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By Lieutenant R. B. Watts, U.S. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard, like the other armed services, must look more to joint operations—here, working with the Navy, a Coast Guard detachment mans the USS Goldsborough’s (DDG-20) launch to conduct a boarding.
The Coast Guard has always had many missions, but has been thinly budgeted. Depending on the political climate, various areas have received more funding than others. In the 1980s, the Coast Guard concentrated on its traditional defensive missions to the point of spearheading an entirely new Navy/Coast Guard command that centers on coastal defense. Cutters were outfitted with the latest in hardware. In the 1990s, to the relief of some and the dismay of others, the swing appears to be away from this trend toward more domestic concerns such as environmental protection, which had previously been given lower priority. The emphasis on military operations has apparently evaporated, for the time being.
But has it really? The United States has, after all, just completed one of its most successful conflicts ever, a conflict to which the Coast Guard provided forces and acted according to its basic war plans. The success of the operation has generated the long-term lesson that our planning for conflict has been well worth the investment. Coast Guard military planning has focused on the worst-case scenario of global war. Full mobilization for Desert Storm did not occur, nor did a threat to the U.S. coastline materialize. Will military operations therefore go the way of other defunct missions in the new world order?
The Coast Guard has not yet abandoned its role in the national military strategy. Military operations are intrinsic to the Coast Guard, an armed service. To remain an effective element of the national strategy we must not abandon our base-planning assumptions. This is a dangerous time for the military, particularly for the Coast Guard and its limited budget. As the Soviet threat appears to evaporate, it is a great temptation in the services to reallocate funding. But now is the time to maintain our established role in military operations. Rather than short-sighted concentration on one mission or another, the role of military operations must be evaluated and modified to meet the shifting world realities. This is necessary in Maritime Defense Zone operations, which are designed to protect reinforcement shipping in the event of global war; low-intensity conflict deployable operations; and law enforcement under the umbrella of Joint Task Force Four.
The Maritime Defense Zone_______________________
In 1985 the Coast Guard formally became part of the Maritime Strategy with the establishment of the Maritime
Defense Zone (MDZ), a Navy command tasked with d6' fense of the coastline outward to 200 nautical miles in tim1’ of war. It was to this command that the majority of the Coast Guard was to “chop” for defensive operations rfi' lated to battle-group breakout and reinforcement shippifk in support of the Maritime Strategy. The establishment 0 the MDZ was a milestone in correcting a serious weakne^ in timely deployment in the Maritime Strategy and
riod
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with no opposition. Reinforcement, although mas- Was anything but rapid. The feared Iraqi terrorist
solidifying that part of the Coast Guard’s role. The MDZ attempted to conduct unified coastal defense operations. A series of intense fleet exercises tested the soundness of the new organization.
The MDZ was controversial within the supporting services. Many in the Coast Guard viewed it with alarm. It looked like the Coast Guard was becoming a mini-Navy and would have to abandon its other missions in support of new, unfamiliar ones such as antisubmarine warfare. Warfare skills became a buzzword, and personnel looked in vain for ways to obtain them.
The Navy accepted the MDZ with mixed reaction. The validity of the mission was beyond question in terms of the global-war scenario; if ships could not deploy from the U-S. coastline, the resources necessary to fight a protracted war could not get through to the appropriate battle- front forces. But the word defense was not in the Navy’s vocabulary and coastal defense was unfamiliar territory. So while important resources were allocated to coastal defense—notably scarce mine warfare assets—the MDZ °ften relied heavily on Coast Guard ships and personnel f°r success.
These days, it has been suggested in some circles that the MDZ will go the way of the Soviet empire. In the new 'Vorld order there seems to be little place for an organiza- h°n designed to protect against Soviet adventurism. But this is an extremely short-sighted reaction, because it Seems clear that rapid reinforcement will be the focal point °f [he next decade’s conflicts. We will need MDZ opera- t'ons. On initial examination, Desert Storm events do not SuPport this statement. The United States initiated a mas- Slve reinforcement operation in the Gulf conflict, and this ^as completely successful. The MDZ was never activated (>r protection of this operation, which cast doubt on its al|dity, according to some.
on closer examination, Desert Storm provides sev- cral hidden lessons that demonstrate a future need for (3°astal defense. Desert Shield was conducted under the ,est °f circumstances: gradually, over a five-month pe
The Coast Guard has participated in both high- and low- intensity conflicts. Seventeen 82-foot Coast Guard patrol boats deployed to Vietnam in 1965 and became Coast Guard Squadron One.
threat never materialized, not because it did not exist, but because national resources were mobilized to defeat it Behind the scenes of Desert Shield was an intense law- enforcement effort designed to defeat the threat before it occurred. Although MDZ forces were never formally activated for port loadout operations. Coast Guard forces performed the port-security mission that was part of the preconflict planning for the MDZ. This was extremely resource intensive and demonstrated that the Coast Guard had indeed benefited from years of planning for this purpose. Had a threat materialized within the ports, the Coast Guard stood ready for activation and more intensive protection operations.
Because maritime deployment and reinforcement will be the way of-the future, the MDZ and its missions cannot be allowed to go away. This brings us to the Coast Guard’s age-old dilemma. Funding is scarce, and the MDZ does not employ pork-barrel units or expensive weaponry, which means that for the command to survive jointness must be increasingly emphasized. The MDZ is a Navy command, so the Navy should become more involved in providing units and in funding. As the military pulls back from overseas bases, coastal defense becomes a more important and attractive option for unused Navy platforms that can perform the offshore protection mission
This does not mean that the Coast Guard should back away from its MDZ commitment. The Coast Guard is expert in many of the missions on which effective MDZ operations rely, such as port security, harbor defense, and law enforcement. Coast Guard units should continue to be employed in these areas, focusing on what they know best. This will stress the jointness element of the MDZ and allow units to operate in environments for which they were designed.
