Will History Repeat Itself?

“The Russians aren’t coming! The Russians aren’t coming!” This cry has rung out with greater and greater frequency lately in the halls and counting ^r°oms of the Pentagon. Reac- hons have varied between glee ^and fear, depending on which ^s'de of the defense buildup fence ^0r>e sits. To restate the obvious, |he events occurring in Eastern Europe are radically restructur- ^lng the world as we know it.

. The changes initiated by So- '^det President Mikhail Gor­bachev are just short of revolu- h°n. The quandary facing the defense establishment is deciding how to react. Is Gorbachev for

real? Or is the possibility of a resurgent Russian bear still an ever-present nightmare? It is not Necessary to guess what to do,

^0r guidance is easily accessible.

On 9 February 1790 the Hon­orable Edmund Burke spoke to ^arliament concerning the future o the English Defence Budget.

^Urke, long famed for his liberal p^lews, was later seen by the rench as a visionary political ^lr>ker, having correctly pre- ^lcted the moral decay and de­I ^ruct'on brought on by the revo- Nhon in his Reflections on the Solution in France. England , °^w faced the prospect of a _c^retlch threat that had suc- rnbed to the ravages of revolu- ⁿ_: Burke’s comments during a ^rliamentary debate on the P^lc hear consideration. He ‘^sed many important points ^evant to the current U.S. de­^nse debate. Following is a ^mmary of his speech, derived fy°ⁿⁱ The Works of the Right Viable Edmund Burke, Re- Lim ^^dd'^on’ Vol. Ill (Boston: T_h^tlt’ ^Bfown & Co., 1865).

Port ®^Llest‘^on: h is of great im- fij ^{atlce to} maintain public con- ^ence in the decisions of the government when setting the defense budget in time of peace. The declared purpose of the majority of English forces is to preserve the balance of power in Europe. The propriety of the annual defense budget’s being larger or smaller depended, therefore, upon the true state of that balance. If the increase demanded of Parliament by the ministers of the government agreed with the manifest appear­ance of that balance, confidence in the government would be very proper. If, instead, the in­crease is not at all supported by any such appearance, great sus­picion of the ministries might be entertained on that subject.

The Threat: The only real threat to the balance of power is the French. That France will remain an enemy is beyond question.

By the mere circumstance of vicinity it always must be an object of our vigilance. There is a natural and inevitable antago­nism between a continental power like the French, whose concerns are dominated by land forces, and a maritime power on the periphery of the continent, whose concern with the conti­nent is free access and stability in order to trade.

The nature of evil is totally changed in France; but there is still an evil there. While the dis­ease is altered, the roots of it lie with Louis XIV, who established a greater and better disciplined military force than had ever been seen in Europe and with perfect despotism. It was in gov­ernment nothing better than a painted and gilded tyranny.

It could be stated that the French decline was fast, and the recovery could be just as fast, but it lacks credibility. While it is true that one may fall with an accelerating velocity; to put that weight back up is hard and is opposed to the laws of physical and political gravitation, thus the same speed is unrealistic. The French have done our business [of destruction] in a way in which we would never have done it. (In February 1792 Prime Minister William Pitt de­clared in Parliament that “never had fifteen years of peace seemed more likely.”¹)

The Strategy: Since they have ceased to be a power in Europe and will take a long time to re­store themselves to an active existence, England's primary duty is to be observant and to regulate her preparation by the symptoms of their recovery. In monitoring the symptoms of her recovery, one should watch her strength, not her form of gov­ernment, because republics as well as monarchies are suscepti­ble to the usual causes of war: ambition, jealousy, and anger. If the French continued in this [revolution) and we continue increasing our expenses now, we would surely be weaker when it was time for us to arm.

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^eedings / _ApriI ,₉₉₀

87

The History: The revolution began in 1789 as a result of King Louis XIV’s economic mismanagement. The cost of involvement in a foreign war (the American Revolution) was entirely financed by loans; pub­lic confidence in the monarchy was low,² and this was further exacerbated by food shortages and runaway inflation. There was nothing to spare for con­sumer goods even though im­ports were undeniably cheaper and of higher quality; the goods clearly aggravated an already serious industrial depression.³

From this dismal foundation, the French swiftly came back. During 1792-94 the French suc­cessfully defended against a coa­lition of European monarchs attempting to restore the mon­archy. Seven years after the rev­olution the French began an of­fensive campaign in Italy. By 1799, ten years after the revolu­tion, there were whispers in Paris about invading England. In 1804 Napoleon coronated him­self emperor for life.⁴ The year 1804 marked the end of William Pitt’s “15 years of peace.”

