered in conducting any nego­tiation that is to result in a treaty is: Why should we have the treaty? The United States has a clear policy on the function of arms control agreements. They should be equi­table and verifiable and should accomplish the following: ► Enhance the national security of the United States and its allies

► Reduce the risk of war ► Strengthen global stability

Under the direction of Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union began develop­ing a powerful blue-water navy and blue-sky naval air force; a trend that continues today. Soviet strategy, tac­tics, weapon development, and future technology initia­tives principally focused on antiaircraft carrier operations and capabilities. The Soviets built a submarine force that, numerically, is second to none. Surface combatants were outfitted with a variety of long, intermediate, and short- range antiship missiles, most of which were nuclear capa­ble. The Soviet Naval Air Force was equipped with long- range bombers, again configured primarily with nuclear- capable antiship missiles.

As these systems matured and Soviet operators became tactically proficient, risk to our carrier forces became un­acceptable. The logical solution for the United States was to augment the deterrent value of the aircraft carrier’s strike power by distributing this power throughout the fleet. Therefore, the United States developed and de­ployed Tomahawk cruise missiles on surface combatants and submarines. Understandably, that move has compli­cated any adversary’s targeting problem and significantly improved the survivability of U.S. naval forces—as well as U.S. ability to continue to deter aggression and keep global peace.

" Nuclear SLCMs deter attacks by nuclear antiship mis­siles from Soviet naval aviation or Soviet naval forces at sea by holding at risk the shore bases from which the nu­clear forces are deployed. Dispersal of naval theater nu­clear forces by deploying nuclear Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs/N) over approximately 200 launch plat­forms (instead of over only a small number of aircraft carriers with their dual-capable aircraft) multiplies Soviet uncertainties and enhances both deterrence and stability. The wide dispersal of U.S. naval theater nuclear forces ensures that a platform with theater nuclear weapons will be available for a retaliatory response to the use of nuclear weapons at sea that is “in kind” but below the strategic force level. The United States does not want Soviet plan­ners to think that nuclear war could be fought and confined to sea. Should deterrence fail today, TLAMs/N that are already on station would provide a militarily effective re­sponse to Soviet attacks without resorting to central strate­gic systems or scarce dual-capable aircraft.

Nuclear SLCMs provide worldwide deterrence presence and extended nuclear deterrence to U.S. allies without amassing a carrier battle group. They extend theater-flexi­ble response to sea without requiring basing or overflight rights.

The inherent survivability and flexibility of TLAMs/N applied across the spectrum of possible conflicts is un­questioned. This survivability ensures that the National Command Authority would have nuclear assets available in theater to support a decision to escalate, if that decision ever became necessary.

TLAMs/N enhance stability. While deterrence is strengthened if an adversary cannot predict the conse­quences of retaliation, it is weakened if the deterrent offers any incentive for preemption. The difficulties of coordi­nating a strike from dozens of platforms, the long flight time of cruise missiles, and the other high-priority mis­sions of their launch platforms combine to make SLCMs

Proceedings / January 1991

I

unsuited to a first-strike role. In addition, their widespread dispersal on board a large number of survivable platforms, each of which carries only a small number of missiles, makes them totally uninviting as targets for a coordinated preemptive strike. TLAMs/N provide deterrence, ex­tended deterrence, flexible response, and stability.

A ban on all SLCMs would mean that both nuclear and conventional SLCMs would be banned. With respect to placing limits or constraints on conventional SLCMs, a matter of law should be addressed. The U.S. Senate, in its Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty Ratification statement, noted that “no restrictions should be estab­lished on current or future nonnuclear air- or sea-launched cruise missiles developed or deployed by the United States ...” and, most of all, the United States should not mortgage future options for short-term political gains. This statement is very clear in its intent: We cannot limit conventional SLCMs.

