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The U-Boat Wars, 1916-1945
John Terraine. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1989. 841 pp. Photos, lllus. Maps. Tables. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($20.65).
Reviewed by Stephen Howarth
In 1917, the U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Page, put it simply: “The submarine,” he said, “is the most formidable thing the war has produced.” In lune that year, Admiral Sir John Jcllicoe, Britain’s First Sea Lord, spelled out what seemed to be imminent national defeat: "There is no good discussing plans for next Spring. We cannot go on.” At Jutland in 1916, his deep concern about— Possibly fear of—submarines was one reason why that battle was indecisive. Winston Churchill was not afraid of much, but some 40 years later even he admitted that during World War II, U-boats had been “the only thing that ever really frightened me.”
With a sparkling text, first-class indexes, interesting illustrations, detailed and instructive appendices, a sound bibliography, and useful source notes, John Terraine’s new history of the U-boat wars >s an excellent book. In it, the U-boat war of 1939-45 is clearly seen as a continuation of the undersea conflict that began in 1916. The weapon that inspired such disquiet in two generations of Britons and Americans was not the only continuity: among U-boat officers there was also a mental continuity. German submariners of 1918 did not regard themselves as defeated, either then or in the two following decades. Many (including Karl Donitz, later chief of U-boats, grand admiral, and ultimately Adolf Hitler’s successor) continued to train in the interwar years, using the limited number of torpedo boats allowed by the Versailles Treaty. Until 1944, all U-boats were submersible vessels rather than true submarines and thus Were highly effective as tactical trainers. Under Donitz’s command in the second War the U-boat arm came very close—as >t had in the first—to starving Britain into surrender.
That it did not ultimately succeed was because of many interlocking factors, the three most prominent of which were intelligence, training, and technology. Terraine charts the unnerving see-saws of the battle of the brains, Bletchley Park versus B-Dienst, with fascinating detail. He describes the convoy battles with an expert’s accuracy and with something close to a novelist’s vividness. The invention and development of weaponry and counterweaponry create a recurrent theme, an eloquent testimony to a macabre but necessary form of ingenuity.
Terraine deserves further commendation for his comparative evenhandedness. When the subject is one that afflicted his own country so deeply, it is difficult to avoid bias altogether; yet as he indicates, it would be not only wildly inaccurate but positively indecent to pretend it was all a British job. Thus, particularly in 1939— 45, he offers just as much detail on the U.S. experience and viewpoint, with all the transatlantic naval politicking and the problems of running a collaborative war when doctrines differed and many other theaters provided their own insistent, competing demands. We have the too- often neglected contributions of the Royal Canadian Navy, the remnants of the Polish Navy, and the Free French. And, throughout the 29-year period, we have the enemy’s own view as well. Showing the battle as much through Axis as through Allied eyes, Terraine’s portrayal of the mind-set of Germany’s naval elite is persuasive. He does not shirk at paying tribute to the professional skill of the U-boat aces, and such is the clarity of his writing that, when brave men meet frightful deaths, one can feel compassion and horror, be they civilian or naval, Axis or Allied. Yet there is, thank God, no hint of glorifying war. Remembering Admiral Jackie Fisher’s dictum of 1913 that “the essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility,” Terraine goes further: “When nations arc fighting for their lives, the only moral imperative likely to be accepted is sheer survival. That is the essence of total war.” But with schrecklichkeit (frightfulness) as an established policy of U-boat High Command, the reader is left in no doubt of where the balances of blame and pity and admiration deservedly lie.
