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Chief of the Australian Defence Force
During a recent visit to Washington, General Gration spoke with Proceedings editors Fred H. Rainbow and Fred L. Schultz about Australia’s defense philosophy in the South Pacific and Indian oceans and the helping hand his navy is lending in the Persian Gulf.
PROCEEDINGS: To help us set the stage for our readers, would you compare your relationships with the Minister of Defence and the three service chiefs with °ur Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his position in our Department of Defense organization?
^RATION: The first point to make is that I am, by law, a commander, and command the Defence Force. The chain °f command in Australia comes from the Prime Minister to the Minister for Defence to me, and then through me to the service chiefs and the three operational commanders: maritime commander, land commander, and air commander. The service chiefs are outside that operational line of command, and their role is twofold—first, to be the principal advisers to trte on matters affecting their services, and second, to raise, train, equip, and supply forces of their services, which are then made available to the joint commanders.
PROCEEDINGS: The current crisis in the Middle East has demonstrated the need for well-trained and -equipped military forces in the United States. What has been the public reaction to the current crisis in your country ?
GRATION: It’s been positive, judging from the response to the opinion polls. There was generally about 80% approval of the multinational response to what has happened. Within that 80%, just under 70% approved of Australia’s early action to commit ships to the Gulf. That was a very strong public endorsement of the actions taken.
PROCEEDINGS: Do you have any plans for touring the Middle East area? GRATION: It depends how long it goes on, but yes, I would expect within the next six months to visit our forces there.
PROCEEDINGS: Could you outline what forces your country has dispatched in response to this crisis?
GRATION: Yes. We sent two frigates, FFG-7s, Adelaide and Darwin, and a supply ship, Success. In addition to that, two medical teams are serving onboard one of the United States hospital ships. These are there primarily to give third- and fourth-line medical support to the Australian forces, but I would expect them also to contribute to the general medical capability of the ships.
PROCEEDINGS: How are those operations affecting schedules elsewhere? They must have changed what you had planned to do with your fleet. GRATION: Yes, the situation has had an effect. For example, as part of our regional commitment, some two years ago we undertook a rolling but permanent deployment of ships into Southeast Asian waters, and we try to keep, at any one time, at least two ships in the area. The deployment of ships in the Gulf has impacted a bit on that. We have only two supply ships, and having one in the Gulf has created some difficulties with our own exercising program in Australian waters and elsewhere. But we’re accommodating that.
PROCEEDINGS: Under what kinds of orders or rules of engagement are your forces operating? Essentially, what is the command organization for your units, the naval units?
GRATION: Like anyone else, we don’t discuss our rules of engagement publicly. Let me just say that they’re consistent with those of the United States, and that the role that's been given to the Australian forces is consistent with enforcement of the United Nations sanctions. For example, on a number of occasions we have fired warning shots at Iraqi ships and have put boarding parties on them. So without publicly discussing them, the rules are consistent with those of the United States.
PROCEEDINGS: And are Australian forces operating with U.S. forces? GRATION: Yes, they’ve been operating in the Gulf of Oman in close coordination with U.S. forces. You asked me earlier about the line of command. In the Gulf operations, it goes from me to the maritime commander, who is a joint commander in Sydney, and from him to the commander of the task group in the Gulf.
So I was kept informed of our boardings of the Iraqi ships.
PROCEEDINGS: The Persian Gulf is the trouble spot at the moment. Would you identify other potential areas in the Indian and Pacific oceans where conflicts might break out that would require multinational military forces to respond? GRATION: I think the Gulf is clearly the one that we’re all focusing on at present.
I don’t think anywhere else has the urgency that’s attached to the Gulf, nowhere even approaching it.
Is there anywhere you had in mind?
PROCEEDINGS: The Indian Navy is growing in significant capability and is interested, seemingly, in becoming the power of the Indian Ocean. Is there any response to that as far as your navy goes? Is that a concern?
GRATION: To say “concerned” is putting it too strongly. But like most countries on the Indian Ocean perimeter, we’re looking carefully at the changes taking place in India. It would be quite wrong to say that we regard the changes as a threat in any way, but there is no question that the Indian Navy is acquiring a power projection capability that it didn’t have before. We’re looking with great interest at developments in nuclear submarines and the acquisition of carriers.
