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The Battleship Battle Group: Defeating the Air Threat

By Lieutenant Commander John D. Furness, U.S. Navy

Current United States maritime strat­^egy calls for a strong global fleet built ^around carrier and battleship battle groups. As a born-again tactical entity, the battleship battle group makes a major contribution to sea control, power projec- ^l|on, naval presence, and nuclear deter­^rence missions. It is capable of deploying 'n a variety of scenarios as a rapid, pow­erful response to national policy require­ments—with or without the protection of ^an aircraft carrier.

Critics have hypothesized that a battle­^ship battle group operating independently "'Quid be unable to meet antiair warfare ⁽'\AW) requirements because of its lack °f organic tactical aircraft (TacAir). i A properly configured battle group, however, given the proper supporting Assets, can fight and win throughout the ^sPectrum of the AAW battle. Careful Consideration of the following factors is Squired if a battleship battle group oper­ating autonomously is to mount a suc- j ^ssful antiair defense: i * Composition of the battle group

• Establishment of a layered antiair de­fense
• Use of the Aegis system, and new threat upgrades (NTU) to existing combat direction systems
• Use of land-based tactical aircraft to support maritime operations
• Resolution of joint interoperability and connectivity issues.

The battleship battle group: Composi­tion of the battle group is driven by the need for a balanced force able to conduct antiair, antisubmarine, antisurface, and strike warfare. The /ovra-class battleships are the most heavily armed ships in the world, and the mix of combatant surface escorts should be chosen to supplement the battleships’ superior capabilities and offset their limitations. (See Table 1.)

The escort most essential to the battle group is a USS Ticonderoga (CG-47)- class Aegis cruiser. Its modem, computer controlled weapon system and embarked LAMPS-1II helicopters are of the utmost importance to the battle group com­mander in establishing his antiair warfare defense. If a hostile aircraft must close within the Aegis cruiser’s 100 nautical mile surface-to-air missile envelope to deliver its ordnance, the cruiser’s unique AAW capability should ensure a high kill probability. The CG-47 class is a true force multiplier and gives a battle group commander the required AAW frame­work upon which to build a successful, layered antiair defense.

Layered Defense: To intercept and de­stroy incoming missiles or aircraft throughout the spectrum of AAW, the battle group requires a layered defense

Critics contend that a battleship battle group operating without air cover is a sitting duck. Tactical air support is essential to counter massed air attacks but a battle group steaming independently can defeat low- to medium-intensity attacks with its own modern antiair weapons.

with hard- and soft-kill weapons. In a low to medium density AAW environment for example, the battle group is capable of a sustained and potent defense. Airspace in this scenario can be controlled out to ex­tended ranges—even without TacAir— by means of the battle group’s organic long range surface-to-air missiles, the Aegis cruiser, additional combat direc­tion systems with new threat upgrades, and LAMPS-1II helicopters in the air­borne early warning role. If the cruiser does not destroy or neutralize all incom­ing targets, Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG- 7)-class frigates or Spruance (DD-963)- class destroyers will add the second layer of defense to pick up the “leakers” with shorter range surface-to-air missiles, each capable of destroying targets at 30-35 nautical miles. The last layer in the anti­air defense consists of hard- or soft-kill close-in weapons such as the Mk 15 Pha­lanx, chaff, and flares.

In a high density air attack however, time is critical to the survival of the battle group. Surface-ship defenders must en­gage enemy aircraft and missiles at maxi­mum ranges to ensure attrition. Hostile aircraft whose air-to-surface missiles out­range the battle group’s surface-to-air missile defenses present the most formi­dable threat. A massed strike launched outside friendly engagement envelopes poses a difficult problem to even the best of layered defenses. Correct threat as­sessment, appropriate reaction, and effi­cient weapons management will take time, even with the Aegis system. TacAir can buy the battle group this time by en­gaging the enemy beyond the battle group’s missile engagement zone—but only if it is on station when needed.

