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By Lieutenant Commander Robert J. Stewart, U.S. Naval Reserve
The Navy has been criticized for refusing to incorporate changes in ship design that would make the fleet more environmentally acceptable. The service’s response has often been that naval vessels are designed to perform a specific combat or combat-support role within the fleet.
Yet, the fleet operates in peacetime conditions most of the time. It uses the same harbors and plies the same seas as do the merchant vessels of all flags— which are required to comply with environmental regulations. Indeed, owners often put new equipment on merchant vessels in anticipation of forthcoming regulations.
To avoid comparing apples and oranges, I have limited my comparison of civil and military environmental equipment to fleet oilers, a type similar to the merchant fleet tankers that must comply with the strictest environmental regulations and have recently come under a great deal of scrutiny.
Navy oilers are assigned to different groups within the fleet. The oilers (AOs), fast combat support ships (AOEs), and replenishment oilers (AORs) have Navy crews; approximately 18 such ships are in service. The remainder of the Navy’s oiler fleet is assigned to the Military Sealift Command (MSC), whose ships have civilian crews. All of the ships deploy to support Navy combatants, and consequently steam to all parts of the world. They routinely enter foreign ports, and they should comply with the regulations in effect.
Over the last decade, ship owners have made major changes in operating procedures in response to regulatory changes
The USNS Guadalupe (T-AO-200) leaves the dock after her christening on 5 October 1991. She can carry 183,500 barrels of oil in her 18 large tanks. Capable of 20 knots, in many ways she is a state-of-the-art ship. But her maximum draft is 36 feet and she lacks the safety of a double bottom.
in virtually every area of operations. Many of these changes reflect increased concern for the environment. [See “Tankers on the Wide Common,” Proceedings October 1991, pages 60-64. |
The changes in the oil pollution regulations extend not only to ship operations, but also to ship design. The use of oil- water separators and oil-water monitors has become common on many different types of vessels. In addition, regulations concerning segregated ballast tanks (SBTs) and crude oil washing (COW) systems have affected the design of tank vessels. More recently, discussions have turned to the use of double bottoms or double hulls on tank vessels.
The Military Sealift Command operates the largest U.S.-flag merchant fleet and the majority of its vessels are oilers that are assigned to either MSC Atlantic or MSC Pacific. The fleet consists of a number of relatively modern vessels. The USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187)-class replenishment oilers are the newest vessels in the fleet and are still coming off the construction line at the Avondale and Tampa Shipyards.
The biggest drawback in the design of the Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers is that the vessels do not have double bottoms or double hulls, even though it is apparent that the intent of Congress is to require double hulls for tankers calling at U.S. ports. The Navy and MSC have often been leaders in complying with environmental regulations on their vessels, yet some of these new oilers—which cost about $130 million each—will be obsolete before they are launched. The problem, moreover, is one that cannot easily be corrected by retrofitting the vessels already in the fleet. Retrofitting a double bottom or a double hull is a major undertaking and a very costly process. The money would be much better spent in design changes—rather than construction order changes—and ensuring that modern pollution-prevention equipment is on board.
recyclables from the trash before burning, and take them ashore for recycling.
As the Navy’s oiler fleet remains dockside for longer periods because of budget constraints, the problem of air pollution assumes more importance. This problem becomes critical in harbors that already have heavy commercial traffic or considerable shore-generated air pollution problems. Problems are not limited to operational combustion controls; they include fuel-oil purifying, stack-gas scrubbing, and hydrocarbon venting coupled with inert gas. These concerns address not only the vessel’s main engine, but also the auxiliaries most vessels operate.
Increasing air pollution has led to yet more regulations. Initially, these regulations only concerned themselves with the pollution caused by vessels blowing tubes while in port or transiting confined channels. More recently, the concern has grown to include stack-exhaust air quality while the vessel is alongside. Many newer vessels have solved this problem, in part, by shutting down the main engine while they are tied up. This is not a viable solution on steam turbine vessels, however, especially vessels on short turnaround time schedules. Other attempts to limit air pollution include automated combustion controls and fuel oil purifiers that can be used to maintain high-quality fuel oil bum mixtures, and good quality fuel oil, respectively.
