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By Captain William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
In the Soviet Union, a naval career and Communist Party membership have long been linked. To enhance his chances of being selected for a higher naval school and a career as a naval officer, a Soviet youth normally showed his loyalty to nation and party by joining the Komsomol youth organization. To advance his naval career, a young officer usually demonstrated his dedication and commitment to service by actively participating in political activities and becoming a candidate for party membership. As he advanced, the party sought to co-opt and control the best officers by selecting them for party membership. Thus, by the time a naval officer reached flag rank, he had been a long-time party member.
Traditionally, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy, some of his principal deputies, and several fleet commanders- in-chief were elected to the Communist Party’s Central Committee. Then, as important communists, they were nominated by party committees in their home towns, places of residence, or some other area in search of a prestigious candidate to run for uncontested election to the Supreme Soviet. Once a year, they would attend the brief session of that rubber- stamp legislature.
Now, governmental restructuring introduced by President Mikhail Gorbachev has brought with it elections for the new Congress of People’s Deputies. Many incumbents faced contested elections, which they could not avoid. If they were to demonstrate a lack of enthusiasm for restructuring, they would endanger both their party and governmental positions. Many leading communists, including the commanders of the Northern and Pacific fleets, lost their formerly safe seats in the legislature.
Among those who won reelection, however, was Admiral Vladimir N. Chemavin, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, as deputy for the Lenkoranskiy Territorial Okrug in Azerbaijan. Likewise, Admiral Vitaly P. Ivanov, Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet, was elected from the Kaliningrad Olbast of the Russian Republic. Both are now real legislators: They are required to take time off from their naval duties to attend the frequent and longer sessions of the Congress. They must state their views on national issues. They must get to know their constituents and their concerns.
Having senior military officers serving as deputies is beneficial to the military because it provides a forum in which they can speak out and state military views on the social and economic issues of concern to the military. Admiral Ivanov initiated this when he addressed the Congress on 21 December, during the debate about the formation of a constitutional supervision committee. The admiral pointed out that:
“A number of statewide problems relating to the armed forces require closer attention from our congress. First and foremost, I refer to the . . . conscription of young people and their service in the armed forces ... the local Soviet leadership in the Baltic region and in the Transcaucasus . . . has managed to force a negative attitude and unwillingness to serve in the armed forces on the people in their republics and, thus, to threaten military conscription with breakdown. These local leaders have managed to create circumstances in which there is a greatly increased incidence of desertion and evasion of military service, actively encouraged, and supported by the People’s Fronts.
“Laws adopted in some republics regarding service on the territory of one’s own republic and proposals for the establishment of national units . . . will bring nothing but harm to the combat strength of the armed forces and, consequently, a weakening of the defense capability of the state. All this is nothing short of deliberate attempts to undermine the basis of our defense capability.
‘Second, we officers realize that in
two years of military service we si
hall
not be able to re-educate fully a young
man of 18, but we can cultivate ai
ind
nurture in him an all-embracing sense of human duty, comradeship, patriot ism, internationalism, and responsi bility. We can raise and develop h's
political and social horizons, sei
;elf"
discipline, and maturity by maintain ing a high degree of order, organic tion, and discipline. . . . Military sef
vice has saved numerous millions
of
our young people from prison
and
penury, set them on the right roa > and given them a proper start in life. . . . Yet energetic attempts ar®
now being made to foist a profession
nal
military on us. . . . Let us glV
thought to what the consequences
would be for the state in the materia moral and spiritual aspect, not |° mention the inability to create mobi i zation reserves. In our country today there is no social, political, or leg3 institution for education and develop
and
ment equivalent to the Army Navy in their influence on young Pe° pie. r
“Third, and this is on the subject o constitutional supervision, the Army
and Navy have today come up aga>
inst
difficult problems of life and service. . . Local and republic authorities not allocate housing for serviceme but, at the same time, they do a"0 the Defense Ministry to build houS ing, schools, hospitals, and kinde gartens in previously allocated plaC®S(
... A bad and difficult situation
has
:ul'
arisen in the provision of social, c tural, and living facilities for service
men.
The admiral, then, endorsed creating 3 constitutional supervision committee an^
proposed several legislative remedies the problems he had listed. . ,
In addition, in their roles as depude“ these naval officers are required to sta their views on other matters of nation interest currently before the Cong*6* They might otherwise have avoided t situation as professional naval office .
For example, on 19 December, Adm ral Chemavin spoke in support of government’s economic plan put forth
199°
Prime Minister Nikolay I. Ryzhkov. Some deputies called for abstentions, Wanting to disassociate themselves from the unpopular compromise plan that did not go far enough for ardent economic reformers but went too far for committed eentral planners. Chemavin said that the eall for abstentions was caused by:
“. . . an evident fear of taking on even the smallest responsibility for both our work at the congress and the state of affairs in the country . . . there should be no abstentions among you. ... To all intents and purposes we are talking about pronouncing a vote of confidence in the government we elected . . . and I think there are no grounds today for not trusting in this government.”
