Comment & Discussion

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Contents:

The Seawolf. Crash Dive!—14

‘Desert Shield’: The First Lessons Learned—14

The Reserve Is Ready and Waiting—18

The High Cost of Reaching the Beach—20

Aegis and the Third World—24

Editorial Board Chairman’s Address—24

The Admirable Servant, Occasionally Obsequious—24

Time to Change This ‘Rent-a-Ship’ Nation—24

Maneuver? Or Victory?—28

Search and Rescue: Everybody’s Problem—28

Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era—30

How to Solve the Naval Aviation Officer Retention Problem—30

Essential Parts of the Job Search—30

The Personal Business Plan—30

He Only Won Once—74

Dust Off That Active Sonar!—74

Hang Together, or Hang Separately—75

Feet Wet: Reflections of a Carrier Pilot—75

Blockade—23

Still Serving—24

In Appreciation—28

Poison Pen—28

Punching Out—30

Damnreservists!—31

“The Seawolf: Crash Dive!”

(See N. Polmar, pp. 133-134, October 1990

Proceedings)

Gerald A. Cann, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)—I take strong exception to Mr. Polmar’s comments questioning the status of the SSN-21. He failed to capture the nuances of both the status of the Seawolf (SSN-21) nuclear-powered at­tack submarine program and the congres­sional hearings related to it.

The Seawolf will provide the United States a submarine with the qualitative and quantitative edge needed to address our undersea needs well into the next century. It will be a technologically supe­rior submarine that will have greater tac­tical advantage and significantly more firepower than our excellent Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines. The SSN- 21 will also have a margin for potential growth, a capability that the SSN-688 no longer enjoys.

Progress on the SSN-21 has been ex­cellent. Key development programs re­lated to silencing, anechoic treatments, auxiliary equipment, propulsion systems, and propulsors have been tested at sea on operating submarines. The hull design, control configurations, and weapons stor­age and launch systems have undergone either full-scale tests, model tests, or simulations. The BSY-2 combat system is a modular development program in­volving exhaustive incremental testing, including the planned use of land-based testing. The overall Seawolf test program is unparalleled in scope, surpassing any other submarine program this country has undertaken. Clearly, the Seawolf design, development, construction, and test pro­gram will produce the finest state-of-the- art attack submarine in the world.

There were certain congressional con­cerns regarding the Seawolf. As noted in the article, the Navy provided testimony to subcommittees of the House Govern­ment Operations Committee and House Armed Services Committee. To say that the hearings “pointed to some disorgani­zation within the Navy’s submarine lead­ership,” or that there was a “devastating hearing” is, in my view, far from accu­rate.

In the case of the House Government Operations Legislation and National Se­

curity Subcommittee hearing concerning the Seawolf AN/BSY-2 combat system, the subcommittee raised a number of is­sues regarding perceived deficiencies in the BSY-2 software development pro­gram. During the hearing, there was frank discussion on both sides concerning concurrency, technical accountability, schedule, and risk. With regard to the House Seapower hearing, the subcom­mittee had questions concerning the Seawolf s performance goals, cost, and schedule. I believe it is fair to say that this particular hearing, which included witnesses from the Central Intelligence Agency, General Accounting Office, Department of Defense, and the Navy, provided the Congress the most complete information about the Seawolf program available at that time. With respect to the issue of the cost of the fiscal year 1991 SSN-21, the total cost I stated for one ship instead of two was correct. What I did not have at my fingertips was the amount of advanced procurement for the fiscal year 1992 ships in the fiscal year 1991 budget. The subcommittee clearly understood why we asked to insert the dollar amounts in the record. When all the facts were considered, Congress fully supported the SSN-21, approving follow- on ship construction in fiscal year 1991.

I hope that these comments set the rec­ord straight.

‘“Desert Shield’: The First Lessons Learned”

(See M. N. Pocalyko, pp. 58-59. October 1990 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Michael C. Braunbeck, U.S. Navy, Joint Opera- tions/Plans (Navy) Advisor, U.S. Mili­tary Training Mission to Saudi Arabia— We can learn, and relearn, some excep­tionally important lessons from Operation Desert Shield; a review of the facts be­hind the operation brings them out rather clearly.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the USS Independence (CV-62) carrier battle group (CVBG) was moved from the Indian Ocean to the North Ara­bian Sea. By the end of the month signifi­cant Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces were in place. And the total force buildup continues toward levels reminis­cent of the Vietnam War at its peak.

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As a result of the Independence CVBG’s location in the North Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman, the carrier’s deck- ready strike package faced considerable flight time to targets in the Saudi Eastern Province. Those aircraft would require in-transit refueling prior to and after striking assigned targets, and were still considerably limited in time on station. There would have been great competition for refueling support, to say the least. Further compounding their transit prob­lem, Navy aircraft employed a different in-flight refueling system (drogue and probe) than the Air Force (boom to box) tankers were configured with. The re­sponse time for the strike package from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN- 69) group was considerably longer be­cause they were farther from the antici­pated scene of action. Thus, the Central Command (Forward) Crisis Action Team considered carrier aircraft to be a second­ary interdiction and strike asset, backing up the Air Force aircraft, which were lo­cated much closer.