The venting of inert and hydrocarbon gases into the atmosphere by tank vessels during cargo transfers has drawn attention recently, because some hydrocarbon vapors are hazardous. Shoreside venting of inert gas or discharge of gas to ballast tanks are viable alternatives to unregulated venting. Ship-to-ship transfer of vapors can be used during lightering operations.
To Navy and MSC credit, the Kaiser- class oilers meet or exceed virtually all pollution and solid-waste regulations presently in effect. They are equipped with oil-water separators and oil-water monitors in both engine room and cargo spaces. The design also includes SBTs. The slop oil system on these vessels uses a three-tank stepped system to decant oil from the water before disposing of the water and pumping the slops ashore.
MSC adopted a “no-styrofoam” policy on its vessels several years ago, and thus does not have to deal with the problem at sea. The ships are equipped with incinerators that enable them to comply with the Marpol regulations even though these regulations won’t apply to the MSC vessels until 31 December 1993. War
Oil-pollution prevention equipment is improving. Oil can not only be monitored, but also separated from water in a process to limit the volume of oil discharged overboard. A variety of systems are in use; most monitor the clarity or opacity of the fluid against a standard to determine the concentration of oil in parts per million.
Oil separators, on the other hand, actually attempt to separate the oil from the water to eliminate overboard discharge. A number of these systems use a screening process. Fine-grained screens allow water to pass but trap the oil. Oil sludge can be macerated, mixed with water, and subjected to screening. Other systems use a centrifuge to separate oil and water by specific gravity. In either case, the oil is stored in a holding tank for later discharge ashore. Using systems now available, vessels can virtually eliminate the overboard discharge of oil during normal operations.
Shipowners are still criticized for their solid waste disposal procedures. Solid waste includes not only trash, but also sewage from the hotel services. Trash can be something as highly controlled as discarded message traffic, or something as mundane as last night’s dinner garbage.
It may be something hazardous or something innocuous. Whatever the case, it must be disposed of properly.
Sewage-treatment systems are now required on board ships; those in use are of two distinct types. Biological process- mg systems use biological organisms to mgest the waste water and process it; these systems require a stable environment for the organisms. Chemical-mechanical systems use a macerater to proCess solids to a liquid stage, after which they can be chemically treated along with mher waste water prior to overboard mscharge.
The MarPol 73/78, Annex V addresses e disposal of trash and controlled subounces such as plastic or styrofoam.
any vessels now use incinerators to Atrn these and other unrecyclable items, k any military vessels already have ship- °ard incinerators to destroy classified ,oe«ages, although the systems designed 0° handle the vessel’s trash would obvi- % need to be much larger. juWarships generate considerable trash iSSK feeding the crew' Much of this waste and lodegradable and can be ground up jn discharged over the side when at sea; Us(M>rt' °ther methods obviously must be in^ ‘ft's the remaining trash—includ- 'va*t‘le majority of the food-packaging cjVj,e (bat must be incinerated. Some lan companies require crews to sort
ships and public vessels were given a five-year compliance timetable under the Marpol regulations.
The sewage disposal systems on these ships are biological sewage-disposal units that use microorganisms to process the solid and liquid waste. These systems are very effective, especially for vessels that are under way much of the time. Waste is processed to the point that only wastewater is pumped over the side—at sea— or into a sewage system in port.
The use of inert gas systems in tank- ship operations is not new, and the majority of operators have been in compliance with the regulations since their inception in 1983. MSC vessels, however, operate without inert gas systems. Their marine diesel fuel and JP-5 (Navy jet fuel) cargoes are both Class-D combustibles and do not require inerting because of their high flash points. As the air-pollution regulations in harbors around the world become more stringent, however, these vessels may have problems loading or unloading.
MSC vessels are in compliance with present hydrocarbon and inert gas vapor- recovery regulations, but may soon require retrofitting. MSC might charter ships for point-to-point cargo runs and use its oilers strictly for underway replenishment operations.
It is interesting that all of the other classes of oilers in the fleet—AOs, AOEs and AORs—are all constructed with double bottoms (and have been for some time.) These vessels, it seems, are built to combat standards, while the MSC oilers are being constructed to civilian standards. The irony is that civilian standards have just undergone significant change, and will soon require not just double bottoms, but also double hulls.
