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By Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, Indian Navy (Retired)
'Tndia has been labeled an “Oriental bully” (The Wash- I ing Post)-, an “awakening power” (Time Magazine)-, -^-“regional bully” (The New York Times)-, “rogue •ndia” (Wall Street Journal); and “regional superpower” •Richard Armitage, a former U.S. Department of Defense \ official). These are widely differing concepts, and they have unique applications to India’s navy.
Hundreds of rmllions of Indians went to the polling booth almost coincidentally with America’s Thanksgiving Hay in 1989. They reinforced their belief in the tenets of democracy (adult franchise, the rule of law, public debate, and the verdict of the people) in one of the most spectacular elections in contemporary history. In the course of the Section, they changed their helmsman (Rajiv Gandhi) and •he party in power. This smooth functioning of the world’s •nost populous democracy (800 million, predicted to reach
one billion by the end of the century) was a shining beacon in a continent that largely operates at different levels of political consciousness ranging from kings, dictators, and ayatollahs to sultans and sheikhs—and under the doctrines of communism, tribalism, fundamentalism, and many hues of “guided democracy.”
Let us therefore join the seafaring communities by stepping over the debris of the Cold War strewn across the continent of Europe and the trade rivalry emerging in the Eastern Pacific Basin, and instead climb up to the bridge of an Indian Navy flagship to have a closer look at the ocean that the evangelist of sea power—Alfred Thayer Mahan—predicted would be the “key to the seven seas. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”
The Indian Ocean covers 28 million square miles. It is the warmest and smallest of the three oceans, extends 6,500 miles across the continents of Africa, Asia, and Australia, encompasses one-fifth of the world’s sea area, and washes 36 littoral and 11 hinterland states. Most of the countries in this area attained independence between 1945 and 1960. A few are also large, independent island nations—the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka. Seven are island chains, some of which are governed by France and Great Britain. One quarter of the earth’s population live in this region of multiple languages, religious cultures, and identities. Half of the nations in this area have populations of less than five million but are rich in minerals, nevertheless.
The Indian Ocean has had a significant cultural influence on countries bordering the region. The great civilizations of Micronesia and Polynesia to the east and the cultures of West Asia came from the Orient. Further, this region is the cradle of all major religions and beliefs— Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Confucianism, Taoism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
Although four continents abut the Indian Ocean, it has always trailed the Pacific and Atlantic oceans in terms of big-power interests. This ocean is neither a geopolitical nor a geostrategic entity; its leaders have regarded it more as African, Gulf, Subcontinental, or Southeast Asian, and have pursued geopolitical strategies encompassing Pan Africanism, Pan Islam, Pan Arabism, communism, and regionalism. Further, almost all countries in this region are nonaligned, and, excepting Australia and South Africa, most are “developing” nations. The Indian Ocean area also contains two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves— leading to the recycling of petrodollars, massive arms sales, instant navies, and migration of labor. Again, many strategic materials—uranium, thorium, chromium, copper, manganese, cobalt, and nickel—with almost the entire world’s production of jute, tea, tin, rubber, cashews, cloves, hemp, and groundnuts are produced here, giving the Indian Ocean region considerable “commodity power.”
Peninsular India
Peninsular India hangs in this ocean space as if suspended from the roof of the Himalayas. India’s 3,000
miles of coastline jut into the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. Although India occupies only 2.4% of the world’s land area, it supports nearly 15% of the world’s population. This coast contains 9 major, 20 intermediate, and 300 minor ports. India’s offshore island territories of Andaman and Nicobar in the Bay of Bengal are 700 miles from its eastern coast, only 60 miles from the island chain of Indonesia, and less than 20 miles from Burma. If one adds the Laccadive group of islands in the Arabian Sea, India’s offshore island territories amount to a total of 1,284 islands and islets. Of these, 418 islands are uninhabited, although at times fishermen from the Pacific Basin disembark their families on some of these islands for as long as three months, then reembark them before returning home. This vast spread of territory requires constant surveillance and patrolling, which in turn extends India’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) by another 700 miles.