The U.S. joint ground forces com­mander remained rightly concerned about the level of support he had in the event the Iraqis should initiate an attack down the east coast. His Army ground forces were light in armor and artillery. The Marines’ arrival brought welcome relief. They and their Saudi counterparts took up defensive positions to delay and channel any Iraqi attack. Their fate was largely in the hands of U.S. Air Force and Royal Saudi Air Force pilots who would pro­vide the majority of interdiction and close air support. Navy carriers were unable to affect the immediate situation, but pro­vided valuable backup support for the ground effort. They had a far greater role in supporting the maritime blockade and covering friendly combatant ships in the Gulf region. Meanwhile, Air Force air­borne warning and control system aircraft were called on to provide extended cov­erage for ships operating in the Red Sea so that carrier-borne E-2s could focus on localized coverage of the battle group’s area of operations. These joint efforts were professionally executed.

The Marine Corps came into theater— by air—after the Army. Circumventing their historical reliance on the Navy, they got to the scene much quicker than they otherwise would have. The lesson learned was an old one: The Marines need more, faster—though not necessar­ily bigger (draft constraining, and too costly to place at risk)—“gray bottoms” to get them to any scene of action. The “black bottom” maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs) worked like a champ in this permissive environment. But MPS con­cept stands as an indictment of the Navy’s amphibious and cargo shipbuild­ing programs. And the Marines have been the victim, not the cause of the problem.

Recognizing some of those shortcom­ings, Congress wisely budgeted to fi­nance further aircraft development and flight testing of the V-22 Osprey, a pro­gram that the Navy, as the developing agency, convinced the Secretary of De­fense to cancel. Congress also voted to fund more sealift ships, such as the SL-7s used to transport Army equipment to Saudi Arabia, after the Navy had ad­dressed the matter inadequately. The pro­jected 1991 shipbuilding program in­cluded a fifth large Wasp (LHD-l)-class helicopter dock landing ship, one Wkid- bey Island (LSD-4 l)-class cargo variant dock landing ship, 12 landing craft air cushion vehicles, and two coastal mine- hunters. The facts speak loudly.

Ships of the Navy’s Ready Reserve Force experienced slow activation and mechanical problems, demonstrating that this program apparently had significant, previously unknown weaknesses. The Commander-in-Chief, Central Com­mand, complained vocally about inade­quate sealift support. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) chartered 36 commer­cial ships, as a result of activation prob­lems and a general lack of qualified crews to man the Ready Reserve ships. The MSC even contracted Soviet shipping to get U.S. military equipment to the scene. What would we have done if we had ever been called upon to fortify Europe?

I was fortunate in having the opportu­nity to augment the Central Command (Forward) staff until their regular staff arrived, and to see these lessons learned (and relearned). Unity of command, as exercised by the joint forces commander, and all of the other principles of war es­poused and explained by Karl von Clausewitz and J. F. C. Fuller remain valid. Interestingly, in Operation Desert Shield, this principle must be addressed from both the joint and combined aspect. The ability to ally the Soviet response has allowed us to balance properly the princi­ples of mass and economy of force. Secu­rity and surprise still work hand-in-hand. Offense remains the only way to achieve a decisive result. Maneuver is necessary to place the enemy in a position of rela­tive disadvantage. Simplicity is desired to allow all involved to contribute to the main effort with little or no guidance. And, finally, the objective guides all; it is the reason for everything else. We have been able to consider the principles to­gether, and produce sound campaign strategy.

As the dust settles, the one lesson that is all too often missed is that the Navy is a part of a larger joint military team. The Navy may be better able to address some situations than others, but obviously not all. In the Operation Desert Shield cam­paign permanent control of land is the main issue; the Army has correctly taken the lead, closely supported by the Air Force, and subsequently by the Marine Corps. The Navy is in a slightly more distant supporting role. Like it or not, that’s how it is.

The logical concern for the Navy and Marine Corps in supporting Operation Desert Shield should be to continue re­viewing their force structure and deciding on what they can best do to contribute to the overall mission. We need to review whether the Marines should remain ashore, and how to lessen the strain that doing so places on their logistics tail. We need to consider how to insert amphibi­ous forces rapidly into hostile territory, overcoming significant antiship missile and mine threats, as well as some uncon­ventional threats such as harbors and beaches covered with burning oil, and prerigged exploding ships strategically anchored in the path of approaching land­ing forces. We need to review our chemi­cal and biological warfare capabilities honestly. We also need to consider how to fight effectively in a truly international community that extends beyond any of our earlier treaty organizations. We need to review the precepts of maneuver war­fare concerning how, where, and when we are going to fight. Much of this is al­ready being addressed at the local level.

Many sailors and Marines involved in Operation Desert Shield provide a great deal of information; we can learn many valid and valuable lessons from those at the scene. The Navy and Marine Corps have accomplished some exceptional feats during the operation, and they should make them known. It is up to us to lay down the sword, after the dust settles, and pick up the pen in order to record and analyze this experience for those who will follow.

“The Reserve Is Ready and Waiting”

(See W. N. Guthrie, H. Baumgardner, and M. Chaloupka, pp. 46-51, September 1990 Proceedings)

Captain S. L. Shippee, U.S. Marine Corps—I would like to comment upon the authors’ statement about the War Powers Resolution. They state: “During the Vietnam experience, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in an effort to limit the President’s authority to use armed force short of declared war or na­tional emergency.”

