The Way Ahead

This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected.  Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies.  Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue.  The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.

The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III Secretary of the Navy

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II Chief of Naval Operations

General A. M. Gray Commandant of the Marine Corps

The course may be straight and true for the Kennedy (CV-67) battle group—here, heading through the North Atlantic toward the Mediterranean—but the way ahead for the sea services is rife with change and uncertainty. We must embrace that change, and continue to cover our bets as best we can.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the world’s preeminent military power— especially at sea, where we enjoy clear maritime superiority. In achieving and maintaining this preemi­nence, U.S. naval forces have sailed the high seas virtu­ally unchallenged for nearly half a century. Since 1945, most of the world’s developed nations have enjoyed peace and stability, often guaranteed by U.S. maritime power.

But now the winds of change are blowing throughout the world—from Washington to New Delhi, from Mos­cow to Pretoria. Events since the summer of 1989 have brought a fundamental shift in the post-World War II bal­ance of power. No longer do we have the sense of cer­tainty that accompanies a bipolar world power structure and a central, agreed-upon threat.

It is time to challenge many of our ground rules and assumptions. Some will require revision; others must be revalidated. We must reshape naval force structure, strat­egy, tactics, and operating patterns that are wedded too closely to the concept of an Armageddon at sea with the Soviet Union. At the same time, we will deal increasingly with political and fiscal pressures to reduce the national debt—pressures that unquestionably will affect the level

of resources available for defense in the future.

Mastering the post-Cold War challenges will require our full range of skill and knowledge as practitioners of the art of naval warfare. We must respond to new initiatives and be prepared to march in different directions. The old ex­cuse—“Because that’s the way we’ve always done it”— no longer will do. We must work to shape and guide the forces of change in the direction that best serves the needs of our nation. At times, this will be an arduous task, but we have a basic edge over potential adversaries in the quality of our people, whose talent and hard work have given us dominance over the high seas for nearly half a century. We must keep before us one goal: to maintain maritime superiority well into the 21st century—through a Navy and Marine Corps able to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.

Even though we cannot predict with confidence exactly what the new century will be like, we know that our fun­damental interests will remain unchanged. The defense of our nation, our people, and our way of life will continue to be our foremost objectives. It also will remain in our inter­est to contribute to the maintenance of a stable and secure world—a world that will advance the welfare of all peo-

pies, within an environment that fosters economic devel­opment and furthers individual freedom and human rights. We live in a world that is more economically interdepen­dent than ever, and we can never afford to retreat into isolationism.

Clearly, international turmoil, aggression, and conflict are not things of the past. Drives for regional hegemony, resurgent nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug trafficking, and terrorism are certain to challenge interna­tional order during the final decade of this century. Within developing nations, dramatic increases in population and growing dissatisfaction with the perpetual gap between rich and poor will continue to be major causes ol unrest and insurgency.

As we confront tomorrow’s challenges we must remem­ber that there are things only the United States can do. As General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has noted, the superpower shingle hangs above only one nation’s door. For the United States—a maritime na­tion—to remain a superpower, it needs a Navy and Ma­rine Corps that can maintain maritime power in the world’s ocean and littoral areas, where this nation and its citizens have political, economic, and individual interests.

How will this far-reaching change affect our national security policies?

• We are likely to face increasing limitations on U.S. ac­cess and influence. Absent a Saddam Hussein as a focal point, developing nations, friends, and even allies may be reluctant to subordinate national interests to a broader common purpose.
• Another reality of the new era will be proliferation of advanced military technology and equipment. As major military powers reduce forces and pull back from forward positions, regional powers and emerging Third World na­tions will accelerate their acquisition of modern combat weapons and delivery platforms. These countries are arm­ing themselves with high explosives, precision-guided munitions, sophisticated air-defense warfare systems, and guided missiles. In addition, regional powers will con­tinue to develop and acquire the technology to pose chemi­cal, biological, and nuclear threats. The widespread pro­liferation of advanced weapons—plus a demonstrated willingness to use them—will present new challenges to U.S. interests and military forces.

► Finally, this will be a period of uncertainty. Warning signs will become increasingly ambiguous and reaction times will be shortened as the identity and motives of po­tential adversaries—and the timing and scenarios of threatening events—become more difficult to discern. Instead of simply facing a diminished but still-potent force of Soviet tanks and warships, we increasingly will con­front new and diverse challenges to worldwide political and economic stability, from organizations and nations bent on disruption or conquest.