More than 100,000 merchant ships ply this ice-free ocean, linking the East to the West and the North to the South. But the development of shipping services in this comparatively underdeveloped region has been tardy, with India having 736 vessels totaling only seven million tons. India’s tonnage represents only 1.36% of the world’s total, which merits comparison with the United States’s 20 million tons, Japan’s 38 million tons, Britain’s 12 million tons, China’s 12 million tons, and the 6 million tons each of Brazil and South Korea.
This component of sea power requires the surveillance of sea lanes, the safety of ships and mariners (especially during tropical storms), and the provision of navigational aids to guide them safely through the choke points of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Hormuz, Jazirah al Masira, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Aden. Although merchant shipping is not as significant as it was for decades after World War
II, it is still relevant to developing countries for earning foreign exchange and encouraging exports; merchant ship' ping also provides employment for thousands of sailors in various foreign shipping lines all over the world.
Pushing the boat a little farther, the living resource component of sea power in the Indian Ocean is said to be 12 million tons of fish, of which only 25% are harvested. Nonetheless, the fishing industry (whose production costs are less than cattle, swine, and poultry) provides a living for 150,000 country fishing craft, 18,000 small mechanized boats, and 150 trawlers. It supports a host of downstream food processors and post-harvest employees, not only generating personal income but also considerable foreign exchange. This expanding activity requires increasing protection and safety services for fishing vessels and their crews, especially during the monsoons. For India, this protection has been the responsibility of the navy and the embryonic coast guard (both funded by the Ministry of Defence), and their responsibilities include the prevention of poaching in India’s estuaries.
The seabed of the Indian Ocean is said to be strewn with trillions of tons of polymetallic nodules, which is likened to a “windfall of apples” containing manganese, copper, nickel, cobalt, and molybdenum. These may last for centuries, as opposed to the limited reserves on the subcontinent and Japan, which differ from those of the United States. India, with 2.2 million square miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and an additional 150,000 square miles of seabed, as a result of its “Pioneer” status, therefore needs seabed-mining technology and a multidisciplinary ocean policy to explore and exploit these resources. The success of such activities could lift India from its present economic backwardness and accelerate its growth rate. The navy, with its trained and disciplined manpower and sophisticated underwater equipment, could play a significant role in promoting and implementing such an integrated ocean policy.
India already has invested nearly $1.7 billion in its offshore structures, which now supply nearly 40% of the country’s oil requirements. Several ocean research vessels, such as the Sagar Kanya (a West German design), the Sagar Sampada, and the Gaveshini, have completed more than 100 scientific cruises with the assistance of the ministries of Ocean Development, Transport, Agriculture, Mining, and Defence. These additional activities have ushered in fresh rules for managing the seas and seabed, which have in turn sprouted additional areas of conflict and cooperation, such as competition for offshore services and supplies, resource exploitation, security of the EEZ, pollution, oil spillage, nuclear waste dumping, poaching, contraband control, and narcotics and environmental security. This will entail additional responsibilities for the navy and coast guard. Further, the defense industry will need to pick up the tab for shortening the time horizon by diverting the military-industrial complex from space to marine technology, which in turn will help to convert the contests and conflicts of yesterday to cooperation and commerce of tomorrow.
The Indian Ocean is fast becoming a dump for human refuse, pollution, detergents, and oil spillage. This not
only threatens the ozone and the ecological balance of the planet, but also affects the multi-million dollar sports and tourist industries. A Regional Seas Program monitors and controls air, sea, and land pollution. India’s small coast guard is manned predominantly by naval officers on deputation. Its director-general is presently a navy vice admiral, and the embryonic service is supported by the nation’s three-dimensional navy.
