Special Report: What about the Philippines?

Background: After World War II, the Philippines and the United States held talks on security matters; at this time, the location of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was first discussed (on a cost-free basis). The agreement was renegotiated beginning in 1954 and through the rest of that decade. The length of the agreement was modified, from 99 years to 25, with the clock to start when all formal documents were signed. This did not occur until 1966, and gave us a fixed term that lasts until 1991. After that it can be abrogated by either party with one year’s notice. Regu­lar renegotiation of compensation and jurisdictional issues have followed, roughly every five years.

Because of the growing possibility that we may not be able to negotiate a lease for more than ten additional years, or even beyond the 1991 expiration date, Congress has become reluctant to fund capital improvements to our major facilities at Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Two years ago, a hold was placed on military construction at Clark and Subic that was not “safety” related. The language of the military construction appropriations bill was couched in a way that allowed the construction of family housing units and barracks, because security con­cerns dictated that we bring as many service people and their families as possible within the relatively safe con- lines of the bases. Even that consideration was overcome, though, in the current tiscal year. The 1990 appropriations denied all funds for further military construction, includ­ing housing, until the outcome of the base negotiations (which began 14 May 1990, a day after suspected commu­nist guerrillas killed two U.S. airmen near Clark) is known.

Such negotiations require the involvement of many par­ties in the United States: DoD, the Department of State, and the Congress. An equally large and diverse number of Philippine groups are also involved.

No one familiar with policy-making in Washington would claim that our government speaks with one voice or is simple to understand. Factions in Congress battle one another; Congress regularly disagrees with the administra­tion; and the departments of Defense and State quietly, but often vigorously, fight each other. But all the battles in Washington do not even come close to the kind of intrigue and infighting in the Philippines over the issue of a contin­ued U.S. presence in their country.

Great Expectations: I set out on my journey with certain expectations. I expected to hear from the U.S. military that our facilities in the Philippines are crucial and irre­placeable; I believed that the Philippine people were fully aware of the economic importance of the bases and that, behind their understandable nationalist feelings, they were not eager to see the U.S. presence diminish; I expected Philippine legislators to tell me privately that they were supportive of another long-term lease. After the discus­sions in Honolulu and Manila, I realized that things were not as I had thought.

Strategically, the bases are on the sea and air lines of communication to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. They provide a force-multiplier effect at extended range from U.S. shores, and keep us within easy range to protect

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three strategic Indonesian straits through which a large Portion of the world’s oil must travel. I had assumed that *he ship-repair facilities would be the most vital aspect of °ur entire Philippine presence. Instead, what I learned was that, within eight to ten years, we could replace the ship- repair capacity at other sites, ranging from Singapore to Honolulu and the U.S. West Coast. Although these arc not the most convenient or cost-effective places, it was obvi­ous after being briefed by the Commander in Chief, Pa- ^c'fic (CinCPac) and Pacific Air Forces (PacAF) that much thought had gone into such contingency plans.

Still another possibility would be to do the same work at Subic, but under contract with the Philippine shipyards, ^which would then be under Philippine management and control. Undoubtedly, there would be considerable resis­tance in Congress to appropriating funds for ship repair in

the Philippines if we are forced to abandon our own facili­ties there. If the past can be considered prologue, we can ^expect a strong congressional push to bring that work back to U.S. West Coast shipyards.

In addition to ship-repair capability, logistics facilities Would need to be in place at forward sites. Guam has often been mentioned as a possible location for these functions, but Guam is undergoing changes, too.

Because it is an insular territory of the United States, we often assume that Guam would be eager to accept U.S. military facilities. Guamanians are proud Americans, aware of their important role in the defense of the Pacific, and most also recognize the important economic role that ^[he military has played in their past. But the 1980s brought a new and even more lucrative business to their islands: Japanese tourists. Anyone who has been to Honolulu re­cently knows that a Japanese family on holiday is likely to add more to the economy than permanently assigned mili­

tary personnel or sailors on liberty. Guamanians arc de­manding control of their own limited land area. As a re­sult, few planners believe we will reach an agreement to build major new military facilities on Guam.

Discussions about relocating air assets to Korea and Japan (as a means of keeping them forward deployed) took place before the President’s fiscal year 1991 budget be­came public. This budget showed the administration’s preference to revert to collocated operation base status at Kwang Ju Air Base, Suwon Air Base, and Taegu Air Base, all in Korea. Most units on these bases would be inactivated or relocated, and U.S. presence would be min­imal. It is uncertain how this move might affect the reloca­tion of Clark Air Base assets.

