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Contents:
Taking a Risk for Safety
Stemming Nuclear Terrorism
If You Threaten to Kill Me, I Will Kill You . . .
The Next Assault Amphibian
Strikes from the Sea
The Six-Year Service Obligation
Officer to Officer
The Capture of the Pueblo
Lies, Damn Lies, Statistics, and the Drug War
The Caribbean: Has Gorbachev Turned His Back?
Reserve P-3s Can Answer the Forward C ' Challenge
Triad or Dyad
The Vincennes Incident
Assisting in El Salvador
LAMPS-III: The Facts Behind the Myths
Follow that Copier!
ENTER THE FORUM We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
Taking a Risk for Safety
Lieutenant Marvin E. Godwin, U.S. Navy—The Chief of Naval Operations directed that all commands conduct a 48- hour safety stand-down 15-17 November 1989, following a rash of accidents that raised questions about risks associated with naval operations. There was a review, but since the mishaps occurred in different geographical areas, under different circumstances, and on board different ships and commands, it was impossible to identify a common thread. It is possible that the accidents were coincidental, but it is also possible that our leadership styles and management procedures had a direct bearing on events.
It is important to remember that many leadership styles reflect the leaders’ personalities and experience and are not subject to instant or radical change. Evaluation and modification of working techniques, on the other hand, can help to identify and possibly avoid risky situations that could result in a major incident.
One of the most common ways of overpressuring personnel is micromanagement; another is punishing everyone for the failings of a few. Both techniques force workers to reject established safety procedures. People will cut corners to maximize their own free time, but there is a big difference between this and a superior placing them in an untenable situation, where they have no choice but to violate procedures.
Do your best workers arrive on board earlier and stay later than anyone else in the work center because they have the most work to do? Eventually such hardworking sailors may become disillusioned and, resenting the unfair workload distribution, begin to cut corners or quit. Thus the work center loses its best workers, and the command and the Navy become losers, as well.
From a safety perspective, any leader who uses intimidation and fear to accomplish the mission is headed for disaster. People working for this type of leader will do almost anything to keep their bosses from learning that problems exist within the work center or command. They will use whatever means they have to gloss over deficiencies in the quickest manner possible. If this means cutting comers, then so be it.
The problems faced by today’s Navy leaders are going to become more and more difficult. If, for example, the Navy is forced into large-scale personnel cuts, the compounding problems of deepening budget cuts and level or increasing worldwide commitments will drive naval leadership to new levels of frustration and fatigue.
If you are staffed at only 90% of your full strength—say, of 100 people—and 20% of these are serving on temporary additional duty in other departments or divisions, you are left with only 72 people to accomplish a mission designed for 100. Consider, too, that while a normal civilian work week is only 40 hours long, the Navy’s week easily runs between 60 and 90 hours, at full staffing. Even if your division or command remained at 100% strength, trying to lead sailors who have to work twice as hard as their civilian counterparts is, at best, challenging-
As these conditions worsen, it wil' become increasingly important to give sound leadership principles more than lip service. Do you really take a personal interest in the welfare of your sailors? If you do, they know it. Are you a micromanager? They know that, too. If you are, what are you doing about it? Are you still pushing for mission accomplishment on an unreasonable schedule? Is your pushing contrary to the advice of your chiefs, leading petty officers, or other supervisors? Do you reprimand in public and praise in private? Is your central motivation a desire to be promoted rather than a genuine concern for mission effectiveness? The real leader is the one who finds the courage to fight such natural temptations to achieve at all cost.
It is our job as Navy leaders to recognize the time when enough is enough— and to do something about it. Unfortunately, such an approach is usually not politically advantageous. The politics of management should not be a problem, but the fact is that your honest dissent and discussions may find their way into your evaluations and fitness reports if you are unfortunate enough to have a supervisor who only wants to hear a cheery “Aye, aye, Sir”—or maybe “How high?”
Nevertheless, personnel safety and equipment readiness demand that you face these issues. Failure to properly advise your superiors of unsafe conditions is to fail—both in your leadership and in
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your responsibilities to your subordinates and to the Navy. To require unnecessary nsks of the men and women who work for you, or to close your door to their ulaims that they are already overextended, is to invite disaster. Only sound leadership and good management can enable us to steer clear of some of the Potential life- and mission-threatening Problems in the Navy.
“Stemming Nuclear Terrorism”
(■See F.I. Barth, pp. 54-59, December 1989
Proceedings)
John E. Vozenilek—The article on nuclear terrorism served as a study of the 1'kelihood that an improvised nuclear device (IND) could be used by terrorist groups, but did not go far enough in assessing the true threat.
Captain Barth’s study was based on the assumption that a terrorist group would have to construct an IND using typical °rdnance principles. In fact, terrorism and security experts place the greatest threat of a nuclear bomb in the construction of a conventional bomb that would he used to spread a mass of nuclear material, rather than a device to detonate the fuclear material. A suitcase bomb that opens and spreads a container of pluto- uium would have as great an impact on a uulitary installation as a nuclear detona- t'on, yet would require no more technical expertise than the typical terrorist bomb- maker already possesses. In this scenario, Ihe greatest problem for the terrorists w°uld be obtaining the material.
A conventional or nuclear threat could he produced with little hazard to the ter- r°rists, as long as the threat involves breaching a sealed container of nuclear material. A small incident could allow ’he terrorists to gain publicity and frighten the populace with little risk. Cas- Uahies resulting from a spill would serve ’he terrorists’ purpose because they could demonstrate the threat.