From my limited view here on station in the Persian Gulf, it appears that the War Powers Resolution merely restricts the executive’s authority to involve the United States in foreign controversies without congressional approval. Specific provisions of the Resolution do ensure that the President has the authority to send the military into combat without requesting authorization from Congress if the United States or one of its territories is attacked.

While I wholeheartedly support our Commander-in-Chief, perhaps said War Powers Resolution was an egalitarian at­tempt to promote a system of checks and balances, thereby further increasing the opportunity for the executive to act, whenever possible, in concert with the both Flouses. I respectfully submit that this is to everyone’s benefit.

“The High Cost of Reaching the

Beach”

(See J. T. Hoffman, pp. 66-71, November 1990

Proceedings)

Colonel Ky L. Thompson, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Captain Hoffman’s article is a welcome addition to the debate over ship-to-shore concepts in the 21st century and the attempt to define a re­placement for the current amphibious assault vehicle (AAV-7).

Relatively little has been written about this issue, despite its impact on both Ma­rine Corps and Navy force structure. Most of what has been written has been a dogmatic defense of a high-water-speed AAV. The Marine Corps will not be well- served by this lack of debate. Worse still, objectivity has been lost as studies and analyses are skewed to include a require­ment for a surface assault, in an attempt to create a need for an armored amphib­ian vehicle.

In view of today’s policies and pro­grams, it is ironic that the Marine Corps, as early as 1946, sought an alternative to the surface assault. In that year the Com­mandant, General A. A. Vandegrift, con­vened a board to consider the major steps that the Marine Corps should take to wage successful amphibious warfare in the atomic age. The board members con­cluded that a new mode of assault was needed and that the helicopter offered a solution. The helicopter, with a relatively unlimited choice of landing areas, would permit troops to be landed in combat for­mation on the flanks or rear of a hostile position. Additionally, the helicopter’s speed made transport dispersion at sea a matter of no disadvantage and introduced a time-space factor that would avoid the presentation, at any one time, of a remu­nerative atomic target. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Com­mandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) concurred in the board’s recommenda­tions and the process for procurement of appropriate helicopters was begun.

In April 1954 then-CMC General L. C. Shepherd, Jr., approved the basic pro­posals for development of the techniques and procedures to be employed in an all­helicopter assault. On 8 December 1955, the CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke, agreed “that plans must be laid for a gradual transition from World War II concepts of landing entirely over the beaches to the ultimate goal of landing all the assault elements from VTOL [vertical takeoff and landing]-type transport aircraft.” Nine days later, on 13 December, the Marine Corps published, in Landing Force Bulletin Number 17, its concept of future amphibious operations. The last paragraph of the bulletin summarized as follows:

“This concept has as its ultimate goal an all-helicopter assault which will endow the amphibious attack with maximum impact and maxi­mum freedom of action. We have already progressed to a point at which our doctrine embraces a powerful two-pronged attack, one prong a ver­tical envelopment by helicopter, the other a surface assault across the beach by conventional means with the latter constituting the main effort. In the future, while improving our still- essential beach-assault ability, we must adopt our organization and equipment, and our tactics, tech­niques, and training, so as to plan major stress on the helicopter assault. Later, as new amphibious ships join the fleet, and as helicopters with greater load capacity become avail­able in quantity, the beach assault can be reduced still further. Eventually, when the concept is fully realized, the beach assault can be eliminated altogether, leaving only follow-up troops and supplies, exploitation forces, and base-development units and material to be landed over beaches or through ports in the beachhead area.” (Bold added.)

The amphibious doctrine contained in Landing Force Bulletin Number 17 was refined the following year when a board under the direction of Major General R. E. Hogaboom concluded:

“There appears to be a considerable

body of opinion in the Marine Corps today which holds that in the foresee­able future all movement from ship- to-shore will be by helicopter. Thus, the “all helicopter assault” concept has somehow become the “all heli­copter concept.” This idea the board believes to be invalid and should be corrected immediately. It leads among other things to requirements being stated specifying helicopter transport­ability for all the arms and equipment of the Fleet Marine Force.”

“The board believes that this line of thinking has perhaps obscured the continuing importance of crossing the beach operations in our modern con­cept. . . . This is not in our opinion inconsistent with the “all helicopter assault” concept, or with the require­ment for the projection of seapower ashore without the necessity of direct assault on the shoreline. Reduced to its simplest terms, the board visual­izes an operation wherein the flexibil­ity of the helicopter-borne assault forces would be exploited to uncover and secure the beaches and to seize critical areas which will be required to enable us to phase in the additional means to maintain the momentum of the assault and secure the objective area.”

Retired Marine Colonels Bruce Brown and Don Wegley brought much of the above information to my attention in the 1970s. In a paper entitled “Genesis Of The All V/STOL Initial Assault,” written in 1979, they expressed their own frustra­tions with the incubus of surface assault:

“It appears that subsequent [to the Hogaboom Board] concepts have thus been driven more and more by heli­copter lift constraints which prevented the landing of armored high-mobility vehicles and heavy firepower. This emphasis on equipment constraints, rather than a clear evolutionary thrust based on earlier doctrine/concepts, has now evolved to the point where the surface landing originally viewed for support of an assault by helicopter has again become a surface assault requirement.”