PROCEEDINGS: Recent internal debates indicate that Australia has a significant “image problem” in Southeast Asia that we were turning our backs on our regional responsibilities, and in embracing a strategic concept of self-reliant defense, were abrogating our responsibilities to our regional friends and neighbors. This is quite wrong. We see ourselves very much a part of the region. We see our own security as inextricably linked with the security of our region, and we feel we have to and are able to contribute, and indeed are contributing substantially, to that security.
In numbers of ways our involvement with the region has increased and is still increasing. I think we’ve dispelled that one.
At the other end of the spectrum, a second image problem has become evident in several places—with some people in
ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY/INSET: AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
With the supply ship Success, background, the frigates Darwin, left, and Adelaide, right, and two medical teams, Australia was one of the first countries to lend assistance to the multinational force in the Persian Gulf. General Gration intends to visit his contingent in the near future.
and the South Pacific. What exactly is the image problem, and what measures are the Australian Armed Forces taking to overcome it?
GRATION: In my view there are two rather different aspects to the image problem. The first arose from misconceptions about the 1987 Australian Government White Paper. There was a concern that we were becoming too inward-looking,
New Zealand, with some of the peace movement in Australia, and with some individuals amongst our Southeast Asian neighbors. For example, a retired Indonesian general raised the matter in 1989. Based on Australia’s capital investment program, the charge was that we were engaging in a dangerous arms buildup, which had the potential to destabilize the region, and the process was referred to as the “new militarism.”
So we had the two. One lot said we Were withdrawing, which was wrong; the second lot said we were indulging in a new militarism, and we were undertaking a dangerous military build-up. Wrong also. We are introducing one or two new capabilities, such as over-the-horizon tadar, but our current investment spend- lng program is, by and large, replacing worn-out capabilities. For example, We re replacing six Oberon submarines with six of the new type 471. We’ve replaced what were originally some 140 yl'tage fighters with 75 F-18s. We will "c building up the destroyer force from (he present 12 to 16 or 17, but that’s a aiodest increase and will be over a 10- or '5-year period. So we would deny strongly that we’re engaging in any new militarism or any dangerous build-up.
PROCEEDINGS: Have you seen a shift ln U-S. interest in the Pacific Ocean in 'he past few years?
^RATION: Yes, I have. The shift—as has been spelled out to us by the United States administration over the past 12 Months—is where you have flagged a [Modest drawdown of forces in Korea and ln Japan. We’ve been following very closely the base negotiations in the Phil- ‘Ppines. So we see a reduction in U.S. Presence. But despite this drawdown, we Welcome the commitment to a continuing Presence and influence in the region, because we feel that it is very important to 'he stability of the region.
PROCEEDINGS: Do you think that change has any implications for Australia?
URATION: Yes. We hope that the change will be modest and will not be Precipitate, because we believe the pres- er)ce and the influence of the United States is an important factor for stability •n the Pacific. But having said that—and anticipating that the United States’s presence will be significant for many years to come—it does, nevertheless, indicate that Australia and other countries in the region must be thinking even more in Self-reliant terms than they have in the Past.
PROCEEDINGS: Throughout history, Australia has fought hand-in-hand with 'he United States—in both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and now in the Persian Uulf. What expectations do Australians hold regarding U.S. support if Australian •nterests are jeopardized?
^RATION: We have the ANZUS Alliance, which doesn’t give any binding commitment, except to consult. But anyone who is considering an aggressive act against Australia, even though there is no guarantee or no formal organization, could not be sure of the reaction of the United States.
So we think in the event of a serious threat to our country that the alliance would be a significant contributor to our security position. It is therefore central to our security thinking, together with the strong acceptance of the Guam Doctrine, requiring each of your friends and allies to look to the greatest extent possible to their own security. This lies behind our concept of self-reliant defense ol Australia in the context of our alliance commitments.