Public opinion is powerful, and in a country that now seems to have fewer enemies, one would question keeping a iarge nuclear arsenal. The public now is more easily swayed toward an attitude of nuclear disarmament. Although a terror- ls’ group may seem to have highly political motives, in reality, its only motive is ’° destabilize a nation.
A story about the release of nuclear material could transform public belief ’hat either military carelessness allowed a ^ak of material, or that terrorists set off a fully improvised nuclear device. It would ’hen matter little whether the incident mvolved an IND or simply the release of material; the terror would have spread, along with confusion among the people.
In the United States, responsibility for combating terrorism occupies a gray area between the police and the military. It belongs to both, yet neither faction can claim to be in charge of the fight.
Who can really say, then, if an IND might be used by terrorists? They do not need to convince authorities of their technical ability, and they gain little by showing off technical expertise for the public. It would seem that a nuclear material spread would offer terrorists all of the benefits of an IND without the risks.
“If You Threaten To Kill Me, I Will Kill You . .
(See J.w. Cottle, pp. 58-59, December 1989 Proceedings)
James Whitaker—Bravo to Lieutenant Cottle for writing, and to you for publishing, his article on the sociocultural makeup of Middle Eastern terrorists.
I lived in various countries of the Middle East for 12 years and came to know the cultures and peoples of the area intimately. But try as I might, I was never able to articulate as well as Lieutenant Cottle what it is about the peoples of the area that causes them to be as they are. In the future, I shall use the article to supplement my attempts at explanation.
“The Next Assault Amphibian”
(See J.H. Alexander, pp. 38-43, November
1989 Proceedings)
Commander Terrance J. McKearney, U.S. Navy, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Seventh Fleet—Colonel Alexander sets forth what has unfortunately become the U.S. Marine Corps party line on the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) and the advanced assault amphibian (AAA). I hear that the LCAC “is not an assault vehicle,” and “it’s too vulnerable,” and the most patronizing misconception of all, “we can’t afford to risk LCACs because they are too scarce and expensive,” every time I sit down with U.S. Marine Corps counterparts to plan an amphibious operation. Supporting arguments are unconvincing, and Colonel Alexander’s article has at least linked the Marine Corps’s uneasiness with the LCAC to its actual source: the Corps sees the LCAC as a programmatic threat to the AAA in the Washington battle for precious bucks. This unfortunate stand threatens to damage our amphibious capability with parochial arguments. Instead, we need a cooperative approach to new tactics.
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The pro-AAA, anti-LCAC argument centers on the LCAC’s supposed fragility in battle and the comparative robustness of the AAA and its predecessor the AAV. This logic is unconvincing, because while the AAV and AAA may have tougher hides against small arms, they also guarantee the enemy more time to dish out punishment. Both the amphibious assault vehicles and the LCAC will have to rely on assistance from supporting arms to get across a “hot” beach, should the mission require such action.
This debate misses the real issue, which is the Marine Corps’s future over- the-horizon (OTH) capability. The LCAC has the ability to conduct open ocean transits to a remote beach, independently and at high speed. By Colonel Alexander’s standard of 30 minutes in the water for maximum troop efficiency (a figure largely substantiated by fleet experience, I might add), a 20-knot AAA will still only offer the Commander Amphibious Task Force and the Commander Landing Force a ten-mile assault capability, an unacceptably short tether to the beach.
Marine infantry ashore need an armored personnel carrier, and it may be time to replace the LVTP-7 landing vehicle. It is unclear that this vehicle has to be more amphibious than the LVTP-7, or amphibious at all. Carrying this vehicle and its troops ashore by LCAC or lifting them ashore by CH-53 would be cheaper and make more tactical sense. Before pumping scarce resources into the AAA, the Marine Corps needs to consider carefully that vehicle’s utility in the amphibious force of the future. Despite its expanded capabilities, the AAA will not fit into the OTH amphibious operation.
Colonel Alexander is right in saying that both “blue” and “green” amphibious warriors must get together and work hand in hand to get the systems we need to fight a modern amphibious battle. We did for the LCAC, and now the LCAC is in the fleet. We should do the same for the V-22 Osprey before our vertical envelopment capability falls out of the sky from old age and tactical obsolescence. But the AAA? It’s doubtful the actual capability added by this system will contribute much to our amphibious force.
“Strikes from the Sea”
(See T.C. Lynn, pp. 34-37, November 1989 Proceedings)
Commander Carl O. Shuster, U.S. Navy, Commander Amphibious Group One— Major Linn is correct that amphibious raiding adds another dimension to the
U.S. arsenal against terrorism. The operations against the Iranian oil platforms are indeed cases in point. However, two other factors will affect the continuation of the Navy-Marine Corps raiding capability and employment. The first is political. The decision to conduct an amphibious raid is a political one, as is the structuring of military forces. Although the Navy-Marine Corps team is the force of choice in the overwhelming majority of contingency operations, that fact carries little weight in congressional circles. Indeed, the very effectiveness of Navy- Marine Corps operations makes them prime targets for those congressional leaders who wish to see an end to “gunboat diplomacy.”
In their eyes, the United States should set an example for the world by deactivating as much of the Navy’s strike capability as possible. Their arguments will become seductive in the coming years of declining defense budgets. The fact that many overseas facilities have ultimately been turned over to hostile entities (Libya, Iran, and Vietnam) will be overlooked in debates centered on shortterm, “fair share” budgetary concerns.