“Notwithstanding the 1955 enuncia­tion of a realistic amphibious doctrine and an increased enemy threat, which further validates the doctrine, the Marine Corps has continued to be driven by a perceived need to land assault troops by a waterborne vehicle and to secure a beach-port early in the

amphibious assault. This, in turn, has engendered a prolonged and expen­sive preoccupation with surface as­sault vehicles which incur extreme design and cost penalties from the perceived requirement to negotiate 8 feet of surf and, once ashore, of [sic] grossly inferior substitutes for combat fighting vehicles currently in the in­ventory of various foreign forces.”

Colonels Brown and Wegley began their paper with the quote, “Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.” (The more things change, the more they re­main the same.) How right they were!

Welcome to the ranks of the iconoclasts, Captain Hoffman—you’re in good company!

“Blockade”

(See E. W. Carter III, pp. 42-47, November 1990, T. A. Varallo, pp. 19-20, December 1990 Proceedings)

Kurt R. Nelson—The crux of Admiral Carter’s argument as to the applicability of blockade to the current Gulf crisis is summed up in two sentences in the arti­cle: “The nation that holds or ultimately gains mastery of the sea is almost certain to achieve its blockade objectives if it also has patience. Facing such power, the nation being blockaded must either at­tempt to enter a battle for which it is ill- suited or try to live with the consequence of blockade: Do without.”

Accepting the premise that blockade can force one of these two outcomes is precisely the argument against using the blockade as a weapon of first choice in our dealings with Iraq; it becomes a roll of the dice with an uncertain outcome, especially with unstable, nontraditional forms of governments, such as exists in Iraq. Our present strategy has created an all-or-nothing option. Either Iraq will pull out of Kuwait or it will be forced to act. If Iraq acts, we will have many tar­gets for mass-destruction weaponry, re­sulting in much higher casualty numbers both in terms of people (civilian and mili­tary) as well as economic targets. Iraq’s technological inferiority becomes less significant in their surprise fist strike of overwhelming force; our technological advantage is greatest when we make pru­dent use of it to remove the numerical superiority of Iraq’s weaponry, through first strike.

Our present policy appears to be flawed. We must either plan (either jointly or alone) to remove the aggressor from his gains and possibly from his gov­ernment, or we must simply deter further

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aggression, ceding the ill-gotten gains already achieved. Perhaps economic sanctions can be used as a punishment. However, the present policy lacks clear objectives—resulting, once again, in an uncertain mission for our armed forces. We have created a no-win situation for our military.

The nature of blockade creates an atmosphere in which our opponent will be forced either to surrender its gains or to lash out, unpredictably. We have merely created targets of opportunity for this aggression, without clear thought to our ultimate objectives or long-term com­mitments. If our objective is to deter fur­ther aggression, let’s arm and prepare Saudi Arabia and its nearby allies for such a role, perhaps leaving a small trip­wire military presence. If it is to free Kuwait, let us act on the international statement from the United Nations and forge ahead. If it is to remove the present government of Iraq, let us execute that plan. But whatever we decide to do, let us do so with clarity of thought and with the best chance of success, not merely using our armed forces as bait. Blockade is not the weapon of first choice in a con­flict of this nature. We must stop reacting and take the initiative.

Iraq has committed an act of war. We must either treat it as war or retire. Blockade merely provokes further actions without meaningful hope of success.

“Aegis and the Third World”

(See USS Amietam (CG-54) Wardroom, pp. 60­64, September 1990; K. R. Bishop, p. 26,

November 1990 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral W. E. Meyer, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Your special Warfighting sec­tion was great! As General A1 Gray says in his Force Marine Fleet manual on “Warfighting”: “There are two basic military functions: waging war and pre­paring for war.” The wardroom officers of the USS Antietam (CG-54) showed they have been involved in a lot of mental preparation for war—including wars of all sizes, and in a variety of world situa­tions.

While making an excellent case for the effectiveness of Aegis cruisers and de­stroyers in conflicts short of all-out war with a super power, they omitted the point that flexibility is only possible in one direction; you must design the war­ship to the highest realistic threat she will face. Doctrine and tactics can always be adjusted to lesser threats, but attempting to scale up less capable or incapable ships to fight against an overwhelming threat won't work.

Even though the Soviets have made an abrupt change in their stated intentions in the past year, their arsenal still contains a vast array of weapons specifically de­signed to take out our carrier battle groups. The only thing that has changed is the present administration’s will to use them.

The sailor must prepare for war by working to understand the full capability of his equipment and how best to exploit it in all circumstances. Today’s combat systems have thousands of lines of digital code, many of which have a bearing on the doctrine and tactics that could be employed. The individual must under­stand all the implications of his pre­engagement decisions in setting up the system, and practice and train accord­ingly and unceasingly.

Editor’s Note: Admiral Meyer shep­herded the Aegis program from its early stages through design and into the fleet. He is known to many as the “Father of Aegis.’’