Overall, the pollution record of the Navy and the Military Sealift Command is outstanding. The fleet has operated with well-designed and well-maintained vessels for years. It is a shame to allow the shortsightedness of planners and designers to allow this record to fall by the wayside in order to save money, let alone the tremendous cost to the government and the environment if a single-hull vessel should be damaged or grounded and spill its cargo into the sea.
Commander Stewart teaches at the California Mar itime Academy, Vallejo, California. He holds a Master Mariner's license and has served on numerous tankers, dry cargo, and ocean-towing vessels; he is the navigator on board the Academy's training vessel Golden Bear. He wrote “Can Double Bottom Tankers Reduce Oil Pollution?” for Proceeding June 1990. pages 85-88.
Reservists Are Ready for Submarines
By Commander Alan K. Hayashida, U.S. Naval Reserve
Today’s Naval Reserve empire emphasizes mobilization readiness—our ability to respond instantly and augment the nation’s naval forces in the event of a crisis; we spare no effort to achieve that end, at least in terms of paperwork and rhetoric. But in the submarine force, new technology and tactics are continually evolving at a dizzying pace, and the restrictions imposed by the nuclear-propulsion program severely—and perhaps unnecessarily—restrict the areas in which reservists are allowed to participate actively. We should reexamine the structure and content of our mobilization training plans and programs, and the underlying policies, to see if we are really doing enough of the right things.
Mobilization readiness in the Naval Reserve depends on two factors: personnel and training. To a great extent, however, personnel readiness is dictated by factors over which unit commanders have little control—total force manning levels, the division of billets between active and reserve components, and the geographic locations of specific reserve units coupled with the availability of personnel in those areas who possess the required specialty skills. That leaves training as the major variable.
What is wrong with what we are doing now? For starters, we spend too much time on evolutions of limited value. Most Naval Reservists, submariners included, devote one weekend per month plus a two-week annual training period (formerly active duty for training or ACDUTRA) to their reserve careers. Granted, many routinely dedicate significantly greater amounts of time, but as a general rule, we spend only 36 days, or 10% of any given year, as weekend warriors. The time we have available to develop and refine our warfare skills to the levels required is almost ludicrously small when compared to the magnitude of the task. We cannot afford to waste time on unimportant issues. This may seem obvious, but we continue to do it.
For example, we routinely spend numerous hours of our drill year preparing, presenting, or attending lectures on general military training subjects such as maintenance, material, and management; fire fighting; basic damage control; the Code of Conduct; and military rights and responsibilities. (This last item has on occasion taken up an entire drill weekend by itself.)
I do not mean to imply that such instruction has no value. The question though is one of priorities.
The problem is compounded by the plethora of administrative requirements levied upon us by the various echelons of command within the Naval Reserve hierarchy. During any given drill weekend, a submarine reserve officer can be called upon to spend more than half his time on administrative matters such as musters (as many as four per day); updating of Reserve Unit Assignment Documents; Individual Readiness Assessment Designators; individual and unit training plans, schedules and records, and, of course, the all-important enlisted evaluations and officer fitness reports. It often seems that we spend more time documenting and reporting readiness than in achieving it.
An officer unlucky enough to be the unit administrative or training officer— necessary steps along the road to command of a reserve unit—may spend the entire weekend entirely on paperwork. It is unfortunate that despite our much- touted efforts to reduce paperwork, our submarine reservists are regularly required to devote an enormous percentage of their precious drill time to preparing reports about other reservists, that are, worst of all, read only by other reservists.
We neither coordinate training nor employ resources adequately. Beyond the issue of time constraints and effort expended on projects of questionable or limited value, we frequently fail to ensure that we receive maximum benefit from the training time and opportunities that are available. Nor do we fully capitalize on the talent and resources present in our own ranks.
Periodically, the Pacific Fleet conducts major exercises—RIMPAC and PACEX—and force-wide calls go out for submarine reservists to support these evolutions as watch standers. To the best of my knowledge, however, it is only for these infrequent major exercises that we expend more than a token effort to organize a team approach that captures the unique benefits of large-scale group training. Why don’t we extend this practice to the many other regularly scheduled submarine operations—antisubmarine warfare exercises, submarine ice exercises, and even individual ship deployments and training cruises? Admittedly these operations may not be conducted on as grandiose a scale as RIMPAC, but they are still the types of tasks we will actually be performing after mobilization.