What I heard at CinCPac and PacAF, and repeated at Clark and Subic, was something quite different than what I had expected: the most crucial elements of our presence in the Philippines are the training capability at the Crow Valley range north of Clark, and the Subic gunnery range and amphibious landing area. The ranges are unique to Asia; U.S. aircraft from all our bases in the region do most of their training there. Because of the changes in environ­mental regulations, it would be impossible to reproduce these ranges anywhere in the world.

Several times a year, Cope Thunder brings U.S. and allied pilots together in exercises that are unique in the world, and made possible by the excellent range facilities. Some military officials estimate that 75% of training capa­bility in the Western Pacific would be lost if we left Clark and Crow Valley. Likewise, the amphibious training done by the Third Marine Division at Subic could not be dupli­cated anywhere on that side of the globe.

My tours of Clark and Subic were visible proof that it would be difficult to replace facilities of this size any­where else in the world. Some have suggested that we could move our air and naval facilities to Singapore. But a quick look at a map will show that a city-state the size of Singapore could not possibly accommodate a huge facil­ity, even if they wanted to accept such a great number of American sailors and airmen.

Alaska might be a fallback position for some of the units currently based at Clark. But from a military con­struction standpoint, Alaska presents considerable chal­lenges. It is extremely expensive to build there, because of labor costs, logistics in transporting materials, and the short construction season. Flying is severely hampered by weather extremes.

Philippine Politics: One phenomenon no American pol­itician can fully appreciate without experiencing it is the Philippine media. The large number of daily newspapers makes for stiff competition for readership, which leads to some of the most sensationalistic reporting imaginable, which contributes to the strength of anti-American senti­ment in Manila.

I was the first member of Congress to visit the country after the December coup. That fact, together with the poli­tics swirling around the base negotiations, resulted in in­tense press interest in my visit. My visit happened to coin­cide with an appearance by Deputy National Security

Adviser Robert Gates—I had not known about his visit until I was in Manila, but the Manila press reported that we had both been sent by President George Bush to call for snap elections in the wake of the coup. I spent a lot of time refuting that notion.

The December coup attempt had an unusual result in public opinion as it relates to the United States. The U.S. support, in the form of F-4s flying against rebel strong­holds at Sangley Point, seems to have caused some groups to swap their positions on the bases. Until the coup, the Philippine military had been the strongest supporter of U.S. military presence, but after the coup, pro-govern­ment Philippine troops were ashamed that the United States was involved. The rebel troops, obviously, resented our actions. On the other hand, the strong nationalists, previously vocal against U.S. presence, now see that the United States helped them to retain democratic rule.

Even more curiously, the guerrilla forces, known as the New People’s Army, were helped in two ways by our actions. First, we helped to avoid a takeover by a military government that would have moved quickly to crush them. Second, our actions gave them more propaganda fodder to whip up anti-American sentiment. The New People’s Army, however, must walk a dangerous tight­rope. If they go too far in their attacks on U.S. military personnel and civilians, they run the risk of drawing us into a direct conflict, which they want very much to avoid.

The coup apparently had some interesting—and unan­ticipated—impacts on public opinion. Before, polls showed 70% of respondents saying they had a “good” opinion of the U.S. military; after, this increased to 82%. Additionally, 71% of the people polled favored retention of the bases, up from 60-65% of earlier respondents. It is important to note that most Filipinos assume that continua­tion of U.S. presence will be tied to an increase in com­pensation.

Only 7% of the people polled believed things would be better in their country if the bases were gone; 54% thought they would be worse, and 34% thought they would stay the same.

Stiff economic realities would follow from a reduction in U.S. presence—a reality the Filipinos are only begin­ning to admit. The Philippine economy has been strong over the last three years, showing at least a 5% growth each year. That is healthy, but not great by Asian stan­dards. The two major U.S. facilities combined are the second-largest employer in the Philippines. The direct contribution of the two bases to Philippine gross national product (GNP) is probably about 2.5%. But when eco­nomic multipliers such as veterans’ benefits, medical as­sistance, off-base spending, and increased tourism are in­cluded, the bases comprise roughly 5% of GNP. As a reference point, the entire defense establishment of the

Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates (left), here with Philippine Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos (right) and U.S. ambassador to the Philippines Nicholas Platt, also visited the Philippines in January, causing a stir in the Manila press.