“Editorial Board Chairman’s Address”

(See H. B. Thorsen, p. 12, June 1990; W. H. Parks, pp. 64-65, July 1990; B. Linder, pp. 16-17, August 1990; R. J. Barrett and R. P. Hansen, pp. 23-25, September 1990;

W. Brooks and C. D. Conner, pp. 24-28, October 1990; S. J. Tangredi, pp. 23-24, November 1990; M. A. Kirtland, pp. 28-29, v December 1990 Proceedings)

“Still Serving”

(See R. F. Dunn, p. 46, June 1990; W. H. Parks, pp. 64-65, July 1990; B. Linder, pp. 16-17, August 1990; R. J. Barrett and R. P. Hansen, pp. 23-25, September 1990;

W. Brooks and C. D. Conner, pp. 24-28, October 1990; S. J. Tangredi, pp. 23-24, November 1990; M. A. Kirtland, pp. 28-29, December 1990 Proceedings)

“The Admirable Servant, Occasionally Obsequious”

(See G. V. Stewart, pp. 46-50, June 1990;

W. H. Parks, pp. 64-65, July 1990; B. Linder, pp. 16-17, August 1990; R. J. Barrett and R. P. Hansen, pp. 23-25, September 1990;

W. Brooks and C. D. Conner, pp. 24-28, October 1990; S. J. Tangredi, pp. 23-24, November 1990; M. A. Kirtland, pp. 28-29, December 1990 Proceedings)

Roger Marshall, President Roger Mar­shall Inc., Naval Architects—As a civil­ian taxpayer who has written for many magazines worldwide I have been fol­lowing the debate on censorship and se­curity review of articles submitted to Proceedings. In my opinion, the security review procedures should be made as painless as possible; the military stands to obtain great benefits by allowing officers to submit articles on current events to professional journals.

Civilians get most of their information regarding the military from newspapers and these same professional journals. But, a newspaper writer, consciously or not, can inject bias into an article that may harm the military greatly. Imagine, if you will, trusting a third party to write your resume and send it out without giv­ing you an opportunity to review it. A well-written article by a participant can set the record straight and get the thought processes of those involved across, even if it goes against current naval doctrine and public opinion.

Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover under­stood that the general public want to know more about the people who are pro­tecting them. The Admiral was a con- sumate expert in getting his opinion across, hence the tremendous public con­fidence today in nuclear submarines, even though the commercial nuclear in­dustry has fallen upon hard times. Unfor­tunately, too few professional officers have the time or ability to put their thoughts in writing and too many worry about peer pressure before making their comments known.

Colonel Parks’s comments regarding naval officers who “believed the general public has no right to know some of the details contained in the article” reflect badly on these naval officers. One won­ders if these decision makers have the same attitude toward items that affect the public health and confidence, such as nuclear waste disposal. Lack of informa­tion breeds mistrust that could lead to a loss of confidence in the military. Secu­rity review people should do everything in their power to ensure that the general public and other professionals are kept abreast of current events in a most timely manner.

Time to Change This “Rent-a- Ship” Nation

Lieutenant Frank Pascual, U.S. Naval Reserve—The problem with the U.S. maritime industry is a lot like the weather. Everybody talks about it, com­plains about it, is frustrated by it ... , but nobody ever does anything about it. In an effort to change this, the Greater New York Chapter of the Surface Navy Association and the U.S. Naval Institute cosponsored a “Sea Lines of Communi­cation” seminar at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, on 5 Oc­tober 1990, as a call to action for the in­dustry, especially after demands of Oper­ation Desert Shield have demonstrated

serious U.S. sealift shortcomings.

In the keynote address, Vice Admiral Paul D. Butcher, U.S. Navy, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transporta­tion Command, detailed how we have moved more material and supplies since August 1990 than in any similar period in history. On the other hand, he empha­sized, 75% of the ships used in the opera­tion were leased from friendly govern­ments because of a shortage in U.S. flag vessels. Luckily, we had the SL-7 fast sealift ships, the Ready Reserve Force, and, in Diego Garcia, a Maritime Prepo­sitioning Force that successfully deliv­ered enough fast reaction support for two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).

If hostilities had been in progress, many of the leased foreign flag vessels probably would not have been available. In this case, we had the overwhelming support of the world community. And since we had not exchanged fire, we also did not have to account for attrition of merchant vessels, a likely product of open hostilities. We were lucky.

Among the major liabilities under which the U.S. shipbuilding industry operates is competition from subsidized foreign industries. To stay competitive, government and industry need to work together to level the playing field for U.S.-flag ships and U.S. shipbuilders.

While some programs, such as the SL-7 ships and the Maritime Preposition­ing Force address some of the issues, no coherent U.S. Maritime Policy is cur­rently in place. We have slipped from a world leader to the level of nations such as Singapore and the Bahamas. In 1950, for example, U.S. flag carriers hauled 50% of all U.S. imports/exports. Forty years later, we carry a meager 4%. This downturn has made us a “rent-a-ship” nation, which must depend on the sealift capabilities of other countries to move our people and equipment in support of our national policies.

This situation begs the question of whether or not we will permit ourselves to let our sealift capability dry up com­pletely. If so, are we willing to suffer the inability to transport and supply our forces when we have to move unilater­ally? Are we ready to pay what would amount to ransom to have other nations decide what they will charge us to carry our exports as well as our imports of oil and other strategic materials? It makes little sense to build and maintain strong forces if we cannot properly deploy and support them. For example, heavy equip­ment for the 101st Air Assault and 82nd Airborne divisions took 20 days to de­ploy. Had Saddam Hussein attacked immediately, these forces might have

been overrun.

