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Camel Support—24
Evil FitReps—26
Contents:
Honor—14
Two Seats—Until Now—14
Ecological Warfare Is the Terrorist’s New Game—19
Taking Charge . . . Without Wearing the Rank—19
Desert Shield: The Forces—19
Shallow Water Antisubmarine Warfare—22
Hang Together, or Hang Separately—24
The Seawolf: Crash Dive!—26
Overhaul the Medals and Awards System—29
Don’t Give Up on the Ship—30
Marine Corps Schools Produce Noncommitted Officers—30
Holland’s Hollands: An Irish Tale—30
The Pole At Last!!!— 32
Exploiting Defense Technology After the Cold War—34
The First Cruise Missile—34
Time To Take a Flying Jump—35
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
“Honor”
(See R. Preisser, pp. 49-50, February 1991
Proceedings)
Midshipman Second Class Michael D. Mehls, U.S. Navy—The U.S. Naval Academy’s Honor Concept has taken several hits over the past few months, but it will endure. Immediately after taking the reins as the new Commandant of Midshipmen, Captain Michael Haskins put the brunt of responsibility for upholding the standards of honor back into the hands of the Brigade.
I agree wholeheartedly with everything that Midshipman Preisser said about the Honor Concept here, but I would like to add some of my own thoughts. Last fall, the Brigade lost all faith in the Honor Concept, in one sweeping blow. Six midshipmen were charged initially with committing the honor offense of plagiarism on a written assignment. After being charged, they were required to appear before a board of their peers, to determine if there was enough evidence to prove them guilty. The board decided that sufficient evidence was lacking for three, who did not actually type the material. One of the midshipmen who was found innocent had been solely responsible for acquiring the plagiarized material—yet he escaped unscathed. When the Commandant reviewed the case, he disagreed with the results of the peer board, finding that two of the three had committed conduct offenses—leaving only one honor violation.
That was a grave mistake. If your signature is on an assignment, you must accept responsibility for everything in that paper. If the assignments had six signatures, then why weren’t all six midshipmen prosecuted equally? The one midshipman who admitted to everything from the start suffered the harshest punishment, even though he did nothing worse than the other guilty classmates. Why did he receive different treatment?
Several other questions rise to the surface. Why didn’t the midshipman who acquired the plagiarized material ever go before the administration as a consequence of peer review? Was it because he was popular and considered a top performer that he was excused by his peers from later hearings? In my opinion, such actions are extremely detrimental to the Honor Concept, precisely because he was a respected leader in the Brigade. The
board’s decision sent the wrong message. If you can’t learn to answer for your mistakes as a midshipman, it will be far too late to try learning how as an officer.
The Honor Concept (USNAINST 1601.3E) states that persons accused of an honor violation have a right to privacy; this includes keeping the names of the involved midshipmen confidential. In this case, however, the accused were regularly approached by other midshipmen who had nothing to do with the case—a major breach of due process.
Another factor that the administration seemed to think pertinent was that three of the six midshipmen had prior enlisted service. Did the administration feel that somehow their concept of honor had been tainted by their fleet experience? This is far from reality. In the operating forces, trust among shipmates is a must.
After this case, many midshipmen felt that if they committed an honor offense they would not be subject to dismissal from the Academy. Instead, they would likely be charged with a conduct offense, which can subject a midshipmen to no more than a year’s loss of leave. The punishment for an honor offense is separation—almost always.
■ In general, midshipmen are very much in favor of separation as the appropriate outcome of an honor offense. Our Honor Concept sets us not only apart—but above. We cherish it, and when proper actions aren’t taken by the administration to remove offenders, it is incredibly disturbing to the Brigade—especially those who are proudest to live under the Honor Concept.
The new Commandant has picked the Honor Concept off the deck and is putting it back on its rightful pedestal. Upon assuming office, he made his position clear that there is no longer any gray area in dealing with honor—only black and white. I hope that his hard-line approach will restore that strong sense of honor to the Brigade, and restore our pride along with it.
“Two Seats—Until Now”
(See R. F. Dunn, p. 13, January 1991; W. C. Zobel and J. Marshall, pp. 14-19, March 1991 Proceedings)
Captain Reuben A. Padilla, U.S. Marine Corps—Admiral Dunn’s article was most impressive, and I agree with just
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about all that he wrote. The admiral’s idea of the Navy “biting the bullet” sounds great, and in the lean years ahead, the cost of one aviator instead of two can only make good sense if you never go to combat.
Flying the most sophisticated fighter/ attack aircraft ever built (the F/A-18D),
1 was the target of no less than three SA-7/14 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and one optically guided SA-2, not to mention the medium-intensity antiaircraft artillery (AAA) in southeastern Kuwait last night. During all of this activity, my Pilot only saw one SA-7/14 as it guided to °ur jet. The other three SAM breaks came off of my calls. Had we been shot down because of a lack of visual acquisition (i.e., two eyeballs instead of four), the cost of a new Hornet certainly would have raised the eyebrows of the admiral. An estimated $1.5 million to train and maintain a naval flight officer to save a $28 million dollar airplane—that’s not bad economics!
Ecological Warfare Is the Terrorist’s New Game
R. F. Bollinger, Master Pilot—The mammoth oil slick Saddam Hussein created in the Persian Gulf may be the first example of grand-scale ecological warfare in history. Using oil—particularly burning oil on water—is not new to naval Warfare, but the magnitude of Saddam’s oil slick is the largest ever created in industrial or naval history. Large oil slicks can hinder and complicate amphibious Warfare, endanger water supplies, and destroy coastal and even deep sea ecosystems and the economies that depend on them. An “ecotactic” is a tactic of indiscriminate mass destruction, and should be declared a capital crime against humanity.