Tactical air support of maritime opera­tions: Tactical aviation is a necessity to ensure autonomous battle group surviv­ability when the enemy attacks with large numbers of bombers capable of launching multiple antiship cruise missiles from long range. TacAir support for a battle­ship battle group can come in many forms and from a variety of sources; support from a carrier is the most logical choice. But a battleship battle group operating autonomously beyond the range of car­rier-based TacAir can request support from U.S. and allied land-based TacAir as it passes through predesignated areas. This concept, commonly referred to as tactical air support of maritime operations (TASMO), could be the key to the suc­cessful employment of the battleship bat­tle group in the execution of a national maritime strategy.

TASMO services are requested by the appropriate unified commander and pro­vided by any service component as the battle group passes through a predesig­nated area. Aircraft will be in direct sup­port of the officer in tactical command, normally the battle group commander, but the individual component commander in support of the TASMO service will decide on allocation and mission priori­ties.

A battle group departing San Diego, California for operations in the Persian Gulf could preplan and implement TASMO protection from, successively:

• U.S. Pacific Fleet assets at Naval Air Station Miramar, California
• U.S. Air Force assets at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
• Combat air patrol protection from a U.S. carrier battle group west of Guam
• U.S. Air Force tactical air services from Clark Air Force Base in the Phil- lipines
• Fighter support from Royal Air Force (U.K.) forces in Singapore.

Tactical air can defeat the enemy air threat and enable the battleship battle group to operate effectively—if the joint or combined forces can resolve the inevi­table coordination problems.

Attaining the desired level of interop­erability depends on joint procedures, coordination, and practice, rather than on technology. At the fleet level. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-34, “Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations, prescribes the doctrine. This classified NATO publication discusses command and control, organization, concepts of operations, message formats, communi­cations, and terminology.

ATP-34 has built-in problems for fleet users. Procedures prescribed are cumber­some, nonstandard, and too complex; d contains unusable voice procedures, un­familiar terminology for pilots and air controllers, and slows down the coordi­nation. In addition, because NATO pro­cedures are not always applicable to our Pacific Fleet, detailed planning and coor­dination is imperative.

Another document is available for use by battle group planners —Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 12, vol. D’ “Tactical Command and Control Plan­ning Guidance and Procedures for Joint Operations,” which outlines procedures for coordinating the air effort in a joint operation and establishes a standard for­mat for the exchange of information dur­ing the tasking process. Land-based atf support is not specifically addressed u¹ this publication, but it can serve as a val­uable adjunct to ATP-34, which is al­ready in most fleet libraries. Fleet opera­tors must become more familiar with ATP-34 and recommend the revisions needed for it to become a workable docu­ment.

A few notes on TASMO: First, coordi­nating TASMO aircraft from multipl^e sources and multiple bases can add a neW dimension to surface warfare capabilities' but only continued training will produce results in combat. Second, allocated TacAir assets must not only be dedicated and scheduled, they must be on call as the battle group passes through a designated area. Finally, the requirement for aeria¹ refueling aircraft—tankers—is implied in tactical air support of maritime opera­tions. Tanker support is vital to mission success and must be included in every phase of planning and execution. Without tanker support, TacAir becomes a shod range, short duration, limited asset. When the low fuel light comes on, pilots get concerned about finding a place to land—so they can fight again another day.

Joint interoperablity and connectivity■ The battle group TASMO concept has the potential for success as long as the join¹ or combined forces can operate together- When TacAir support comes from assets external to the U.S. Navy, interoperabd' "y becomes an issue.

Interoperability is defined as ‘‘the abil- "y of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.” What this means is:

' Face-to-face planning and coordination between the players

' Compatible equipment and procedures ' Standard language and message for- 'nats to ensure that information can be

exchanged

' Standard operating procedures and Protocols for information exchange pur­poses

Simply stated, only effective planning simple, common procedures at the ^unit level will ensure successful TASMO operations. At a minimum, common fre­quency guidelines, authentication materi- ^S' and classified keylist coordination ^must be promulgated well in advance of Planned operations.

Antiair warfare as an asset: Antiair Warfare for the battleship battle group is a manageable problem. But to survive in today’s era of high speed, long range and extremely destructive offensive air- launched weapons, the battle group must have the correct mix of ships and a pre­planned, well rehearsed system of lay­ered A AW defenses. There is no doubt that the most effective use of naval fire power is to employ a battleship battle group with a carrier battle group for inte­grated battle force operations. The capa­bility of the carrier’s combat-air-patrol aircraft to destroy hostile aircraft and missiles far from the force make this symbiotic relationship a highly desirable option.