Shortly thereafter, in an interview in *he military journal, Red Star, on 21 December, his role as a deputy from Azerbaijan required Admiral Chemavin not 0r|ly to speak out, but to take sides on that very critical issue.
“Events in Azerbaijan, in connection with Nagorno-Karabakh, give me no peace as a communist, a deputy, and a man. ... I am increasingly confirmed in my opinion that the intolerance and animosity that are guiding some people’s actions are often based not only on the accumulated social problems, but also on the political instability brought about by illegal anticonstitutional acts [by Armenians] . That is why I and the other Azerbaijani deputies asked the Supreme Soviet Presidium to examine obscure problems. This will help us find a way out of the crisis.”
Finally, these military legislators are required to get to know their constituents ®nd the problems they face in everyday *fe. In his interview, the admiral admitted that:
“. . .of course, the problems in my electoral okrug are not confined to this. . . . We have a surplus work force—unemployment in effect—an economy that has been neglected in many respects, a most acute housing problem, and a poor medical service. ... So much produce rots and remains unharvested or unexported that you wonder how people put up with it before. ... I, for example, am worried about road construction. There are few roads there, and they are neglected. . . . There is a great need for tractor equipment.”
The admiral takes his responsibilities as a legislator seriously. He stated:
“I may be reproached for being a legislator involved in minor questions. But you understand, this is necessary, people expect it. ... I am going to Lenkoran in January and will consult with the voters on . . . questions relating to life in the region. ... I would be ashamed to look people in the eyes if everything remains the same.”
Naval Officers and Current Affairs
While their leaders are forced to speak out about the complex social and economic issues facing the Soviet Union and to participate in resolving them by legislative action, most Soviet naval officers are only interested bystanders. They view the turmoil around them with mixed emotions.
On 1 January, Red Star carried a report captioned “Thoughts on the Times and the Party.” It was drawn from a session in which the crew of the missile cruiser Sevastopol was encouraged by the party organization to “express its attitude toward the realities of our day and toward the party’s present place in society and the situation within the party.”
One captain third rank was bewildered and offended by the new politics:
“I did not think that I, who have not been a communist for long, would be among those who are now being blamed for so many sins. For the collapse of the economy, for stagnation, for [Joseph] Stalin’s crimes, for [Leonid] Brezhnev’s lack of talent. . . . Intellectually, I understand that the party is responsible for its members, and that every party member is responsible for the party as a whole. But my heart objects. What have I got to do with it? Surely, it wasn’t I who organized the persecution of dissidents, who pushed those who dared to have their own opinion into psychiatric hospitals and camps and sent them to be shot? Surely it wasn’t I who promoted a sick and arrogant leader to the summit of power.”
A captain second rank maintained his dedication to the old political attitudes:
“That’s it! . . . Enough, gentlemen! Have you read Lenin? ... it is a pity that we have learned most often merely to take some quotations from Lenin, yet it would be useful to take a new and attentive look at the enormous statistical material he cites. . . . The proletarian revolution was not a whim of the Bolsheviks, as some people are trying to prove today, but a historical necessity for the unfortunate working masses.”
A second captain third rank saw a conspiracy.
“In my opinion, as regards the struggle for power, everything is far simpler. It is primarily the mafia that is countering society’s healthy forces in this struggle. Yes, let’s call things by their names, and there is no point in making out that this is a normal democratic process.”
Another captain second rank was concerned as a professional.
“It seems to me that we should assess our deeds in a more principled manner. . . . The combat training plan in the unit is fulfilled reluctantly, to a poor standard, yet we remain passive. We prefer not to intervene, not to risk our position. A careerist and toady beats a path to the commander’s chair and again we close our eyes. An injustice is done and we do not bar the way to the bureaucrat who has gone too far. So people form an opinion of the party. Hence, both our authority [as party members] and that of the
un>1
the radiation situation was a^ remains normal . . . within bac ^ ground limits. So there is no danger all to the vessel or the life and heal of the crew.”
ating unit. We shut down that
party as a whole [is undermined].”
The author of the article admitted that these opinions were “different and perhaps contentious in some respects. . . .” But he said that “people agree on the main thing.” That agreement, he stressed, reflected the current party line: “Only the party can consolidate all society’s healthy forces around the ideas of revolutionary transformation.”
Continued Defense of the Carrier
When the Soviet Navy ballyhooed its achievement in taking conventional takeoff-and-landing aircraft to sea on board the carrier Tbilisi, others opposed the effort. (See “Inauguration of Soviet Sea-based Aviation,” Proceedings, February 1990, pp. 118-119.) As a result, the Soviet Navy must now publicly defend its acquisition of aircraft carriers. In so doing, it frequently finds it necessary to cite U.S. carrier force levels.