Unfortunately, the tactics are not limited to oil slicks. Damaging locks, dams, and port structures is a legitimate tactic of War. Bombing a key river control feature at a critical river stage can change a river’s course, destroying the delta ecosystem and ruining the economics of ports at the mouth of the river and the potential of the entire river-basin economy. One small bomb can thus become an instrument of mass destruction. Biological warfare aimed at crops and stock animals can be an “ecotactic” geared to starve civilian populations. Now, during the first outbreak of ecological warfare on a grand scale, is the time for the world community to address the issue.
The naval establishment should:
► Establish a legal task force, perhaps headed by the Coast Guard, to draft international accords defining—and banning as capital crimes of war—the use of ecological warfare. Defining it will be the hard part. Burning oil is an old naval tactic, it’s the scale and intent of the activity that defines it as an “ecotactic.”
► Establish an “ecotactic” countermeasures organization, perhaps headed by the Coast Guard with elements of the NOAA Corps, the Public Health Service, and perhaps Seabee Disaster-Recovery teams and private contractors on standby.
Ecotactics are destructive and cheap terror tactics. It is time to start dealing with this new reality on the international legal front and in military planning.
“Taking Charge . . . Without Wearing the Rank’’
(See K. V. Logan, pp. 64-69, February 1991 Proceedings)
Jeanne Jorgensen—When my husband’s copy of Proceedings arrives in the mail, I don’t usually expect to find an article about the role of a military spouse. Kathleen Logan’s article was a pleasant surprise. We have not received your publication for very long, so I’m not sure how often you include articles of this nature. Please continue to provide such helpful information. This article is certainly a “keeper” for me.
Lieutenant J. E. Hopkins, U.S. Navy—I believe that Mrs. Logan should have considered several other important factors in preparing her interesting manuscript for Proceedings. The article ignores the growing number of dual-service couples and does not talk about coping with the requirements of being the commanding or executive officer’s wife while simultaneously serving as a Navy officer, which happens to be my situation. The article just touches the issue of the female COs/ XOs and the role of their husbands in the “wives’ net.” In addition, a large percentage of wives now work outside the home, which limits the amount of time available to meet the demands of the job and keep their families on an even keel during deployments.
These are real dilemmas that call for innovative leadership and flexibility on the part of all involved.
“Desert Shield: The Forces”
(See pp. 83-84, January 1991 Proceedings)
Captain Patrick A. Moloney, Marine Superintendent, Military Sealift Command, Pacific—Your listing neglected to include some of the significant Navy as-
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sets in the area. The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Forces of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) are on station, as they have been virtually continuously since 1979. In direct support of the various task forces on both sides of Saudi Arabia and in the Mediterranean Sea are the underway replenishment ships USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187), USNS Rigel (T-AF- 58), and USNS Sirius (T-AFS-8) from MSC Atlantic. Representing MSC Pa
cific are the USNS Passumpsic (T-AO- 107), USNS Hassayampa (T-AO-145), USNS Ponchatoula (T-AO-148), USNS Andrew J. Higgins (T-AO-190), USNS Walter S. Diehl (T-AO-193), USNS Spica (T-AFS 9) and USNS Kilauea (T- AE-26). The USNS Apache (T-AFT-172) has provided additonal support by towing the disabled fast sealift ship USNS An- tares (T-AKR-294) to Rota, Spain, in August.
The Civil-Service mariners of MSC and the Navy detachments on board these ships were some of the first on the scene, and will be among the last to go when the business at hand is concluded. Let’s give them the same recognition their grey- funnel customers receive.
“Shallow Water Antisubmarine
Warfare”
(See G. B. Thamm, pp. 93-95, February 1991
Proceedings)
Dr. Ralph Ernest Chatham, Commander, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Mr. Thamm extols the virtues of diesel submarines, a position I have occasionally supported. Unfortunately he commits the classic error made by most partisans of specific military platforms by not making a clear case of how well his platform can perform a mission. In the case of shallow-water antisubmarine warfare (ASW) that performance would be dreadful.
Assured detection of quiet submarines is virtually impossible beyond the reliable acoustic path—a range of two to three miles at the best. Sometimes surface ducts do give longer ranges. Deep-water convergence zones allow occasional glimpses of submarines at much longer ranges. Shallow water, however, does not permit convergence zone propagation, and the scattering of sound by the bottom makes detections quite difficult. Scattering at the surface doesn’t help much either. It takes many $ 100-million diesel submarines spaced on four-mile centers to accomplish coastal defense— and we can’t afford that.
Part of the problem stems from our including in each and every platform: a weapon system, detection arrays, a propulsion system, a pressure hull, a few people, parts, and provisions. Fixed coastal arrays or sonobuoys to detect submarines would be better and cheaper. Then stand-off weapons might be launched from a few centrally located shore sites. Cover, deception, jamming, and decoys should also be easier to employ near home than in open ocean. This is not cheap, but it is better than blindly patrolling up and down the coast, hoping to stumble over some enemy submarine.