But even when separated from the car­rier’s protective air umbrella, the battle­ship battle group can use its organic capa­bility to operate and survive in low and medium air threat situations. It is in the high threat environment that land-based TacAir will be essential to fight the outer air battle.

In the future, our worldwide naval commitments are certain to increase while fiscal constraints continue to frus­trate our strategic and tactical planners.

Use of the battleship battle group in scheduled and contingency deployments is a viable option for those grappling with the problem of how to relieve our dwin­dling carrier force from seemingly ever- increasing global commitments. The bat­tleship and her high technology escorts are a strategic and tactical force to be reckoned with and battleship sailors are tackling perceived antiair warfare limita­tions head-on to improve capabilities. Innovative use of battle group assets, lay­ered defenses, well-rehearsed combat system teams, and genuine, long dura­tion, multiservice TASMO can give a battle group the firepower required to fight and win in a modern, high threat environment.

Commander Furness is a naval aviator and has served with the LAMPS community since 1977. While em­barked in the USS Doyle (FFG-39), he deployed with the USS Iowa's (BB-61) Battle Group to the Gulf of Mexico and the North Atlantic. He wrote this while attached to the Naval War College, Newport. Rhode Island.

Antiship Missiles for U.S. Navy Helicopters

. The United States Navy is almost alone ^ln >ts lack of helicopterborne antiship ^m>ssiles, which are employed by a large growing number of allied and Third ^w°rld nations. Small antiship missiles ^aUch as the Sea Skua have been carried by ritish Navy Lynx helicopters for some ^lme and growing numbers of navies are moving toward equipping their helicop- ,^Crs with more potent weapons. France’s p^Uper Frelon is armed with the AM-39 ^x°cet; the British advanced Sea King Carries two Sea Eagle missiles, as does he EH-101; the Italian SH-3 carries two ^ea Killer Mk II missiles, and even the ⁿdian Navy flys a Sea King with two Sea Eagles. The United States Navy is clearly ⁿ°t on the leading edge of these develop­ments.

The Navy and Marine Corps team de­lays hundreds of helicopters around the '^v°^rld and it is building more at a rapid mte—AH-lWs, SH-60Bs, SH-60Fs. The hlions of dollars invested in these heli­copters, however, has not translated into ^ne ability to threaten Soviet surface action groups. Soviet naval units need ^ayoid only a handful of carrier battle 8^r°Ups, remain beyond Harpoon range, and count on outrunning our nuclear at- ^ck submarines. Otherwise, the Soviets can operate their entire surface fleet with near total impunity. What would arming our naval helicopters with antiship mis­siles accomplish? It would debilitate the Soviets tactically, strategically, economi­cally, and psychologically.

Although an all-out war at sea with the Soviets is an unlikely scenario, it is one we must be prepared for. Fortunately, in preparing for this scenario with missile- equipped naval helicopters, we are also preparing for our most likely combat sce­narios: low intensity conflict with Third

The U.S. Navy is missing a bet by failing to arm more of its seagoing helicopters with air-to-surface mis­siles. The SH-60B LAMPS-III fired its first Penguin missile late in 1989, years after the missile was available.

World littoral nations, many of which also employ modern precision guided munitions. The well-publicized Persian Gulf performance of the U.S. Army’s Task Force 160 helicopters, which were armed with only rudimentary air-to- surface weapons, gives some indication of the potential of ship-killing naval heli­copters.

As currently configured, how capable is a battleship battle group of retaliating against a Third World patrol boat that at­tacks a frigate on the periphery of the group and then speeds away? What is the risk involved in a Third World small combatant firing an infrared homing sur­face-to-air missile at an unarmed U.S. Naval helicopter closing to short range to make a night time visual identification? In failing to merge two of our most pow­erful and promising technologies are we sending our troops on one-way missions with absolutely no power to retaliate? Does an unarmed naval helicopter really have any tactical utility in today’s fleet?