An Evolving Strategy

For almost half a century we focused on the possibility of global war, to be fought primarily on the European continent and in its adjacent waters. To deal with the many changes and cope with the new uncertainties, we must shift the objective of our national security strategy from containing the Soviet Union to maintaining global stabil­ity. Our evolving strategy must focus on regional contin­gencies in trouble spots wherever our national interests are involved.

For U.S. naval forces, this shift—from global commit­ment against a single threat to global commitment against a number of regional threats—poses a dilemma: What do we do with a maritime strategy formulated during the Cold War, focused primarily on global conflict with the Soviet Union? The answer: We extract the strategy’s enduring principles, and apply them to current planning. The mari­time strategy itself remains on the shelf, with Atlantic and Pacific operations plans as bookends, ready to be retrieved if a global threat should reemerge.

In an address at Aspen, Colorado, on 2 August 1990, President George Bush stated that U.S. defense policy must adapt to the significant changes in the world, without neglecting the enduring realities of the nation’s security. The President outlined a future U.S. defense policy based on four major elements:

• Deterrence
• Forward Presence              .
• Crisis Response
• Force Reconstitution

Deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, costs less than any level of conflict, and will remain the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy. Nuclear deterrence will be re­quired as long as any country possesses the nuclear- weapon capability to strike the United States or endanger U.S. forces abroad.

Around much of the globe, the Navy and Marine Corps will be the primary means of preserving U.S. regional influence. In a time of decreasing availability of overseas bases for U.S. land and air forces, the presence of capable naval forces near areas of potential crisis remains a key element of national security. In addition to contributing to deterrence, deployed naval forces strengthen our ties with allies and demonstrate continuing U.S. commitment to maintaining world peace. If deterrence fails, forward- deployed forces guarantee timely responses at points of conflict.

Since most of the world’s population lives within 50

miles of the sea, our naval power-projection capabilities t will remain particularly useful in applying U.S. military c might at appropriate places and times.                            Naval crisis re-      S

sponse means much more than simply           maintaining the       j

capability to keep the sea lines of communication open to           (

our allies and sources of critical materiel.    We must be able       j

to project credible military forces rapidly to meet threats posed to our interests, in places where no friendly forces- ( in-being exist.

Having the capability to project sea-based power is es­sential to the defense of these interests, most of which are t found in littoral areas. To maintain stability, we must be ( able to influence events on land, as well. As noted earlier,              i

the reality of declining force levels and shrinking overseas      1

infrastructure means that our naval expeditionary forces ^r

will have to be forward-deployed and self-sustaining as they project power over or across the beach. In some cases, they may pave the way for longer-duration joint or combined operations, in which forward-deployed naval forces are present or arrive first on the scene to enable the ^ sequential introduction of additional forces.

While our new defense strategy is geared primarily to regional threats to U.S. interests, it also must take into account the uncertainty surrounding the ongoing upheaval in the Soviet Union and Central Europe, and the capabili­ties of the Soviet military that we expect to remain in place tiuring the foreseeable future. A global conflict with the Soviet Union appears to be far less likely than in the recent Past, but we must preserve our ability to reconstitute ade­quate forces, if faced with a resurgent global threat to Peace.

Combined and Joint Operations________________

Collective security remains central to U.S. strategy. In tile past, our primary security ties and operations centered °n countries with whom we maintained formal alliances. Such alliances remain a strategic necessity for the nation, but their character may differ substantially in the future. The Gulf War’s allied coalition may be a harbinger of

and institutional ethos.

The unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are intended to be complementary, enabling, and enhancing, and they provide us with the means to generate the greatest total combat capability in the shortest time. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm will serve as prototypes for future joint operations. During the Desert Shield buildup in Southwest Asia, we demonstrated the enabling role of maritime forces. Forward-deployed naval forces already on scene were augmented within days by two carrier battle groups, a Marine Expeditionary Force, the Air Force’s 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, and paratroop­ers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. These forces contributed to the initial defense of Saudi Arabia and cov­ered the subsequent arrival of additional ground and air

I

i

U.S. NAVY

future security arrangements that will complement long­standing treaties, such as NATO. We must heighten our ^emphasis on combined operations and training with na­tional forces of many regions—both to facilitate coopera- ¹ tion and coordination with them and to maintain our own expertise in likely operating environments.