The second aspect is operational. Successful raids require an element of surprise along with timely and exact intelligence information. Surprise will be difficult if the amphibious task group is offshore for several weeks establishing a “presence,” while the government’s various bureaucracies and branches debate the potential courses of action with leaks to the press to enhance the debate. More important, the United States does not appear to be good at obtaining precise intelligence in a timely fashion. Much of this may be based on the U.S. penchant for technical and strategic intelligence, although overemphasis on the Soviet threat is also responsible. The sort of intelligence required to conduct an amphibious raid or coup de main is best obtained through a human intelligence network such as the British established in occupied Europe during World War II. These networks require resources applied over a period of time, something that has not been directed at the Third World.
Unfortunately, the recent reduction in superpower tensions probably will result in an overall decline in defense-related spending, especially in intelligence, with no corresponding change in intelligence collection or production priorities. Ultimately, domestic political and bureaucratic processes pose the greatest threat to Marine Corps raiding forces, and only a concentrated effort by the entire Navy- Marine Corps leadership will ensure the continuation of this vital capability.
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The Six-Year Service Obligation
Lieutenant Michael Amedick, U.S. Navy— Tucked away in the 1990 Defense Authorization Bill is a provision to raise the active duty service obligation for service academy graduates to six years. This pro- v'sion is a bad idea; it should be removed.
There are many arguments against this 'dea. For example, it will diminish the number of qualified candidates for appointment. Congress appears to assume that there is an unlimited number of quailed applicants. This is not true. The Naval Academy, for instance, receives roughly 15,000 applications each year. Of these, only about 2,500 are fully qualified. About 1,800 candidates are offered appointments. Approximately 1,400 accept them. Raising the service obligation can only decrease the number of candidates. With the number of 18-year-olds already in decline nationally, the acade- nues will be under increased pressure to recruit the top-quality candidates necessary for their demanding programs.
A second reason to scrap the extended obligation is its unfairness to future ser- Vlce-academy applicants and graduates. Congress should not require 17-year-olds to make commitments lasting until they are 28. The high cost of academy training ls cited as a reason for lengthening the commitment. But the cost of academy training has not risen relative to the cost °f private colleges. Furthermore, how does one measure repayment? By the number of mid-watches stood? By the number of months away from home and family? Clearly, the question is not that s,rnple. How many academy graduates, *°r instance, feel they still “owe” the government something after their five- year commitment is over?
The final objection is the most serious. Such an extension will be detrimental to nulitary preparedness and morale. Inevitably, some academy graduates, for whatever reason, will not enjoy their Jobs. They will want to resign their commissions at the earliest possible time. It makes no sense to keep these people around any longer than we do now. Officers who are effective and like what they are doing are going to stay anyway, so ^hy not let the others go?
“Officer to Officer”
{See C.A.H. Trost, pp. 50-52, December 1989 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: Admiral C.A.H. Trost, C.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, responded to questions addressed to him after his talk at Grechko Naval Academy
in Leningrad. Presented is part of that dialogue.
Five naval cadets: Let us congratulate you on your Navy Day. We have some questions for you: How much sailing training on board ships do junior-year midshipmen have during their education at the Annapolis Naval Academy? Are the four years all formal education? How much time is spent on sailing practice? How many hours of bodybuilding do your naval cadets have every day? What is your favorite military occupational speciality in the Navy?
Trost: Thank you for your congratulations. During their four years at the Naval Academy, midshipmen spend some of each summer at sea. Sailing occupies a great part of the first summer as each midshipman undergoes basic sailing instruction and learns to operate small craft in the Severn River adjacent to the academy. Through the rest of their time at the academy, midshipmen may also operate any of the various sailing craft available, once they qualify. These range from two- man sailboats to 44-foot yawls used for open ocean training. The academy sailing team is one of the finest in the world and participates in many international events.
Midshipmen complete several training cruises during their four years at the Naval Academy. During their second summer, midshipmen spend about two months on ships and submarines learning the routines of the sailors. During their third summer at the academy, midshipmen spend several weeks learning about each of the major warfare communities of the naval service, including the U.S. Marine Corps. During their last summer at the academy, midshipmen return to the fleet for eight weeks to assume the roles of junior officers on board ships, submarines, and in aircraft squadrons.
As to your question concerning the amount of physical training midshipmen receive, every semester each midshipman is required to be enrolled in at least one physical education class. More important, every midshipman must participate in a sport after classes every afternoon during the academic year, either at the intercollegiate or the intramural level.
And, finally, your question about my favorite military occupational specialty— we call them warfare specialties in the Navy. There are three warfare specialties; aviation, submarine, and surface warfare. Each of these qualifications requires a high degree of study and effort. While, as you might expect, there is good-natured rivalry between the communities since all assume they serve in the best warfare area, they are all professional Navy men
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and women. As a submariner, I am of course very proud of our submarine service and my long association with that community. I have learned, though, both as a fleet commander and as Chief of Naval Operations, to depend on and favor all of our warfare specialists equally. Naval operations demand the utmost teamwork and there can be no weak links if you expect to be successful at sea. In fact, the importance of learning to appreciate the need for teamwork is one reason why we place such emphasis on participation in athletics at the Naval Academy.
Captain First Rank Uvarov (Retired): Earlier this year, weekly Moscow News reported that there was an agreement between Ministries of Defense of the United States and the Soviet Union for exchanging cadets between one of the Soviet Military Fighter Colleges and West Point. What is your opinion about exchanging naval cadets between one of the higher naval colleges and the Naval Academy in Annapolis?
Trost: It is an interesting proposal. I would welcome, on a trial basis, an exchange program involving a limited number of U.S. midshipmen and naval cadets from the Soviet Union. We currently have an exchange program with other nations that affords the midshipmen an opportunity to exchange places with their
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counterparts for up to two weeks. It may be feasible to adopt a similar program between our countries. Our midshipmen in the Russian-language studies program would benefit greatly from such an exchange.
