Since 1962, when it emerged as the follow-on to the P-2V Neptune, the P-3 Orion aircraft has been the venerable long- fange airborne antisubmarine warfare workhorse of the fleet. As the Soviet Union introduced quiet, more technically advanced nuclear-powered and diesel submarines, the P-3 went through a number of acoustic package enhancements to ensure that the Navy’s capability was more than equal to the threat. With the advent of the Update III, and its associated single advanced signal processor acoustic gear, and plans for the Update IV package, the P-3 faced the new Soviet “quiet targets” with the ability to locate, track, and if necessary, destroy these platforms anywhere in the world. Operation Desert Storm showed the P-3 to be even more useful and versatile.
As a true multimission aircraft, the P-3 is constantly in high demand to perform a host of missions, including search and rescue, reconnaissance, communications relay, and intelligence gathering. For many years, maritime patrol aviation has also played a major role in providing antisurface warfare (ASUW) support to the carrier battle group. Prior to the Harpoon missile modification, the P-3’s ASUW weapons capability was limited to Bullpup and forward-firing aircraft rockets, which were used during the Vietnam War. Following that era, P-3 aircrews began training more as the distant eyes of the battle group or as remote targeting platforms that could identify hostile surface units and then vector strike aircraft to the target. In the mid 1970s, when the Harpoon entered the P-3 weapon inventory, the aircraft developed the capability not only to identify surface targets, but to destroy them while remaining outside the threat envelope.
In recent years, maritime patrol aviation maintained a presence in the Indian Ocean with a deployed squadron or detachment in Diego Garcia conducting littoral site visits to Masirah, Oman, Bahrain, Djibouti, and Seeb. As an ASUW platform in the Persian Gulf theater, the P-3 was immediately in high demand after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Because of the politically sensitive staging locations and a general lack of access by news media, patrol aircraft participation in both operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm received little publicity during the seven-month operation. Total commitments included more than 7,500 hours of flight operations supporting various battle groups. Patrol Squadron One, deployed to Cubi Point, Republic of the Philippines, and a detachment in Diego Garcia, was the first to respond (8 aircraft, 11 aircrews, and 200 support personnel), immediately redeploying the entire squadron to Diego Garcia as the primary logistics staging area. Additional forces from Patrol Squadron Nineteen deployed to Misawa, Japan. Patrol Squadron Two and other active and reserve squadrons were used to augment Patrol Squadron One as they stood up detachment sites in both Masirah, Oman, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Patrol Squadron Eight detached from Brunswick, Maine, to assume the Jeddah responsibilities. As the buildup of patrol aircraft forces progressed, Patrol Squadron Four relieved Patrol Squadron One in Diego Garcia and Patrol Squadron Eight relieved Patrol Squadron Twenty-Three in Jeddah.
As in the maritime patrols of Vietnam, surveillance flights in support of Desert Shield, also known as maritime interdiction force operations, and in the North Arabian Gulf in support of Desert Storm were the primary missions of the P-3s. The distinct advantage brought to maritime interdiction and the North Arabian Gulf by maritime patrol was the highly accurate standoff surveillance capability of the inverse synthetic aperture radar, complemented by its standoff weapons capability (Harpoon). Although the weapons were not employed by P-3s, the ability to identify surface contacts at an extended range and to provide accurate targeting to strike aircraft proved to be major contributing factors to the attrition of the Iraqi inventory of naval combatants and supporting units.
Within hours of the initiation of Operation Desert Shield, patrol aircraft commenced surveillance support of interdiction efforts on all sides of the Arabian Peninsula from detachments on the Red and the North Arabian seas. These detachments provided four to five missions per day that queried all merchant ships plying routes to Iraqi or Jordanian ports as well as activity in the vicinity of the Gulf of Oman. This surveillance effort effectively blanketed all traffic in the region with unlimited support to boarding operations by providing initial location and query, tracking, and communications relay. The mobility and long range of the P-3s were complemented by U.S. Navy and allied helicopter missions, British Nimrods, and U.S. Navy S-3 Vikings. The P-3 was the workhorse, logging in excess of 4,400 flight hours and querying more than 6,500 vessels during Operation Desert Shield.
The Outlaw Hunter aircraft was a key platform in interdiction operations. Assigned to Patrol Squadron Nineteen, this prototype modification of the P-3 had been deployed to the Seventh Fleet theater prior to the Iraqi invasion and was immediately detached to support Desert Shield. The Outlaw Hunter suite consists of an officer in tactical command information exchange system (OTCIXS), tactical data processor with a Global Positioning System interfaced with the inverse synthetic aperture radar system. Designed as an over-the-horizon targeting system, the Outlaw Hunter’s attributes lent themselves to interdiction operations.