Problems in the U.S. maritime indus­try are indeed formidable, and they have gone largely unresolved for the last 20 years. In calling the industry and govern­ment to action, all sides agree on the ur­gent need for a fairer, more competitive world market. We need legislative relief. Among proposed solutions are U.S. gov­ernment subsidies, rebate of the import tax for cargoes carried on U.S.-flag ves­sels, and a requirement that critical stra­tegic materials be carried only in U.S. ships. In addition, the Ready Reserve

Fleet could be chartered for commercial use to compete with foreign ships.

On their own, few of these programs can expect to be initiated without the strong support and partnership of ship­builders, shipowners, labor, and the administration. According to Federal Maritime Commissioner James J. Carey, the industry needs to “show a positive budget impact” in these tight economic times. If the use of foreign flag vessels costs $9 billion annually in foreign trade debt, then we must reverse this situation in a way that makes economic sense. To

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do this, we need to involve the public and the media, as well as government and industry. The time for complaining about the problems of the U.S. maritime indus­try has run out. It is now time to act. If we fail to act now, we do so at great na­tional peril.

“Maneuver? Or Victory?”

(See S. Coughlin, pp. 70-71, September 1990;

J. P. Stossel and M. Oleksiak, pp. 14-18,

November 1990; B. I. Gudmundsson, p. 22,

December 1990 Proceedings)

William S. Lind, author of Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Westview Press, 1985)—Lieutenant Coughlin makes sev­eral good points, including that doctrine is not a substitute for a well-educated of­ficer corps, and that all theory is subject to friction and uncertainty in war. Ma­neuver warfare theory emphasizes both points.

However, in posing the question “ma­neuver or victory?” Lieutenant Coughlin ignores both a great deal of history and reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of maneuver warfare. Many military vic­tories have been won by maneuver. Ma­neuver theory does not simply call for moving about. One of its central concepts is Schwerpunkt, or focus of efforts. The Schwerpunkt represents the commander’s attempt to achieve a victory. Maneuver theory demands that the commander take great risks if necessary to concentrate his power in his Schwerpunkt. German usage of Schwerpunkt agrees with Lieutenant Coughlin's emphasis on moral force.

Lieutenant Coughlin states that Opera­tion Barbarossa “maximized combat power quickly at a single point” and sug­gests it represents the German Army’s “strategic expertise.” “Operation Bar­barossa worked brilliantly,” he writes. In fact. Operation Barbarossa was strategi­cally fatally flawed from the outset, pre­cisely because it attacked Schwerpunkt. German forces were divided into three separate army groups with divergent, unrelated objectives. The German Army, following maneuver warfare, wanted to focus on the destruction of the Red Army, but was overruled by Hitler and German High Command. Barbarossa represents not German strategic exper­tise, but rather the weakness of Germany at the strategic level.

Unfortunately, few Marines seem to understand the meaning of Schwerpunkt. If that failure persists, the Marine Corps could fall into the error of maneuvering for the sake of maneuver instead of ma­neuvering to win.

Joseph     Forbes—Maneuver       warfare should not be automatically confused with maneuver. Many critics look at the term “maneuver warfare” and see only the first word. This leads to confusion, just as looking at the term “crab apple” and seeing only the first word, would lead to misunderstandings.

The second word of the term “maneu­ver warfare” should not be overlooked. Maneuver warfare is not simply move­ment, it is a type of warfare, a style of fighting.

When Lieutenant Coughlin claims that “the champions of maneuver warfare seem fascinated with “lost causes,” he forgets the Israeli Army’s use of maneu­ver warfare.

Lieutenant Coughlin is also in error in claiming that according to Karl von Clausewitz, “War must be waged to­tally.” What Clausewitz actually be­lieved is that political objectives should shape wars and determine the intensity of commitment. To Clausewitz, total war was a theoretical abstraction. Of course, wars may require various levels of com­mitment according to their nature. Coughlin is way off base when he as­sumes that maneuver warfare is somehow incompatible with an intense commit­ment to fighting a war.

“In Appreciation”

(See Secretary’s Notes, p. 11, August 1990

Proceedings)

'Chief Petty Officer Raymond B. Bowman (Retired)—When I saw the note of appre­ciation and photographs of the late Admi­ral Robert Bostwick Carney in the Pro­ceedings, the following incident came to mind:

When Admiral Carney was Com­mander Second Fleet, I was a rated Quar­termaster on board the small carrier USS Palau (CVE-122). Admiral Carney had been flown on board for a visit while we were operating off the Virginia Capes.

When the time came for this departure, he was standing in an area aft of the navi­gation bridge conferring with the ship’s captain and air officer. We had increased speed for flight operations, and the cap­tain and air officer were voicing their concern about not having enough wind across the deck for a safe launch.

“That’s okay,” said Admiral Carney, “If anything happens to me everybody below me moves up one.”

“Poison Pen”

(See R. P. Khanna, p. 38, November 1990 Proceedings)

Commander George E. Erickson, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve—Captain Khanna’s anecdote regarding fitness reports struck a chord. Years ago, the U.S. Naval Academy required midshipmen to write the equivalent of fitness reports on mem­bers of their company, including their own classmates.

The most telling report I ever saw was written by a member of the class of 1958 (just senior to me) on one of his class­mates. I can’t quote it verbatim, but what follows is close:

“After graduation, the latitude and longitude of this man should be regu­larly published in the Notice to Mari­ners. He is a hazard to navigation.”