Joint power-projection operations will be required to protect worldwide U.S. interests. When each service ful­fills its respective role, we can capitalize on synergistic capabilities that stem from decades of organizational focus

Deterrence, both nuclear (left, a Poseidon C-3 missile breaks through Florida waters) and conventional, will continue to depend heavily on forward-deployed naval forces. Regional alliances—here, the Saipan (LHA-2), foreground, sails for a NATO exercise with (left to right) Spain’s Principe de Asturias, the USS Eisenhower (CVN- 69) and Italy’s Giuseppe Garibaldi—must remain strong to offset shrinking overseas basing infrastructure.

¹ Proceedings / April 1991 ^ -

But as ongoing developments in both the Soviet Union and Southwest Asia demonstrate, it is difficult to foresee ' the course of future events. Replays of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm certainly are not the only scenar­ios we expect to see in the 1990s, so we must maintain prudent hedges against uncertainty. Accordingly, mari­time forces will continue to be required to establish and maintain the sea control essential to power projection op- ) erations, whenever and wherever they are necessary. Bat- tie space will be more complex. Control of the air, sea, and undersea environments, essential to successful mili­tary operations on land, will take on a different character but certainly will be as complex as maintaining control in an open-ocean environment. Sensors and communications systems designed for blue-water operations may not work as well in confined areas, shallow seas, or over land. The threats posed by small coastal-patrol boats, shore- launched cruise missiles, and shallow-water mines will present new challenges to our operators. Quick-reaction

First on the scene for Operation Desert Shield, naval forces (top, an SH-3 Sea King tracks the liquid natural gas carrier Hoegh Gandria through the Gulf) enforced the blockade of Iraq and covered the arrival of the first troops (here, members of the 82nd Airborne Division debark from a C-5A in Saudi Arabia). Gear for the first three Marine Expeditionary Brigades arrived in maritime prepositioning ships within ten days of sailing while a coalition air force (facing page, Qatari, French, Canadian, U.S.—not shown, British and Saudi) flew cover.

units. U.S. Navy warships maintained sea control and en­forced United Nations sanctions throughout the buildup period. Naval capabilities, which complemented those of allied air and ground forces, were integrated fully into theater-wide planning before hostilities commenced.

combat capabilities and the ability to maintain an accurate and timely tactical picture will be critical for operational success in these non-ocean areas.

Changing Employment!Deployment Concepts_______

Forward deployment of naval forces in peacetime pro­motes regional stability by demonstrating continuity of commitment, strengthening friendships, enhancing readi­ness, and reducing reaction time in crises. Nonetheless, the realities of the post-Berlin Wall era cause us to rethink our employment and deployment concepts.

In the coming decade, naval forces will be called upon to conduct a wide variety of missions: from peacetime situations through crisis to conflict resolution. Many of these missions, such as strategic deterrence and protection of American lives and property, have been with us for years. Others—such as presence; humanitarian assistance; nation-building; security assistance; and peacekeeping, countemarcotic, counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and crisis-response operations—will receive new emphasis as We focus our efforts on developing and maintaining re­gional stability.

It is not easy to determine just how much presence may he required in a given region at a given time. It is clear, though, we no longer can rely on the Cold War’s deploy­ment data base. It is also clear that gaps in presence can lead to instability, power vacuums, and regional percep­tions of lack of interest or disengagement by the United States, whether accurate or not.

Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for full exploitation of the mobility and flexibility of our naval expeditionary forces. That means new patterns in length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. The crisis-action and deterrent-force modules re­cently developed by the Marine Corps are examples of the kind of flexibility that is needed.

From the Korean War until the end of the 1980s we

concentrated our operations in deployment hubs, where American and Soviet interests overlapped at likely points of crisis. The changes occurring in our security environ­ment will require us to break out of these hubs. Fortu­nately, changes in U.S.-Soviet political and military rela­tions will allow greater freedom for operations in broader, less-rigid zones of national interest.

At the same time, reduced superpower friction enables differing configurations of naval forces to meet specific regional requirements. Recent operations off the coasts of Liberia and Somalia, for example, were executed success­fully by a task force composed of amphibious ships, a Marine special-purpose force, and surface combatants. To respond effectively to larger crises, however, we need car­rier aviation and forcible-entry power, together with credi­ble surge capability. U.S. naval force levels in and around the Persian Gulf rose from a handful of ships on 2 August to more than 100, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The force included six aircraft carriers, 30-plus amphibi­ous ships, dozens of surface combatants, and several at­tack submarines. The Marine Corps deployed more than 90,000 active-duty and Reserve Marines to the region— either ashore or afloat. Concurrently, naval forces contin­ued their presence operations in the Mediterranean, West­ern Pacific, around the Philippines, and off Central and South America, to provide support to U.S. and allied in­terests in those regions.