Mr. Thamm’s article quotes all the cliches comparing diesel to nuclear submarines. “Coolant pumps ... are noisy.” Many of our nuclear subs don’t even use coolant pumps at patrolling speeds. “There is a considerable infrared signature from the cooling water spewing from the reactor [sic] into the sea.” The cooling water doesn’t even come close to the reactor and it is almost instantly diluted by the enormous volume of water in the
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sea. There is virtually no signature from that. A snorkeling diesel, however, can leave a significant infrared scar above the surface. But along our coasts, we control the air space and therefore can use infrared detectors. Enemy submarines can’t.
Thamm says, “The SSN can’t operate effectively in shallow coastal waters.” Having navigated a nuclear ballistic- missile submarine submerged in Long Island Sound I disagree. Nuclear submarines can operate in coastal waters.
Thamm claims that a larger crosssection for active sonar makes nuclear submarines worse for coastal ASW. I would be delighted if enemy submarines resorted to active sonar in our coastal waters. Doing this would highlight them to our ASW forces.
Mr. Thamm further states that “all other leading navies [have concluded] that the modern diesel-electric submarine is ideal ... for shallow-water ASW.” He submits the following characteristics to prove his case: modem diesel boats are elusive, quiet, and their virtue lies in an ability to remain undetected. They can creep along at exceptionally low speeds for extremely long times. He claims that it is acceptable for them to be noisy while snorkeling since the coastal area makes lots of noise itself. (Why, then, did he complain about the putative noise of nucs?)
These qualities, while impressive, do not constitute superior ASW. Mr. Thamm has actually made the case for the effectiveness of diesels in a coastal attack role, not ASW. It would not take particularly new or exotic technology to achieve those characteristics. Virtually every attribute Mr. Thamm has imputed to new diesels could also have been found in the Barbel (SS-580), one of the last three U.S. Navy diesel boats. One of her commanders ran the Barbel for seven days on a 1970s technology battery without snorkeling. When she then entered into an exercise with two nuclear boats, she still had about 20% of her battery energy left. If the Cold War continues to wind down, we won’t have much of a need to perform creeping interdiction off someone else’s coast. If we do, we may want to get there faster than a 12-knot snorkel transit would allow. In contingency and limited- objective warfare, our surface ships perform surface interdiction much better and much cheaper.
Other navies, however, may find interdiction of surface ships—off our coasts or off their own—a worthwhile goal. We should be concerned about the threat from submarines operating in shallow waters, but Coast Guard subs are not the systems to control that threat.
“Camel Support”
(See P. E. Bowen, p. 70, February 1991
Proceedings)
Justin F. Gleichauf, author of Unsung Sailors: the Naval Armed Guard in World War II (Nava! Institute Press, 1990)-~ Captain Bowen has shown excellent awareness of the camel’s military potential in desert operations.
I do not wish to detract from the fine article, but the Army used camels more than 130 years ago, based on a recommendation approved by then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. In 1856 a cargo of 33 camels was landed at the port of Indi- anola, Texas, causing “consternation among army hostlers and absolute panic among livestock.” The camels and their Middle-Eastern handlers were part of an experiment to use camels as pack animals in the arid Western frontier. After the camels arrived, the first (and last) U.S. Army Camel Corps set up base at Camp Verde, near San Antonio.
One phase of the project used camels to survey a wagon road from Fort Defiance, New Mexico Territory, to California. The expedition was led by a most unlikely leader, former Navy Lieutenant Edward F. Beale. Beale later explored the vast West in company with Kit Carson. Beale successfully completed a 4,000- mile trip through tortuous terrain and hostile Indian country without losing a man and with profound admiration for the performance of his camels, one of which he rode himself.
Lieutenant Beale became a general in the Union Army, and later Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Beale was an ardent advocate of “camel support,” but the Civil War and the advance of the iron horse across the West halted the experiment. However, anyone who can still remember “Get Your Kicks on Route 66,” should know that the famed highway west, almost without change, follows the original route laid out by Lieutenant Beale and his camel train.
“Hang Together, or Hang Separately”
(See T. L. Gatchel, pp. 56-62, November 1990; P. J. Docrr, p. 75. January 1991 Proceedings)
Colonel Peter F. Herrly, U.S. Army, Chief, Joint Doctrine Branch, 57, The Joint Staff— Colonel Gatchel and Captain Doerr note that Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, basically is a retitled multiservice publication and may warrant a review.
As part of the joint doctrine development process, a comprehensive review is
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under way, led by the Navy’s Joint Doctrine Branch (OP-607). Incidentally, the Navy is also the lead agent for much of the extensive new family of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, including publications on contingency operations, shipboard helicopters, sealift support, riverine operations, joint logistics over the shore, and combat search and rescue.
Overall, “business is booming” in the joint-doctrine arena, thanks to the tremendous support and active involvement of the five services and the ten combatant commands. In the near future, we anticipate completing more than 50 post-1986 “new starts” in joint doctrine, designed to enhance the efficiency and combat effectiveness of joint operations. The Navy’s steadfast support in this effort has been an indispensable part of the joint doctrine community’s success to date.
“Evil FitReps”
(See J. L. Byron, p. 90, December 1990; B. J.