Captain First Rank Uvarov (Retired): For 12 years, I was the deputy head of the Leningrad Naval Engineering College (LNEC) and studied and read a lot about the Naval Academy in Annapolis, but had no opportunity to visit. Now I teach naval cadets in the LNEC. What do you think, may I be invited to visit the Academy this or next year?
Trost: Another good question, Captain Uvarov. The U.S. Naval Academy is a national historic site and a major tourist attraction. The grounds and many of the buildings are open, on a regular basis, to the public and visitors from all countries. Recently, your Soviet naval attaches in the United States visited the academy. In the past, naval training vessels of other navies have visited the academy either by anchoring in the Chesapeake Bay near Annapolis or mooring in nearby Baltimore. The U.S. Naval Academy would welcome the opportunity to host such a visit by a Soviet training ship.
“The Capture of the Pueblo”
(See L.M. Bucher, pp. 28-29, February 1989; D.M. Karcher, p. 20, April 1989; P.R. Schratz, p. 76, July 1989; M.J. O’Donnell, p. 33,
August 1989; T.W. Pleasant, p. 32, October 1989; C. Kimball, pp. 20-22, December 1989 Proceedings)
Rear Admiral Horace H. Epes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Kimball states that my failure to launch fighters from the USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) to investigate the Pueblo's (AGER-2) distress call is beyond his understanding.
I do not know what information he was privy to in reaching this conclusion, but I would like to relate a few facts for his benefit, and also for other “Monday morning quarterbacks” of this event. In compiling these facts I reviewed both my own file of the Pueblo's messages and the Report of the House Armed Services Inquiry into the Pueblo incident.
The Enterprise (Captain Kent Lee commanding), with Commander Carrier Division One embarked, departed Sasebo, Japan, on the morning of 23 January 1968 en route to Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin for combat operations. At approximately 1440 (all times local Korean time), I was handed a message, an interception of a relay to major commands by the Naval Security Activity,
Kamiseya, Japan, from the Pueblo. It reported that she was being harrassed by North Korean patrol craft near Wonsan, North Korea. Subsequent information revealed that this message reached the Enterprise one hour and 40 minutes after transmission by the Pueblo.
Almost immediately (eight minutes later) another message from the Pueblo was received, relayed by Kamiseya to all Western Pacific attack carriers. The Pueblo reported that she was being boarded by the North Koreans. History reveals that this boarding attempt was unsuccessful and was followed by firing on the Pueblo, with subsequent boarding and capture at 1432 (before the first message was received by Enterprise).
At 1440 the Enterprise was 500 nautical miles from Wonsan. We had ready- alert fighters, armed for air-to-air combat, but other aircraft would have required arming and readying for any contemplated strike (approximately one- and-a-half hours). We had no briefing material for pilots on the Wonsan area, no rules of engagement, and no definitive mission. We also knew that the U.S. Air Force had ready aircraft on airfields in South Korea, much closer to the Pueblo than we were.
In view of these considerations and the fact that the Pueblo was already in North Korean hands, I elected to maintain status quo and await developments. These were not long in coming. At 1550, we received a message from Commander Seventh Fleet (my immediate superior in command). This message directed us to reverse course, to head toward Korea, and to take no overt action until further informed.
Why did such a tragic incident happen?
- The Pueblo and her crew were ill- prepared for hostile action. They had not been briefed to anticipate such.
- There were no contingency plans for assistance to or rescue of the Pueblo, should the North Koreans initiate hostile action. A clear warning by the National Security Agency to the Joint Reconnaissance Center in December 1967 of the threat of North Korean hostile action against intelligence collection activities was apparently ignored by those planning the Pueblo's mission.
Forces that might have assisted the Pueblo were not assigned such a mission and were unaware of her operations. In addition, the Pueblo's operations were monitored in special intelligence communications circuits, which delayed reaction by operational forces.
1 hope that we have learned from this incident.
“Lies, Damn Lies, Statistics, and the Drug War”
(See C.M. Fuss Jr., pp. 65-69, December 1989 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Kenneth M. Olson, U.S. Naval Reserve—The article appears inconsistent with current U.S. enforcement activities. The argument stands on an unsound foundation; it implies that the “various antidrug agencies” (the Office of National Drug Control Strategy and its supportive federal agencies) are more concerned with the development of statistics than collecting narcotics intelligence and other enforcement operations. The article goes as far as to compare the war on drugs to the Vietnam War with its obsession for body counts as a measurement for success.
The comparison between Vietnam and the drug war is not realistic. The Office of National Drug Control Policy addressed this issue in the National Drug Control Strategy that stated,
“Most Federal agencies that deal with drug traffic assess their own performance and that of their employees through a kind of ‘body count’: arrests made, kilos of cocaine seized, convictions gained, and so on. These numbers will remain necessary so long as Congress and other executive branch agencies insist on using them as a measure of effectiveness.”
Such a system does require review, but it is not the various antidrug agencies that have instituted such a “measure of effectiveness.” Since Congress controls the federal purse strings, and this is their “measure of effectiveness,” statistics will remain the guidestick of future federal funding when the narcotics-funding pie is cut each year. The statistics that are used to pursue annual funding should not be confused as an annual report on the progress of the United States in the battle against narcotics.