When we train with our gaining commands as individuals, we are more often than not assigned to assist our active-duty counterparts with selected portions of their duties. What we need is to take over whole functions, in much the same manner as we will be called upon to do in wartime. Dissenters will undoubtedly argue that it is difficult or even impossible to schedule and coordinate combined periods of active-duty training for large groups of individual reservists; that the varying demands of individual civilian employers and careers make such an approach just too hard. The rebuttal to any such argument is straightforward: If we cannot structure our private lives and civilian careers to allow us to receive essential training in groups, under conditions where we have ample time to plan, how can we even remotely conceive that we will be able to support mobilization on a moment’s notice?
Against the charge of not using available resources to reap the maximum benefit, the submarine reserve program as I see it has no alternative but to plead nolo contendere—no contest.
Our personnel come from all avenues of society and possess an enormous array of talents and professional skills. In our ranks are college professors, as well as program managers and project engineers for the defense contractors who are designing the sensors and combat systems that will be installed on the Seaw'o//'(SSN- 21) and future classes of submarines. We also have members who supervise civilian nuclear power plants and engineers who, as civilian employees of the Navy, regularly serve as embarked technical specialists for missions in areas such as Arctic warfare.
Yet we rarely seem to take full advantage of the fountain of knowledge these dual citizens can offer. Instead, their civilian professions are often seen as interfering with the advancement of their Naval Reserve careers. As a specific example, the Navy’s Arctic Submarine Laboratory in San Diego employs a nuffl' ber of reserve officers who are regularly called upon to deploy with fleet units in support of major exercises—and other missions. But the reserve community' rather than exploiting the experience these officers gain on deployments, views theif absence as harmful to their careers; atter
I
tial UlUch
quirn "T-----------------
outdated, helped develop a two- e Submarine Reserve Officers Up-
'gned. Reservists who recognized that of their knowledge was becoming
date Course to bring up to speed reserve officers who have been separated from active duty for an extended time. These courses, first instituted in 1982, have been of enormous value in allowing reservists to learn—from the same active-duty instructors who teach their colleagues in the fleet—about the most recent advances in their warfare specialty.
The basic concept behind the update course is good, but it is impossible for an officer who has been off active duty for ten years, and who may never have served on a nuclear-powered ship, to assimilate in two weeks all he has missed. Continuing the course is an excellent idea, but it should not be limited to an isolated experience that is repeated every five years or so; it should be merely the first step in a well-planned progressive training regimen that encompasses at-sea reinforcement of the skills taught in the classroom.
Annual Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanding officers’ conferences are also a very positive factor. These conclaves, attended by all submarine reserve unit commanding officers also draw representation from the COs of most of the active-force submarine gaining commands. For more than a decade, these gatherings have presented an unparalleled forum for reserve COs to discuss common problems with their peers and their regular-Navy counterparts.
Like the Reserve Update Course, the intent and benefit of these conferences should be expanded. Rather than addressing reserve problems primarily, however, many of which are unique to a single unit or specific geographic locale,
all, they have missed weekend drills.
Reservists rarely train on nuclear submarines. Unlike many of our surface warfare counterparts, who drill at sea on Naval Reserve Force ships, and our colleagues in the Naval Air Reserve, who fly first-line aircraft, submarine reserve personnel rarely, if ever, go out on nuclear submarines. The submarine reserve program consists exclusively of base, tender, and staff units. No units support individual nuclear submarines. Indeed, there were until very recently (perhaps some still remain) a good many senior submarine reserve officers who had never served on a nuclear boat, and had seen the inside of a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) only on a tour.
Several arguments have been advanced to justify this policy:
^Nuclear-powered ships are so complex and the safety requirements so stringent that the Navy could not possibly allow part-time sailors to operate these vessels.
^ fhe active forces already have enough Personnel to fill all submarine shipboardmanning requirements; consequently there ■s no requirement for reservists.
Without belaboring the weaknesses inherent in these arguments, are the safety requirements for an F/A-18 or a Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyer any less demanding or important than those for SSN?