This does not mean that at some time in the future the U.S. Congress would not accept some type of limitation on conventional SLCMs, but clearly there is strong sup­port in Congress for maintaining future options with re­spect to conventional SLCMs. Aside from the political support for conventional SLCMs, there are also very good military reasons for maintaining them in weapons maga­zines. In the area of antiship SLCMs—Harpoons and Tomahawk antiship missiles—the Navy possesses highly capable weapons. The ability to attack enemy ships at over-the-horizon ranges with ordnance that can produce at least a mission kill and many times can produce a hard kill is militarily significant. The ability to attack at such long ranges allows the tactical commander flexibility in weapon selection for both offensive and defensive fleet operations. In a major fleet engagement, the benefits gained by coordinating an SLCM attack just in advance of a tactical air strike to soften the target is only one of the possible tactical employment options. In the area of strike warfare, conventional SLCMs and conventional TLAMs with unitary warheads or submunitions offer many em­ployment options. The conventional SLCMs can be used to strike the primary target and thereby prevent having to place tactical air assets at risk, or they can be used to provide antiair warfare suppression support just in ad­vance of a tactical air strike to improve the survivability of the tactical air assets.

Both the antiship and strike missions can be carried out with SLCMs that are deployed in the fleet today. The fu­ture offers great promise for enhancing the capabilities of cruise missiles by extending their range, navigational ac­curacy, and seeker target identification; therefore the mili­tary utility of SLCMs will also increase. Clearly, conven­tional SLCMs offer significant military utility and flexibility to operational commanders. To remove them from our weapons inventory would increase the risks faced by our military forces.

A ban on nuclear SLCMs would have no effect on air- launched cruise missiles. The Soviets have a substantial naval aviation capability that includes both nuclear and nonnuclear air-launched antiship cruise missiles; any agreement that does not address this threat to U.S. aircraft carriers would be seriously flawed and would result in putting the cross hairs back on the flight deck.

If we were to take Soviet naval aviation into account and the United States were to accept a ban on all nuclear weapons except those that are constrained by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, the results could be disastrous. The Soviets would be able to employ a small number of their strategic heavy bombers in an antiaircraft carrier role with nuclear-armed antiship cruise missiles. Even if this action were specifically banned, the substantial incentive to the Soviets to retain such an ability as a covert wartime option is obvious.

Contrary to Ensign Christopher Duquette’s assertion (see “Ban the SLCM,” Proceedings, June 1990), Secre­tary Brown’s statement that cheating on a small scale is not militarily significant is not applicable to nuclear SLCMs. The use of nuclear weapons at sea in an antiair­craft carrier role would force the United States either to accept the loss of its naval forces’ ability to support ground forces or resort to the only retaliation in kind at U.S. disposal: strategic nuclear forces. If the United States allows the Soviets to think that it may be possible to fight a limited nuclear war at sea that would result in the loss of U.S. naval forces and their ability to support ground forces, then the United States must also be willing to ac­cept war termination on terms that may not be favorable.

In his advocacy of banning SLCMs, Ensign Duquette also asserts that a total ban would resolve the nettlesome question of verification. I do not think this assertion is correct. If the United States were to agree to a total ban on SLCMs, it would want to ensure that, for the duration of the treaty, no Soviet ships had SLCMs on board or were capable of employing them. All verification methods pro­posed to date only constitute a costly set of confidence­building measures that leave the questions of covert pro­duction and stockpiling of SLCMs unanswered. The in­tractable nature of the verification problem persists.

One final point to consider is that the issue of SLCMs is not a solely bilateral one. The proliferation of SLCMs to many of the world’s navies is a fact of life. It would be unconscionable for the United States to forfeit the capabil­ities of conventional SLCMs such as the Harpoon and TASM and their war-fighting utility against other naval forces; it would be equally unacceptable to forfeit the con­ventional strike capability offered by conventional TLAMs and TLAMs with unitary warheads or submuni­tions, with their war-fighting utility in low-intensity con­flicts.

The policy objectives of arms control agreements can­not be met by an SLCM ban. SLCMs enhance U.S. na­tional security, and verification remains an intractable problem. The United States should reject any constraints on this high-technology weapon system, which represents future technology and options.

Lieutenant Commander Olmstead is assigned to the Chief of Naval Oper­ations staff in the Arms Control branch of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division. He is the primary action officer for naval review of negotiations that deal with SLCMs, Defense and Space Talks, and the Standing Consultative Commission of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.