The article also states that the best hope of winning the drug interdiction war lies in disrupting the smuggling infrastructure in the United States. The U.S. distribution infrastructure is quite expendable as far as the cocaine cartels in Medellin and Cali are concerned. As soon as one organization is exposed, apprehended, and prosecuted, others are waiting to take its place. The profits netted by these criminal organizations are staggering. And about 70% to 80% of the cocaine being smuggled into the United States arrives in cargo containers. Each U.S. port receives hundreds of cargo containers daily, and the U.S. Customs
U.S. COAST GUARD
These drug-bust stencils are not the moral equivalent of Vietnam body counts; they mean federal funding.
Contraband Enforcement Team working around the clock can only search a small fraction of them. Cargo cannot be held up indefinitely to search for narcotics. If every day cartels ship in ten containers packed full of cocaine, they can be assured of getting at least nine through Customs. Moreover, containers can be diverted and transloaded through a number of countries to disguise the country of origin with no direct personal involvement. In addition, because of all the noises, fumes, oils, and other lubricants around ports and ships, narcotics detection dogs are also ineffective. It currently is not good business to put a load of cocaine on an aircraft or small boat. The cartels are aware of this, which is why they use the container method.
Greater emphasis should be placed on developing foreign sources of information specifically targeted toward obtaining information on containerized shipments of narcotics. Extensive loading crews are required and their recruitment would be a better interdiction approach than applying large resources in trying to disrupt a replaceable U.S. infrastructure.
The article continues with its analysis by stating that the current arrival-zone strategy is flawed because there is no current nationally coordinated narcotics intelligence system that can obtain and analyze valuable narcotics intelligence maintained by the state and local law enforcement agencies, conduct postseizure inspections of seized conveyances, and produce intelligence reports. A National Narcotics Intelligence System (NN1S) has existed since 1973. This system has evolved to supply tactical, investigative, and strategic drug intelligence for drug control activities that are carried out by local, state, federal, and foreign law enforcement officers and policy officials. Contributions to this drug intelligence data base come from a wide variety of sources. The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Information System indexes all drug-related information available in the federal system.
The drug intelligence programs within NNIS perform three primary functions. First is the collection and analysis of information in support of major drug investigations. The DEA’s centralized data base comprehensively analyzes worldwide trafficking organizations. Analysts are organized according to the type of drug to research worldwide drug networks.
Second is the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), located at Fort Bliss, Texas. This center supports the federal interdiction effort with sensitive and timely information about the movement of drugs by individuals, vessels, and aircraft, as well as commercial cargo. EPIC is a composite of ten federal agencies whose missions are to counter the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States. In addition EPIC has agreements with police organizations from all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Samoa, and the Virgin Islands. These states and territories can obtain drug intelligence on criminal suspects or provide intelligence to the national data base. Because most of the federal agencies give access to their individualized data bases, EPIC is an all-source drug information center.
The third aspect of NNIS is its development of strategic drug intelligence for resource and policy decisions. Here, information from the intelligence community complements that gathered by U.S. Customs Service and DEA special agents deployed in more than 45 countries. Intelligence research specialists analyze this information to assess drug-production capabilities, foreign governments’ resolve to establish counter drug programs, corruption, and other matters ot strategic importance to the U.S. drug- control activities. Assessment of domestic production, trafficking, availability, and consumption are also critical elements to U.S. counterdrug operations and are also addressed. In addition to NNIS, the Central Intelligence Agency has established the Counternarcotics Center. The center provides an essential link between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies.
The article goes on to assert that professional intelligence debriefers are required to extract valuable intelligence that law enforcement agents miss because their goal is to obtain evidence for prosecution. Federal agents undergo extensive training in debriefing techniques. They possess skills and an understanding of the individuals they are debriefing beyond
lefense it comes to
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those of an intelligence debriefer. In most cases the debriefer will be the case agent who developed a rapport with a source that led to his or her recruitment. It is unlikely that sources will provide information to anyone other than their handler. This is normally based on selfpreservation. The source knows that the cartels will track down any source they know about as a warning to others.
An effective approach toward combatting narcotics trafficking requires a four- prong attack. The first is aggressive interdiction of the precursor chemicals di
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Second, aggressive law enforcement action must be taken to eliminate the massive profits realized by the sale of narcotics in the United States. Movement of any monetary unit in the amount of $10,000 or more, either in or out of the United States, must be reported to the Treasury Department by the financial in
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stitution effecting the transfer. The U.S. Customs Service maintains the data base with all of these transactions under the Bank Secrecy Act. The only other way to return the profits to Colombia is by bulk shipment. The U.S. Customs Service has been granted statutory authority to search not only shipments coming into the United States, but also shipments being exported out, to protect against the illegal transfer of high-technology and unreported currency. The Financial Enforcement Center centralizes law enforcement assets in conducting international money laundering investigations. By going after the profits of narcotics traffickers, backed by stiff prison sentences, drug smuggling becomes a low-profit, high-risk proposition with the likely result of a long-term prison sentence.
The third prong is aggressive joint interdiction operations. Operations must equally concentrate on the inspection of commercial cargo containers and aircraft, vessel, and vehicle searches. I disagree strongly with the proposal that the U.S. Coast Guard be withdrawn to a 100-mile arrival zone and the U.S. Customs Service be withdrawn to the beach. The article proposes that by doing so, U.S. Customs could reduce its commitment to boat operations and increase its inspections ranks. The U.S. Customs marine operators are presently Customs special agents with the Office of Enforcement. They are in an Office of Personnel Management job series different from that of the U.S. Customs inspectors who are uniformed personnel assigned to the Customs Services Inspection and Control Office. The two jobs are not interchangeable. Even to suggest the withdrawal of interdiction assets is not a realistic proposition. U.S. naval assets should be added to supplement such successful joint operations as Operation Wagonwheel, Hunter, Checkmate, Snowcap, and others.