It was the 1980s before the naval heli­copter emerged from the backwaters of technological innovation. Far from being on the cutting edge, the naval helicopter community prior to this decade was on a very dull edge indeed. Low budget prior­ities begot antiquated gear, which re­sulted in peripheral missions for helicop­ters—which put the community in the back of the line for emerging technology. Today this situation has been reversed. Our modem helicopters are now poised on the cutting edge of military technology that has given them the potential to pre­vail tactically.

Putting air-to-surface missiles on U.S. helicopters has been discussed for years. The process is now underway but prog­ress has been slow. Watching the tortuous process that the LAMPS-III system’s SH- 60B has gone through as we try to equip it with the air-to-surface Penguin missile has caused many to question the serious­ness of our intent. Although the Penguin missile was available when LAMPS-III entered the fleet in 1983, it was not until 1989 that an SH-60B fired a live Pen­guin. Now the program has shrunk to the following dimensions:

• 28 SH-60Bs will be configured to carry Penguin
• 200 Penguin missiles (AGM-119) will be purchased
• 39 Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates will be configured to handle the missiles
• The system is scheduled to begin en­tering the fleet in 1990

What does this relatively slow progress in the SH-60B and Penguin program por­tend for other naval helicopters? Do anti­ship missiles on helicopters represent gold-plating or do they fulfill a critical requirement?

The arrival of helicopterbome antiship missiles has been delayed for many rea­sons, some of them good and sufficient. When confronted by the technical sophis­tication, size, speed and reliability of many of today’s U.S. Naval helicopters, it is difficult to remember that we have only very recently reached this impres­sive plateau. Helicopters have been at sea since the late 1940s, but equipping them with technologically advanced antiship missiles was not feasible until recently. Insufficient power was the major reason— H-34s on the carriers struggled to do the search and rescue mission; the SH-3 was tethered to the inner zone; the SH-2 series has always pushed the limits of maximum gross weight and has had significant reli­ability problems for many years; early CH-46s and CH-53s were underpowered and had austere avionics. In short, the potential weapons carriers had trouble fulfilling their primary mission, let alone trying to do it with a heavy missile strapped on. The technology of the era was unpromising to say the least.

The antiship missiles then available were about as far from the leading edge of technology as the helicopters; they were heavy, inaccurate, and incompatible with the helicopters. They were a long way from looking like an idea whose time had come.

Perversely, Soviet submarine technol­ogy mitigated against arming helicopters with antiship missiles. The astounding growth of the Soviet submarine fleet and its rapidly emerging technical sophistica­tion presented the U.S. with compelling technical challenges and antisubmarine warfare became priority number one throughout the fleet. If your operational requirement was not related to ASW, it did not get much of a hearing in the E-ring of the Pentagon. Technological priorities given to ASW at the expense of other programs reached extreme propor­tions. In the late 1970s in the Mediterra­nean, SH-2F aircraft aboard Knox (FF- 1052)-class frigates conducting real world ASW operations had the latest sys­tems—towed array sonars, acoustic pre­diction systems, new sonobuoys—but navigated over vast ocean expanses with a grease pencil and a PT-429 plotting board salvaged from old P-2V Neptunes.

These factors—underpowered, low- technology helicopters; heavy, low- technology missiles; and the diversion of leading edge technology to ASW—made it illogical to press on with serious at­tempts to outfit our helicopters with anti­ship missiles. This situation persisted into the early 1980s but now has changed sig­nificantly.

The U.S. Navy has undergone such a tremendous growth in size, technological sophistication, sustainability, and per­sonnel stability that what was unthinkable 15 years ago, impossible ten years ago, and uncertain as little as five years ago, >^s now compelling.

First, metallurgy, aerodynamic, flig*¹¹ control, avionics, and manufacturing technologies have put us firmly in the big helicopter business. The 11-ton SH-60B is the follow-on to the six-ton SH-2F. The maximum gross weight of the CH-53E is an incredible 73,000 pounds. Large heli­copters with lots of power and excellent growth potential are attractive candidates for missiles.