In the future, the need for focused forward presence and credible surge capability—more than historical deploy­ment patterns—will dictate peacetime employment of naval forces.

Changing Force Capabilities and Structure

To meet the demands of our national security strategy, we need naval forces that possess a wide range of capabili­ties. These must include: sea-based strategic forces, for continued deterrence of nuclear attack; surge forces that can react rapidly to any crisis; forward-deployed expedi­tionary forces capable of going anywhere, with full logis­tic, medical, and repair support; and a sea-based maritime prepositioned force.

By maintaining a credible Trident submarine force, we will have a modem, survivable, and potent sea-based stra­tegic deterrent capability well into the next century. At the same time, our attack submarine force will retain the num­bers and capability needed to hold at risk sea-based strate­gic platforms able to threaten the United States. We cannot discount the major open-ocean warfighting potential of the Soviet submarine force, which has yet to experience any downturn in production rates or technological develop­ments. Threat of its use could reemerge quickly, should the intentions of the Soviet leadership change—so we can never afford to cede our current technological edge in sub­marines and antisubmarine warfare.

tasked on short notice to conduct combat operations—for extended periods—anywhere in the world.

During the 1990s, we expect to adjust the composition of our carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups routinely, to suit specific situations. Untethered from the earlier predominant concern with the global war-at-sea scenario, we have new flexibility to shape our combat punch to prescribed missions and expected threats. Often, we will be operating with smaller battle groups, particu­larly as our older surface combatants are replaced by fewer—but more capable—cruisers, amphibious ships, and destroyers. Adding the newest generation of strike aircraft to the air wing, just after the turn of the century, will enhance our capability significantly. But improved capability never will be a substitute for adequate numbers. A single unit still cannot be in two places at one time. We

GENERAL DYNAMICS ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION: INSET/U.S. NAVY (R. MCROY)

With the Soviet Navy threat reduced, our modern attack submarines and surface combatants can better augment carrier air power, as they did with cruise-missile attacks on Iraq (facing page, the Mississippi [CGN-40] launches a Tomahawk from the Red Sea). Amphibious forces will continue to mix old and new (here, the 30-year-old Raleigh [LPD-1] receives a CH-53E while operating with Amphibious Group 2 and the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in the Gulf).

Preserving our edge does not require a massive building program. Continuation of our current attack submarine force through its programmed service life, together with a construction program to maintain our industrial base for building submarines, will allow us to retain a credible at­tack submarine force into the next century. Freed from a nearly full-time requirement to train for ASW in far- forward areas, this force now can be available for more regional power-projection and support missions.

Our carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are the cornerstones of our forward deployed forces, and will remain so. These supremely independent forces can be tailored to include varying numbers and mixes of tacti­cal aircraft, surface combatants, submarines, logistic sup­port ships, and Marine air-ground task forces. They can be must have enough carriers, amphibious ships, and surface combatants to maintain focused, forward, simultaneous peacetime presence in several regions—along with a surge capability to respond to larger crises.

Complementing carrier air power is the formidable fire­power distributed through our modem surface combatants and attack submarines. Major advances in weapons tech­nology have brought longer ranges and greater accuracy in weapons and combat systems small enough to be em­ployed from a variety of platforms, making it possible to disperse a significant amount of firepower. The effective employment of Tomahawk missiles against Iraq from bat­tleships, attack submarines, cruisers, and destroyers is a precursor of the multi-mission utility we must continue to emphasize in the future.

Our need to exploit the tactical advantages and flexibil­ity of distributed firepower with sophisticated, state-of- the-art weapons does not obviate the need for guns and other less-complex weapons. We must continue to distrib­ute all forms of striking firepower among many platforms, to give our war fighters a menu of complex and simple weapon systems of varying capabilities and costs. Longer ranges, complex employment considerations, and a wider variety of available weapons will bring renewed emphasis

on tactics and techniques, fully as important as firepower itself.

Distributed firepower expands our capability to project power landward. But controlling events ashore ultimately means putting warriors over the beach with the capability to do what must be done. The flexibility inherent within the Marine Corps’s force structure of three active (and one reserve) divisions, three active (and one reserve) air wings, and three active (and one reserve) force service support groups—formed into Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—provides warfighting commanders with a wide range of military capabilities. Our existing MEFs provide a reservoir of integrated combined arms power from which Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) all special-operations capable—can be task organized to execute simultaneously a wide range of missions around the globe.