Furthermore, I doubt that those who argue that our shipboard manning-levels are sufficient without reserve augmenta- h°n have adequately anticipated the need f°r crews to man the new ships that will Undoubtedly be built once a war begins, nr for relief crews similar to those used uring World War II to spell the regular chip’s complement between patrols. This °es not even address the possibility, ahuded to earlier, that many reservists Possess skills obtained through their civil- lan careers that make them every bit as Qualified to man our nuclear ships as Uiany of their active-duty counterparts.
Even if the arguments against having uservists serve on nuclear submarines ere valid, is it not essential for an in- y^'^unl mobilizing to a tender, squadron. r battle group staff to understand the ca- u Cities and limitations of the ships ose formations and deployments he ' u/^6 P'ann'n8 anc* organizing? p.. mt are we doing right? I have of1 rited a very grim picture of the state Cvsubmarine reserve readiness, but not
thing in this program should be
The USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720) and her crew returned to San Diego after supporting the Gulf War Coalition with Tomahawk missiles. Are there any reservists in this picture—or are nuclear submarines too complicated for "part-timers?"
more time should be set aside to allow the active-duty COs to air their problems: their reserve comrades may very well be able to offer solutions. The focus should be on the needs of the submarine force as a unified whole.
One of the submarine reserve force’s most noteworthy accomplishments dates from just a decade ago, when a handful
of junior reserve officers saw a need____
and an opportunity—to excel, and jumped on it. With the assistance of the active- duty operations staff, they established a program for reservists to qualify and stand watches as the Staff Command Duty Officer for the Commander Submarines Pacific representative (West Coast). This program allows specially qualified reservists to serve on an equal footing with their active-duty comrades in arms.
But the farsightedness of these officers did not stop there. The program they developed included sea duty for officers as part of a carrier battle group’s direct support staff, leading to qualification as a Submarine Element Coordinator. Unfortunately, the practical demise of the direct support concept prevented the full realization of this last objective. Nonetheless. it is obvious that reservists can provide real-time, meaningful assistance to their active-duty counterparts even in peacetime.
What must we do better? The crux of our problems lies in making better use of the valuable personnel resources in the Submarine Reserve Force. We should streamline our administrative requirements and actually reduce paperwork. We should reexamine the value of much of our present training, while more aggressively scheduling annual training for the unit as a whole, and capitalize on the diverse fleet operations being conducted everyday.
We must focus our attention on what is really needed, and redirect our efforts toward developing and refining the skills we will actually be required to use if and when we are ever mobilized. Then, and only then, will we be ready to go when the inevitable call comes.
Commander Hayashida served on active duty as engineering officer on board the USS Pollack (SSN- 603), and on the staff of the Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. He has worked since 1984 as an Arctic adviser and underway test director at the U.S. Navy Arctic Submarine Laboratory in San Diego, California, and has participated in seven submarine deployments under the ice.
Patrol Wing Commanders: Neglected Assets
By Lieutenant Commander Matthew T. Peters, U.S. Navy
The Navy’s main instrument for effecting a worldwide presence since World War II has been the carrier battle group—a significant offensive force capable of autonomously projecting power ashore without regard to local basing sites or international political concurrence. But we are overlooking the capability of shore-based patrol aviation to help the carrier battle groups maintain their competitive edge.
As U.S. Navy resources dwindle, naval leadership must continue to seek economical ways to maintain tactical capability by capitalizing on existing assets that have been overlooked in the glow of robust financial support. Just because “that is the way we’ve always done it,” is no longer germane. As an example, U.S. Air Force assets have been operating with battle groups with increasing regularity of late. Their contributions include Harpoon- equipped B-52s, KC-135 and KC-10 inflight refuelers, and E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.
Ironically, the Navy’s own patrol squadrons (VPs) have not yet achieved optimum integration with the battle group command structure. First on the list of things to do should be the periodic assignment of VP wing commanders to the carrier battle group antisubmarine or antisurface warfare (ASUW) commander role.
Current carrier battle group command- and-control doctrine is founded on the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept: a system where warfare commanders, i.e.. the ASW, ASUW, and antiair Warfare (AAW) commanders operate autonomously, pursuing their individual charters while the CWC monitors their actions and—theoretically—offers guidance only when they deviate from established policies.