You will see in what I’ve just said that because we’re looking to our own selfreliant defense first and foremost, the threshold at which we would be expecting assistance from the United States is quite high. In the last few years, we’ve come a long way. Having said that, we derive what we believe are very substantial defense benefits from our security relationship with the United States, quite regardless of what would happen if Australia were to come under threat. Indeed, we would say that it is in the context of our alliance relationship with the United States that a small country like Australia is able to pursue self-reliance. I’m talking here about our intelligence and scientific exchanges, the acquisition of equipment, logistic support, and the training together of our forces to develop interoperability. These are all very important to us.
PROCEEDINGS: The U.S. Navy’s policy of neither confirming nor denying that ships are carrying nuclear weapons has been used as a reason to end naval cooperation between the U.S. and New Zealand navies. Your forces still have a good working relationship with New Zealand. Do you see a normalization of relations between the United States and New Zealand anytime soon?
GRATION: No, I don’t. We accept the NCND policy without equivocation. There are good reasons for that. We accept them and don’t have any problem with them. In this we differ fundamentally from our cousins in New Zealand. We regret, but understand and accept, the rift that has now evolved in security matters between the United States and New Zealand. However, we believe it’s in no one’s interest that New Zealand’s defense forces or general security position should deteriorate any more than they have. We therefore maintain a strong bilateral relationship between Australian and New Zealand defense forces.
It hasn’t been possible for us to compensate for all that New Zealand used to draw from the United States, but we’ve compensated a good deal. For example, we do more exercising with the New Zealand defense forces than we did before the split. There is probably more cooperation on acquisition of hardware than there was before the split took place. And we believe it’s in both your interests and ours that we don’t see New Zealand go down the drain in the defense field.
PROCEEDINGS: Given the stigma of nuclear weapons, do Australia and New Zealand discuss the issue often? GRATION: No, because our positions are well known to each other, and ours is different from theirs. They understand that, and we understand that. So there’s not a great deal to discuss.
There is an election coming up in New Zealand. In the opinion polls, the government is lagging quite a long way behind, and on that basis a change of government seems likely. But the opposition have indicated that they do not intend to change their nuclear policy, and for that reason my answer to your question is no.
PROCEEDINGS: The end of the Cold War has had many effects, including in this country a call for reduced military budgets and proclamation of a peace dividend. How have recent changes in the Soviet Union’s stated goals and objectives affected public support for your military budget?
GRATION: I should make two points here. The first is that Australian defense policy, which I can encapsulate as a selfreliant defense in the context of our ongoing alliance and regional commitments, was not predicated on East-West relationships or on events that were taking place in Europe. Our defense policy is not driven by any enemy; it’s driven more by our unique strategic geography. So, in theory at least, there shouldn’t have been much effect. That’s the first point.
The second point is that in practice, of course, there was an effect. It’s inescapable. Australians looking around the world at what’s happening to the United States and European defense budgets, and looking at the general reduction in global tensions, naturally come to expect some sort of peace dividend for Australia. Our defense spending is already well down on expectations at the time of the 1987 Defence White Paper, when government forecast plus-3% real growth per annum off into the foreseeable future. In fact, we haven’t had anything like that; it’s been hovering around zero growth, and it is zero this year. 1 think that will probably be the pattern ahead. So, that indirect cf- feet has flowed on.
There is a third effect that perhaps I should mention. The global strategic changes have not yet flowed into the Pacific region, although they seem certain to do so in some form or other. This has created considerable future uncertainty in the region. Uncertainty does not necessarily mean things are getting worse, but we believe strongly that a time of future uncertainty is really not the time to be reducing budgets further and disbanding our defense forces.
PROCEEDINGS: What are the priorities in your next defense budget? GRATION: We do have priorities. Incidentally, we don’t have a Navy, an Air Force, and an Army budget, except for current operating expenses. The capital investment is done centrally. When I use the term “capital investment,” I’m referring to investment in military equipment, ships, planes, aircraft, weapon systems, communication systems, and so on, plus investment in military infrastructure— bases, airfields, etc., as distinct from current operating expenditure on activities, personnel, consumption of ammunition, and so on. We have a strong commitment to a sustained capital investment program, and are in about year 5 of a 15-year program. We intend to keep about 30% of the total defense expenditures going into capital, compared with a low in the mid- 1970s of around 10%. It is essential that we sustain our capital investment if we are still to have a viable, modem, and professional defense force around the turn of the century, because our last surge of capital spending was about the time of the Vietnam War. Much of our current equipment is, if not worn out already, obsolete and getting very old.