United States comprises 5.5% to 6% of our own GNP. It is hard to imagine what would happen to our economy, and how long it would take to recover, should we lose our entire defense industry all at once. The economic effects of a similar move by the Philippine government would be staggering and long lasting. In addition, the U.S. bases alone, not considering other trade between the two coun­tries, are the eighth-largest export market for the Philip­pines (for reference, the eighth-largest export market for the United States is Hong Kong).

The press seemed less interested in my true mission as a member of the military construction subcommittee. Look­ing at bases with an eye toward relocation would have been classified information only a few years ago. Today, it is an accepted fact that our Congress is concerned for the future of the bases.

The bottom line for most Philippine officials I met is the amount of aid the Congress and the President will agree to in return for a renewal of the base agreement. At the time of my visit, it was not widely known that Congress had not met its 1990 obligation for Philippine aid in fiscal year 1990. The Philippine government was expecting to re­ceive $160 million in economic support funds this year. Grants for foreign military sales in the amount of $200 million is the other portion of the total of $360 million in bases-related assistance that we were expected to meet. But we were forced to cut back by $96 million. This year also marked our first allotment to the Multilateral Assis­tance Initiative, which is distinct from our bases-related assistance. We were able to appropriate only $175 million of our first year’s commitment of $200 million. All told, we may be as much as 30% below the total package of $658 million, including food aid, that the administration had promised to seek from the Congress.

When I told the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Com­mittee of the Philippine House of Representatives what the likely allocation would be, I saw him pale (and he is one of the strongest supporters of our presence in the Philip­pines). He told me frankly that he did not believe there could be negotiations for an extension of our bases if the

United States did not meet its 1990 aid commitment, ^which was made in the 1988 base-agreement extension.

The same day, Senator Robert J. Dole (KS-R) an­nounced his proposal for shuffling our foreign-aid priori- fa*. His proposal was to reduce aid to the top five recipi- ^e°ts (the Philippines being number five), and shift it to ^e,T>erging democracies in Eastern Europe. His proposal Would keep the overall amount of foreign aid steady at ^r°ughly $13 billion per year. Filipinos at all levels of the government—President Corazon C. Aquino, Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos, Foreign Secretary Raul ^nnglapus, and President of the Philippine Senate Jovito Salonga—universally expressed dismay and astonishment ^at this proposal.

Foreign Secretary Manglapus also shared his concerns ^ahout two related compensation issues. The first was the failure of the U.S. Congress to pass a waiver of the so- ^called Berry Amendment for the Philippines. The Berry Amendment codifies a “Buy American” provision for ^most food products for U.S. forces abroad. A waiver of these requirements would allow the DoD to purchase cer­tain Philippine products for use by U.S. forces throughout the Pacific.

In addition, Secretary Manglapus was disturbed about Problems Filipinos who served in the U.S. armed forces during World War II have encountered in receiving full Veterans’ benefits.

, Another issue for Philippine officials is the form any fature bases agreements would take—treaty or executive ^a8reement. The Philippine constitution requires that future base agreements be ratified as treaties on both sides. The current agreement is an executive agreement by both par­ses. That negates the need for U.S. Senate ratification.

^requirements if the base agreement becomes a treaty obli­gation.

I reminded him that we are party to a treaty governing ^our participation in the United Nations, but that treaty ob­ligation has not prevented Congress from failing to meet ds obligation to provide sufficient funds to the United Na­tions. I explained that the U.S. Senate could ratify a treaty, and then the House, which must originate all ap­propriations bills, could refuse to appropriate the full ^arnount required by the agreement.

The president of the Philippine Senate, Senator Salonga, was equally emphatic in suggesting that an exec­utive agreement was “out of the question” because it Would be unconstitutional. 1 pointed out that an executive ^agreement and a treaty carry equal weight in international faw, and that our 1947 bases agreement had been a treaty far the Philippines and an executive agreement for the United States. We met all our obligations under the 1947 ^agreement. The senator seemed impervious to my argu­ments.

A side issue to this debate is the possibility of a national referendum in the Philippines on the issue of base rights. Recent polling has indicated strong Filipino support for continued U.S. presence there, and many political observ­ers believe that a national referendum would be useful in

Jim Kolbe was in the Naval Reserve from 1965 to 1977 and served on active duty in Vietnam with coastal and riverboat operations in 1968­1969. In 1984, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representa­tives. In September 1989, after giving a talk at the U.S. Naval Institute seminar in San Diego, he visited the USS Constellation (CV-64), shown here. ^{[1] [2]}

After the coup attempt in December 1989, President Cory Aquino appeared on television to demonstrate that she retained control. Her country would suffer a huge eco­nomic setback should it lose U.S. income.