Sea Power in the Indian Ocean
In the colonial era, maritime nations acquired a monopoly of sea power. First it was the Portuguese, who captured the choke points of Socotra, Aden, Hormuz, Malacca, and Goa and imposed Res Nullius (exclusivity) in the Indian Ocean. This pattern of maritime strategy— winning decisive naval battles in the Atlantic in order to establish colonies in the Indian Ocean—continued throughout the colonial era. The defeat of the Spanish Armada, followed by the victory at Trafalgar heralded Pax Britannica, which also was based on the strategy of capturing choke points. To ensure that power remained firmly in the hands of the Royal Navy, these choke points became Imperial coaling stations (with the advent of steam) and included Aden, Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Freemantle. The Indian exchequer paid 135,000 pounds sterling to the British Admiralty until World War II for the maritime defense of India, although ships-of-the- line were not based in this tropical region, and hence no decisive naval engagements could take place in this ocean. The British even made sure that the small supportive Bombay Marine (which later became the Indian Navy) was controlled by the Admiralty and not by the Viceroy of India or his British Commander-in-Chief (even if he were Field Marshal Lord Kitchener!).
Independent India also continued to give a low priority to its maritime responsibilities, possibly because of its Commonwealth links, and the presence of the Royal Navy was taken for granted. This neglect of the seas was further reinforced by conflicts with Pakistan and China in the Himalayan areas in the early 1970s. The Indian Navy at this juncture consisted of one old cruiser, three wartime destroyers, and four old frigates. About this time Britain announced the withdrawal of its naval forces from east of the Suez, which possibly encouraged the superpowers to take advantage of the indivisibility of the seas to usher in the Cold War. Military alliances such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were concluded, based on the opposing ideologies of the two superpowers. India, however, deliberately chose a policy of nonalignment (judging each case on its individual merits), which meant neither neutralism nor equidistance, nor putting on a balancing act between the superpowers who had by now evolved the system of bipolarity that continued for nearly three decades until it was torn down in Eastern Europe.
However, the quest for naval facilities in the Indian Ocean by the United States and Soviet Union continued with unabated vigor. The U.S. Pacific Fleet’s operational responsibility was extended to the coasts of East Africa and the Persian Gulf, which presently is the operating area of the U.S. Central Command, consisting of air-transportable forces whose supplies and equipment are prepositioned at sea, supported by tactical aviation and naval task forces. Base facilities were also expanded in the Philippines, Gulf of Thailand, and on the erstwhile British Indian Ocean Territory of Diego Garcia, presently claimed by Mauritius.
The Soviet counterweight soon made its presence felt in the Indian Ocean, with naval facilities at Socotra, Dagleg Archipelago, Massawa, Assab in Ethiopia, and North Yemen. France in turn strengthened its facilities in the Reunion of Mayotti group of islands. Malagasy (Madagascar) was split between French influence and the natives’ preference for complete independence. Similarly, Mauritius has come closer to the parental stock of India. The Seychelles followed suit and sought India’s assistance in combating a South African-based coup attempt. The Maldives started moving away from British influence with the closing down of the British military facility at Gan, and was yet another island nation to request India’s help in combating an attempt from mercenaries to overthrow the elected government. Sri Lanka also sought Indian military assistance to resolve the ethnic rivalries between the Tamils and Sinhalese, costing the Indian Army more than 1,000 lives.
With the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the United States looked to bisected but strategically located West Pakistan to defend the Afghans in Pakistan against the Afghans in Kabul, in light of earlier Soviet incursions into the soft underbelly of the Third World. This Soviet intervention enabled Pakistan to seek and win a $3.2 billion aid package in 1982, followed by another $4.02 billion, consisting of $2.8 billion in economic aid and $1.76 billion in military credits at highly concessionary rates, which were to be repaid at 5% interest over seven years after a grace period of five years. Similarly, billions of dollars’ worth of arms have been pumped into this region. With the rising cost of weapons, massive trade deficits, and narcotics trade, the instability of this volatile region has been increased as seen in the Persian Gulf, West Asia, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Yemen, and Pakistan.