O’Donnell, pp. 20-21, March 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mark S. Danley, U.S. Navy—Our use of the fitness report as both an evaluation and a counseling tool is dangerous, presenting inconsistent and often mutually exclusive goals. The report should be used for evaluation and not as a counseling tool. My suggestion: Don’t show the fitness report to the eval-, uated officer. The officer has no need or right to review a subjective performance evaluation that is primarily used to support special program selection and promotion. I propose:
- Eliminating review of the report by the officer
- Continuing use of the same basic form
- Requiring a related counseling session (documented on the fitrep)
- Implementing an additional feature (e.g., feedback postcard) that the fitness report has been received at Naval Military Personnel Command
Counseling is vital to any young officer’s professional growth, development, and grooming to support fully his commander. However, counseling is and should be separate from an evaluation that reports on an officer’s ability/suit- ability to advance and meet the Navy’s needs. Formal counseling must occur for lieutenant commanders and below and should occur for more senior officers. I strongly believe that this counseling should be documented on the fitness report. Perhaps a statement such as:
“I, Captain J. P. Jones (the reporting senior) have formally, personally, discussed Lieutenant Smith’s strengths and weaknesses regarding his professional and personal performance and conduct on (date of counseling).”
I believe every commanding officer would be willing to make this statement. Also, I believe commanders will adjust the “ritual dance of marks ...” and stop lies or exaggerations that currently abound.
Fitness reports can then be used to evaluate officer suitability and performance, and an officers’ performance records will become more clear and therefore more useful. Specific adverse matter should continue to be brought to the attention of the officer. An additional statement would be required for these cases: “This counseling has included recommendations to Lieutenant Smith that may ensure improvement in the following areas (specific topics included).”
This statement would be included only for instances of adverse remarks using those cases defined by the fitrep instruction in Chapter One, NAVMILPERS- COMINST 1611.1A.
The current system allows the Navy to select those officers best suited for advancement and special programs. However, we can improve an already-effec- tive system by detailing performance appropriately on a fitness report and counseling officers separately on required improvements.
We can and should quickly restore honesty to the fitness report process.
“The Seawolf: Crash Dive!”
(See N. Polmar, pp. 133-134, October 1990;
J. I. Lieberman and W. P. Lawrence, pp. 2023, February 1991 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Jack A. Garrow, U.S. Navy (Retired), Vice President, Public Relations, Newport News Shipbuilding— Senator Lieberman presented a spirited defense of Seawolf with which we agree. He also equally defended his constituent, Electric Boat, in answer to Polmar’s observation that “logic and financial considerations. . . . indicate that Newport News (Shipbuilding) should be the single submarine shipbuilder.”
We appreciate the senator’s fervor for both Seawolf and his constituent and our competitor, Electric Boat. But, with all due respect, the senator got some facts wrong. And, in the interest of keeping the record correct, please note the following.
Senator Lieberman contends categorically that “Electric Boat is the only firm experienced in the new modular construction system.” Not true. Newport News Shipbuilding invested heavily in what is now the world’s most modern
Modular submarine construction facility, designed specifically to optimize Seawolf production. Shortly, Newport News will christen its fifth Los Angeles-class SubMarine produced in that facility.
Newport News has been building aircraft carriers in a modular process since 1981.
The senator states that “Electric Boat has the advantage of a larger design and engineering workforce, which partially explains why the first Seawolf was awarded to the Connecticut shipyard in 1989.”
First, the construction contract was not awarded based on the size of either shipyard’s design and engineering staff. It Was awarded solely on the lowest bid.
Second, as to design and engineering staffs, the relative size is difficult to determine, because the shipyards are organized differently. But, to that point, Newport News employs about 5,000 designers and engineers. It has the largest and best computer capability in the industry and has a patented three-dimensional Modeling system called VIVID for ship and submarine design that is unmatched *n the industry. The Navy named Newport News as the lead design yard for the Seawolf and also the Los Angeles class, now being built by both yards. Although Newport News might have the largest design and engineering staff of the two shipyards, size is not relevant in this issue. Capability and talent are, and Newport News will gladly stand on those two attributes.
Finally, the senator contends that because “building submarines is different from building carriers,” it leads “to proportionally more, not less, overhead.” The subject of overhead is complex. There are basic, generic costs of operating a shipyard that are spread across the entire business base. Usually, the larger the base, the lower the overhead rate. Also, costs unique to carriers or submarines, or any other program, are charged directly to that program. We certainly could debate the point of overhead with the Senator. Although we have built Many other types of ships, naval and commercial, we are no strangers to subMarine construction. Newport News began building submarines at the turn of the 20th century.
Newport News Shipbuilding and Electric Boat are both fine nuclear submarine builders. That is why both are still building them when others have long since disappeared from competition.
It is in the best interest of the Navy, both shipyards and this country’s industrial base that both shipyards continue building submarines. However, if only one must build them, we would have to agree on this occasion with Mr. Polmar!
“Overhaul the Medals and
Awards System”
(See V. Zoschak, Jr., pp.81-82, February 1991
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Michael J. O’Donnell, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve— Although I understand Commander Zos- chak’s frustration in his encounters with the Coast Guard awards system, I do not agree that the appropriate solution is a radical overhaul of the medals and awards process, or that award approval- and-issue authority should be delegated to unit commanding officers.
The award nomination not only honors the individual for extraordinary performance, but also spotlights the recipient as an example worthy of emulation throughout the service. If local units authorize awards for their own personnel, this public element of the “Attaboy!” will be lost, solely to improve timeliness. During my tenure as commanding officer of a reserve unit, I liked the awards-review chain because it enabled the good word about the person being nominated to get out. Local unit-award authority would lessen servicewide awareness of the performance. This is exactly the opposite of what Commander Zoschak is attempting to accomplish.
As he notes, external review creates a degree of quality control and objectivity in determining whether an individual (or unit) has performed well enough to rate an award when compared to the level of performance throughout the District, Area, or the entire Coast Guard. A commanding officer can lose sight of the true level of performance if the sample for comparison is condensed to a small number of personnel.