Was the whole Battle of the Atlantic a defensive or an offensive operation? Many of those who participated saw it as defensive first and last. And was it in fact an Allied crisis of the magnitude that Britons believed? Some modern authorities—primarily U.S. rather than British or German—deny this. There is more than a difference of opinion here. “[T]he touchstone,” says Terraine, “was always OVERLORD. Those whose hearts were not in OVERLORD”—and he makes it clear that this included many contemporary British servicemen—“never understood the Atlantic. . . . Too often OVERLORD is seen simply as the assault landing on the Normandy beaches.” Much more than that, it was an 11 -month campaign of which the Battle of Normandy and the advance into Germany were parts. All told, 970,000 vehicles, more than 18 million tons of supplies, and nearly 5,500,000 men were deIn 1937 the Nazis, here commissioning seven new subs, were gearing up for another round in the U-boat wars, in which submarines would nearly starve Britain into surrender once again.
ployed. In Terraine’s judgment, “[t]here can be no conceivable notion of building up and maintaining such a force as this with undefeated U-boats at its back.” It would be fatuous to disagree; the Battle of the Atlantic was indeed a crisis for all nations involved, and the end of the U-boat wars was a huge, offensive Allied victory.
Mr. Howarth is author of several books, including The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun: The Drama of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1895-1945 (Atheneum, 1983) and Koh-I-Noor Diamond: The History and the Legend (Charles River Books, 1981), and coauthor of Lord Nelson: The Immortal Memory (Viking, 1989), among others. He has written To Shining Sea: The Story of the U.S. Navy, 1775-1989, to be published this summer by Random House, and Jutland, to be published next year by Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
The Doolittle Raid: America’s Daring First Strike Against Japan
Carroll V. Glines. New York: Orion Books, 1988. 258 pp. Photos. Notes. Bib. Ind. $17.95 ($16.15).
The Doolittle Raid
Duane Schultz. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988. 325 pp. Photos. Maps. Notes. Bib. Ind. $18.95 ($17.05).
Reviewed by Stanley L. Falk
Nearly half a century later, the simultaneous publication of two books about the 18 April 1942 air strike on Japan led by Lieutenant Colonel “Jimmy” Doolittle attests to the continuing interest in this fascinating episode. Both of these books recount the story in considerable detail. And both concentrate on the experiences of the 80 individual flyers who conducted the raid.
Duane Schultz’s volume is clearly the better of the two, but each is highly readable and entertaining. Carroll Glines’s book is apparently a reworking of earlier accounts he published, some passages of which he repeats verbatim (including an introduction by General Curtis LeMay), while adding only a limited amount of new material. Schultz’s account is more rounded and broadly focused, using a number of recent sources that Glines ignored.
Schultz also makes a greater effort to show the Navy’s role in the attack. A task force commanded by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., made the hazardous approach into Japanese waters. The plan called for 16 B-25s to leave the carrier Hornet (CV-8) about 500 miles from Japan, make a surprise attack on Tokyo and other cities, and then fly on to land at friendly bases in China. But the task force ran into Japanese picket boats before it could reach the projected launch point, so Doolittle and his men had to take off sooner than planned and at a greater distance from the target.
While there is no question that Doolittle and his flyers took the major risk in the operation, the danger to U.S. sea power was grave. In coming within 650 miles of the Japanese coast, Halsey was risking half the U.S. carriers in the Pacific as well as a precious force of cruisers, destroyers, and oilers. Had the Japanese managed to intercept and destroy or badly maul those ships, the blow to the Pacific Fleet would have been more damaging in many ways than the losses sustained at Pearl Harbor.
Now an independent historical consultant and lecturer, Dr. Falk is a former chief historian of the U.S. Air Force. He was also deputy chief historian for Southeast Asia, U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has written a number of books about his specialty, World War II in the Pacific.
The Liberation of Guam:
21 July-10 August 1944
Harry Gailey. Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
- 231 pp. Illus. Notes. Bib. Ind.
Reviewed by Captain Kenneth J. Hagan, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)
The saga of the U.S. recapture of the lost island of Guam from the Japanese in the Pacific campaign of World War II is the topic of Harry Gailey’s book. It is a bloody tale, with plenty of dogged heroism and dedication to country shown by the foot soldiers on both sides. The Americans suffered 7,714 casualties in 20 days of fighting. The 3rd Marine Division “paid the highest price ... of all combat units.”