Our first priority, then, is capital spending. Of course, when you put priority on capital spending, you have to make tradeoffs against current readiness, which means restraining operating costs and costs for personnel. I believe we’ve struck a balance that is about correct for our strategic situation, but we have had to hold very tight on operating costs and personnel numbers.
Within the capital spending, we are putting clear priority on maritime forces. By far the two largest current projects are the replacement of our submarine fleet and the construction of a new class of ANZAC frigates. We are also bringing into service the Seahawk helicopter, and this is a major program. So naval or maritime forces are getting the largest share of the capital vote.
PROCEEDINGS: Japan is considering acquisition of some ships that will be capable of going beyond 1,000 miles from the home islands. Obviously they’re looking to play a greater role in the Pacific. I know “concern” is a buzzword. Obviously this is something that the Aus-
Interview
Commodore D. J. Campbell,
Royal Australian Navy
During the same visit, Proceedings seized an opportunity to talk about the Naval Institute with long-time member Commodore Campbell, Australian Naval Attache.
PROCEEDINGS: We would like to ask you, as a member of the United States Naval Institute and a member of the Australian Naval Institute, a few questions about the two organizations. First, why did you join the United States Naval Institute?
CAMPBELL: This probably sounds precocious, but I think even when I was a youngster I realized how important, how fundamental, professional reading and writing were to professional training and education. It’s as simple as that.
1 first encountered the Proceedings when I was 15 in the Naval College. The only way to ensure that I had access to the current issue was to get my own copy. So I joined the Naval Institute. The Proceedings and Britain’s Naval Review are the premier professional military magazines in the world.
PROCEEDINGS: We’re impressed with your publication, as well. It’s been in existence 15 years?
CAMPBELL: Yes, 15 years, as opposed to the U.S. Naval Institute’s—what?— 117. The Australian Naval Institute was based unashamedly on the U.S. Naval Institute. By that I mean it was the model that we chose. The ideals and objectives are the same. The structure and the constitution are very much the same as the
U.S. Naval Institute’s.
Our missions are identical. You do more than we do, and that’s a function of scale and a measure of our limitation of resources. For example, we don’t have—■ although we aspire to—an oral history program and a book publishing program- On the other hand, we do publish a journal. We do a lot by the way of promoting debate on naval and maritime issues. We sponsor a series of distinguished speakers and memorial orations, and award silver medals for essay writers. We also run a Naval Seapower Symposium. I know all these are very familiar to you.
PROCEEDINGS: We were very honored to receive a letter soon after your Navy formed the Australian Naval Institute, asking our permission to copy the “Nobody asked me, but . . .” column in your Proceedings.
CAMPBELL: Yes, that’s right.
tralians are very interested in. GRATION: There are two aspects of this. An incremental move wouldn’t cause much worry. Indeed, we welcome moves that we already know about, Where I think the Japanese are moving to a force of about 60 ships. We see that as a very useful contribution to the protection °f sea lines of communication. So, point pne is that we welcome what’s happening ln the Maritime Self-Defense Force.
But the second aspect is to understand that there is still a lot of sensitivity around our region, particularly in the ASEAN countries, with their memories of World War II, about a significant resurgence in Japanese military power, particularly the capacity for power projection. I know that the Japanese are aware of this and sensitive to it, and therefore are very careful, indeed, in the way they’re moving forth.
PROCEEDINGS: Another aspect of that
is that the Soviets have placed forces and capability into Vietnam bases. While the Soviet Union is drawing down its forces generally, and there’s been a lot of discussion about reduction of forces, have you actually seen any evidence of that? GRATION: Let’s just say I have seen evidence of a drawdown in the Soviet forces at Cam Ranh Bay, which is what you’re talking about. They’re still there, but there has certainly been a drawdown.