Low-Intensity Conflict
The Coast Guard has a long tradition of serving alongside the other armed services in low-intensity conflicts (LICs). Although operations once there have been extremely successful, actually getting Coast Guard units into LIC has often been difficult. The most notable examples of Coast Guard forces involved in LIC operations were riverine operations in Vietnam and the recent port-security operation in Desert Storm. But the political arena has not always been kind to Coast Guard participation in LIC In 1987 a proposed deployment of 110-foot patrol craft to the Persian Gulf was canceled in the face of considerable political backlash, despite the obvious utility of the boats in the conflict. With this rejection, the Coast Guard retreated somewhat from the LIC arena, concentrating on the development of deployable reserve port security teams that
would be used in the event of reserve mobilization. Before Desert Storm it was generally held that these forces would be used only in the event of subsequent activation of the MDZ.
Desert Storm changed this focus. Prior to the selected reserve mobilization, it was privately held among many planners that reserve forces would never be used. The bitter lessons of Vietnam were still very much alive; mobilization of reserves brought with it a clear indication of the national resolve and commitment that could only be used at the risk of creating an unpopular war. This was not the case in Desert Storm. Although only partial mobilization occurred, the system did work. On the Coast Guard side, port security units were mobilized and deployed, and they conducted successful operations alongside the other services as planned.
A number of points are immediately obvious, pertaining to the Coast Guard LIC deployment for Desert Storm. The general problem with current LIC deployment forces is that they are subject to political whim. Their use cannot be determined by the utility of the platform; it is subject to the direct decision of the National Command Authority. The politics of this decision can be fickle, making planning for the use of LIC forces difficult. The proposed Persian Gulf deployment of 1987 used far fewer forces in a much less dangerous role than those deployed in Desert Storm, yet it was roundly condemned by the press and Congress. Although port security reserve units were considered in planning for this deployment, the idea was quickly abandoned in the aftermath of this reaction.
This leads us to the question of whether or not the Coast Guard should maintain a LIC component in the future. There is no question that the role is valid; the question is how much emphasis the Coast Guard should give it in planning. LIC forces are extremely specialized and thus expensive. Regular active-duty units are not presently equipped for overseas movement, and reserve forces are subject to political decision making. This indicates that if the Coast Guard desires to expand in this area, it should make its LIC-deployable forces a mixture of active duty and reserve forces. This could mean designating an active port security rating in the Coast Guard that could perform normal port operations during peacetime in the Captain of the Port command structure. In times of conflict, certain Coast Guard forces would be deployed.
LIC is a valid mission for the Coast Guard and one in which much can be contributed to the national effort. But it should not be done on a case-by-case basis if the Coast Guard is to continue in this area. It would be far better to dedicate forces right away, and design a structure to support the mission.
C ounternarcotics
Drug interdiction has always been exclusively a Coast Guard mission, given increasing emphasis in the call for a national drug strategy. In response to this demand, since 1989 countemarcotics at sea has been under the control of Joint Task Force Four (JTF-4), a multiservice force dedicated solely to countemarcotics interdiction. JTF-4 uses a vast command-and-control network, including an afloat element that operates in the Caribbean. This is primarily composed of Navy vessels, with Coast Guard cutters operating under Navy operational control until the moment of enforcement action.
JTF-4 can be seen as a case study for military interoperability in the future. Countemarcotics is very much a military “game,” run according to joint-operations guidelines. Ships and cutters operate in the traditional task force command structure, reporting to an afloat commander. This is where some difficulty arises. The Coast Guard designs and equips its own ships, often opting for civilian radar, navigation, and communications systems that are not compatible with Navy combatants. Thus they have difficulty working effectively in the task-force environment without extensive training.
The problem of Coast Guard-Navy compatibility has been addressed by several NAVGUARD boards, and various 378-foot cutters have been outfitted with more modern weapon systems, notably Harpoon and CIWS. But this misses the mark. The firepower would certainly be needed in a global-war environment operating in the Norwegian Sea, but Coast Guard cutters do not need this armament while operating under the umbrella of the MDZ. In this environment and in the current law-enforcement role, advanced weapons are not needed. What is needed is the ability to search the horizon and communicate.
Until the threat is eliminated, law-enforcement operations will continue. But they will come increasingly under the umbrella of joint military operations, which is the Coast Guard’s traditional area of expertise. To remain a strong player, the Coast Guard will have to become more established in joint interoperability. The days of the lone- wolf approach to countemarcotics have passed; today communication with the other players is essential. This means possessing the technology for compatibility.
Conclusions
The Coast Guard has spent a great deal of time apd effort solidifying its position in the national military strat' egy. As an armed service, it has much to offer in performing missions along the entire spectrum of conflict. But as the political environment changes, it is tempting to allocate scarce resources to other missions and abandon oi>f military operations planning.
This would be a great mistake. The Coast Guard is in3 very strong position to contribute to all elements of mili' tary action, worst-case scenario or everyday joint opera' tions. We need a realistic appraisal of our curren strengths. We need to strive to make joint military operations more efficient, so that they become an essential' ongoing part of the Coast Guard mission.
Lieutenant Watts is currently serving on board the USS JosephusDanrf: (CG-27) as part of the Coast Guard/Navy exchange program. He served as a fleet exercise planner for Maritime Defense Zone Atlanta and was part of the planning team for the 1987 Coast Guard deployin'11 to the Persian Gulf.