This “command by negation” policy maximizes the force’s resources across the tactical spectrum by encouraging subordinate commanders to employ their skills innovatively without waiting for detailed orders. The ideal battle group, the one upon which the CWC concept was originally predicated, was composed of carriers or battleships, a minimum of two cruisers, and numerous escorts and support ships. In the case of a carrier battle group, the carrier air wing served as the main battery.
The CWC concept has thus far served the Navy well, with assigned responsibilities equitably distributed among the force’s senior officers. Unfortunately, recent force-structure reductions, coupled with personnel and operating tempo guidelines, have significantly reduced the size of individual battle groups. These decisions have stretched the ability of the remaining senior officers to meet all of the CWC requirements in what is an essentially horizontal command structure.
The battle group’s carrier and cruiser commanding officers, air wing commander, and the destroyer squadron commander assume the various roles under the aegis of a flag officer as CWC. In addition to the primary warfare commander roles, the battle group’s senior officers must also fill several other warfare coordinator roles—air resources, screen commander, helicopter element coordinator, etc.—as well as all of the warfare commander-coordinator alternates. Given the carrier battle group’s current structure, this equates to roughly six officers assuming primary responsibility for more than 25 roles, a difficult task even for seagoing naval officers. Inevitably, junior officers must support their commanding officer’s composite warfare concept assignments, with the result that limited manpower resources are shifted amid sometimes conflicting priorities.
The declining size of the battle groups over the past several years has forced battle group commanders to sacrifice some of the flexibility inherent in the CWC doctrine. Ideally, all of their warfare commanders and coordinators, and their alternates, would be equitably distributed among the force to capitalize on the strengths of the specific senior officers and their wardrooms, and to avoid a debilitating, perhaps disastrous, loss of ca- I pability should ships be lost during a wartime engagement.
Smaller carrier battle groups, however, have forced more responsibilities on fewer and fewer senior officers. The current trend to load carrier decks with offensive power-projection aircraft, combined with increased S-3 aircraft taskings—especially aerial refueling missions—and fewer deployed aircraft, has eroded corporate tactical ASW/ASUW expertise. As a result of these reductions, command de-
Battle group commanders have begun to use patrol aviation extensively, but they are missing a bet by not using VP wing commanders as composite warfare commanders.
cisions have now been delegated to mote 1 junior officers. The tactical and strateg,c decisions, however, which could havS both a direct impact on a 7,000-man bat' tie group—not to mention the political id1' plications—should be made at the capta*n' commander level, not delegated to ths lieutenant commander-lieutenant leve '
Pa i!°nS cornmand center—essentially a tei.C 'UP kit style ASW Operations Cen- at ASWOC) that can be rapidly erected ip) . ^ detachment site worldwide. These $hU°Vernents during Desert
3S6 d-Desert Storm operations, when P-
both the Persian Gulf and Red Sea [See “If It Was There, P-3s Found It,” Proceedings, August 1991, pages 41-43.] P-3 aircraft now regularly operate with Navy battle groups, generally providing either distant antisurface or antisubmarine services. The aircraft’s endurance, weapons capabilities, and significant on- station time allow carrier crews to take a break, without loss of any coverage or tactical capability. Despite impressive inroads, however, P-3 integration into the battle groups appears to have reached an impasse.
VP officers are routinely assigned to battle group commander and destroyer squadron staffs; VP liaison officers are temporarily embarked during major exercises; some 30-50% of carrier wardrooms are composed of VPers on their disassociated sea tours; and VP enlisted personnel are highly coveted by the other ASW communities.
Current policy, however, employs senior VP leadership in an area-ASW role instead of directly integrating them into the battle group command structure. Neither patrol squadron wing commanders nor their staffs play an active role in initial battle group planning nor in any phase of at-sea operational planning; instead, the community has relied upon senior lieutenants ashore and afloat to represent the community and espouse its ideals on a daily basis, while the ashore components merely provide services as requested. While these junior officers perform well, the absence of direct wing-commander involvement at sea eliminates a talent and sacrifices a synergism the Navy can no longer afford.
Integrating the P-3 community into the battle groups’ command structure should be a natural, evolutionary process to compensate for battle group size reductions, shifting airwing priorities, and increasing patrol aviation capabilities. Active employment of the VP wing commander and his staff, as either the ASW or ASUW commander, would ease the rigorous CWC requirements and bring into play the vast talents of professionals who have trained their entire careers for this role.