All MAGTFs are fully prepared to deploy rapidly by a variety of means. Using amphibious shipping, strategic sealift, strategic airlift, or maritime prepositioned ships, these expeditionary forces are light enough to get where needed and heavy enough to win. More importantly, they arrive capable of conducting sustained combat operations. Taking advantage of the synergistic combat capability re­sulting from the integration of ground combat, air combat, and combat service support elements under a single com- i mander, a variety of MAGTFs can be formed. Each MAGTF, regardless of size, is a self-sustaining, fully combat-capable force able to operate either independently or as a part of a joint task force. Each also possesses the command and control capabilities needed to form a com­mand element for joint and combined operations.

Marine Expeditionary Forces are the Corps’s principal

Proceedings / April 1991

organization for combat and peacetime preparedness. Today, drawing upon the forces assigned to the MEFs within the Atlantic and Pacific commands and Selected Marine Corps Reserve forces, two task-organized MEFs have been committed to Operation Desert Storm. Ashore is the I Marine Expeditionary Force, which because of its size and composition is, in essence, a Marine Expedition­ary Corps. It is composed of the 1st and 2d Marine Divi­sions (Reinforced), the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Rein­forced), and the 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups, four naval construction battalions, and an Army armored brigade. Additionally, a MEF afloat has been formed by combining two Marine Expeditionary Brigades and one Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) are designed specifically to deploy by a variety of means. They are capable of conducting sustained operations, and they also are the lead elements for larger Marine expeditionary forces. The rapid buildup of combined-arms power dem­onstrated during Operation Desert Shield resulted from this capability. Two MEBs deployed by strategic airlift and married up with equipment and supplies brought into the theater by two squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships. In addition, two other MEBs deployed to the region on board amphibious shipping. These forces became the lead elements of the MEFs currently serving in Operation Desert Storm.

Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) are forward de­ployed routinely to maintain influence and enhance stabil­ity in regions of interest. Afloat in task-organized amphib­ious ready groups, these MEUs represent our nation’s on-scene, immediately responsive amphibious power- projection capability. MEUs routinely deploy with a spe-

Marine Expeditionary Units with special-operations capa­bilities routinely deploy afloat in presence roles, and are often first on the scene when crises erupt—here, Marines from the 22nd MEU (SOC) provide security for non­combatant evacuation operations, from the roof of the U.S. Embassy, Monrovia, Liberia.

cial-operations capability. The 22nd MEU recently was tasked with providing security for the U.S. Embassy and the evacuation of threatened U.S. and foreign citizens and diplomats in Liberia.

Special-Purpose MAGTFs are configured to accomplish specific missions. These MAGTFs are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide range of conventional and unconventional operations. They can deploy by a variety of means and normally are composed of Marines and sail­ors who are highly trained in both day and night opera­tions, to include raids and strike operations. Recently, a Special-Purpose MAGTF was formed from amphibious forces in Southwest Asia to respond rapidly to the unex­pected crisis in Somalia. Two amphibious ships were de­tached from the task force operating in the Persian Gulf and raced to the crisis area. Four hundred and sixty miles from the objective, two helicopters loaded with a special- purpose force were launched. They were refueled in-flight by Marine aircraft. This force was able to reach Somalia in time to protect and evacuate threatened American and for­eign citizens, before returning to the Persian Gulf to con­tinue with its other mission.

Any consideration of conducting naval operations in shallow waters along the world’s littorals raises the specter of mines. In the maritime environment of the 1990s, we will have to be proficient in mine warfare, both offensive and defensive. On the offensive, our P-3 aircraft and Air Force B-52s can carry large quantities of mines over long distances and place them with accuracy. Tactical carrier- based and Marine aircraft also can deliver mines, as part of a coordinated air strike. Our submarines can plant mines in heavily defended areas and then engage ships with torpedoes or cruise missiles, as they try to evade the mine fields.

We have focused most of our mine warfare efforts in the area of countermeasures. Our helicopter and surface mine countermeasures forces are getting better all the time, but we face new challenges as mine technology spreads worldwide. Shallow-water mines, for example—readily available at low cost—are simple weapons easily em­ployed by potential adversaries. In the 1990s, we will con­tinue to explore and develop new technologies, including laser mine detection and the use of remotely piloted under­water vehicles for locating and neutralizing naval mines. Our surface mine-countermeasures force, manned by both active and reserve personnel employing these new tech­nologies, will be a vital part of our balanced naval force.

An equally vital—though until recently less-noticed— contribution to our maritime power is strategic sealift. During the first 60 days of Operation Desert Shield, 85% of all cargo sent into the Persian Gulf theater moved by sea. We have long recognized that strategic sealift would be a critical component of our maritime force structure in the 1990s, and we were ready for the challenge.

