Book Reviews & Books of Interest

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Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War

Paul Fussell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. $19.95 ($17.95).

Reviewed by Major General Fred Haynes, WS. Marine Corps (Retired)

Paul Fussell’s Wartime rounds out the recent literature of the Second World War by giving us a look at it through the eyes °f one who is a veteran and a long-time teacher and literary critic. Dr. Fussell is not new to commentary on war. He won a number of prizes for an earlier volume, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford University Press, 1975). That yolume concerned mainly the war’s image in British literature. In Wartime, be attempts to portray World War II in terms of how people dealt with it.

Fussell’s own description of the book |^s in the preface. “It is about the rational- nations and euphemisms people needed to deal with an unacceptable actuality from 1939-1945,” he says. “For the Past fifty years, the Allied war has been sanitized and romanticized almost be­yond recognition by the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant and the blood-thirsty.” Fussell’s objective, he says, is to balance the scales.

The balancing act is on a very large scale. The book’s 18 chapters cover such diverse aspects of the period as: “Preci­sion Bombing Will Win the War,” "School of the Soldier,” “Chicken Shit, An Anatomy,” “Drinking Far Too Much, Copulating Too Little,” and ‘High-Mindedness. ”

The material that he has gathered is interesting and should be useful to those who may be crafting novels about the war and to those with a general interest in the literature, including the poetry, songs, and ditties of the time. Dr. Fussell is at his best when writing as a literary critic. His chapter on compensation has an ex­cellent analysis of a number of issues of Horizon, a cultural periodical that Cyril Connolly developed to compensate for Wartime deprivation.

I fully agree with Dr. Fussell’s impli­cations that war is not the most intelligent of human activities. War is, always has been, and always will be inhumane and bloody. And it is frequently senseless.

Furthermore, regardless of the merits of a cause, patriotism and associated high­mindedness tend to disappear on the bat­tlefield. These are replaced by a unique sort of camaraderie and concern for each other among soldiers in battle. 1 doubt that combat in any stage of recent history has been very much different in this re­gard. The three wars I have seen certainly support this.

Several observations are puzzling, such as Fussell’s statement that fighting on islands like Tarawa, Saipan, or Iwo Jima could hardly be called “combat” at all in the traditional sense. Perhaps I do not know what traditional combat is. But I do know that his conclusion that “clev­erness died on those islands on the Pa­cific” is wrong. He thinks that somehow the need to resort to heavy firepower sounded the death knell for the plethora of skills that are necessary in fighting. In truth, skillfulness was a hallmark of the Pacific campaigns. The development of the war-winning amphibious tactics, techniques, and equipment were the product of remarkable military thinking between the two World Wars. Moreover, although many of the Pacific battles were vicious and bloody, I can say from per­sonal experience that every effort was made to win quickly, with minimum cas­ualties.

Dr. Fussell’s major theme, explicit or implied, is that the war had no redeeming features. One must conclude that he be­lieves we should have allowed Adolf Hit­ler and Emperor Hirohito to continue their headlong, destructive activities in Europe and the Pacific. I believe that once Hitler had come to power and the Japanese had expanded their hold on the Pacific Rim, World War II had to be fought. Both Hitler and Hirohito had to be stopped, and I have never been able to figure out a way that we could have done so without resorting to arms.

As one who lived through the prewar and wartime periods, I cannot help but be confused by a statement such as the fol­lowing: “America has not yet understood what the Second World War was really like and has thus been unable to use such understanding to re-interpret and re­define the national reality and to arrive at something like public maturity.” True? I do not think so.

Fussell closes the book by describing General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s prepa­ration of a statement he intended to have handy if the invasion of Europe was re­pulsed. Eisenhower is said to have writ­ten, “the troops have been withdrawn,” but he changed that, according to Fus- sell’s research, to read, “I have with­drawn the troops.” He then quotes Eisen­hower’s acceptance of total personal responsibility: “If any blame or fault at­taches to this attempt, it is mine alone.” Finally, comes the really heavy finish. “As Mailer says, you use the word shit so you can use the word noble, and you refuse to ignore the stupidity and barba­rism and ignobility and poltroonery and filth of the real war so that “It is mine alone,” can flash out, a bright signal in a dark time.”

Dr. Fussell ought to stick to his literary analyses and commentary. Wartime, per­haps, is good literature, but the author’s views on the reasons and necessity for, and the nature and results of World War II are far from the mark.