Second, today’s helicopters ^art’ equipped with sophisticated avionics an sensors that make them compatible wit modem antiship missile technology. Radar, forward-looking infrared, identi­fication friend or foe, and electronic war­fare suites contribute to finding and de­stroying ships. Table 1 lists nava helicopters currently in the U.S. inven­tory that are capable of carrying at leas* one type of antiship missile.

Third, perhaps the fastest growth in the defense industry has been in precision guided munitions. Antiship missiles are lighter, longer-range, and pack more punch than ever before. Table 2 li^st* western air-to-surface missiles that com be readily adapted to U.S. Navy helicop ters. These missiles—representative oj a wide spectrum of weight, lethality, g^ul ance systems, and modes of operation-^ provide numerous options for the heh copters listed in Table 1.

As modem surface combatants have grown in technical complexity and so phistication, vulnerable topside radars, sensors and systems have proliferated- Ships are so dependent on these that even an antiship missile with minimum punc can turn a warship into a blinded non combatant.

It would seem then, that the case f°^r helicopterbome antiship missiles is ^,n deed a compelling one. But would the combination really make a difference- The Soviet Navy is overwhelmingly m^e world’s largest and it possesses many more surface combatants than the ne* several navies combined. While U-b- sea-based tactical aviation could over whelm even the mightiest Soviet surface action group, what is the real magnituo of our seaborne tactical aviation capab* ity? The Soviets face a worst case see nario of only about two dozen vessels > our almost 600-ship Navy that can launc ’ aircraft armed with antiship missiles. A we making it too easy for them?

Tactically, the case for equipping °^u naval helicopter forces with antiship rm^s silcs, in large numbers, is clear cut. A J U.S. surface combatant capable of em

*From Norman Friedman’s Guide To World Naval Weapons Systems (Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989).

The lightweight AS-15TT antiship missile—here, fired from an SA 365F pauphin II developed in the mid-1970s—is carried by naval helicopters *n France, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

*From Couhat, J.L. and Prezelin, B., ed.. English Language edition bv A.D. Baker 111, Combat

barking a helicopter becomes a launch point for a helicopter equipped with a deadly weapon.

Psychologically, a U.S. fleet with sev­eral hundred ships carrying antiship mis­sile-equipped helicopters, would put ex­traordinary pressure on the Soviet Navy. Every sortie would be high risk. A navy forced to operate under those conditions would cease to be an instrument of na­tional policy—it would become an ex­traordinarily expensive liability.

The concept of deploying antiship mis­siles aboard U.S. Navy helicopters is new enough that its success could be imper­illed by a disjointed approach to fleet in­troduction. While they cannot guarantee success, several initiatives could hasten the successful deployment of helicopter- borne antiship missiles throughout the U.S. fleet:

• Naval planners must clearly define the roles and functions of armed helicopters.
• Helicopterbome antiship missiles should be introduced into our war games.
• The Navy should signal its willingness to move forward with helibome anti-ship missiles to industry.
• The Navy must take a realistic ap­proach to fielding these weapons in the fleet. It is unrealistic to try to arm every helicopter.
• Priorities must be established for the fleet introduction of antiship missiles.

The effects of glasnost and perestroika on the Department of Defense weapons procurement efforts promise to signifi­cantly proscribe our ability to introduce totally new weapons systems into the fleet. More utility will have to be gar­nered from existing weapons systems. U.S. Naval helicopterbome antiship mis­siles clearly have the potential to deliver more return for a very limited additional investment. Wc must marry these two existing technologies and prove their operational utility.

The Navy must move out more smartly than it did with the SH-60B and the Pen­guin missile. We must encourage our manufacturers to direct their energies towards producing even better systems for this mission. Without discounting the importance of the many other missions carried out by our naval helicopters, we must recognize that possessing the capa­bility of striking the enemy fleet is the very essence of seapower.

Commander Galdorisi commands Light Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron (HSL)-41 at NAS North Is­land, California. He has served in LAMPS squadrons on both coasts and commanded HSL-43. He most recently served as executive officer of the USS New Orleans (LPH-11).