I’d like to offer my own anecdote. My reserve unit consisted of several highly motivated individuals. I began to view this sustained superior performance as the norm for the entire Coast Guard Reserve. When I recommended a Boatswains Mate First Class for a decoration, I selected the Commandant’s Letter of Commendation Ribbon, because he was an excellent performer among a unit full of outstanding people. I was given a pleasant “reality check” when the District Awards Board returned the nomination to me with instructions to resubmit it as a recommendation for the Coast Guard Achievement Medal, a higher award.
In my experience, Awards Boards are not constituted to be an obstacle to recog-
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nition of exceptional performance. I believe the difficulties encountered by Commander Zoschak in the awards system are local administrative weaknesses, rather than the result of unsound policy. The Awards Board also doesn’t hesitate to upgrade an award where warranted. As for timeliness, Awards Boards have been known to come looking for nominations for departing commanding officers when the executive officer hasn’t taken the initiative.
I’m afraid that delegation of award authority to local commanding officers would make the integrity of the awards process much more vulnerable to even the appearance of abuse, a risk that simply is not justified by merely improved timeliness. Unlike Commander Zoschak, I believe the awards system works well, and should not be changed.
“Don’t Give Up on the Ship”
(See W. D. O’Neil, pp. 46-51, January 1991
Proceedings)
D. Theodore Edelmann, fire protection engineer—Captain O’Neil presented a detailed view of the vulnerability of the surface combatant: she cannot hide. Because of the obvious possibility of damage, the Navy trains its personnel in damage control and fire fighting. The best defense is a good offense as proved by the men of the USS Stark (FFG-31). I would like to add some information to support Captain O’Neil.
First, seamen have received improved training and exposure over the past two- and-a-half years. This resulted from a Fire Fighter Certification program, enacted by then-Chief of Naval Education and Training Vice Admiral Nils Thun- man. This program restructured the course outlines (from recruit training through advanced team training), and enhanced the quality of training by applying some of the principles developed through research at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). These new principles added realism to the training fires and increased the control of the fires by using spray fires. The use of spray fires has been implemented at naval fire schools to provide a realistic exposure fire while reducing training injuries by providing instructors with “total” control of the training scenario. Further developments by NRL have improved the fire fighting tactics and equipment used for shipboard (and aviation) fire fighting.
Captain O’Neil stated many people are wrongly critical about the combustible properties of aluminum. But the true hazard associated with the use of aluminum for structural support and configuration on board ship was stated by Captain O’Neil, specifically, that most aluminum alloys begin melting below 1000°F. The average flame temperature is approximately 1500°F. This being the case, aluminum structures can collapse under their own weight, which has been demonstrated by other NRL research projects. Therefore, damage repair and fire fighting operations cannot be effectively conducted when ladders cannot be traversed— if standing—and fire fighters cannot expect any exposure protection from bulkheads that may also collapse under their own weight.
While radar cross-section can be reduced, it cannot be eliminated. And although the naval fleet is well-equipped to protect itself against attack, the ability to control the mitigation of damage, once imposed, can save the ship and her men.
“Marine Corps Schools Produce Noncommitted Officers”
(See P. J. Carroll, pp. 83-84, November 1990 Proceedings)
Captain R. G. Steffens, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve—Lieutenant Carroll’s attempt to identify the problems in the military indoctrination and professional development of Marine Corps officers is on the mark in many cases, but to state that Marine Corps schools produce non-com- . mitted officers is not entirely accurate or tme. His case may be better stated, “What are the men and women who desire to lead Marines committed to?” Despite its name, the Officer Candidate School (OCS) is not a school but a screening, evaluation, and commissioning program. Lieutenant Carroll correctly notes that the highly motivated men and women who enter OCS are not being adequately challenged. Eight hours of sleep per night, weekends off, and the lack of any real mental or physical stress has led many to believe the officer corps is a nine-to-five job—not a demanding and rewarding way of life.
On the other hand, Lieutenant Carroll’s analysis of the “promotion- competitive” atmosphere misses the mark. A lack of objective scoring in OCS and The Basic School (TBS) will lead to subjective assignments of military occupation specialities (MOSs) by an already overburdened staff, and a situation where face-time with TBS instructional and company staff will have undue influence on MOS and initial Fleet Marine Force assignments.
The Basic School is an officer-indoctrination course, not a school. The brief modules of instruction are designed to give second lieutenants a fundamental understanding of the Marine air-ground team, an overview of the Marine Corps, and a solid foundation upon which to develop leadership skills. A lieutenant does not leave TBS with a lineal number carved in granite, but with some fundamental skills in leading Marines. From this point, an officer must make it on individual merit. Those who found the shortcuts at OCS and TBS will be more likely to come up short in the FMF. Those who discovered and continue to develop the real spirit of OCS and TBS, when faced with the hard choices and challenges of being strong officers, will make the correct choices and find themselves respected by subordinates, peers, superiors, and—most of all—themselves.
“Holland’s Hollands: An Irish Tale”
(See R. Compton-Hall, pp. 59-63, February
1991 Proceedings)
Captain Roy C. Smith III, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The article about John Holland and his submarines briefly mentioned Halstead’s Intelligent Whale. Let me add a footnote about that remarkable craft, now displayed at the Navy Memorial Museum in the Washington Navy Yard.