Against this grim backdrop, Gailey too briefly recounts the pitiful effects of interservice rivalry. Admiral Chester Nim- itz wanted Guam primarily as “the forward base for the Central Pacific Command preparatory to an assault on Formosa.” As a result, “work on the projected air bases on Guam was given very low priority.” Harbor improvement, command headquarters, supply, and medical facilities took precedence over fields for B-29 bombers, much to the chagrin of Major General Curtis LeMay, the commander of the 20th Air Force charged with strategic bombing of the Japanese home islands. LeMay bitterly recalled the deleterious effect of disagreeing over the strategy of air power in the final months of the Pacific War: “All along, that was the way it went. Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa—thousands and thousands of young Americans died on those islands, in order to give us a base of operations against the Japanese homeland. And here people were, piddling around with all this other stuff, and not giving us anything to fly from or fight with.”
Eventually, on 6 August 1945, the Enola Gay crept along a runway on Tinian and lumbered into the air burdened with nuclear death for Hiroshima. The war ended; Guam again became a Navy-run colony.
Thirty years ago a U.S. citizen could not linger overnight without explicit permission of the Navy Department. Today, the island is a haven for Japanese honeymooners.This is an ironic counterpoint to Harry Gailey’s moving account of the high cost young men must pay for overseas empires.
Captain Hagan is a professor of history at the U.S. Navy Academy. His most recent book is This People's Navy: The Making of American Seapower (1990).
For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer
Archie Roosevelt. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1988. 500 pp. Photos. Maps. Index. $24.95 ($22.45).
Reviewed by Commander Robert E. Bublitz, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Finally, a book that departs from the premise that “intelligence” is what the James Bonds of the world do. In fact, For Lust of Knowing rather tickled me because it supports my favorite bias, namely, that one should expect an intelligence officer to be intelligent. Archie Roosevelt, a spellbinder and a scholar of awesome breadth and depth, spent 32 years in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His overseas posts included chief of stations in Beirut, Istanbul, Madrid, and London. He retired in 1974.
If you’re looking for tales of high adventure, the knock-’em-down, beat-’em- up, and steal-the-secrets while bedding- the-beauty variety (and who doesn’t from time to time?), then don’t reach for Lust of Knowing. If, on the other hand, you’d like to get away from the drug-’em and plug-’em school, and soak up the feeling of how a professional intelligence officer approaches his target country, target culture, and target people, and what he must study, digest, and apply to do that, then this book has certainly earned a place on
your shelf. Roosevelt’s exposition of the knowledge base a professional intelligence officer needs to do the job stands the test of time.
Roosevelt closes with his strongly held opinion that the CIA should be an intelligence-collection and covert-action agency, foregoing the paramilitary role assigned to it since its inception, a role responsible for nearly all of the notoriety CIA has garnered. Roosevelt would leave Paramilitary operations in the hands of the military, arguing that they are technically and psychologically better qualified to undertake special operations, and that, unlike the clandestine collector of intelligence, the paramilitary agency always becomes known in the end. I can’t disagree with his point of view.
For Lust of Knowing is a book worth owning—there hasn’t been one like it for a long time. A brief dictionary of the rnany foreign terms Roosevelt introduces (and explains) as he goes along would have made a valuable book even better.
Commander Bublitz retired in 1968 after 15 years in intelligence assignments. He is presently executive assistant to the chairman of the board of the Chase Manhattan Bank.
From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision—A Memoir
Paul H. Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989. 504 pp. Photos. Append. Ind. $25.00 ($22.50).