If the engine of war—the mil­itary infrastructure and support base—is not destroyed and the causes of war—ambition, jeal­ousy, anger, and military adven­turism—are not changed, war results as soon as the new politi­cal system can create a focus. The hostile environment of the neighboring monarchies created a focus for the French levee en masse. This environment forced the French to keep their indus­trial base mobilized. Although the French Revolution ended the military threat to England, it took Napoleon four years to re­build the military, and only ten years to rebuild to a full military force capable of threatening the British Empire.⁵ England’s de­fense bill larmy estimates] de­clined and rose accordingly through that period.

The Present: These thoughts on France in 1790 are just as appli­cable to the Warsaw Pact today.

Burke’s speech reads much like today’s editorials if, each time they appear, you replace France with Warsaw Pact and monarchy with communism. The common ground between then and now is that the political and economic systems did not meet the needs of the people and failed.

If the dictates of history and weapons make war inevitable, one should not squander re­sources on the present defense establishment at the expense of economic strength and to the detriment of the military force that will be needed. The hostile environment of the neighboring monarchies created a focus for the French. Even when a coun­try is shaken to the roots by rev­olution, if the people and weap­ons are not destroyed, the capability to wage war can be quickly rebuilt. Political capabil­ity leads to threat of war.

Similarly, in considering the threat of the Warsaw Pact na­tions, we must remember that unless their productive and tech­nical capacity is reduced, the capability for rebuilding will always exist. We must, then, as the British did in the 1800s, watch our primary threat closely. As the immediate dan­ger from standing forces sub­sides, our standing force expen­ditures should decline. At the same time, we should be wary of providing a motivation for rearming. It would, in fact, be­hoove us to create an environ­ment that will lead to the dis­mantling of as much of their arms and military industrial and technical base as possible and redirect their national interests inward. Unless fundamental changes are made, renewed con­flict seems inevitable.

As we create our strategy, we need to ensure that our available resources are not wasted but, instead, are committed to giving the greatest leverage in line with the increased warning time for rearming.⁶ This rationale leads our investment to be in basic science and technology, rein­

forced at the expense of particu­lar systems. By vigorously em­phasizing research and development and limiting pro­duction to prototyping and oper­ational testing, we can husband our strengths and increase our domestic technical and industrial capacity, freeing our economy for competition in the world market. We could, then, field systems whenever the present threat justifies the commitment and where we would gain the greatest leverage, while main­taining the capability for war­time surge requirements.

Insight to the crumbling So­viet system and U.S. response can be gained from the study of history. With the loss of Eastern European military capability and the linkage to Western econo­mies, Eastern Europe will not threaten U.S. military or eco­nomic interests. However, the Soviet military potential remains intact and their ambition to be a world power remains. If history is an indicator, renewed U.S. conflict with the Soviet Union is inevitable, and this country’s resources should be conserved to deter military conflict.

‘William Doyal, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (New York: Oxford Univer­sity Press, 1989), p. 200.

²Ibid., p. 67.

³Ibid., p. 87.

Thomas E. Griess, The West Point Military History Series, The Wars of Napoleon (Wayne- NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1985).

⁵George Fasel, Modern Europe in the Making (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1974). Of note is that it took four years after the Kho­meini revolution to rebuild the Iranian Army under threat of invasion by Iraq. It took Ger­many 15 years to rebuild after 1918.

⁶This applies to warning of conflict, as op­posed to shorter warning of attack and is fo­cused on a survivable nonnuclear assumption-

Proceedings / April

Lieutenant (junior grade) Gaffney gradu ated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1987 as a Rhodes scholar and is com­pleting graduate studies at Oxford.

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Lieutenant Colonel Fender is a Strategic Planner with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. has been involved in integration of Ac­quisition program reviews on the OSD and HQ Army staff as well as in many assignments in Armor and Aviation uni^ts