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By Captain Mark J. Cravens, U.S. Marine Corps
The Marine Corps prides itself on the capabilities of its air-ground team and yet a brigade commander told my class at the Amphibious Warfare School that his biggest problem is integrating aviation into operations.
We have made technological changes,
“You either have an AO on station— or you don’t have any air support.” Despite modern technology, it still takes an aviator and a trained aerial observer—working full time—to pierce the fog of war and sort out the confusion on the battlefield.
updated our doctrine to reflect an increased operational tempo, and decreased the time required to move from point A to point B—yet the gap between our air and ground assets remains. Marines who possess an intimate understanding of the brigade’s aviation combat element (ACE) and its ground combat element (GCE) must bridge the gap.
Integrating air and ground within a brigade, as opposed to the smaller Marine Expeditionary Unit, poses a real challenge. It is at the brigade level that a Marine Corps air-ground task force commander possesses an aviation element with sufficient organic combat power to act as a separate maneuver element; it can even be the focus of the brigade’s main effort.
The difficulty in employing the brigade’s air and ground units cohesively stems from a lack of experience and understanding at the staff level. Very few aviators or ground officers, as staff planners, are familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and requirements of both aviation and ground units. This is understandable. As the Marine Corps has become more complex, less time is available to learn about the other person’s job. Nevertheless, the requirement exists.
To assign aviators to ground staff billets long enough to become proficient in ground operations in unsuitable—the time is not available. Moreover, the Marine Corps is so short of aviators that we are having trouble filling cockpits to support our air-ground task forces.
To assign ground officers to aviation billets is unacceptable also. While there is no current shortage of ground officers, experience at the staff level does not translate to operational knowledge. And yet, this is exactly what we require of them when we ask them to plan the operational employment of units with which they have little or no direct experience. Would it not be ideal if we could find officers who have acquired detailed operational knowledge of ground and air in the normal course of their assignments? Do such officers exist? I submit that they do—they are called aerial observers (AO). Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-l and -2 train ground officers as AOs. While their worth to the Marine Corps is largely unexploited at this time, these officers could become the bridge that spans the gap between the GCE and the ACE.
Aerial observers are second- or third- tour ground officers, drawn primarily from the infantry and artillery, although officers from other fields have served.
They graduate from the 12-week AO school with the basic skills required to spot artillery and naval gunfire, and control attack aircraft and helicopters. They fly in OV-lOAs, UH-lNs, and OA-4Ms; it costs about $70,000 to train an AO—
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Proceedings / November 1990
hut it is money well spent. Upon graduation, AOs normally report to VMO-1 or VMO-2 for a three -year tour.
Within six months to one year, a typical AO is proficient at the VMO mission and familiar with the planning considerations and employment of the other avia- t'°n communities. During his tour, the AO will participate in many combined arms and brigade exercises. He will conduct joint operations with the Navy, Army, and Air Force, and he will deploy either to Europe or to the Western Pacific. On average, he will accumulate between 750 and 1,000 flight hours.
How does this ground officer fit in with the aviators of VMO? Quite well. Whether in the aircraft or at the mission Planning table, he brings with him his extensive experience of ground opera- dons. He knows how to communicate with ground units, and he knows what information is pertinent to the ground commander. He also is better trained than an aviator to understand the ground commander’s intent and concept of opera- dons. And the best part is this: for 5^0,000 and one year of training, the Marine Corps gets an officer who is well- digh indispensable on the battlefield.
There is one drawback to this otherwise bright picture. When an AO completes his three-year tour, he returns to his primary military occupational specialty (MOS), never to return to the ACE. The Marine Corps solution was to create the Supporting Arms Coordinator- Airborne SAC(A) specialty. Under this Program, ground combat officers attend Naval Flight Officer school and are reassigned a primary MOS as air crew. But jhe program is longer and more costly— ■1 adds about a year and costs about $1
NAW <R. D. KEEFER. JR.) million. After NFO school, the SAC(A) still has to attend the twelve-week AO school and complete the training at his VMO squadron.
In addition, the officer never returns to the GCE—so the experience he gained as a ground officer becomes dated, and the experience he gained in aviation is never shared with his former ground associates.
I propose that we continue to train company-grade ground officers as AOs. After completing their tour with VMO, they can attend the appropriate level school and then return to their primary MOS for a battalion-staff job. When they are up to speed again, they should take command of a company or battery lor a normal tour as commanding officer. Upon completion of the three-year ground tour they will return to the squadron as a senior captain or major to serve as a department head or executive olticer. By this time, they should be ready to proceed to Washington for a tour at Headquarters, or a “B” billet for a normal period, and then return to a brigade or regimental staff.
These tours would ensure the availability of officers who have had extensive experience at the company or field-grade levels in both their primary MOS and in aviation. This experience would make them invaluable to a brigade commander in his efforts to integrate his forces on the battlefield.
Our current practice of having air officers oversee and plan all aviation matters presents difficulties. Their inexperience with ground operations and the current shortage of aviators in the Marine Corps are just two of the problems. In addition, there is the difficulty of mixing helicopter and fixed-wing experience. A brigade air officer must understand helicopter, antiair warfare, and offensive air support operations. He must also know the strengths and weaknesses of each aviation community. The problem with relying solely on aviators to oversee all of these functions at the brigade is that helicopter pilots normally arc not familiar with fixed-wing operations—and vice- versa.
AOs, on the other hand, rapidly become quite familiar with fixed-wing operations. They learn how to obtain air support, control it, coordinate the suppression of enemy air defenses, and mark targets. Because the VMO squadron belongs to a Marine helicopter group, AOs also learn a great deal about helicopter operations on a daily basis. In addition, many of the VMO pilots are former helicopter pilots, and they provide a wealth of knowledge for the AO.
As it stands now, it would be the kiss of death for a ground officer, hoping to be selected for major or lieutenant colonel, to have two three-year tours with the air wing. But why should this be true? The argument that an infantry or artillery officer serving as an AO would be out of his primary MOS too long is wrong. He certainly has more tactical contact with ground units from his OV-10 than does an officer on recruiting duty. VMO air crews must constantly interact with members of the GCE to perform their mission.
The reality is that a ground officer serving as an AO does not get the same credit from promotion boards as an officer serving in a “B” billet assignment. Therefore, aerial observers completing their second VMO tour would not be as competitive as their contemporaries. We need to alter our perception of what is valuable to the Marine Corps and what “tickets” must be punched to make a suitable senior officer. There is valuable experience to be gained in a “B" billet and Headquarters assignments. But ground officers who are knowledgeable about the complexities of aviation, and who can employ this experience at the brigade level, are vital to the performance of the Marine air-ground team.
The AO is a rarity in today’s specialized Marine Corps. He is a widely experienced combat arms officer—a generalist, if you will—who has bridged the gap between our aviation and ground combat elements. The Marine Corps should exploit his unique qualifications.
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