Reviewed by Lawrence J. Korb
If you could choose only one individual to describe and analyze firsthand the major events that have significantly affected U.S. post-World War II national security policy, that person would have to be Paul Nitze. Dean Acheson, President Harry Truman’s Secretary of State, may have been Present at the Creation (Ache- son, Norton, 1969) of the containment policy, but he left government in 1953. The six Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (Columbia University Press, 1984)—Averill Harriman, George Kennan, Charles E. Bohlen, Robert Lovett, Dean Acheson, and John J. McCloy— influenced U.S. policy from the late 1930s, when they helped Franklin D. Roosevelt prepare the nation to enter World War II, until 1968, when they helped persuade Lyndon Johnson to withdraw from Vietnam. But that was their last hurrah, some 22 years ago.
In Hiroshima to Glasnost, Paul Nitze takes the reader from the summer of 1940, when he came to Washington to assist James Forrestal develop U.S. wartime policy toward Latin America, to the summer of 1988, when he helped Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan prepare for their triumphant Moscow summit that signaled the end of the Cold War. Nitze held government positions close to the center of power for almost this entire 48 years.
After World War II, Nitze served in an incredible number of significant national security posts. He was director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State in the Truman administration; assistant secretary of defense, secretary of the Navy, and deputy secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson years; an arms control negotiator for President Richard Nixon; and ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the president and secretary of state on arms control matters in the Reagan administration.
His only prolonged absences from government were in the Eisenhower and Carter years, but he almost served in both administrations. Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, wanted Nitze for his Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs but Nitze was blackballed by Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI). And Nitze was one of the principal advisers on defense and foreign policy to candidate Jimmy Carter in the 1976 campaign. However, his realpolitik views on defense and arms control were out of sync with the initial naivete of the Carter administration. After leaving the presidency, Carter admitted he should have heeded Nitze’s advice.
Even out of government Nitze played a significant role in the development of national security policy. In the Eisenhower years Nitze was an adviser to the Gaither Committee, in the Ford years he was a member of Team B, and in the Carter years Nitze was a founding member of the Committee on the Present Danger. The efforts of each of these groups increased support for a strong national security policy and rising defense spending.
Nitze did more than just hold high- level positions; he used them to influence a wide variety of policies. These included NSC-68 (which urged “a substantial and rapid building-up of strength in the free world ... to support a firm policy intended to check the Kremlin’s drive for world domination”), the Marshall Plan, the Strategic Bombing Survey, the Austrian Peace Treaty, the H-Bomb, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, selective service, the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) I and II, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Nitze has held more jobs in more administrations in the last halfcentury than almost anyone else. Here, as Navy Secretary, he tests out a hydrofoil patrol craft.
While Nitze’s memoir tells us a great deal about the events of the past 50 years, one should not read it for that reason alone. In this memoir, one can also discover how an individual can have a permanent career at the highest levels of government. Nitze was able to do it because he was independently wealthy (vitamins and Aspen); well educated (he even took a year off from his career as an investment banker to return to Harvard to study sociology); extremely intelligent (he was well versed in even the most arcane details of nuclear weapons); incredibly hard working (Nitze personally drafted everything from the Strategic Bombing Survey to the “Walk in the Woods” arms control proposals); lucky (service in the Eisenhower and Carter administrations would have doomed him for posts in the Kennedy and Reagan eras); unpretentious (he was willing to serve in positions far less prestigious than his previous posts in order to stay involved); and tenacious (in the Reagan years he outlasted all his adversaries).
Like others who write their memoirs, Nitze occasionally rationalizes and glosses over his own inconsistencies. Two instances stand out: his repudiation of the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty in order to support Reagan’s SDI, and his public attack on Paul Warnkc during the latter’s confirmation hearings to be director of Arms Control and Disarmament Association. Nitze does not overdo it, however, nor does he use the book to get even. Overall the “Silver Fox” (the nickname the Soviets gave him) has written a memoir befitting the place he has earned in the public service Hall of Fame.
Dr. Korb is director of the Brookings Center for Public Policy Education and senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program. He was assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.
Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy
Air Wars and Aircraft: A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present
Victor Flintham. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1990. 415 pp. Photos. Maps. Tables. Append. Gloss. Bib. Ind. $40.00 ($36.00).
Aerial engagements in Algeria, Indonesia, Angola, Israel, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Grenada are but a sampling of the many recorded in this book. In addition to descrip- hons of the wars and crises involving combat and support aviation, this comprehensive work mcludes complete orders of battle; descriptions of aircraft markings; more than 100 maps; more than 200 photographs; and full details on units, equipment, bases, and dates °f employment.
The Confederate Privateers
AVilliam Morrison Robinson, Jr. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990. 372 pp. Plus. Maps. Append. Notes. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).
This is a reprint of a seminal work first published in 1928. Telling the story from the Southern viewpoint—a sovereign state waging legitimate war in self-defense—Robinson used war records and other archives to chronicle the exploits of the men the North called pirates” and the South called “gentlemen adventurers.” The author recounts the cruises °f the Jefferson Davis, the Dixie, and the Pygmy submarine Pioneer.
The Dictionary of Military Quotations
■lustin Wintle, editor. New York: Free Press, 1989. s06 pp. Ind. $29.95 ($26.95).
li you want to know who said, “The mere absence of war is not peace,” or to find a colorful quote from Winston Churchill about traditions in the Royal Navy, this book of more than 4,000 quotations dealing with the art and science of war will serve you well.
1'inancial Aid for Veterans, Military Personnel and Their Dependents, 19901991
Gail Ann Schlachtcr and R. David Weber. San Carlos, CA: Reference Service Press, 1990.
291 pp. Ind. $35.00. Must order two books, Prepaid.
Each year, more than $30 billion in financial aid is set aside for veterans, military personnel, and their families. Full tuition for Vietnam veterans in some states and an $8,000 grant to Eagle Scouts with parents in the American Legion are but two examples. Yet every year a substantial portion of that money goes unclaimed because potential recipients are unaware of its existence. This book lists and describes the many sources of these monies and how they may be obtained.
Marines and Military Law in Vietnam: Trial by Fire
Lieutenant Colonel Gary D. Solis, USMC. Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center. 1989. 295 pp. Photos. Maps. Append. Notes. Ind. $17.00 ($15.30).
This latest addition to the official Marine Corps history of Vietnam chronicles in a straightforward manner the work of the 400 Marine Corps and 27 Navy lawyers who confronted the myriad of legal challenges in Vietnam. While most Marines served honorably and bravely in Vietnam, there were cases involving fraggings, racially based crimes, drug offenses, and the murders of Vietnamese noncombatants. These judge advocates sought justice, and this is their story.
William Beecher. New York: Brassey's, 1990.
213 pp. $15.95 ($14.35).
Nuclear peril is the topic of Pulitzer Prizewinning journalist Beecher’s (and Brassey’s) first work of fiction. Fanatical nuclear physicists, Israeli Mossad agents, renegade Egyptian military officers, and the KGB are all intertwined in a plot involving a theft of plutonium from South Africa, the mysterious disappearance of a Soviet cargo jet, a U.S. newsman on the trail of the biggest story of the century, a plot to bomb Moscow, and a surprise ending. Senator William S. Cohen, coauthor of The Double Man (William Morrow & Co., 1986), writes, “Bill Beecher has brought to life the nightmare of nuclear terror.”
Milestones of Aviation
John T. Greenwood, editor. New York: Hugh Lautcr Levin Associates, 1989. 310 pp. Photos. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $75.00 ($67.50).
Stunning photography and a well-written narrative fill this large-format book about the history of aviation. But rather than chronological, the approach is thematic, addressing aviation’s development through chapters titled “Farther,” “Faster,” “Bigger,” and “Better.”
National Interest/National Honor: The Diplomacy of the Falklands Crisis
Douglas Kinney. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989.
372 pp. Tables. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $49.95 ($44.95).