General Haynes, a combat veteran of three wars, is an executive with LTV Aerospace and Defense Com­pany and a former military consultant for CBS News.

Captain Bligh: The Man and His Mutinies

Gavin Kennedy. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House, 1989. 321 pp. Photos. Figs. $34.95 ($31.45).

Bligh: A True Account of Mutiny Aboard His Majesty’s Ship Bounty

Sam McKinney. Camden, ME: International Marine Publishing, 1989. 210 pp. IIlus. Maps. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($20.65).

Reviewed by N. A. M. Rodger

In different ways, both these books are obvious attempts to catch a market on the bicentennial of the Bounty mutiny. Gavin Kennedy in particular, who published a well-received life of Bligh roughly ten years ago (Bligh, Duckworth, 1978), has recycled much of his material. This book does not cover quite as much ground as the biography, but concentrates on the several mutinies in which Bligh was in­volved during his career: not only the Bounty affair, which occupies more than two-thirds of the book, but the Defiance mutiny of 1795, in which Bligh was put in command of the forces that regained control of the ship; the Nore mutinies of 1797, in which his own ship was in­volved among many others; and finally the military coup by which he was ejected as governor of New South Wales in 1808 by a group of army officers whose cor­rupt practices he had attempted to re­strain.

Professor Kennedy adheres to the in­terpretation of Bligh’s life and character that he put forward in his earlier book, and that is broadly accepted by most modem authorities. Far from being a cruel tyrant, Bligh was an officer of hu­manity, arguably even of weakness, who scrupulously cared for his men, but en­tirely lacked the human sympathy so needful in a successful commander. An irascible, and sometimes inconsistent per­

RICHARD HOUGH

As governor of New South Wales in 1808, Bligh again faced a mutiny. Armed officers found him hiding under a feather bed in the Govern­ment House and arrested him. Years later he was vindicated and pro­moted to flag rank.

fectionist, a driver rather than a leader, Bligh set high standards both for himself and his junior officers. When he met these standards he could be generous in his praise, but when, more often, he missed them, he fell into ungovernable fury. Clearly, he lacked some qualities of the great commander, but many officers would have been worse to serve under.

Kennedy is clear in his conclusion that the key to the Bounty mutiny lies in Fletcher Christian’s immaturity, if not mental instability. A more sensitive cap­tain would doubtless not have been taken by surprise, just as a more adroit politi­cian might have made more of the diffi­cult situation in the infant colony of New South Wales. But in neither case was Bligh primarily to blame.

Of his other professional qualities there can be no doubt: he was one of the finest navigators of his age, the favored pupil of Captain James Cook, and completed what is still the longest open-boat voyage ever to have been made in such circum­stances. He was also a successful fighting commander, who distinguished himself

at the battle of Camperdown and earned Horatio Nelson’s thanks for his crucial contribution to the narrow victory of Copenhagen.

On Bligh himself, and especially on the Bounty affair, Kennedy is probably our leading authority. But unfortunately his authority stands on an extremely nar­row base. The same quality in this cele­brated episode that so attracts film direc­tors and cranks seems to repel professional historians, and Professor Kennedy, himself an eminent economist, is not in home waters. Outside the life of Bligh himself, he knows much too little about the 18th century, and about the ] 18th-century Royal Navy in particular. This shows in ludicrous details, such as the assertion that in 1797 “the main con­cern of the King and the Admiralty was j the choice of ship to carry him to his hon­eymoon” (George III had then been mar­ried 36 years). But his unfamiliarity with naval life in the period is much more seri­ous because it repeatedly leads him to misinterpret events, to lay stress on things that were ordinary routine and to miss what was genuinely remarkable.

Many of these blunders are trivial, but by no means all. It is extraordinary, for instance, that he attaches little weight to Bligh’s action in making Christian an act- | ing lieutenant, which was taking a power on himself that no officer, not even a commander-in-chief, possessed. Had the death of one of his officers caused a va­cancy, Bligh could have promoted some­one to acting rank to fill it. But where no lieutenant was established, only the Admiralty could create one, and there was no precedent for a second commis­sioned officer in an armed vessel with a lieutenant in command. If we are to take the action at face value (which seems doubtful), it could certainly be read as evidence of megalomania, and anyone interested in Bligh’s character must give it serious consideration. Professor Ken­nedy does not, because he does not real­ize its significance.