India has adopted the Emperor Ashoka’s “Wheel of Dharma” in its flag, signifying the continuity of change and the desirability that it be smooth and continuous like the functioning of a wheel. Hence, in this ocean of tension, India must structure a navy tailored to meet a variety of threats at sea and by sea, such as: security of its island territories, threats to offshore assets (Bombay High), island grabbing (Moore Island), policing its EEZ, maritime boundary disputes, antismuggling operations, interventions by invitation (as from the Seychelles, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka), nuclear waste dumping by external countries, and the defense of its coastline.
It is at times argued that a big Indian Navy will frighten other nations in this region. But a world that has lived with
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ing yards of Mazagon Docks and Goa Shipyard. The area of responsibility of the Western Naval Command extends to the North Arabian Sea. Bombay continues to be the largest commercial and naval port, with Khandla in the north and Goa in the south being the other major seaports in this region, handling oil, containers, and iron ore.
the superpowers and later with China should also be able to coexist with a big India. Conversely, a small naval force will not be able to protect the subcontinent’s growing spectrum of interests and responsibilities either in peace or in war. Nonetheless Delhi continued to spend less than 2% of its gross national product (GNP) on defense until 1972. This rose to around 3.3% of the GNP after the Chinese conflict and remained so for nearly 15 years. The GNP is presently $246 billion. India’s economic growth, which was about 3.5% for many decades, has only now touched 5% in the current plan. Further, in recent years, the Indian defense expenditure has been around 14% of GNP, one of the lowest in the region. Of this amount, the Indian Navy’s share was only 12% of the defense budget, compared to the average 20% to 30% spent by neighboring nations.
Western Naval Command
Against this backdrop of growing responsibilities at sea and the budgetary constraints normally in play the geostrategic and geopolitical features of peninsular India should be analyzed. To the west is the Arabian Sea, connecting India to East Africa and the Gulf. In this region lies Pakistan, Iran, Persian Gulf, East Africa, and the choke points of Hormuz, Aden, and Bab el-Mandeb. The Western Naval Command headquartered at Bombay includes a modern naval dockyard and the major shipbuild-
Eastern Naval Command
The Eastern Naval Command at Vishakapatnam houses the Hindustan Shipyard and another modern naval dockyard. The other major shipbuilder is at Garden Reach, Calcutta. Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are the rimland nations in the Bay of Bengal, with the Andamans and Nicobars being India’s largest offshore islands. An integrated fortress command, headed by a vice admiral, operates from Port Blair (an international tourist paradise), the state capital of this island territory- The Submarine Command Headquarters is also in this command. The major ports of Madras, Paradip, Vishakapatnam, and Calcutta handle traffic for the entire Eastern region including the landlocked countries of Nepal and Bhutan. The Indian Navy has port facilities at Madras, Calcutta, and Port Blair. The civil and military airfields at Madras, Arkonam, Vishakapatnam, Calcutta, Port Blair, and Car Nicobar provide air reconnaissance facilities for the Bay of Bengal.
Southern Naval Command
The headquarters of the navy’s training command is at Cochin, where training squadrons and professional naval academies are based. An advance staging post is in the Laccadives islands, with repair facilities and shipbuilding yard at Cochin and Goa, the latter being the headquarters °f the Naval Air Command. The Indian Air Force Southern Air Command is situated at Trivandrum. The major Ports in this area are Goa, Mangalore, Cochin, and Tutocorin with the Seychelles, Mauritius, Reunion, and "Malagasy being the large island nations in the southern Indian Ocean. The Southern Naval Command actively assists the annual scientific expeditions (nine to date) to Antarctica and the Indian bases of Dakshin Gangotri and Maitrey there.
Thus, geostrategically, peninsular India should have three fleets—Western (Arabian Sea), Eastern (Bay of “engal), and Southern (Indian Ocean). However, there are only two fleets at present, and it is perhaps a matter of •'me before a Southern Fleet is established, particularly when the naval base at Karwar (near Goa) is completed.
and Ships_____________________________________
The responsibilities of the Indian Navy have grown considerably, in light of the new ocean regime that has added 2-2 million square miles of EEZ to the jurisdiction of Uelhi, the protection of the extensive coastline and offshore islands, the security and safety of Indian shipping, tishing, and oceanographic vessels, and the management °f seabed resources. Operating modern ships in tropical Waters means severe temperatures, humidity, and corro- Slon. Dry docking is mandatory for navigational, current, and medium repairs for ships. Refit periods could extend r°'n a few weeks to a few years, involving different categories of routines to be carried out on the hull, propulsion 'nachinery, and weapon systems. As a general rule, at least one-third of the ships will be non-operational at any time—a figure applicable to most modern navies.