The VP wing commander is a major command captain at the zenith of his operational career. The typical career path to achieve this position has included three operational VP tours (including one as executive officer-commanding officer); at least one sea tour, normally on board a carrier; and several shore tours. His wing staff is designed to be led by several commanders and a staff of roughly 100 personnel. Data-management capabilities and communications nets parallel
The senior officer-in-waiting is the VP wing commander.
The current VP community is a direct descendant of World War IPs seaplane squadrons, which operated autonomously while providing over-the- horizon surface-target information for higher staff-level consumption. Today, the air crews fly a variety of P-3 Orion aircraft based at four (soon to be three) continental United States bases plus numerous overseas deployment and detachment sites.
The P-3, with 12-man crews and more than 12 hours of endurance, provides many tactically significant services. Authorized missions range from ASW and ASUW to mining and counter-narcotics operations; missions that can frequently be performed simultaneously because of crew size and proficiency. Individual crew performance is closely monitored and tracked via an intricate, objective training and readiness system; a system that induces fierce competitiveness among aircrews while producing a tremendously effective tactical and strategic force. All operational flights are briefed and debriefed by the wing commander’s staff at an ASW Operations Center to ensure this effectiveness.
Historically, the P-3 community has operated independently and somewhat askew from its surface and tactical aviation brethren. Over the past few decades aircrews have inherently pursued their Primary mission (anti-SSBN operations) alone, operating without wingmen and pften thousands of miles from their bases ln all types of weather conditions. This anti-SSBN mission, cued by intelligence sources and historical data, dovetailed Perfectly with the platform’s endurance.
P-3 battle group integration has only J'ecently evolved, perhaps accelerated y the addition of a formidable Harpoon tPssile capability (six missiles per air- rfaft) achieved in the early 1980s. Limed aircraft modifications made during s.e Inte 1980s, including the global portioning system, satellite communica- a°ns, officer-in-tactical command circuits, cn° inverse synthetic aperture radar, have ^ntbined with existing LINK 11 and sig- leant on-scene commander capabilities thr'nCreaSe ^'^'s utility in a multi jtfeat battle group environment. Its util erapS ^Urt*ler enhanced by the mobile op
those on board battle group flagships_____
the officer-in-tactical-command information exchange system (OTCIXS), the joint operational tactical system (JOTS), and the VP shore-hop net (a dedicated circuit connecting the ASWOC with the ASW module on the carrier)—and provide direct access into the Tactical Flag Command Center (TFCC) or any other desired warfare module. A significant portion of the wing staff have recently completed carrier-based sea tours and possess the tactical action officer (TAO) and officer of the deck (OOD) qualifications that ensure intimate knowledge of current battle group operating procedures. Continued receipt of the battle group’s operational taskings, and on-site participation throughout the force’s work-up and planning phases, would ensure a viable warfare commander fully adept at meeting any warfare challenge.
The remaining issue is defining the actual wing staff presence on board the flagship during the work-up and deployment regime. This would necessitate a change
in the way we currently do business______
where VP wing commanders prosecute threats within static boundaries in support of mobile at-sea forces. One alternative is to maintain the static boundaries, but have each wing commander assume cognizance of a battle group role on a rotational basis, i.e.. Patrol Wing Ten would primarily support Battle Group Delta, Patrol Wing Two would work with Battle Group Charlie, etc.
While not all warfare commanders presently ride the flagship—most notably the AAW commander—this is the natural location for the VP ASW/ASUW commander and his afloat staff. Once embarked, the commander or his staff representatives, would prosecute their assigned responsibilities employing all available assets—assigned or otherwise. The exact staff presence would not be an overriding obstacle, and indeed would probably not be fully articulated until the actual CWC assignment was rendered A small expansion of ASWOC/wing staff manning commensurate with the increased tasking, however, would provide the necessary manpower. With the hardware and personnel skills already in place, only the decision to do it is lacking.
Commander Peters is an instructor with VP-31, the Pacific Fleet Readiness Squadron at Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California. He has flown with VP- 19, served with OpNav, and was most recently Flag Secretary with Carrier Group One embarked on the USS Constellation (CV-64) and the USS Independence (CV-62).
Pr,