The fourth prong concerns reeducation and community awareness. This is the most time consuming, but it is the most important. It will take 25 to 30 years for the current and next generation to be educated on the dangers of narcotics use, thus curtailing the demand side of the equation.
“The Caribbean: Has Gorbachev Turned His Back?”
(See T. Ashby, pp. 79-82, January 1990 Proceedings)
Editor’s Note: On page 82 in the January issue we published a reference to the Arena government in El Salvador. It should have read, “which appeared headed for collapse.”
Reserve P-3s Can Answer the Forward C3 Challenge”
(Sec J- Roscoe and D. Hall, pp. 103-104, September 1989 Proceedings)
Captain Richard S. Zeisel, U.S. Navy 'Retired)—Once again, Commander
Roscoe and Lieutenant Hall have manned to “invent” the old.
Command, control, and communica- ions (C3)
—or just plain communica- ions—has been the bugaboo of military °Perators since the beginning of recorded c°mbat history. Almost any training or °Perational analysis dealing with multiple Un'ts begins its summary of effectiveness W|th commentary relating to communica- b°ns. and, like as not, with the words communications were lousy.” A few years ago, the Department of Defense assessment of the C3 problem caused the creation of a C3 ‘ ‘czar” (Donald Latham) to begin work on rectifying the situation.
ari°us communities took internal steps to support their own unique needs. For example, submariners developed their Outlaw Shark” system as a targeting a>d for long-range (Tomahawk) missile shooters. Even the maritime patrol (VP) community, in which the authors claim Membership, took action to improve the 0 1 (intelligence) capability of the supPorting antisubmarine warfare opera- honal centers (ASWOCs); VP HF (high requency) broadcast, data link, and sat- dlite communications (SatCom), a retirement for certain P-3 UD Ills, UD and now the P-7. The latter two did n°t make it into the requirements article, S'nce these capabilities will probably not bc retrofitted into reserve units. This sad state of affairs is lamentable, as is the assertion that the reserve P-3s need only be pressed into service in this regard. Again, I decry the faulty analysis in the derivation and satisfaction of operational requirements.
The Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company studies the effectiveness of lheir ASW products in order to make intelligent decisions in the future. Certainly, an understanding and appreciation °t the operational environment assists in this regard. In a far-reaching Navy- industrial Cooperative Research and development (N1CRAD) program report t° the PM-4 sponsor (the ASW program Manager for naval materiel, then Rear Admiral Dick Martini) in 1984, Lockheed pinpointed certain failings of the VP C3 system. One of the major findings was a lack of reliable, fast communications in forward areas, especially in view of the fact that ASWOCs never attained the Portability needed to support the forward; deployed proclivity of P-3 operations.
Using mostly IRAD funds, and with the creative support of Rear Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, Lockheed produced a pilot model of a system known as the Mobile Operational Control Center. This system provides ASWOC-style C3I at any remote site capable of landing a P-3, while at the same time tying into modern data link satellite networks for the exchange of vital C3I between supporting and supported commands. It is housed in three suitcase-size “boxes,” easily carried aboard a P-3 (or any aircraft), and even has its own power supply for complete independence. The system cut its teeth on a NATO exercise that featured P-3s from Jacksonville, Florida, flying out of a non- P-3 base in Spain. Although capable of supporting any P-3 through HF voice/ teletype systems, it really hums when using the computer-to-computer data link network with satellite communications a special capability. The addition of data link speed over a redundant long-range net (SatCom) has proved to be a large factor in realizing additional benefit from time-sensitive operational intelligence. The Navy has a number of these units, as well as complementary SatCom installations on selected P-3Cs, which will eventually receive a SatCom retrofit. A limited number of additional units is contracted for future delivery. Since P-3 squadrons must be self-supporting at their forward-deployed sites, one unit per squadron may be the eventual goal.
The Navy appreciates that communication is a primary VP mission. People in the community are also thinking about the problems of supporting the myriad of tasks assigned to the P-3/VP force, especially as exacerbated by the mixed bag of assets that comprise the hardware. The authors did an excellent job of describing that need. 1 hope, however, that in the rush to get the job done, we do not ignore analysis of the total set of requirements and what is available to meet them and push out something far short of providing adequate C3.
The problem of the aging, equipment- obsolete reserve P-3s also needs to be resolved; it would seem unconscionable that, given the size and capability of the Soviet submarine force, the U.S. Navy would allow its VP capability to dwindle.
“Triad or Dyad”
(See J.R. Lynch, pp. 61-65, January 1990;
W.F. Gadberry, T.J. Eccles, pp. 14-20,
February 1990 Proceedings)
Jan Paul Hope—“Triad or Dyad?” and “The Carriers Are the Wrong Targets” are right on the mark about seeking a more affordable nuclear deterrent force.
The nuclear Triad was not created as a strategic concept and then brought to fruition through technological invention. Technology brought the Triad by inventing in succession:
- Long-range penetrating bombers
- Land-based ballistic missiles
- Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
Since then, technology has continued
inventing and we now have the technological means to deliver nuclear weapons by four additional means, which are:
- Air-launched cruise missiles
- Submarine-launched cruise missiles
- Surface-ship-launched cruise missiles
- Land-launched cruise missiles
We have negotiated away the seventh means of nuclear weapons delivery because the range of the land-launched cruise missile in our inventory fell within the parameters of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force reduction agreement.