With the high cost of fuel comes pressures to reduce the °Perating costs of ships and curtail the use of expensive and highly sophisticated weapon systems for basic train- ln§- By careful coordination at annual training conferences and during the planning of biannual refit programs 'Using all the tools of modern management), costs have . een kept under control. Naval armament and spare parts jnventories dependent on the class authority of ships are °cated in all the three commands. Further, the teeth-to- a,‘ ratio is kept at an acceptable level, and the Indian Mvy has a fairly good record for maintaining a high de- §ree of operational availability of ships, submarines, and aircraft with naval shipyards and naval air repair organiza- lQns working around the clock.
Force Architectures
At the outset, it is better to understand the operational Yardstick applicable to medium-power navies in order to av°id the jargon of armchair strategists. Terms such as carrier battle groups,” ‘‘massed sea power,” ‘‘disabling I'jrikes,” and so on are rarely applicable to medium mari- ■ute powers. As comedian Mort Sahl aptly remarked Hell hath no fury like a noncombatant!” For example, a,rcraft carriers do not necessarily have a screen of two antiaircraft destroyers, four antisubmarine frigates, and another four general-purpose frigates with two direct- support attack submarines and replenishment vessels. If this were so, all the principal surface combatants of middle naval powers would be doing nothing else but screening their small aircraft carriers! An aircraft carrier, on the other hand, should possess her own integrated air defense with interceptors at combat air patrol (CAP) stations, strike aircraft on alert, and antisubmarine helicopters on the screen dipping their sonars well below the temperature gradients in the Indian Ocean, which makes them the most effective killer of submarines. Aircraft carriers can and must operate singly in smaller navies with one or two attendant destroyers, tactically maintaining a high speed of advance—perhaps one of the primary reasons why no aircraft carrier has been sunk since World War II. It is also pertinent to observe that the contemporary aircraft carriers in medium-power navies displace about 20,000 tons and carry a complement of approximately eight V/STOL fighters and six antisubmarine helicopters. This is only one- eight of the air complement of U.S. attack carriers whose primary role is projection of sea power. And it is pertinent to note that the U.S. Navy desires to operate 15 such attack carriers. Even keeping to this modest operational mix of aircraft, India will require at least one sea control platform for each of its three fleets (although it is prudent to have two platforms at sea for cross operating in times of emergency, especially in peacetime) with a mix of both fighter interceptors and antisubmarine aircraft. And again based on the principle of ‘‘two up and one down” (for maintenance and repair), India should have at least five aircraft carriers instead of the present two small platforms with only ski jumps and no catapults for operating Sea Harrier aircraft.
Further, in view of the extent of the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea, and the Southern Indian Ocean, where India island territories and sea lanes of communication lie, it requires at least six long-range maritime aircraft on either coast and another four undergoing periodic maintenance, which makes a total of at least 16 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. India has presently only half these numbers and no airborne early warning force multipliers.
The missile environment that was ushered into this region by the Indian Navy’s Styx missile attack on Karachi in December 1971 has now a plethora of missiles, such as the Exocet, Harpoon, Sea Eagle, Stinger, Cobra, Silkworm, and Sidewinder, which cover surface, subsurface, and air threats. In this environment, electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) are also necessary, as seen in the 1973 Israeli- Arab conflict, the 1982 Falklands Conflict, and, recently, during the U.S. raid on Libya.