The capabilities of the information exchange system’s satellite communication suite improved communications and the ability to update tasking, pass contact reports on all queried vessels, and maintain the big picture with respect to battlegroup units and the reported locating data on critical contacts of interest from all source data. High-quality targeting data were routinely maintained on all critical contacts well outside any potentially hostile surface-to-air missile envelope. The highly reliable satellite communication system greatly simplified communications, compared to the limited and often unpredictable high-frequency communications experienced by P-3s not equipped with the new information exchange system.
The improvement in communications alone was most significant, but it was enhanced by the highly accurate positional data from the Global Positioning System. These two systems alone were so well-received and valuable to mission accomplishment that all additional aircraft equipped with the more sophisticated radar were fitted with portable Global Positioning System equipment at the outset of hostilities. The ability to locate any vessel out to the limit of patrol sensors, and to classify it, was the key factor in the subsequent requirement to maintain the aircraft on station around the clock in the North Arabian Gulf. This radar system is not without limitations, and while certain applications have not been completely developed (such as overland exploitation), increased resolution options in the processor and display will significantly improve the detail of contact identification and add confidence to its already superb recognition capability.
With the capability to classify targets comes an adjunct feature called periscope mode. As the name implies, it is most effective in submarine periscope detection. While every mission included communications relay and electronic surveillance measures, mine detection using the periscope mode also came into play. With this capability, we detected and located the thousands of mines deployed by Iraq prior to and during Desert Storm.
External factors played a major role in the effectiveness of our mine-searching mission. Among them were tidal effects, wave height, and contact size. Detections also depended on aircraft altitude and aspect in relation to the mine-search area. While the results are still under evaluation, the potential applications are impressive. This application and the many detections of potential Iraqi mine-laying vessels weighed significantly in the decision regarding amphibious operations in the area.
As Desert Storm approached, and the carrier battle groups commenced operations in the Gulf, around-the-clock maritime patrol aviation support became crucial. While the advanced radar-equipped aircraft were dedicated to the surveillance of the North Arabian Gulf, the rest were also used to cover the critical areas of the central and southern Gulf to detect and identify units fitting a potentially hostile attack profile. Although this effort was significant, not one valid hostile surface threat was detected in the southern Gulf.
As Desert Storm commenced, the value of the more sophisticated patrol radar became immediately apparent. Within hours of the outbreak of hostilities, strike aircraft returning to the carrier from Iraq reported antiaircraft fire in the vicinity of the Mina al Bakar oil terminal. Radar investigation of the area detected a Group III tanker and a small vessel that was a possible patrol boat. While the patrol aircraft maintained radar contact on the potential target, strike aircraft were vectored in on the first successful engagement of an Iraqi patrol boat. Additionally, the unique abilities of the inverse synthetic aperture radar confirmed a successful strike and battle damage assessment, the first of many. The Group III vessel later showed up in support of an Iraqi military hovercraft, and both units were destroyed. Maritime patrol aircraft flew a total of 3,170 hours in direct support of Operation Desert Storm.
Another capability that played a significant role in this engagement was the use of the infrared detection system. By tracking the Iraqi hovercraft’s heat signature, patrol aircraft could provide vectors to in-bound strike aircraft.
The height of our support efforts was 30 January when we detected numerous Iraqi vessels, including patrol boats, minesweepers, and various support craft in the vicinity of Bubiyan Island and Kuwait Harbor. The subsequent wholesale defeat of the Iraqi naval force, commonly referred to as the “Bubiyan Turkey Shoot,” was the inevitable result. Coincident to the surveillance effort in the North Arabian Gulf was patrol aircraft support of the various units clearing the numerous oil rigs, platforms and terminals, as well as islands adjacent to the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coastlines, which extended to the vicinity of the North Arabian Gulf surface forces operation area. The efforts of these units in retaking the occupied platforms and islands were superb. Patrol aircraft contributions included the continuous surveillance of all structures capable of supporting enemy operations against allied forces.
All contacts were evaluated by our sophisticated radar, with vessels of questionable class confirmed as hostile or friendly by Infrared. Vessels operating in support of Iraqi-occupied platforms ceased operations for the most part, once hostilities commenced, leaving Iraqi-occupying forces to fend for themselves. We detected a number of small vessels during the capture of Iraqi forces on an occupied Kuwaiti island and engaged several prior to making the Kuwaiti-Iraqi coastline. The radar was the key in detecting and reporting all activity in the vicinity of the island and accomplishing the recapture without casualties.
As with any combat unit, patrol aircrews train to place weapons on target. But Desert Storm did not afford such opportunities to P-3s. Whether or not maritime patrol aircraft should have been employed as weapon shooters, a few considerations merit discussion. During the early stages of the conflict, surface-to-air missile threats were uncertain, and the size of the patrol aircraft operating areas Were small. The existing inventory of weaponry for these aircraft should have been employed during those all- too-frequent periods of waiting for the strike package to arrive to engage potentially hostile vessels. When we train to use a weapon in combat, we should use it in war, especially when any engagement delay could result in friendly casualties from hostile fire. The threat was minimal, and the chance of engaging friendlies or neutrals was almost negligible. The opportunities to engage by patrol aircraft with a safe standoff was frequent, and while most of these factors were uncertain before the war, we came to the realization soon after the shooting started. But we never capitalized on it. Aircrews were aggressive, mission- oriented, and fully aware that each mission was a combat sortie.