The same weakness attends his whole treatment of the nature of mutiny and naval discipline, which bears no trace of modem scholarship. Indeed, it is note­worthy that his bibliography contains nothing published since 1978 (and little before it), except works directly about Bligh himself and the Bounty. Conse­quently, we meet everywhere traces of the sort of caricatures now abandoned by serious historians. This undermines the whole purpose of the book, for if the na­ture of mutiny is not understood, the character of the man can scarcely be made clear. For its information about Bligh this book cannot easily be faulted, but we still badly need someone who can set it all in context.

Sam McKinney’s book aims at quite a different object. It is a narrative woven from extracts of Bligh’s own narrative; the journal of Boatswain’s Mate James Morrison of the Bounty; the reports of Captain Edwards of the Pandora, who recaptured the mutineers on Tahiti, and of George Hamilton, her surgeon; and the

narrative of Captain Beechey of the Blos­som, who interviewed the last survivor of •he mutiny shortly before he died. The author, or perhaps editor, brings to his choice of passages and linking narrative a deep knowledge of the sea and a short reading list (which includes several items Professor Kennedy should have picked ^UP). The result does not take scholarly knowledge of the affair much further, but •• clearly is not meant to. The book is beautifully printed in two colors in Bas- kerville type, with numerous charts and small illustrations, including attractive if fanciful ink sketches by Nathan Gold­stein. For the nonexpert it is a handsome and evocative introduction to some of the °riginal narratives. Readers of McKinney ^who are inspired to inquire more deeply Mil certainly move on to Kennedy for his greater detail and sophistication, but they Mil still have a considerable way to go.

Mr. Rodger, an assistant keeper at the Public Record Office in Kew, England, is the author of many books, among them The Wooden World: An Anatomy °f the Georgian Navy (Naval Institute Press, 1986).

Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race

Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka. S1PRI Strategic Issues Paper. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 183 pp. Tables. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $35.00 ($31.50).

Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Jonathan Kapstein, U.S. Naval Reserve

Short of mobilizing for war, there is nothing more disturbing than down- ^Slzing forces and disarming. Now that the Warsaw Treaty has disintegrated, the Soviet land forces have pulled back, and •he U.S. dream of a 600-ship navy has faded, there is more interest than ever in assessing the strengths of the two super­power navies. At the same time, there Mil be more talk and temptation to rely °n nuclear weapons to replace any disap­pearance of conventional firepower.

Here is a new and well-written work Just in time to back up any discussion about the future of the superpower na­^vies. It is a superb analysis by a noted Japanese military commentator and a "'ell-qualified U.S. scholar. They set out •° compare the Soviet and U.S. navies and conclude, slightly to their own sur­prise, that the Soviet Navy is unexpect­^edly weak in design, technology, and doctrine. For example, the Soviet Navy’s impressively large submarines mask the mability to combine missions in a single hull and major failures in both electronics and compact, solid-fuel missile technol­ogy. No wonder NATO naval officials in Brussels say the Soviet Union could retire 30% of its combat fleet tomorrow and lose only 5% of its efficiency. The Soviet Navy is approaching block obsolescence.

The authors go down the list. They compare overwhelming U.S. superiority in aircraft carriers and the mix of aircraft. On the other hand, the Soviet Forger ver­tical takeoff and landing aircraft uses a clumsy mechanism of two separate liftjet engines installed vertically behind the cockpit which causes a major sacrifice in almost every category of performance. Even the impressive Kirov- and Slava- class cruisers are vulnerable in any war­time scenario beyond the range of land- based aircraft. That is the reason why the Kiev-class ships bristle with antiair and antiship missiles. Even more impor­tantly, the Soviet Navy spends little time at sea. Soviet ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) deploy at sea 11-15% of the time, in contrast to the 66% of the U.S. Navy’s Ohio (SSBN-726) class.

This is not to disparage Soviet success. The Soviet space program is far more ambitious and advanced than the U.S. one. Western pilots recently flew the MiG-29 as guests of the Soviet air force, and reported that it is a honey. But it is clear that these are exceptions based on considerable, equally exceptional na­tional effort.

Let’s also clear up something else while we’re at it. This book was pub­lished under the auspices of the Stock­holm International Peace Research Insti­tute (SIPRI). SIPRI’s name, to be sure, has a doubtful ring to U.S. ears accus­tomed to suspecting organizations using the word “peace” as a front for anything but peaceful aims. Despite its unfortunate name, SIPRI is an accurate and objective arms research group based in neutral, well-armed Sweden. It was SIPRI, for example, that brought the proliferation of ballistic-missile programs in the Third World to general attention.