When I was the Museum Director 1966-70, that ancient submarine fascinated me. It was shaped like a short, fat cigar, powered by six men on a hand crank, and its weapon system was a diver who emerged through a double-lock hatch under the bow to attach a limpet mine to the enemy hull. But it failed its acceptance trials and the Navy lost all interest in submarines until Holland’s time.
One day, a gentleman came into my office and introduced himself as Halstead’s grandson. This was the first time he had ever seen his grandfather’s marvelous invention, of which he had heard so many stories as a boy. He said the craft had worked perfectly, that his grandfather had taken his grandmother on an excursion beneath the Hudson Bay only a few days before the acceptance trials without any problems. But the night before the trials, his grandfather, who was a bit of a philanderer, was caught in the wrong bed and shot dead. Unfortunately he was the only one who had ever operated the Whale; no one else on the staff had any experience in that regard and, although they did their best, the submarine sank. She was raised in time to save the crew but that was the end of the Navy trials.
“The Pole At Last!!!”
(See T. D. Davis, pp. 36-42, February 1991
Proceedings)
Ted Heckathorn—In 1970, young astronomer Dennis Rawlins wrote a provocative article, “Peary and the North Pole: The Lingering Doubt,” (June 1970 Proceedings), which raised serious questions about Rear Admiral Robert E. Peary’s claim that he discovered the North Pole in 1909. Rawlins’.barrage stimulated explorers, scientists, and historians to reexamine Peary’s controversial North Pole claim. Now, with the Peary papers finally open to the public, the time bomb Rawlins activated 20 years ago appears ready to explode.
The National Geographic Society and the Peary family have strongly disagreed with Rawlins’s conclusion. The Peary family played an important role in Arctic exploration between 1891 and 1909, and
Who’s keeping score? Photogram- metric rectification, using shadows to determine the sun’s elevation and pinpoint location, has scored some points in the Peary-and-the-Pole debate. But is this enough? Major players in this controversy will square off again on 19 April 1991 (see pp. 20-21).
still maintains a connection with the people of North Greenland. Peary also had close ties with National Geographic from its inception in 1887 until his death in 1920. In 1908, National Geographic contributed a substantial sum to Peary’s expedition, and in 1909, after a cursory examination of his records, certified Peary’s North Pole claim.
Most geographical organizations and reference books, and even Congress accepted Peary’s claim on the basis of National Geographic’s certification, but a few individuals dissented. Thomas F. Hall, an elderly sea captain from Civil War days, became Peary’s nemesis. After a comprehensive examination of Peary’s 1906 and 1909 journeys, Hall concluded that Peary faked both claims. In 1917, at his own expense, Hall published Has the North Pole Been Discovered?, and mailed copies to most of the libraries in the United States. Peary conducted a secret investigation of Hall, but made no public response to the issues Hall raised. British historians Clements Markham and J. Gordon Hayes raised serious questions about Peary’s and other polar claims. General Greely, a prominent member of National Geographic’s Board of Trustees also doubted Peary’s claim. Many explorers remained silent on the subject after the National Geographic Society retaliated against Roald Amudsen in 1926, for his statements to the press.
Strong support from several famous polar explorers overcame the questions raised by Peary’s critics. Rear Admirals Richard Byrd and Donald MacMillan, along with explorers Robert Bartlett, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, William Herbert Hobbs and others, helped to maintain Peary’s claim until Rawlins opened his assault in 1970. In 1973, after Rawlins published his book, Peary at the North Pole: Fact or Fiction?, the tide shifted strongly against Peary.
In 1986, the National Geographic Society and the Peary family commissioned noted British explorer, Wally Herbert, to make a comprehensive examination of Peary’s records. Herbert was the first neutral outsider to gain access to Peary’s diary and personal papers. After two years of work, Herbert concluded that Peary did not reach the North Pole, based upon Peary’s navigational irregularities, claims of incredible speeds by dogsled, and conflicting accounts by Peary and his assistant, Matt Henson. Herbert published The Noose of Laurels, in 1988.
After Herbert published his results, the National Geographic Society engaged Rear Admiral Thomas Davies and his organization. The Navigation Foundation, to make another examination of Peary’s records. Admiral Davies and his staff spent more than a year examining Peary’s records and photographs. Davies, using photoanalysis techniques and current oceanographic charts, concluded that Peary and Henson did reach the North Pole, or got within a few miles of it. Davies published his results in 1990, with Robert E. Peary at the North Pole.
Most scientists, explorers, and polar historians hoped that the opening of Peary’s private papers in 1986, would finally resolve his North Pole claim.
These recently-opened records have raised far more questions than they have answered. Davies and Rawlins have analyzed previously unpublished photographs and their findings do not agree. More than 100 photographs taken by Henson at the “North Pole camp” have disappeared. Henson stated that he lent them to Peary, and that Peary refused to return them. After extensive searches, only a handful have been located.
Many other key records and documents are missing. The diaries kept by Robert Bartlett and Matt Henson have vanished, along with the field notebook of Professor Ross Marvin, the chief scientist and navigator, who was murdered during the expedition. Peary’s own diary contains huge gaps for the days when he said he was at the North Pole, as well as most of his return journey. There are no observations for longitude or compass variation, and no reliable documents as to the compass course they followed. In 1909, the compass variation was unknown over most of Peary’s route. Virtually all of the documentary evidence that could confirm or refute Peary’s North Pole claim is missing from the files.