Clark would be practical, and that the shipyard could eventually revert to Philippine control. Such a view ig­nores the hard reality that all the ship-repair equipment and facilities belong to the United States, and that a stub­born and angry U.S. Congress would likely insist on the removal of most equipment. The floating drydocks, cranes, lathes, and all other major equipment could be removed. A shipyard full of buildings with nothing but skilled workers would be as useless to the Philippines as to the U.S. Navy.

Mrs. Aquino was unwilling to talk directly about the bases agreement. She did say that U.S. citizens seem to believe that their presence at bases around the world is solely for the benefit of the host country. She thinks that Americans need to be educated about the benefits to U.S. security that accrue from our forward-basing strategy—a view I heartily endorse.

Mrs. Aquino obviously wanted to impart to me the im­pression that she was very much in charge of her country. She was emphatic in her view that the aftermath of the December coup attempt had solidified her popularity. In her estimation, the majority of Filipinos had been shaken by the attempt. Unlike earlier, more half-hearted efforts, this one had made them aware that their newfound democ­racy was vulnerable. Groups previously seen as reformers are now considered mere terrorists by the people. She be­lieves that because she refused to allow expediency to tri­umph over the due process of law in dealing with the reb­els, she has become more popular. Unfortunately, in the eyes of most of the world this looks like weakness and ineffectiveness.

As if to emphasize that she was in command, President Aquino described how, on the following day, a governor of one of Luzon’s northern provinces who had seized power illegally and supported the coup would be removed from office—by force if necessary. Ironically, this same governor became the center of another Aquino mini-crisis a few weeks later, when an attempt to place the ousted governor under arrest erupted into a fight between forces loyal to the opposing sides.

The president was similarly anxious to emphasize pro­grams of economic development. She described in detail programs to help the farmers and fishermen in the most depressed of the southern islands.

I left the palace knowing nothing more of Mrs. Aquino’s views on base negotiations, but that omission was probably no accident. Instead, President Aquino con­veyed to me, and I suppose to the entire U.S. Congress, that she was working to change conditions for the average Filipino.

After my return to Washington, Mrs. Aquino an­nounced she would soon give the required one-year notice of termination of the lease agreement. The current lease runs through September 1991; on that point there is no

disagreement. But the Philippine government interprets the agreement as requiring notice of termination one year before the end of the lease. We interpret the agreement to say that anytime after September 1991, either party can call for termination of the leases a year later. Mrs. Aquino cited her interpretation of the agreement and put the United States on formal notice of her intention to termi­nate the current agreement. Filipino dissatisfaction with U.S. aid levels was cited as a major reason for the formal notification.

Singapore: Since one of the objectives of my trip was to assess alternatives for our Philippine basing mode, I con- ; tinued westward to Singapore to look at facilities that are being considered for increased U.S. usage. The political and economic climate that pervades the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) coun­tries is unique. And none is more successful than Singa- ¹ pore. It boasts an 11% growth rate, 2% unemployment, and 2.4% inflation. Foreign investments comprise two- thirds of all investment in Singapore, with the United States the largest participant; 35% of the country’s foreign investment is American. The petrochemical and electron­ics industries are booming, but it is the service industries, notably Singapore’s growing financial domination of i Southeast Asia, that serve as pacesetter for high salaries and a per capita income of $10,700—the highest in the region.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has run a tight political ship for more than 20 years. By American standards of democracy, Singapore is a restrictive, autocratic society with a controlled media, heavy import duties on cars and luxury items, and laws that force personal savings at a j staggering rate of 40%.

Although Singapore is theoretically a non-aligned coun­try, Lee Kuan Yew gives short shrift to Marxist ideolo­gies. Neither the Soviet Union nor the People’s Republic of China have defense attaches in Singapore, and Soviet warships are denied the right of port calls (although “fish­ing vessels” are allowed). Singapore’s own military is

substantial, considering the size of the nation, with the army the largest service. Because of space limitations on *he island, their large armor contingent is maintained in Taiwan. The air force is currently purchasing F-16s, and their gunboats carry sophisticated Harpoon missiles.

“Joint site” survey teams have completed an initial as­sessment of facilities suitable for U.S. use. A U.S. pro­posal for joint use was delivered to the Singaporean gov­ernment this winter, at nearly the same time as my visit. The Singaporeans firmly believe that a U.S. presence is necessary in the Western Pacific. Without it, they fear that the Soviets, the Chinese, or—most worrisome of all—the Japanese will move to fill the vacuum.