Naval Control of Shipping: A Reserve Mission

By Lieutenant Joseph DiRenzo III, U.S. Naval Reserve

who

ists, but retired U.S. Navy captains

“The NCS [Naval Control of Ship­ping] organization operates in a vacuum. Most of the active duty Navy doesn’t know we exist,” said Vice Admiral Paul D. Butcher, U.S. Navy, at the 1989 Na­tional Naval Control of Shipping com­mander’s conference.¹ Vice Admiral Butcher is Commander, Military Sealift Command and is assigned additional duty as the Chief of Naval Operations’ assis­tant for Naval Control of Shipping (OP- 06N).

A poll conducted by the author at the Naval Base Norfolk, Virginia; the sub­marine base at Groton, Connecticut; and the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis confirmed that most respondents were unaware of the large, well-trained Naval Control of Shipping Organization, ready to be activated in time of war or national emergency.

What is this organization that no one seems to know about? First, a brief his­tory, since the idea of controlling and protecting merchant shipping is hardly new. Nations engaged in ocean trade have for centuries realized the importance of controlling and protecting their mer­chant ships on the high seas. Convoys, often accompanied by an armed escort vessel, were the result.

While merchant ship convoys prior to the twentieth century were an attempt to protect trade, the advantages of convoy­ing during wartime became evident to the United States during World War I, al­though the country was involved directly for a relatively short time. Even so, the United States was ill-prepared to control and protect merchant ships when it en­tered World War II; more than 250 mer­chant ships were lost to German U-boats off the East Coast and in the Caribbean during the first six months of 1942. After the United States instituted convoys, merchant ship losses were sharply re­duced.²

During the early days of U.S. involve­ment in World War II, the U.S. Navy es­tablished several organizations to control and protect merchant shipping. These were the forerunners of today’s Naval Control of Shipping Organization (NCSORG), which was officially estab­lished in 1950.

The organization’s mission is to “pro­vide for the safe movement of merchant ships during contingency situations or in time of war or national emergency and in peacetime to prepare for executing that mission.”

The term “naval control of shipping” includes such functions as organizing and routing convoys and merchant ships sail­ing independently, reporting on their movements, and diverting them when appropriate. The Naval Control of Ship­ping Organization controls both military reinforcement and resupply shipping and civil economic shipping. Military ship­ping may be the organization’s highest priority customer but civil economic shipping will represent 90% of the total shipping involved. The'Naval Control of Shipping Organization is not responsible for the employment of merchant ships, their loading and unloading, or harbor control—all of which are handled by civil authorities—or for the assignment of escort forces, which are designated by military authorities.

At present, NCSORG involves both an allied organization and national organiza­tions, whose structures are parallel. The U.S. organization is the subject of this article and can serve as an example of a national organization. The U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders are as­signed as the Operational Control Au­thorities (OCA) for the naval control of shipping. In this capacity, they order convoys and independent ships to sail, designate routes, arrange for protection, order diversions, if necessary, and main­tain liaison with civil shipping authori­ties.

Each OCA directs numerous Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) officers plus a large number of convoy commodores and staffs. The NCS officer conducts prepa­rations for sailing convoys and individual ships at the port level and is responsible for merchant ship routing and reporting. The NCS officer deals directly with the merchant ship masters and crews in pre­paring them for transit.³

Convoy commodores and their staffs sail on the merchant ships in convoy, and exercise control over the convoy, subject to the authority of the officer in tactical command—the escort force commander. Once the convoy is underway, the con­voy commodore is responsible for its safe navigation, although individual ship mas­ters remain ultimately responsible for the safety of their own ships.

The present Naval Control of Shipping Organization is composed of five active duty Navy personnel, dedicated full-time to naval control of shipping duties, and more than 3,800 reservists—more than 99% of the peacetime organization—who would be mobilized to serve with OCA staffs, NCS offices, and the staffs of con­voy commodores. At the present time- the convoy commodores are not reserv­have had significant command-at-sea experience, and who would be recalled to active duty; there are approximately convoy commodores in this pool. The Navy is considering expanding the list o convoy commodores to include reserve surface warfare captains and reserve cap­tains who hold Merchant Marine licenses and have considerable sea experience.