The United States introduced the underwater adversary into this region when it leased the submarine Ghazi to Pakistan, ostensibly for training purposes. This submarine saw action both in the 1965 conflict and in 1971, when it was sunk off Vishakapatnam by a ruse de guerre as she stalked India’s only aircraft carrier, Vikrant. Thereafter, Agostas, Daphnes, and Type-1500s, Foxtrots, Kilos, and recently the nuclear-propelled Chakra have been added to the submarines being operated in this area by both superpowers, thus escalating the management of confusion in
this growing ocean of tension.
The Indian Navy’s 24 principal surface combatants are comprised of several general-purpose frigates, with only conventional gun power. Of this number, only about 20 warships will be operationally available at any one time. And if this is divided into two, or later three, fleets, each will have no more than six to eight frigates to carry out the enlarging range of responsibilities as stated. Even Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, with more than 60 major war vessels, can assume vastly increased responsibilities overnight. China has already built up effective fleets in its three naval commands. Hence, India’s modest efforts to design, construct, and add another dozen warships to its present force level cannot be construed as having expansionist or hegemonic ambitions.
On the other hand, the Indian Navy has the advantage of well-developed repair, logistic, and base facilities for surface ships and submarines and for operating long-range maritime aircraft on both coasts. Therefore, this faster operational turnaround gives the littoral navies almost a three-to-one advantage at any time over external fleets, both in time and space. It will thus be able to give a bloody nose to any maritime power seeking to violate India’s territorial integrity or attempting to cut India down to size. Further, the tropical environment takes a heavy toll on sailors from more temperate climates, both psychologically and physiologically, in spite of the comforts of air conditioning (which, paradoxically, is more for the health of the electronic gadgetry than for the operators!) Above all, regional navies will be playing on home turf, for a cause that is nearer to home and, hence, more visible. It will not be in the category of Benito Mussolini’s Italian Navy which was said to be marvelous as instruments of visibility but pathetic in the final test of armed conflict.
Ocean resources, technology, industry, and sea power have become the trumps for attaining national goals. It becomes more cost-effective to be strong as vacillation invariably attracts adventurism. A militarily weak and idealistic India was attacked time and again by both its smaller and larger neighbors. Further, one cannot always keep on adding the pros or cons of defense spending and then balancing them to see which weighs heavier.
The Indian Navy must double present force levels within a reasonable period in order to be free of external buffeting, while protecting its national interests. India is too big a country to be taken for granted. This increased force level will keep the Indian Navy well within the parameters of a medium naval power.
This modest objective of Indian defense policy is perhaps shared by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Their respective security perceptions recognize India as a regional power. To quote Dr. Fred Ikle, former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy:
“India could be a power that contributes to world stability as the United States will see it, and want to shape it in 1995 and the year 2025, and a power with which we could work together much as we try to work together with other major powers now to enhance our long term national security aims. And that I think is an exciting possibility that perhaps (opens) a new chapter in the United States—Indian relations.”
What better view can a sailor have from the flag bridge than to see a balanced and self-reliant Indian Navy, well integrated into the country’s industrial, social, and security framework and drawing into its fold a wide spectrum of disciplined sections of society? This in turn will weave this technological and highly demonstrative service into an effective tool for implementing national policy, in order to ensure a more peaceful and less excitable ocean. It will be comparatively free from external pulls and pressures but will continue to be a natural medium for bringing together the hearts and minds of like-minded nations. This emerging relationship between the seas and the states, which in course of time may well change the very nature of strategic and environmental security, may not be the single most important facet for promoting a “gentler and kinder world,” in the remaining years of this century. But, then, who knows, it may!
Vice Admiral Roy is currently a Ford Foundation Research Fellow at the University of Illinois at Urbana. He retired from the Royal Navy after 42 years, which included service on battleships, cruisers, and minesweepers. He later commanded air squadrons, destroyers, frigates, and an aircraft carrier in the Indian Navy and was commander-in-chief of the Eastern Naval Command in the Bay of Bengal. Decorated twice f°( “distinguished services,” he is president of the Indian Navy League and founder member of the Society for Indian Ocean Studies and Ocean Policy.