A legitimate question is whether the first two and oldest means of nuclear weapons delivery are now technologically obsolescent and strategically unnecessary, given the existence and technological advancement potential of the remaining four means.
Sea-based missiles are more mobile and survivable than land-based forces. In particular, submarine-based missiles are now virtually invulnerable before launch and will remain so. Surface-ship-based missiles are more mobile and likely more survivable because of their mobility, than land-based missiles. Sea-based missiles do not present strategic targets within the U.S. homeland.
Trident warheads are as accurate as land missiles, preclude targeting our homeland, are virtually invulnerable, are mobile over a dispersed per-launch operating area almost 100,000-times greater than truck mobile land missiles, and are less than one-fifth as costly as mobile land missiles.
The cost of new production for nuclear warhead delivery systems is substantially less for sea-based missiles than for mobile land missiles or penetrating manned bombers. The cost of decreasing the number of nuclear warheads is substantially lessened by wholly eliminating one or both of the two oldest and most obsolescent of the current six means of nuclear-weapon delivery.
Four means are enough, and we should improve the cost-effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent by increasing the emphasis on the accuracy, mobility, and survivability of sea-based ballistic missiles and sea-based cruise missiles.
“The Vincennes Incident”
(See N. Friedman, pp. 72-79, May 1989; D.R. Carlson, pp. 87-92, September 1989; D.L. Molnar. B.L. Brown, J.H. Odegaard and A.E. Rondeau, R.C. Benitez, pp. 16-20, November 1989; M.R. Adams and A.R. Banks, p. 14, December 1989; F.G. Hoffman, and M.C. Agresti, pp. 14-24, January 1990; R.W. Covey, J.T. Gillick, and W.G. Key, pp. 22-28,
February 1990 Proceedings)
Captain M. Eckhart, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Valid questioning of the Vincennes (CG-49) tragedy will not go away, notwithstanding the unsubtle message delivered through Commander Rondeau’s reprimanding response to Commander Carlson. Captain Hoffman had it right “that something went wrong in the Persian Gulf that day.” My questioning follows from years of design involvements bracketed by considerations of how warships are designed versus how they are employed.
The Vincennes case points to exploitation of technology to achieve specialized warfare capabilities, and then misusing the implemented warship in general purpose ways. If so, it is professional dissembling to reduce that case to an accident of war. The case holds implications of a serious command lapse in letting the wrong warship get into a fighting situation it should not have been near.
The first question is why an Aegis cruiser was allowed to get into a firefight with assault boats. The entangling circumstances are reported to have involved helicopters, data linking, and five-inch guns, none of which is unique to the Vincennes. What is unique to the Vincennes is Aegis. Hazarding a billion-dollar cruiser against spit kits, particularly in a situation that did not involve its unique capabilities, does not come out as a logical command trade-off. While it was highly improbable that the Iranian boats could sink the Vincennes, their machine guns could easily have done disabling damage to the fixed radar arrays that are the core of Aegis cruiser capabilities. That exposure was wholly unnecessary, in any case, since guided-missile frigates were on the scene.
In addition, basic seamanship principles confirm that an Aegis cruiser should never tangle with fast agile small craft. Its poor stability will put it at disadvantage whenever fast maneuvering is needed. This lesson was revealed by violent heeling during the air engagement (reported as 32°) throwing everyone and everything in combat information center head-over-heels during the air engagement. That the officer-of-the-deck could feel free to make such a turn while things of greater importance were going on in combat information center is a significant question in itself. But the main point is that the frigates were better suited than the Vincennes in every respect to engage the Iranian boats.
Last and most important, the general air situation was out of keeping with the characteristics deliberately and carefully designed into the Aegis ship combat system at great cost. Only one operational aspect of the Persian Gulf obviously warranted an Aegis cruiser. That was the threat of simultaneous launches of a large number of Silkworm missiles, as reportedly deployed along the Iranian shores.
It was said that only 189 seconds were available for command decision on the Vincennes. Investment in Aegis cruisers has been justified based on a small fraction of that interval being long in tactical real time. The problem is that ambiguity was not in the design specifications, but the Vincennes was allowed to get into a highly ambiguous tactical situation.
Consequently, the Vincennes was not ready to deal with a situation she was not designed to handle. That was on-the-job- training of a deadly sort. This is unavoidable in hot wars, but it was very avoidable in the Persian Gulf. It also was unnecessary.
To a designer, the case indicates that something was seriously amiss with rules of engagement. There had been previous public pronouncements that the rules of engagement had been thoroughly scrubbed in light of earlier mishaps. Events suggest that the scrubbing was looking backward remedially, rather than thinking ahead preventively.
This is not a passing issue. It is becoming an evermore critical issue as warship capabilities become more and more bounded by mechanization specifications, thereby constraining human adaptivity in real time. Captain Rogers was left to guessing, and he guessed incorrectly.
Much high-technology design effort and large national investments are predicated upon claims of operational authorities who thought through how to kill in unambigous, high-intensity warfare. There is another side to that thinking coin. That is to direct equal professional rigor to not killing when avoidable in low-intensity warfare.
Rear Admiral Frederick C. Johnson, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I am sick and tired of reading accounts related to the “accidental” shoot-down of the Iranian airbus by the Vincennes (CG-49), particularly by those not immediately involved. The shoot-down was not an accident. It was an error, maybe but not an accident. Intuition tells me that the Vincennes's Aegis system performed pretty much according j to design and that her ship’s company went about their business as professionally as any other combat-ready crew would under equivalent circumstances. Furthermore, I contend that it is patently unjust and unprofessional for those who lack all the details to pass judgment on the performance of either the ship or her crew. No one, senior or junior, should pronounce judgments unless they were on deck in that situation and were able to see it from the Vincennes's vantage point- j
“Assisting El Salvador”
(See J.U. Cole, pp. 60-69, November 1989
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Byron Morgan, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), Chairman, Peace and Justice Task Force, Los Ange- . les Archdiocese—As a Navy pilot who | served in World War II—during which 1 was missing in action and interned in the Soviet Union—and later served in Korea and Vietnam, I disagree with Major Cole’s assessment of the situation in El Salvador.