The reserve program is structured an involves specific training requirements designed to prepare the participating ^re" servists for mobilization. The training ^lS intensive, and involves formal schooling- team training, and on-site training during exercises. All unit members, both offi^ce* and enlisted, receive extensive forma schooling. Both the basic and advance courses are taught at the Antisubmarine Warfare Center at the Naval Base, No^f folk, Virgina. Qualification for specif^|C Naval Control of Shipping naval offi^cer billet codes and naval enlisted codes ** accomplished by completing both forma schools and a lengthy hands-on training-

Exercises at all levels—OCA, hA office, and convoy commodore ^a[C conducted frequently and provide reser^v ists with an opportunity to train at mobi zation sites and experience simulate wartime or national emergency situ® tions. The Naval Control of ShipP¹¹¹- Organization conducts two major e^xe.^r^ cises annually, one in spring and one the fall, to test the ability of the NCS r- serve units to operate worldwide. Bn¹ - in these exercises are coveted and the re suits show that the training works.

Recently, the reserves had an opp°^rtu nity to demonstrate the quality of ¹⁽¹ training to the active Navy. During ¹ tanker war in the Persian Gulf, reservis volunteered to ride the reflagged Kuw® tankers in convoys as Naval liaison o cers. These officers provided guidance ^ naval control of shipping doctrine to Commander, Joint Task Force, Min ^ East and Commander Middle East F°^rc’^ staffs and were instrumental in the s cess of the operation. The organizah was finally on the map.                                                -_c

Vice Admiral Butcher was enthusia⁵ ^ about the liaison officers’ performan^c “You [Naval Control of shipping Org^Jj^ zation] already have taken the most portant step you could—providing

Naval Reserve officers from the Naval Control of Shipping Organiza­tion volunteered for convoy duty on reflagged tankers during recent hos­tilities in the Persian Gulf.

^J Mitchell group of volunteer reservists to assist the ^active duty Navy with convoy operations ^ln the Persian Gulf. Your naval liaison officers who rode the reflagged tankers ^Were the first group of reserves on station ^ln the Persian Gulf, and they created fa­vorable publicity for the NCS program. ^Y°u should take great pride in their out- ending performance in the Persian

How does naval control of shipping (NCS) work in actual practice? First, HCS must be implemented. Second, the Haval Control of Shipping Organization 'Oust be activated.

After these two prerequisites are met, ^U S.-flagged merchant ships arc directed V proceed to the nearest friendly port.

representatives meet the ships as 'hey arrive, board them, brief the mas­^ters, and record data concerning the ships.

The information obtained is then pro­cessed at the port’s NCS office, staffed °y reservists. A typical office is broken u°wn into two departments—operations ^aUd administration. The operations de- Purtment deals with masters and their ^ships; the administrative department runs ue office’s internal affairs.

Naval Control of Shipping office spe­cie billets and responsibilities include:

•  Commanding officer—directly re­sponsible to the Operational Command ^uthority (OCA)

_ Executive officer—responsible for the ?dministrative functions of the office

• Operations officer—coordinates all arrivals and departures of merchant ships, controls boardings and routings. He does this with four assistants: the routing offi­cer who routes all convoys and indepen­dent sailings, maintains convoy status, and prepares the sailing orders folder; the convoy officer who maintains the data card file on individual ships, issues in­struction packets to the convoys, and des­ignates the convoy’s formation; the boarding officer who conveys instruc­tions from the NCS office to the masters of the ships, completes boarding cards on each vessel, maintains the status of on board publications, inspects the vessels for seaworthiness, and—most impor­tantly—establishes the ship’s data card, which contains detailed information about the vessel; and the duty officer who maintains the watch.

► Administrative officer—Key assistants are responsible for overall communica­tions, merchant ship communications, and classified publications. The commu­nications officer is responsible for the extensive communications required to control shipping. This includes advising the convoy officer of visual signals, mak­ing up identification codes, and updating all available communications policies and procedures; he is assisted by the merchant communications officer.

Once a decision has been reached by higher authority to send cargo by ship to a particular destination, the operational command authority (OCA) at the Atlantic or Pacific Fleet-level assumes responsi­bility for carrying it out. The OCA will order either a convoy or independent sail­ing (assuming civil authorities have de­termined to sail their ships), plan the route, and request a naval escort.