PROCEEDINGS: Has their level of activity in visiting the island countries of the Pacific diminished?
GRATION: It was never high, but it’s even less high than it was two or three years ago. Three years ago, the Soviets were negotiating fishing agreements with some of the smaller island countries. They’re not doing that anymore. Their presence is quite low.
PROCEEDINGS: Is there anything that you expected us to ask that we didn’t, or that you would like to elaborate upon? Feel free to address any issue or concern that we did not touch upon.
GRATION: I think you covered all the issues I expected. The final word I would like to tell you is that although there are great differences in scale between the United States and our own forces, presently we’re being driven to review the way ahead by the same sort of factors. I’m talking about the changes in the strategic situation and the resultant budgetary pressures, where there is that question of the peace dividend and an expectation in some quarters that governments will spend less on defense. Finally, there is the question of the national expectation of what Australia and the Australian people expect in their defense force. This is all driving us to do some fundamental rethinking about the structure of the forces and the policies that we should be following through the 1990s.
If you don't cure that censorship difficulty, I'm telling you, you are going to kill the Naval Institute.
PROCEEDINGS: The editor of the magazine, Clay Barrow, sent back 15 other titles he thought might work instead of ‘Nobody asked me, but . . .” He also offered the option of “Nobody asked me, but . .
CAMPBELL: We took that one. It was such a good model, why change a good thing?
PROCEEDINGS: What suggestions do you have for the United States Naval Institute in order that it might improve its service to its members?
CAMPBELL: If I knew the answer, I Would be rich and famous wouldn’t I? Every publisher would come to my door. I think you’ve got to get the naval professionals signed up when they’re young. I think that’s very important. Get them as s°on as they join the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, or even beforehand if you can. In more practical terms, it Would be very useful to find a device to have them automatically renew their uiemberships. Most of us are fundamentally lazy, no matter how many reminders you give us.
PROCEEDINGS: Are active-duty pro- tYocecdings / December 1990
fessionals encouraged to write for publication in your Proceedings? CAMPBELL: Yes. In fact, they are the chief sources of manuscripts.
PROCEEDINGS: By encouraged, I mean does the senior leadership in your Navy view positively the critical discussion of issues important to your Navy? CAMPBELL: Yes. No question about that. 1 wish I could only lead by example. When I was younger, I used to write regularly and frequently for our journal. But the older and wiser I get, the more I realize how little I know. There’s some funny psychological trick in all this. It makes me reluctant to write. But I forget that the young officers would probably wish me to, because they don’t see my limitations as I do. I think that’s something that bedevils all senior officers. My excuse is that I write all day, every day, and I just couldn’t stand to sit at night and write an essay for the Institute.
PROCEEDINGS: Are any restrictions placed on what an author can discuss on the pages of your magazine? CAMPBELL: The short answer is no. Obviously, it’s got to be relevant to the sea services. It’s got to be with good
manners, i.e., not disparaging. Security would be the third consideration. But that looks after itself; we trust our officers. People obviously bear security in mind when they write. As a backup, normal editorial process will take care of any questionable security issues. We do not have, I’m very glad to say, anything like your current censorship problem. It is shocking that there are those who would attempt to censor your military professionals.
If you don’t cure that censorship difficulty, I’m telling you, you are going to kill the Naval Institute. You will kill its spontaneity; you will kill any sort of debate; you will kill any initiative. It’s the damndest thing I’ve ever heard of. You’ve got to get rid of it.
PROCEEDINGS: Your reaction was worth the trip to Washington. You cut to the heart of the issue. The fascinating thing about it is that as the Soviets open up, the U.S. Department of Defense considers closing down on what its military professionals can say.
CAMPBELL: Quite right. It’s absolutely amazing.
PROCEEDINGS: We are working the issue and hoping that common sense will prevail before any formal changes in the way we do business occur. At this point, the censorship issue remains unresolved. CAMPBELL: It’s such an un-American thing to do in this day and age. As a professional observer of the U.S. scene, it is an extraordinary turn of events.