Commentary

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U.S. NAVY (J. LEEHOGTS)

Vice-Admiral, U.S. Navy, (Retired)

Two Seats—Until Now

Critics of cost and sophistication in modern weapon systems are legion. Mostly they are off target because they ignore the fact that the potential enemy also has sophisticated weapons to use against our forces and there has to be a match, yea, superiority. Yet, there are indeed occasions when our systems are unneces­sarily over-sophisticated and over-priced. Unfortunately, one of those occasions is now: the recent decision in favor of a crew of two for the Navy’s next fleet air defense fighter aircraft.

There was a time when a crew of two in a fighter aircraft made eminent sense. When the Phantom II first came on the scene the management of its weapon system was labor intensive, and in a multi-faceted combat environment, it was near impossible for one pilot to maneuver the aircraft, keep track of friend and foe and operate the radar and missiles simultaneously. Thus the Phantom pilot was given an assistant, soon upgraded to the stat­ure of teammate. This was the radar intercept officer: the RIO. This team—the RIO, the pilot, and the Phantom II—soon proved its worth from the decks of carriers around the world and in combat over North Vietnam. On the ground, the RIOs proved as good as—or better than—other officers. In fact, the RIO was often the best officer in the squadron or on the staff, in the ship, or the Pentagon. But putting that second crewman in a fighter began more than 30 years ago, when the Phantom was a quantum leap in both aircraft performance and weapon systems capabili­ties, and it took a lot of human intervention and control to exploit all the possibilities. Much has changed since.

Even while the Phantom was making its mark, the Tomcat was on the drawing boards. In the highly charged political atmo­sphere of its birth, given the TFX controversy, and the glamor and mysticism of the new Phoenix missile, there was no serious challenge to the two-man concept. In fact, there was strident advocacy for such a crew. So much so that to ensure the Tomcat could not be flown by a solo pilot, the IFF control switch was placed in the rear cockpit.

Today, as the Navy considers a next generation fighter, the two-man crew has become a seemingly sacrosanct article of faith. Aircraft manufacturers hoping to supply the Navy’s next generation fighter shrink from proposing a single-seat fighter and even the Navy’s own request for proposal for the Navy Ad­vanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) stipulates a crew of two. With modem technology and need to minimize fighter weight, maxi­mize performance, and save taxpayers’ dollars, the logical ques­tion is, “Why?”

Why, indeed? In fly-by-wire aircraft the physical effort of control manipulation is all but removed from the pilot’s work schedule. Heads-up displays fed by a wide spectrum of both external and internal sensors and digital communications links can present an incredible amount of information. The most im­portant of that information can be sorted out by even the most rudimentary versions of artificial intelligence. Inertial navigation systems, global positioning systems, radar, forward-looking in­frared, and moving map displays make navigation a piece of cake. On-board computers recommend maneuvers to locate and intercept targets, gain advantage, avoid threats, deploy counter­measures, and adjust to a degraded system far better and quicker than can any human twisting knobs, flipping switches, and watching scopes while pulling Gs. Voice advisories provide threat, altitude and impending system problems. The pilot, as some have said, becomes a mere voter among all the on-board computers. That may be an exaggeration, but do we need two voters? In the aircraft of the 21st century we indeed do not.

The second voter is not only unnecessary—he is also unaf­fordable. We cannot afford him financially, we cannot afford him performance-wise.

Consider the performance penalties of adding a second crew­man in a fighter. The takeoff weight increases because of the extra person and the required support systems: instrumentation, seat, more heat load on the environmental control system, oxy­gen, anti-G, and, probably, a larger canopy as well. The extra weight, perhaps as much as 2,000 pounds all told, means less takeoff fuel available, which means less time on station and shorter radii for every mission. Since the support systems must be permanent installations, not expendable like fuel and ord­nance, the recovery weight is also higher. This, in turn, means a heavier aircraft on recovery, which requires more wind over the deck as well as less reserve fuel available for wave-offs, holds, and bingos. The larger canopy could well increase the radar cross-section of the aircraft and the extra systems to be supported will have some affect on maintainability . . . and a two-place aircraft will certainly cost more.

It will also be costly to continue to recruit, train, support, and berth aboard ship a bright, college-educated, highly trained RIO. Not only is this incredibly expensive, it might even be increas­ingly difficult as the prospect for long-term peace brightens and that part of the defense dollar allocated to naval aviation grows more dear. Building an aircraft without the need for an RIO would thus save that money and infrastructure.

Building such an aircraft would mean, of course, the eventual end of the RIO community. To abolish a community that has served with such honor and distinction and made so many contri­butions to the Navy and naval aviation should not be lightly taken. As a group the RIO community has had heroes and exem­plars of leadership, and many have served outstandingly well in critically important management, staff, and training assign­ments. At one time not too many years ago, when both the un­dergraduate pilot training rate and the pilot retention rate were abysmally low, naval aviation might have collapsed without the RIOs. It’s time to think about thanking the RIOs for a fine job, and help them transition to A-12s, E-2s, and S-3s.

American technology can give us the next-generation Navy fighter as a single-seater, superior in performance to anything in the sky at a cost the taxpayer can afford. The Navy should bite the bullet and press on.

Admiral Dunn commanded VA-146 during the Vietnam War, and later commanded the USS Saratoga (CV-60) and Naval Air Forces, Atlantic. He was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare (OP-05) when he retired in 1989.