Who could improve on that?

“Search and Rescue:

Everybody’s Problem”

(See J. W. Mullarky, pp. 40-44, October 1990;

T. D. Walters and A. L. Gerfin, p. 14,

December 1990 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Charles D. Lowery, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Having just completed a background paper on strike rescue for Commander Submarine Development Squadron Twelve, I read Commander Mullarky’s article with great interest. I think he would be reassured by the emphasis placed on strike rescue by Commander Carrier Group Four and Commander Submarine Development Squadron Twelve during exercises con­ducted in June and October 1990. Strike rescue is very challenging and requires solid tactics and advanced training to be successful. The E-2/nuclear-powered at­tack submarine/special warfare triad offer significant potential for a very credible capability.

Strike rescue has to take advantage of new technology. The submarine force is actively involved in integrating both new tactics and the latest hardware into this triad. Although our present emphasis rep­resents a renewed effort, the submarine has long assisted in recovering downed personnel in hostile environments. In­deed, a submarine rescued an aviator named George Bush. It also completed 503 other rescues and compiled more than 3,000 days on lifeguard station to­ward the end of World War II. As late as 1972 two SSNs—USS Barb (SSN-596) and USS Gurnard (SSN-662)—

successfully accomplished a search and rescue of a downed B-52G crew in a “hostile environment”—Typhoon Rita. Commander Mullarky correctly point out that “in wartime no one can get enough combat search and rescue.” Our aim is to give the Commander in Chief another option.

“Arms Control During the Pre­Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars”

(See W. H. Parks, p. 123, October 1990 Proceedings)

Yoya Kawamura, U.S. Naval Institute Silver Member—It is absolutely wrong to say that Japan built the battleship Yamato “in violation of agreements.” Japan offi­cially withdrew from the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 on 29 December 1934. Subsequently, the Washington Treaty, together with the London Treaty of 1930, expired on 31 December 1936. Both the Yamato and her sister ship Musashi were laid down in 1937.

“How to Solve the Naval Aviation Officer Retention Problem”

{See W. P. Lawrence, pp. 82-83, February 1990; K. W. Hitchner, p. 84, August 1990;

D. A. Hathaway and J. J. Destafney, pp. 20­23, November 1990; L. Armistead, pp.24-25, December 1990 Proceedings)

Captain Matthew C. Jacobsen, U.S. Air Force, Instructor Pilot, U.S. Air Force Academy—I have followed with interest the debate over pilot retention, the bonus program, and other proposed solutions to the problem. As a U.S. Naval Academy graduate and an active-duty U.S. Air Force pilot, I have a different perspective than has been offered thus far on this problem. I believe it is necessary to look for reasons why the bonus program did not work to find solutions that will not include the same pitfalls.

The terms of the bonus, in fact, act as a deterrent to most pilots. As the program is administered in the Air Force, the indi­vidual who signs up for the bonus faces a $12,000-per-year pay cut at the 14-year point when the bonus runs out. Most pi­lots at this point have heavy financial commitments (e.g., mortgages, high school or college-age children). Even worse, the Air Force captain who accepts the bonus has just received the largest per-year income of his active military career. How does the military expect to retain the right people under these condi­tions?

The current situation makes it possible for a 7-year captain to make more money than a 16-year lieutenant colonel. In fact, every squadron commander makes less money than his captains who took the bonus.' Such a system in the civilian world would lead the managers to either quit or put out less effort. A company would not want to attract and retain the type of person who would accept this sit­uation, and neither should the military. I agree with Commanders Hathaway and Destafney that it is incredibly short­sighted to cut the pay of officers who elect to accept more responsibility.

Other circumstances are working against retaining officer pilots. Since pro­motion opportunity to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel is decreasing, junior officers can now expect that if they stay in pay increases will slow with time and they will have less chance of getting pro­moted. These changing conditions in of­ficers’ career patterns suggest that the Air Force and Navy may actually be encour­aging their most talented officers to leave active service.

The most glaring difference between an Air Force or Navy flying career and an airline career is compensation. The bonus does little to correct the problem, and— because it contains a built-in pay cut at the 14-year point—may even encourage pilots to leave the service. To correct this, flight pay should be added to base pay as follows: flight pay = 1/2 base pay (for an entire career).

Most reward models predict that an individual will choose to work—and work harder—for an organization where the likelihood of achieving valued out­comes are greatest. The military should adopt a predictable reward system that promises valued and reasonable out­comes. Linking flight pay to base pay would make military service more attrac­tive in the long term. It would also re- ‘ward officers who are willing to take leadership positions.

The current assumption is that the Air Force only needs to pay a pilot (as op­posed to an officer) who is not captured by the lure of retirement at the 20-year point. This assumption has proved faulty because 40% of those pilots who had reached nine years of service in 1989 elected to leave the Air Force. On the other hand, encouraging pilot officers to stay in the Air Force by ensuring that their income would increase as their re­sponsibilities (both professional and pri­vate) increased would work. This pay structure would also ensure that we re­ward daily those who are willing to take the hard jobs in the future. We should recognize that we are not just trying to keep our pilots in uniform; we are trying to keep our future leaders in uniform. To keep the right people, we must recognize that compensation must increase with responsibility.