The murder of Professor Marvin has kept a cloud over the expedition for 80 years. The popular professor served as Peary’s private secretary and third-incommand. Marvin led the scientific work and was the expedition’s expert in navigation. When the expedition returned in 1909, Marvin reportedly had drowned while crossing some thin ice. In 1926, Peary’s Eskimo foster son, Kudlooktoo, confessed that he murdered Marvin by shooting him in the head, to prevent the party from abandoning another Eskimo on the Arctic ice. Marvin’s family and some members of the expedition did not accept either story. Marvin’s death was investigated in a superficial manner. Among polar historians, only Hall probed deeply into the matter, and he had no access to Peary’s personal papers.
As new evidence continues to surface we may soon be able to unravel many of the mysteries surrounding Admiral Peary’s last expedition. Perhaps a reader of Proceedings can provide a clue to the whereabouts of the missing diaries of Bartlett and Henson, Henson’s photographs, Marvin’s notebook or the research papers of Thomas F. Hall of East Dennis, Massachusetts, and Omaha, Nebraska. When these missing ingredients are added, Peary’s North Pole claim will be like a time bomb with an 80-year fuse. The missing evidence will ignite the fuse and either Admiral Peary’s critics will be blown away or his reputation will be blown to shreds.
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The Hybrid Hydrofoil could answer the Navy’s need for a small ship that is fast, maneuverable, and cost-effective.
“Exploiting Defense Technology After the Cold War”
(See A. Skolnick and C. D. Allen, pp. 113—
117, November 1990; P. H. Crissy, p. 14,
February 1991 Proceedings)
John R. Meyer, Jr., David Taylor Research Center (DTRC)—The authors provide noteworthy examples of missions that small, low-cost ships should meet, albeit without specific values attached to such parameters as speed, range, motions, and payload. The statement that the “U.S. Navy has virtually no surface combatant ships or craft in the 50 to 3,600-ton range,” is incorrect. There are six 240-ton patrol combatant missile hydrofoils (PHMs) operating with PHM Squadron Two in Key West, Florida. These small, fast, maneuverable, and sea-kindly ships have provided the Navy with unique capabilities since 1983. Many articles about them have appeared in Proceedings and elsewhere.
The PHM is not known for its long range—since its design specifications did not call for high endurance—but it is well within the size range suggested by the authors, and could be designed to meet more stringent requirements, including transoceanic capability.
The authors also indicate that ‘‘all of the specialized hull forms that were examined over the past two decades sacrifice either payload or range, or both, to achieve improvements in speed.” This generalization is not sufficient to justify the dismissal of “advanced vehicles.” There is a price for speed, so invariably the question of “how much is speed worth?” enters into the equation. However, hybrid surface ship technology, which combines and capitalizes on positive aspects of various advanced vehicle and monohull attributes, should be added into the equation.
The David Taylor Research Center has by studying hybrid surface ships for more than 15 years. The technology has matured through analytical studies, feasibility studies, computer simulations, and model tests. Feasibility studies clearly indicate that at least one hybrid ship, the Hybrid Hydrofoil, is technically feasible and provides considerable potential over current small monohulls and conventional hydrofoils in terms of maximum speed, motions in rough water, and range at high speed.
A Hybrid Hydrofoil consists of a conventional monohull form with the addition of a long, slender, strut and lower body added to its keel. The lower body buoyant lift is augmented by the dynamic lift from a fully submerged foil system. Foil dynamic lift occurs at speeds of about 12-15 knots and above, when the upper hull is lifted from the water surface leaving only the small waterplane of the single strut at the interface. The foil automatic control system maintains pre-determined flying height and provides a stable platform in waves. The foil surfaces are sufficiently powerful to counter roll, pitch, and heave motions that would occur with a conventional monohull in high sea states. Propulsion of a Hybrid Hydrofoil is provided by one or more prime movers in the upper hull, either driving through a mechanical Z-drive, or an electric transmission system, to one or more propellers on the stern of the lower hull. An alternate arrangement is to place the entire propulsion system in the lower hull, thereby eliminating the Z-drive requirement.
Specifically, the payoffs of Hybrid Hydrofoil technology for small ships are:
- Retention of the favorable hydrofoil characteristics in terms of high speed, excellent seakeeping, and good maneuverability
- Improved hydrodynamic efficiency at speeds greater than about 20 knots with relatively low-speed degradation in waves (The ship does not have to slow down; in fact, it is better to maintain higher speeds for good motion control)
- Favorable flow conditions around the symmetrical lower body of a Hybrid Hydrofoil provides improved propulsive efficiency compared to a conventional ship propeller arrangements or current hydrofoil waterjet systems
- Reduced surveillance signature by a significant magnitude relative to a conventional monohull of comparable displacement or a hydrofoil with multiple struts because the single slender strut at the water surface produces a very small wake
- Nose of lower hull provides ideal location for a sonar without the addition of another appendage
- Greater range and endurance at high speeds than either a conventional monohull or hydrofoil of comparable size by combining high fuel fraction with relatively high hydrodynamic and propulsive efficiencies
If the U.S. Navy really needs and wants small, mission-capable, long-range 'ships. Hybrid Hydrofoil technology as described above should be considered. The issue of cost of these ships, when placed in the proper perspective of the cost of the Navy’s 7,000 to 9,000-ton ships, will be seen as a giant step forward for affordability.
“The First Cruise Missile”
(See J. H. Bothwell, pp. 56-57, December 1990
Proceedings)
Theodore Spahn—The sidebar on Hanna Reitsch quite properly paid tribute to a brave and skilled aviatrix, but it’s a pity that you misspelled both her forename and her surname.
