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RADM Charles. F. Horne III, USN (Ret.)
.. The Persian Gulf War graphically demonstrated once again ut future regional conflicts likely will involve mine warfare. °r the United States, mine casualties to the Princeton (CG-59) and the Tripoli (LPH-10) and before them in the Iran-lraq War, "e Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58), the resulting lost operating r‘mes for these ships, the third of a billion dollars or more in cPairs, and the extraordinary after-the-fact mine countermeaSUres (MCM) efforts require that the nation devote immediate and technological efforts to address the mine threat.
The recent combat also illustrated how important high tech- 11° °gy can be to the United States in regional conflicts. In addi- 10n. it suggests that high technology must be applied today to J^uie countermeasures capabilities, or the Navy and Marine orPs team will continue to experience serious limitations in uture regional conflicts.
If the same amount of money that it will ultimately take to rePair the three mined warships were applied to improving our
nated by a team approach with frequent access to key naval leaders to facilitate the free How of information and the making of decisions.
- Mine warfare needs to be integrated into Navy officer and Marine officer training and service progression, as is done with amphibious warfare.
- Fleet, battle group, and amphibious staffs would be strengthened by having mine warfare billets and these billets filled with trained professionals.
- A strong case can be made that one or two surface MCM support ships should be acquired to deploy with Navy minesweepers. The MCM support ships would provide the logistic, command, control, communications, and intelligence support to multiply by several times the effectiveness of the Navy’s mine- hunters and minesweepers in a regional conflict.
- The services would benefit by continuing to maintain the close working relationships established with our allies during the recent Gulf War in mine countermeasures and joint responses.
Most of all, we need to maintain the current high-level attention and Navy-wide focus on mine warfare well after the current mine crisis. A mine warfare focus needs to be sustained over the next two years on a high level and continuous basis. To do anything less ensures that mine warfare will continue to be our Achilles’ heel in regional conflicts.
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I,llne countermeasures, the nation could purchase a dramatic and substantive improvement to its mine warfare capability.
In this light, there are eight areas that Congress, the Office of ne Secretary of Defense, and the Navy might consider in their 'forts to improve mine warfare.
Prom Congress across the board, more attention and creativity t'ee<J to be focused on mine warfare to integrate and strengthen
The war on mines continues today in the Persian Gulf, with ships and divers from many nations conducting mine countermeasures. Although the U.S. Navy has some new ships joining its mine warfare fleet—here, the recently commissioned USS Sentry (MCM-3)—mine warfare still “can’t get no respect” in the world’s most powerful navy.
its
capabilities and contributions.
. Sufficient research-and-development funding needs to be as- sjgned and protected against budget cuts to achieve responsive fallow water and amphibious mine countermeasures.
* Adequate research-and-development funding needs to be as- s'gned and protected against budget cuts to acquire effective Jjtine avoidance capabilities for individual submarines and sur- ace ships.
\ The Navy would benefit by instituting a system whereby the dialogue on mine warfare and its improvement can be coordi-
If we address and correct our long-standing mine countermeasures limitations we will not only acquire far greater national and maritime flexibility, but we will increase deterrence of future Third World opportunists.
Admiral Horne served as Commander, Mine Warfare Command, before retiring from the Navy. As Commander, Mine Warfare Command, he outlined a “New Role for Mine Warfare” in the November 1982 Proceedings (pages 34-40). He currently works for McDermott, Incorporated, Babcock & Wilcox.
Proceedings / July 1991
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