Arguing that much can be learned from the diplomatic successes and failures of the Falklands Conflict, Kinney writes that “this assessment of the diplomacy of the Falklands crisis is a critique of the methods and not the motivations of Argentina, the United Kingdom, and those (the author included) who tried and are still trying to help them resolve their dispute.”
51 The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World
Bernard Prczelin with English-language edition by A.D. Baker III. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. 1040 pp. Photos. Illus. Gloss. Ind. $120.00 ($96.00).
This is probably the single most useful reference on naval forces available anywhere. It has 3,700 photographs and line drawings and comprehensive data on ship characteristics,
performance, crew complements, aircraft, electronics, and weapons, and covers the navies, coast guards, and paramilitary maritime forces of more than 165 nations. The opening assessment of the top naval powers in the world provides a useful overview of recent developments and future trends.
Sea Power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in World War I
Paolo E. Colctta. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989. 176 pp. Photos. Ulus. Maps. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.75. Prepay + $1.25.
The naval operations conducted in the Atlantic Ocean and North, Mediterranean, and Adriatic Seas during World War I are the focus here. Coletta contends that this naval war was fought using attrition tactics and was the first war fought in three dimensions.
Geoffrey Brooke. London: Leo Cooper, 1989.
256 pp. Photos. Maps. Gloss. Bib. Ind. Order directly from publisher at Miehelin House, 81 Fulham Rd, London SW3 6RB.
In early 1942 the Japanese crossed the cause-
Samuel M. Katz. New York: Sterling Publish- p
8305 U.S. Naval Institute
way to Singapore Island, precipitating what Winston Churchill called “the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.” But not all of those in Singapore in that dark hour capitulated. Many escaped, some to die horrible deaths as fugitives, others to survive and fight again. Brooke is one of the latter. His experiences are reflected in this book and so are those of many others, which he has compiled through extensive research. This is an excellent account of a little-known chapter in World War II history.
Other Titles of Interest__________
The Aviation Careers of Igor Sikorsky
Dorothy Cochrane, Von Hardesty, and Russell Lee. Seattle: WA: University of Washington Press, 1989. 208 pp. Photos. Illus. Maps. Append. Bib. Ind. $35.00 ($31.50).
Competition in Coastal Seas: An Evaluation of Foreign Maritime Activities in the 200-Mile EEZ—Background Paper
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989. 34 pp. Photos. Tables. Figs $2.25 ($2.02).
Fighting Words: The Correspondents of World War II
Richard Collier. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 230 pp. Photos. Bib. Ind. $17 95 ($16.15).
Follow Me: A History of Israel’s Military Elite
ing Co., Inc., 1989. 160 pp. Photos. Illus. Bib. $24.95 ($22.45).
German Naval Air Service
Alex Imrie. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1989. 50 pp. Photos. Illus. $9.95 ($8.95).
The Great Universal Embrace: Arms Summitry—A Skeptic’s Account
Kenneth L. Adelman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. 366 pp. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).
One Shot—One Kill
Charles W. Sasser and Craig Roberts. New York: Pocket Books, 1990. $4.95 ($4.45) paper.
A Race on the Edge of Time: Radar, the Decisive Weapon of World War II
David E. Fisher. New York: Paragon House,
- 371 pp. Photos. Figs. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).
Reevaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War II
James J. Sadkovich, editor. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. 203 pp. Tables. Notes Bib. Ind. $42.95 ($38.65).
The SIGINT Secrets: The Signals Intelligence War, 1900 to Today
Nigel West. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1990. 347 pp. Photos. Maps. Tables. Figs. Key. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $22 95 ($20.65).
Sword of the Shaheen: A Novel
M. E. Morris. Novato, CA: Presidio Press,!
- 321 pp. $18.95 ($17.05).
Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1990. 224 pp. Photos. Maps. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45) paper.
Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 19811987
Bob Woodward. New York: Simon and Schuster Audioworks, 1987. 180 min. $14.95.
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