Over the past ten years, we have spent more than $7 billion on sealift. Our sealift force numbers 130 ships, including eight fast-sealift ships capable of meeting de­manding, high-speed schedules, as they carry vital materi- j als for forces airlifted to the scene of action. We expect to add to our inventory over the next few years.

The current shipping pool is sufficient for scenarios with long warning times, but even large numbers of fast- , sealift ships would be insufficient for most short-warning scenarios. This is why we have maintained three sets of prepositioned equipment and sustainability on 13 naval ships, with each set capable of equipping and sustaining a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. All of these equipment sets, together with the Marines who use them, are now in Saudi Arabia. This prepositioning program proved its worth despite the short warning time and long distances of Operation Desert Shield. No matter what the mode of transportation, however, sea and air superiority are the keys to our ability to deliver materials when and where needed.

Preserving our leadership base is more important to our ability to maintain maritime superiority than any category of weapon systems or delivery platforms. A professional officer and enlisted leadership core is essential for any combat-ready military force. Rebuilding an educated, trained, and experienced cadre of professional leaders takes a great deal of time, and is far more difficult than rebuilding force structure.

Training and education will be top priorities in the 1990s. In a constrained fiscal environment, a well-trained and educated force will provide the highest payoff for our investment. Professionalism will remain our primary force-multiplier. As the threats we face become more ca­pable and more technologically sophisticated, shrinking both battle space and reaction time, we will not have the luxury of a practice shot; we will have to do things right j the first time.

In addition to the appropriate mix of skills and experi­ence levels our personnel force will require in the 1990s, we also will need the right mix of active and reserve forces. As specified in Title 10, U.S. Code, reserve forces exist to buttress active forces in times of war or national emergency, and when other exigencies demand. The value of a ready, trained reserve component is being demon­strated dramatically in Operation Desert Storm. Navy and Marine Corps Reserve personnel have responded su­perbly, and are integrated into our force structure to en-

hance not only our capability in Southwest Asia, but also °ur capability to maintain presence and respond to crises 'n other regions of the world. We will continue to need the reserves.

Since we now anticipate additional warning time with respect to global threats, we can best use shrinking re­sources by planning for phased mobilization of those re­serves needed to augment regular forces in the event of major East-West conflict. Toward that end, we are trans­ferring roughly 25% of our current inventory of surface combatants, the Knox (FF-1052) class frigates, to the re­serves. Most of these frigates, primarily designed for the ASW convoy mission, will be placed in reduced availabil­ity (ready for full duty in 180 days), with operating time devoted exclusively to Selected Reserve training.

The Navy of the 1990s and Beyond___________

How big a force do we need?

The size of our force will be determined by the follow­ing three criteria:

^ We need a force capable of supporting the President s national security strategy. We must be able to maintain forward deployments and be able to reinforce in the event of a regional contingency. We also must retain sufficient strategic forces to deter a resurgent global threat.

V We need a force that can sustain the level of readiness and response capability required to implement that strat­egy. To sustain that level of readiness, our ships, subma­rines, and aircraft must be well-maintained and combat

ready. Sufficient time and resources must be allocated for overhaul and maintenance. We also must afford opportu­nities for adequate basic and advanced training in a realis­tic, stressful environment.

► Our people remain the strong foundation upon which our maritime strength is built. We must continue to attract and retain the best of our nation’s youth. To do that we must operate our force in a way that provides our sailors and Marines a decent, realistic quality of life—beginning with stable sea and shore rotation patterns. Current guide­lines concerning the time sailors and Marines are away from home port must be followed, even while force struc­ture shrinks. We also must provide them adequate time for maintenance and training. Our sailors and Marines must continue to have confidence in their ships, their equip­ment, and their shipmates.

With these criteria, we can size our balanced total force for the future at about 450 active and reserve ships, plus three active and one reserve Marine division/wing teams (Marine expeditionary forces). Plans to achieve necessary reductions are in place. We will get smaller in a rational way. And, we remain committed to building a force that will provide a realistic and affordable margin of security

The USS Avenger (MCM-1), lead ship in the newest class of mine-countermeasures ships, reflects the Navy’s new focus on surface forces that can both detect and destroy mines. Here, the Avenger and the older minesweeper Adroit (MSO-509) await offloading in the Persian Gulf from the submerging transport deck of the Dutch heavy- lift ship Super Servant-3, during Operation Desert Shield.