The Air Force and Navy have to find a way to make a military career more at­tractive to pilot officers. Some will say that there are intrinsic problems with an Air Force or a Navy career, and—no matter what—pilots will leave the service to fly for the airlines. A good percentage of pilots who do resign from the service continue to fly for the National Guard or Air Force/Naval/Marine Corps Reserve. This shows that the job of military flying is still attractive. The Air Force and Navy must capture those things that are attrac­tive, and discard those things that encour­age pilots to leave. Further, we must con­sider the long-term responsibilities we expect our officers to take on—and re­ward them accordingly.

“Punching Out”

{See F. G. Mastin, pp. 39-45, June 1990; G. R. Baumann, p. 23, September 1990; K. Jordan, p. 22, October 1990; W. H. Cook, p. 93, November 1990 Proceedings)

“Essential Parts of the Job Search”

{See K. C. Jacobsen, pp. 40-41, June 1990; G. R. Baumann, p. 23, September 1990; K. Jordan, p. 22, October 1990; W. H. Cook, p. 93, November 1990 Proceedings)

“The Personal Business Plan”

(See A. R. Buist, pp. 44-45, June 1990; G. R. Baumann, p. 23, September 1990; K. Jordan, p. 22, October 1990; W. H. Cook, p. 93, November 1990 Proceedings)

Joseph P. Schulte, Jr., Special Agent in Charge, Anchorage (AK) Division, Fed­eral Bureau of Investigation—Planning for your retirement—and in most cases obtaining a new position in the private sector—requires planning and research. This should start no less than two years from the time that one will be retiring.

To put this time frame into perspective, we can look back to when our children were in high school and involved in se­lecting a college. In most cases, they started in their junior years. Those who started earlier ended up in the types of colleges they wanted; those who started late went through a lot of anxiety and uncertainty, and had to be lucky to get the schools they wanted.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation recognized the importance of this and several years ago began a series of one- week retirement seminars for those who are within one year of retirement. These seminars have been universally ap­plauded by those who have attended.

Help from professionals who are expe­rienced in career transition can take the sting out of retirement and lead to suc­cessful decisions. We all have different needs, desires, and capabilities—and the benefit gained from sharing our concerns and experiences at these retirement semi­nars is substantial.

“Damnreservists! ”

(See S. L. Blanton, pp. 83-86, October 1990;

S. Groteboer, pp. 27-30, December 1990

Proceedings)

Quartermaster Third Class Christopher P. Briem, U.S. Naval Reserve (enlisted in the Naval Reserve SAM program in 1985; employed by the Congressional Budget Office as a assistant defense analyst)— Naval Reservists are quick to complain about the disrespectful attitude of their active-duty counterparts toward the re­serve community. Reservists see the fail­ure of the full-time community to accept its part-time brethren as the most promi-- nent cause of failure of the “one Navy” concept. Before the reserve community blames anyone, however, it must first look inward to build the pride and profes­sionalism that are needed to earn the re­spect of the active Navy.

Naval Reservists have failed to give their own junior enlisted the respect that they demand from the active Navy. The Naval Reserve is a caste system which deeply divides its members into two cate­gories: the prior-service sailors who enter the Naval Reserve after serving on active duty and the non-prior service sailors who have enlisted under the Naval Re­serve’s Sea Air Mariner (SAM) program.

The program for taking in non-prior ser­vice is still relatively new to the Naval Reserve and represents a smaller percent­age of Naval Reserve manpower than found in other reserve components. Un­fortunately, the SAM program has been treated as the “black sheep” within the Naval Reserve for mostly unfounded rea­sons. The argument is made that the aver­age SAM reservist is unable to contribute to the active or reserve community be­cause of his or her lack of active-duty experience and less-than-satisfactory atti­tude. It is quite true that as a non-prior service enlistee, the SAM sailor will lack the hands-on experience of his prior- service peers. Other reserve components have succeeded in taking in such non­prior-service enlistees and making them into productive servicemen. The failure in the Naval Reserve to achieve similar results rests not with the individual SAMs, but with the Naval Reserve’s training program.

There are problems with the quality and intensity of the reserve training pro­gram. The problem for SAMs, however, is not the lack of facilities, but the unwill­ingness of the senior enlisted and officers to accept the SAM community as a part of the Naval Reserve community. Be­cause of this, they are not willing to put out the effort to make SAM training ef­fective. Without the cooperation of the most experienced petty officers it is im­possible to make quality sailors out of anyone. SAMs have been derided by their reserve peers to the point where they are no longer willing to put effort into their naval careers. Who is willing to dedicate oneself to an organization that consistently denigrates his or her ability?

For the Total Navy concept to succeed within the Naval Reserve it is fundamen­tal that the SAM community receive the respect it deserves. There is a large pool of energy and dedication among the Naval Reserve’s most junior members. The SAM community represents some of the best-educated junior enlisted in the entire Navy. Coupling the civilian educa­tion of SAMs with quality naval training will increase the readiness of the entire Naval Reserve.

As the long-term drawdown in active forces begins, the need for a strong Naval Reserve becomes more important. With a smaller active-duty base for the Reserve to draw upon, the relative importance of non-prior-service sailors will grow. A revitalization of the SAM program is es­sential. This revitalization can only begin once the Naval Reserve accepts the SAM community as one of its own. Only when there is “one Reserve” can the “One Navy” concept succeed.

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