Foremost among the critics is Georgiy A. Arbatov, academician and deputy, thus, both skeptic and budget cutter. On 22 December, Red Star carried a ‘rejoinder” by a captain first rank to Arbatov who, in the course of a television show, when “. . . juggling with the concept of defensive sufficiency, expressed his negative attitude to the building of aircraft carriers for our Navy.” The captain noted that, “subsequently, he [Arbatov] repeated the same thesis at the Congress of People’s Deputies. . . . Unfortunately, neither in the television program nor at the Congress was the statement . . . commented on or questioned in any way.” The captain wondered if that “. . . was because all Soviet citizens who are really concerned about defense sufficiency ... are only too aware of the longstanding acute need for this type of ship.” The captain noted that, “It is strange that academician Arbatov, who, as Director of the USA Institute, has a relatively good idea of the might of the U.S. Navy, does not want to grasp this.” The captain concluded that
“As a naval serviceman, I will cite only one reason in defense of aircraftcarrying ships. Without them it is not possible to say that the fleet’s surface ships and submarines are well protected. The fleet costs the state to much to neglect its safety.”
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev also disputed Arbatov. The marshal, in a letter to the antiestablishment weekly magazine Ogonek, stated, “I disagree absolutely with his [Arbatov’s] view that the development of aircraft-carrying ships by our Navy is mistaken. I could justify this, but do not want to take the bread from the naval seaman’s mouths.” The marshal did, however, go on to argue with the views of Arbatov and Ogonek about the number of carriers in the U.S. Navy.
“I stated . . . that there were 15 of them, while the reply [from Ogonek] says that there are 14. Perhaps the editorial office had information that in January 1990 the Americans are removing the obsolete aircraft carrier Coral Sea [CV-43] from the inventory. That is true. But in November 1989, a new aircraft carrier, the Abraham Lincoln [CVN-72], joined the fighting strength of the U.S. Navy. So the United States has 15 aircraft carrier task forces and 16 actual aircraft carriers. As for the Americans’ intentions regarding forthcoming reductions in carrier task forces, these are only good intentions, and you know where the road paved with good intentions leads.”
Plagued by Rumors
Living in a nation where a newspaper named “Truth” (Pravda) published mostly party propaganda, where a newspaper named “News” (Izvestiya) published mainly government press releases, where all military information was considered secret, all publications were censored, and all means of communication closely controlled, Soviet citizens have come to depend on word of mouth for the real news. But that source is no better than the others and, consequently, the Soviet Union is one vast rumor mill.
Unlike the past, when authorities ignored rumors, the present policy of glas- nost requires that they be quelled by openness. The Soviet Navy has found it necessary to respond occasionally to rumors about the missile cruiser Kirov.
On 4 November, Izvestiya asked Admiral Chemavin:
“ ... recently a report flashed through the press stating that disturbances had allegedly broken out on the missile cruiser Kirov on a long voyage—that its crew refused to obey the Navy staff and had put forth demands of a political nature. Is this true?”
The admiral responded:
“Nothing of the sort. . . .The cruiser Kirov has been at its berth in Sev- romorsk since August ... in plain view of the whole city. I can assure you that if disturbances had broken out on the Kirov, they would not have gone unnoticed from the shore. In general, I advise you to get in touch with Sevromorsk and talk to the crew of the cruiser.”
Izvestiya did just that and talked to the political officer of the ship by telephone^ Red Star went one step further. On - November, a special correspondent f°r the newspaper reported:
“lam sorry to say that I flew to Sev- romosrk with the thought that something really had happened—there |S no smoke without fire. . . . Nothing of the kind. Since 28 August the ship has been lying peacefully at its bertn and not a single even slightly extraordinary occurrence has been recorded during that time. Except that Admira [Carlisle A.H.] Trost, U.S. Chief ot Naval Operations, recently paid a visit. So all the talk of a strike on the cruiser is groundless.”
Soon thereafter, the cruiser sailed f°r the Mediterranean, arriving in mid- December. Then, on 30 January, Soviet news agency TASS released a report that stated:
!‘The commander of the nuclear- powered cruiser Kirov, which is °n combat duty a long way from base, has refuted rumors to the effect that an accident occurred in the reactor sec tion of the the ship and that the cre^ received a large dose of radiation-
According to a radio reported by a fleet journalist to a local newspaper in the Sev romorsk area, the captain of the K>r°v stated:
“The state of the vessel and its main nuclear power unit is normal and a lows normal work to continue. All tn crew are alive and well. The cruiser being recalled from combat du > ahead of schedule because of a dis covery of a gas leak from the i>ri phase of the number one steam gener
The captain concluded, perhaps weary of all the attention: “The Kirov has bee the subject of rumors before.”