Given the tiny size of the Singaporean nation, it is obvi­ous that we cannot re-create our Philippine facilities there. However, in a post-Cold War environment, a small pres­^ence in Singapore may provide the perfect fit for the United States’ new strategic requirements. The U.S. pres­^ence could provide a forward-deployment staging area, to he used in a manner similar to coaling stations at the be­ginning of this century. In addition, U.S. presence serves ^as a visible symbol of our commitment to the region.

The two facilities proposed for U.S. use are the air base ^at Paya Le Bar and the Senbawang Naval Basin. Com­pared with Subic or Pearl Harbor, Senbawang is a sleepy P'ace, barely changed from its pre-World War II era, but h does possess many good features. There is a large wharf, with two berths, proposed for U.S. use. The fuel hnes are no longer active; electric power and steam, while nearby, do not serve the pier. But these would be negotiat­ing items.

A two-story warehouse is also under consideration for a U.S. headquarters building. The bottom floor would con­tinue as a warehouse, while the upper floor would be used f°r administrative space. A substantial amount of housing ^ls on base and in reasonably good condition: until re­cently, it was occupied by Australian officers and their families.

After a quick tour, I visited the Ministry of Defense to meet with Lim Siong Guan, the Permanent Secretary, or highest-ranking civil servant. Secretary Lim expressed concern about the possible lack of political commitment hy the U.S. Congress to a continuing presence in Asia. It Was hard to argue with him on this point. He said that his government would like to see a multiyear commitment with guaranteed compensation. I tried to explain the con­gressional appropriations process—a daunting task—and ^lts limitations on multiyear funding. I said that, although °ur Defense Department and our service chiefs might ^agree on the need for a presence in Singapore, there are ⁿumerous other factions competing for federal dollars, ^each with its own advocates in Congress. With the Soviets Perceived as a diminishing threat, there will be an increase m the difficulty of getting Congress to commit dollars to expanding a military presence anywhere outside the United States. The key, I suggested, will be to keep the cost of a U.S. presence as low as possible.

An unresolved issue is airspace rights over Malaysia: ^aireraft departing from Paya Le Bar find themselves in a matter of seconds over Malaysia. I asked Mr. Lim if his country could be of assistance in persuading the Malay­sians to allow us airspace rights. The answer was quick and decisively negative. Singapore considers this a prob­lem for the United States to deal with—politically. Possi­bly, economic benefits could be offered to neighboring countries of a U.S. presence in Singapore. For example, ship-repair work could be done next door in Malaysia. A sharing of economic benefits, we agreed, would be likely to make the neighbors view a U.S.-Singapore agreement in a more favorable light.

Finally, we touched on the perception of some ASEAN members that our “courtship” of Singapore is only a de­vice to put pressure on the Philippine government for a quick and favorable settlement. I expressed my view— one I believe is shared by the administration and Congress alike—that Singapore would not be a substitute for bases in the Philippines. Singapore would help us meet our na­tional-defense commitments on the edge of the Pacific Rim and beyond to the Indian Ocean. But it cannot replace Clark Air Base or Subic Naval Base.

Conclusions: U.S. bases in the Philippines and our ne­gotiations to continue their use illustrate the dilemma the United States faces in the entire area. The importance of trade with Pacific Rim countries and our status as a mari­time power argue strongly for a continued, highly visible U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev continues to press for reductions in U.S. naval forces. The United States must not allow itself to be drawn into such an agreement, though it may appear to have a certain sense of symmetry to it. Our countries have fundamentally different strengths: the United States is a maritime power and the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. The United States does a large portion of its trade in the Pacific; the Soviets trade almost exclusively with Europe. A continued U.S. presence in the Pacific is crucial to protect our economic interests there. It also con­tributes to maintaining the delicate balance between com­peting Asian interests. The United States is seen almost universally in East Asia as an umpire—a guarantor of na­tional sovereignty.

Before my trip I believed that another ten-year agree­ment could be negotiated without too much difficulty. That does not seem likely now. Now I think there is a strong possibility that our presence in the Philippines will be diminished within the next two years. Whatever the outcome, the diplomatic and political road ahead of us will be long and arduous.

If we leave the Philippines, we must recognize that we will not have the same quality of facilities or training else­where. Our military forces have adapted in the past, under far more difficult circumstances. We will do so again. Pol­icymakers must not lose sight of the importance of U.S. presence in the Pacific; we must not, in a fit of pique, rush to dismantle our facilities there. Just as no individual is indispensable, no one base and no one ally can be indis­pensable to safeguard our national security.

Congressman Kolbe is a third-term Representative of Tucson.