Incidentally, Miss Reitsch was the only woman ever to receive a rarely awarded medal, the Combined Pilot- Observer Badge in Gold with Diamonds.
She flew out of Berlin in a small plane (the last one to leave the beleaguered city) shortly before the Soviets captured it in 1945. After the war, she worked as an aviation instructor, and set a new German record for glider flight in 1970, when she was in her late fifties.
I
“Time To Take a Flying Jump”
(See R. F. Dunn, pp. 107-108, January 1991
Proceedings)
Colonel James W. Orr, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Bravo Zulu to Vice Admiral Dunn, for his discussion of powered-lift airplanes on board ship! Having ^isspent a good portion of my youth fly- lng tailhook airplanes off several ships, I limbed into my first Harrier in 1970 with a real “show-me” attitude. To say the least, I became a convert. However, as good as the AV-8 series has been for its Primary mission, detractors have used it as a club to beat on the powered-lift conCePt. Let me explain.
The Marine Corps wanted a quick- response close-air-support (CAS) system.
Ashore or afloat, the AV-8B is so superior in performance to its predecessor—the AV-8A—it almost should not share the Harrier name.
The vertical takeoff (VTO) capability of the AV-8 made it very attractive for the mission, and we chose this airplane, which could be positioned temporarily a few (10-20) miles from potential targets, just out of enemy artillery range. The alternative, to meet a 5-10 minute response time, was airborne loiter with a conventional airplane, with the attendant Use of fuel, parts, aircrew time, and, quite often, jettisoned ordnance—all of which added demand on an already saturated logistic pipeline. While the VTO may be the only way to launch in many instances, it is an admittedly inefficient way to muscle payload into the air. If additional payload is required, a short takeoff (STO)—using a few hundred feet of the road, matting, grass field or flight deck—takes advantage of aerodynamic wing lift to multiply the payload many times. So, while I would never dismiss the VTO capability, our early emphasis on VTO gave the Harrier the reputation of being as short-legged little airplane that wouldn’t carry much—great for air- shows but not much else. Also, the AV-8 is subsonic and doesn’t (but soon will) have a radar. No matter how many times we explained why we bought the airplane, it was constantly compared to the F-4/F-14/F-18 as an all-weather fighter and the A-6/A-7 for range and payload, usually assuming a VTO by the AV-8.
Since the 1980s, the Marine Corps, the Royal Air Force, and the Spanish Navy has flown the AV-8B follow-on to the AV-8A. Although it is based on the same propulsion concept, the AV-8B is such a marked improvement over the AV-8 A that it shouldn’t share the AV-8 or Harrier name. Ashore and afloat, the AV-8B is dramatically superior in terms of flying qualities, range/payload performance and systems capability. In the VTO mode, the AV-8B has double the range or payload of its AV-8 A predecessor. With a 1,150- foot takeoff roll (or 750 feet with 20 knots wind-over-deck) the new AV-8B night-attack version will get airborne with a variety of ordnance loads greater than 5,000 pounds and a full load of fuel. The range with these more respectable payloads is in the same league with the F-16 and F/A-18, although the Marine Corps emphasis is still on those shorter ranges associated with quick-response CAS from forward locations.
On to the shipboard aspects: First, as Admiral Dunn notes, STO/VL will reduce and eventually eliminate reliance on catapults and arresting gear. At least three times in my short memory, (light operations have been made impossible by mishaps that have left the flight deck cratered and/or machinery unserviceable— and not even as a result of enemy action. In all these cases, a few STO/VL airplanes on board could have continued flight operations. In this day and age, we should eliminate opportunities for the enemy to put us out of business even temporarily. The ability to operate with almost any relative wind is another obvious carrot for the ship’s skipper, as is the simplification of the deck spot.
Admiral Dunn correctly notes the two biggest advantages of large ships: stability and economies/efficiency of scale. There is also a corollary to the stability issue. Consider a fixed-wing pilot attempting a landing on a moving deck. The instant that he turns off the 180° or leaves marshal, he is predestined to take whatever deck angles and movement that will exist when he and the deck rendezvous at some point a few miles ahead. Even during the wildest deck motions, however, the STO/VL pilot can hover for a few moments and choose a relatively steady deck for his landing.
There is an interesting mutation on the “economy of scale” and “alternate (emergency) landing platform” ideas raised by Admiral Dunn. Credible studies have looked at basing AV-8B-class attack airplanes on board smaller ships in company with and under the protective umbrella of the very capable CV or CVN. The result is an increase in air-to-ground sorties by a factor far in excess of the relative numbers of the additional attack airplanes. This wouldn’t be the answer to all our problems, but it could make an adversary’s life very uncomfortable.
Finally, I offer some numbers to support Admiral Dunn’s debunking of the “performance penalty” myth surrounding powered lift airplanes. It costs 550 pounds of weight to give the AV-8B its V/STOL or STO/VL capability. It would have cost 800-1,200 pounds to turn a bird of similar size and performance into a tailhook carrier airplane.
No reasonable person would recommend that we precipitously abandon the conventional-takeoff-and-landing/cata- pult/trap concept that we know and trust, but we should keep our minds open to a better way. A start toward a Navy STO/ VL air wing would be to integrate a squadron or two of (preferably Navy) our current generation AV-8B STO/VL airplanes into existing CV operations. After some time at sea, the guys on the sharp end of the spear could then spell out the real requirement, based on their operational experience. We might be very pleasantly surprised.
One potential problem if this happens: What will our grandchildren call the 'fail- hook Association?
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