Maritime patrol aircraft flew 219 missions, supporting 31 naval engagements resulting in damage to or destruction of 53 Iraqi naval targets by surface combat air patrol.
Support of Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf was inverse synthetic aperture radar-intensive. Of all sorties, 70% were capable of employing the sophisticated radar. (100% in the North Arabian Gulf and 100% of patrol aircraft-assisted strikes benefited from the unique radar’s capabilities.)
Patrol aircraft support continued throughout the Gulf War, but detections of Iraqi naval vessels were minimal. During the postcease fire period of 1-15 March, the operational tempo gradually declined from six sorties a day to two. But even with the war over, maritime patrol aviation has continued to play a dominant role in resuming interdiction operations to maintain the United Nations trade embargo.
Where will maritime patrol aviation be in the future? There will always be a requirement for the P-3s’ long-range ASW capabilities. The increased capabilities and multifaceted roles of patrol aircraft will continue to be a key factor in both strategic deterrence and tactical operations.
Commander Brooks is the commanding officer of VP-19. Lieutenant Commander Hiser is the squadron tactics officer and officer in charge of VP-19’s detachment to the Persian Gulf. Lieutenant Commander Hohl is the training officer of VP-19 and a resident expert on the Outlaw Hunter aircraft.
Iraqis in the Sights
The following sequence reveals that the attrition of the Iraqi fleet was a direct result of the inverse synthetic aperture radar detection/ targeting provided by maritime patrol aviation.
2 August: Iraq invades Kuwait.
4 August: The first U.S. military reaction was the arrival of maritime patrol aircraft.
7 August: Operation Desert Shield is officially announced.
November: Operation Imminent Thunder used patrol aviation as the primary surface surveillance asset to provide early warning of potential Iraqi naval threats.
5 January: Maritime patrol aircraft commenced dedicated Arabian Gulf sorties. This included participation in exercise Candid Hammer, which tested the ability to maintain 24-hour coverage in the North Arabian Gulf, coordinated patrol and reconnaissance operations to evaluate Iraqi response to patrol aircraft presence, sophisticated radar capabilities, and antiship mine detection. Aircraft equipped with the inverse synthetic aperture radar were indispensable assets to the battle group.
8 January: Surveillance conducted by patrol aircraft in the North Arabian Gulf detected an Iraqi T-43- class minesweeper possibly underway to conduct mining operations.
10 January: Masirah detachment was increased to six crews/five aircraft. Further site visits were conducted in the Persian Gulf littoral. However, logistical and political factors dictated that Masirah remain the primary site for patrol aircraft detachment operations.
15 January: British Nimrods began dedicated surveillance flights in concert with U.S. Navy P-3s in the Arabian Gulf. Although limited in number, the augmentation of the sophisticated radar coverage, with the Nimrod’s excellent Searchwater radar, allowed continuous 24-hour patrol aircraft coverage in the North Arabian Gulf. The detachment in Masirah increased to eight crews/ seven aircraft.
17 January: At 0400 local time, the liberation of Kuwait, now known as Operation Desert Storm, began. On station, the Outlaw Hunter-configured P-3 detected an Iraqi patrol boat and quickly vectored a strike package in from the carrier battle group for the first reported naval kill of the war. Additionally, the radar provided a confirmed battle damage assessment.
18 January: Patrol aircraft provided radar coverage for the USS Nicholas (FFG-47) and coalition forces for the retaking of oil rigs in the Dorrah oil fields used by Iraqi forces to fire upon returning strike aircraft to the carrier battle group. The surveillance effort was designed to ensure that there would be no Iraqi waterborne attempt to engage friendly forces.
23 January: Intelligence indicated that a merchant tanker had been providing support to Iraqi patrol boats in the North Arabian Gulf. Aircraft with the advanced radar detected the merchant in the predawn hours and vectored a strike in at first light for a successful kill. Additionally, an Iraqi military hovercraft was detected in company with the merchant and engaged by follow-on strike aircraft. Patrol aircraft played a role throughout the scenario, providing communications relay and vectors into the area. Infrared and radar were extremely effective.
Patrol aircraft also played another important role this day, picking up the distress signal of a downed F-14 emergency locator transmitter and providing assistance for a successful combat rescue by coalition forces.
25 January: In an act of environmental terrorism, Iraq dumped millions of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf. Patrol aircraft assets provided reconnaissance on the spread of the oil in the Gulf.
30 January: The large remainder of the Iraqi naval fleet attempted to sortie to safe havens along the coast of Iran. Radar quickly detected the departing vessels and a large-scale strike destroyed as many as possible. Many referred to it as the "Bubiyan Turkey Shoot."
VP-19