A Canadian F/A-18 and a Soviet MiG-29 at the Abbotsford Air Show in August 1989, where a Canadian pilot flew the MiG-29—a “honey.” But most Soviet weapons and plat­forms are less sophisticated than advertised.

So while the first half of this book clears away much of the sea mist and mystery over Soviet naval capability, the other half is a remarkably clear discus­sion of the both doctrine and hardware in embarked nuclear weapons. Between a quarter and a third of all nuclear weapons in the world are naval. Of the 16,000 at sea, more than 95% are ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and another 6,500 are tactical. Every day the five nuclear navies—the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and the People’s Re­public of China—have more than 45 SSBNs on patrol carrying more than 4,000 warheads.

Considerable national resources are going into modernizing and expanding SSBN and SLBM arsenals, even while budgets are falling. While there is great public optimism about restraining force on land, the authors conclude that super­power naval arms control will emerge as a highly charged, contentious argument.

Meanwhile, with Sean Connery chang­ing from his famous role as the profes­sional James Bond to the professional but defecting Soviet naval submarine com­mander in the movie The Hunt for Red October, it is inevitable that public inter­est and discussion will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Navy. To the extent that this book fully lines up facts and figures, its help at this time is superb.

Commander Kapstein served in the U.S. Army and received his Naval Reserve commission in 1965. A career foreign correspondent for Business Week, he currently is based in Brussels covering the Benelux and Nordic nations plus the European Community and NATO headquarters.

Books of Interest

By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)

The Story of Byrd’s

2] Beyond the Barrier: The Story of Byrd’s First Expedition to Antarctica

Eugene Rodgers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990. 320 pp. Photos. Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($19.96).

The story of Admiral Richard E. Byrd’s explo­ration of Antarctica has, until now, been sub­J^ect to the bias of the admiral and his allies. Rodgers, a public-information officer for the

EUGENE RODGERS

First Expedition to Antarctica

U.S. Antarctic Research Program from 1963 ^to 1965, has written an account based partly on *he admiral’s private papers, which have re­p^ently been opened. The result is the first ob­jective look at the expedition—a provocative R'°k sure to stir controversy. The admiral, ^while losing some of his artificial luster, is ^revealed at last as a human being.

defender of the Chesapeake: The Story of Fort Monroe (Third Revised Edition)

Richard P. Weinert, Jr., and Colonel Robert Arthur. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing, 1989. 361 pp. Photos. Ulus. Append. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).

Fort Monroe in Virginia is the largest perma­ⁿent seacoast fortification constructed before foe Civil War, and has been a major Army post for 167 years. It is home for technological improvement, military training, and the devel­opment of doctrine. It also played a role in the Civil War. Its story is retold in this updated version of a long-standing work.

The Future Battlefield and the Arab- Israeli Conflict

Hirsch Goodman and W. Seth Carus. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990.

218 pp. Tables. Append. Gloss. Notes. Ind.

$16.95 ($15.25) paper.

Two Middle East military experts assess the impact of technological innovation on Israeli and Arab military forces. Focusing upon Israel and Syria (the most likely belligerent among the Arab nations), Goodman and Carus ana­lyze relevant aspects of developing technology to determine their anticipated effect upon the balance of power in the Middle East. Israel, they conclude, holds the advantage.

General-At-Sea: Robert Blake and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution in Naval Warfare

Michael Baumber. London: John Murray, 1989.

284 pp. Illus. Maps. Notes. Bib. Ind. Order directly from publisher, 50 Albemarle St., London W1X 4BD, U.K.

Oliver Cromwell, after having overthrown the monarchy and seized power in England, dis­trusted the British Admiralty’s loyalties to the crown to such a degree that he sent some of his trusted generals to sea to oppose the formida­ble Dutch Navy. He revolutionized naval war­fare by that act, and set the stage for the Royal Navy supremacy that was to last for more than two centuries. Perhaps the most successful of these generals-at-sea was Robert Blake, and Baumber provides an important reassessment of this outstanding 17th-century commander who defeated the Dutch Navy and twice de­stroyed the Spanish treasure fleet.

Inside Spetsnaz: Soviet Special Operations: A Critical Analysis

Major William H. Burgess III, editor. Novato,

CA: Presidio Press, 1990. 308 pp. Maps. Charts. Figs. Append. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

Specialists in military intelligence, special operations, and Soviet history combine in this volume to sort out truths from the abundant myths regarding the eclectic Soviet Spetsnaz. The 14 essays discuss the relationships be­tween Spetsnaz and the Soviet KGB and GRU;

recount their role in World War II, the Arctic, Manchuria, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and, more recently, off the coasts of Sweden; and predict future uses. The treatment is bal­anced, incisive, and highly informative.

Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of American Intelligence in Vietnam

Orrin DeForest and David Chanoff. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. 294 pp. Photos. Gloss. Ind. $19.95.

Colonel Stuart Herrington, author of a seminal work about the campaign for hearts and minds in Vietnam, Silence Was a Weapon: The Viet­nam War in the Villages (Presidio, 1982), writes that “there is no question that the intel­ligence operation run by Orrin DeForest was the most effective in the war.” This is DeFor­est’s memoir, in which he recounts how, as chief interrogation officer for military region three, he revolutionized the Central Intelli­gence Agency’s operation, setting up a highly effective network of spies and counterspies that, at one point, provided as much as 80% of the hard intelligence serving U.S. and South Vietnamese interests in Vietnam in the post- Tet Offensive era.

Superpower Britain

Roy Sherwood. Oxford: Willingham Press, 1989. 88 pp. Photos. Bib. Ind. $24.95 paper. Order directly from publisher, 22 Schole Rd., Willingham, Cambridge CB4 5JD, U.K.

Recalling the not-so-distant period when Brit­ain held superpower status and was, in fact, ahead of the United States and Soviet Union in certain areas of superpower technology, Sher­wood traces the path of Britain’s decline, un­covering a “tale of bright vision and high en­deavour eclipsed by incompetence, ignorance, and blind stupidity.” He focuses upon aero­nautics, missiles, space, and nuclear power.

U.S. Military Strategy in the Gulf:

Origins and Evolution Under the Carter and Reagan Administrations

Amitav Acharya. New York: Routlcdge, 1989.

203 pp. Maps. Tables. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $62.50 ($56.25).

Acharya explains the nature and dimensions of U.S. strategy in the Persian Gulf following the fall of the Shah of Iran. He considers the influ­ences of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war and analyzes the forma­tion of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task

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Force and the U.S. Central Command. A con­cluding chapter assesses the achievements and failures of U.S. strategy in the region.

War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan

David C. Isby. New York: Sterling Publishing, 1989. 128 pp. Photos. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

Isby has written the first substantive study of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan since Soviet forces withdrew. With 103 photo­graphs—many never before published— accompanying a narrative based on firsthand accounts of Afghan guerrillas and extensive research, this book sheds needed light upon “Russia’s Vietnam.”

Other Titles of Interest

Armed Services and Society

Martin Edmonds. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. 226 pp. Figs. Bib. Ind. $27.50 ($24.75).

Canalgate: A Panama Canal Brief for the American People

Samuel J. Stoll. Livingston, NJ: Policy Press,

1989. 589 pp. Maps. Ind. $19.95 ($17.95).

Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising

Don Peretz. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1990. 246 pp. Photos. Maps. Tables. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $14.95 ($13.45).

Pacific Marine Museums and Data Centers

Honolulu, HI: Institute for Marine Informa­tion, 1990. 242 pp. Photo. Maps. Ind.

Restive Partners: Washington and Bonn Diverge

W.R. Smyser. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. 166 pp. Notes. Ind. $18.95 ($17.05) paper.

Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat

Susan D. Moeller. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989. 474 pp. Photos. Notes. Ind. $25.95 ($23.35).

Soviet Navy at War 1941-1945

Przemyslaw Budzbon. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1989. 50 pp. Photos. Illus. $7.95 ($7.15).

The Soviet Union and Arms Control: Negotiating Strategy and Tactics

Paul R. Bennett. New York: Praeger Publish' ers, 1990. Tables. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $39.95. ($35.95).

Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445-1871

John A. Lynn, editor. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990. 262 pp. Figs. Notes. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

Tribes with Faces: A Dangerous Passage through the Chaos of the Middle East

Charles Glass. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990. 510 pp. Maps. Ind. $18.95 ($17.05).

Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy

Ralph Bennett. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989. 496 pp. Maps. Append. Gloss. Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

World War II in the Mediterranean, 1942' 1945

LtCol. Carlo D’Este, U.S. Army (Retd- Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1990. 206 pp. Photos. Maps. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($20.65).

Audio

Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer

Peter Wright with Paul Greengrass. Read by Richard Bebb. New York: Simon and Schuster Audioworks, 1987. 180 min. $14.95.