Major Cole, a former military adviser who served in El Salvador, bases his conclusions upon an image of that country j derived only from the perspective of the Salvadoran Army and power structure. This is the same oligarchy that created the conditions which caused the citizens to protest, to demonstrate, to fight, and, in the case of many, to die.
The present situation resulted from a fraudulent election held on 20 February 1977, in which General Carlos Humberto i Romero took power. This action brought the people into the streets. Three hundred were killed, thousands were arrested, and many disappeared.
This horror was the start of a war : against the peasants waged by the mili' tary, paramilitary organizations, and the government. The list of massacres, disappearances, bombings of civilians, and death squad activities continues.
1 have seen El Salvadoran Army helicopters fly over villages and attack repopulation centers. Our village of Guarjila in Chalatenango Department (province) was 1,000 strong—800 children, 160 women, and 40 men. It has been attacked many times by the Salvadoran Army, its helicopters, and A-37 gunships.
This is not the red-white game. This is not the same as Korea. The model is not Afghanistan here, or even Cuba. Perhaps this is George Orwell’s land, where an enemy is required in order to survive.
“LAMPS-III: The Facts Behind the Myths
(See K.F. Delaney, pp. 95-96, December 1989 Proceedings)
Commander Bruce R. Linder, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Elrod (FFG- —Captain Delaney’s description of the evolving LAMPS-III tactical philosophy fully outlines the tremendous tactical ^vantages that are evident once the LAMPS-III is integrated with a modem surface escort. During the USS Elrod's (FFG-55) recent deployment to the Middle East Force, all of Captain Delaney’s SH-60B facts were revalidated, and all of his SH-60B myths were dispelled.
Let me add another important fact that may help to underscore his primary Points: synergism.
(l Webster defines the “synergism” as •he action of two or more elements to uchieve an effect of which each is indi- yidually incapable.” Although synergism 's u rather overworked word in the de- •ense press today, it is an especially important concept guiding our weapon systems designs today.
Each ship or weapon system has mis- s'°n limitations as well as tactical strengths and weaknesses. In the case of •he Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class/ LAMPS-III combination, strengths of one offset (happily) the weaknesses of the other. Where one may be singly incapable, the combination of ship and helicopter becomes very capable indeed. Where •he ship may have limits on radar detec- ti°n range, the helicopter can range far und wide. Where the helicopter may have endurance limits, the ship can doggedly stay on station for weeks. Where the ship ttay be vulnerable to close-in submarine attack, the helicopter is invulnerable. Where the helicopter may need defense against attacking fighters, the ship can Provide that with its surface-to-air missile system. '
This true synergism is apparent in all 'Mission areas. Examples abound of this tlramatic improvement in the Oliver Haz- Urd Perry-class ship’s ability to perform any assignment. During the Elrod's Midtile East deployment, the ship could adequately protect merchant traffic through- °ut an entire sector of the Persian Gulf by Use of both shipborne and heliborne sensors and weapon systems. Other ships 't'ould have had to proceed in close escort w,th these merchant ships to provide a s,milar level of protection. In another instance, the Elrod was able to provide bar- Ocr surveillance along an extended patrol hue for day, a scenario that would have demanded the use of as many as five Pmket ships if it were done without the use of the ship’s indigenous helicopter.
Captain Delaney’s article is a good primer for what the LAMPS-III means to the escort force of the Navy. His concluding comments allude to the dynamic future of the LAMPS-III. In truth, if the Navy becomes smaller but maintains its current commitments, there can be no successful future without individual ships that can perform the work that once took many ships. The force-building aspects of the embarked LAMPS-III provide just this kind of synergistic solution.
Follow that Copier!
Lieutenant Commander David Stern, U.S. Naval Reserve— Security is a topic that anyone associated with the Department of Defense is familiar with. As a Naval Reserve officer who served in the submarine program while on active duty, I have seen rigorous measures taken to ensure that all types of communications are safeguarded—fleet communications, telephone calls, and face-to-face discussions to name a few.
One system that I do not recall being addressed from a security standpoint is the everyday copier. While most systems are marked as to the classification level for which they arc cleared, the copier seems to have slipped through the cracks.
When using a copier, care was, as always, required in the disposition of the copies and original documents. I never thought much about further safeguards until the copier at my civilian place of employment started malfunctioning.
Specifically, the problem manifested itself in a form of double printing. The machine would produce a copy of the original document that was intended for duplication; however, it would also produce, on the same page, an image of another document, after its original had long been removed from the machine. This machine was a high-quality copier from a leading manufacturer.
1 previously did not realize that a copier can retain an image after the original document has been removed. But I, like most people, use the machine without giving too much thought to the mechanics of the operation. I find it difficult to comprehend why the problem has not been addressed before now. Obviously, the potential for compromising security from such a malfunction is clear. Perhaps the common copier deserves a better look with respect to hardware and operating procedures.
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Each record provides • Name of ship • Class of ship • Dale • Latitude • Longitude • Pertinent Comments
[2] Source of data - JANAC, Japanese Trom's, National Archives RG 457, etc.