Sailing orders (the merchant ship’s “Op order”) are prepared for each ship in the convoy. Subsequently, a pre­departure conference is held for all par­ticipants, including the convoy commo­dore and his staff, who will by then have embarked on a ship in the convoy. This conference lays out the game plan for the convoy; NCS representatives are avail­able to answer questions prompted by the sailing orders. At the conclusion of the conference, the convoy sails.

Vice Admiral Butcher summed up the future of the Naval Control of Shipping Organization as follows: “ . . .we must adapt to changes in the world in which we operate. It is important that we learn from history and properly apply those lessons; however, it is also important that we do not blindly follow history and continue forever to do things the way they have always been done . . . those of us charged to lead the Naval Control of Shipping Organization need to be imagi­native and innovative.” 'VAdm Paul D. Butcher, USN, Assistant for Naval Control of Shipping (OP-06N), speech at the Na­tional Naval Control of Shipping commanding offi­cers conference, Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, 10 June 1989.

²OpNavInst 3450.3F, "U.S. Naval Control of Ship­ping Manual,” 16 June 1989.

⁵Ibid.

⁴Butcher, op. cit.

Lieutenant DiRenzo is the Development Officer at the U.S. Naval Institute. Qualified in submarines and surface warfare, he is now serving in a reserve billet with Naval Control of Shipping Unit 106, Baltimore, Maryland.

New Frontiers in Submarine Combat Systems

B

y Richard W. Russell and John S. Davis

The essence of submarine warfare has Ranged dramatically. In the past, it was characterized by one-on-one engage­ments—a submarine executing a torpedo ^at'ack on a surface ship or another sub­marine. But weapons such as the Mk 48 advanced capability torpedo, Harpoon, Tomahawk land attack missile (both con­ventional and nuclear), and Tomahawk antiship missile have added a new dimen­sion to submarine warfare. Today’s at­tack submarine now operates in an envi­ronment where “concurrency of missions” prevails.

Large-aperture acoustic sensors are

iments-

com^-

Blue submarine against an Orange

being developed to search for and detect quiet Soviet submarines. Long-range communications, over-the-horizon tar­geting links, and other external sensors provide wide-area surface and subsurface contact and target data, requiring fusion with data from the submarine’s own sen­sors. These highly sensitive sensors will lead to significant sorting and correlation challenges for the submarine commander and his crew. Future submarine combat systems must be designed to contend with this explosion in contact and target data, and with the numerous choices in weapon and countermeasure types, tactics, and employment strategies.

Compounding the problem will be the fast pace of submarine combat operations in high-threat environments. The crew will be under great stress and will require assistance to filter data, select appropriate weapons and tactics, and respond rapidly to counterattacks.

Vital submarine combat activities in­volving men, command decision pro-

The Naval Underwater Systems Cen­ter’s combat simulators allow oppos­ing submarine commanders to con­duct real-time engagements that assist in the development of improved attack systems.

cesses, command and system interoper­ability, and information management must be completely understood if we are to ensure that future submarine combat systems achieve peak performance.

Questions that require detailed investi­gation arise:

• What timely information does the commander need to fight effectively and win the submarine engagement?
• What types of displays facilitate the delivery of this essential information?
• What are the system design strategies that will most effectively convey the level of uncertainty associated with tactical data?
• How does the submarine combat sys­tem sort, correlate, and manage target and contact data? How does the com­mander interact with this process?
• How does one measure the perfor­mance of a complete system—the com­mander and crew coupled with the sub­marine?
• What concept of system operation is most effective in countering the projected threat? How will the concept of operation influence development and application of technology to create the next-generation submarine combat system configura­tions?

The Naval Underwater Systems Center is exploring these questions and develop­ing answers for present and future sub­marine warfare scenarios. Recent ad­vances in computer processing capabilities, graphic workstation perfor­mance, and visualization technology have made a concept that was unthink­able five years ago achievable today. ^ particular, the laboratory prototyping ⁰ complete advanced combat systems pfl°^r to specification development is now within reach.

The Center has completed preliminary concept development and demonstrate that high-fidelity, interactive submarine simulations are feasible. These Simula^­tions will be used to study the perfor­mance synergies between the submarine attack team and conceptual submarine systems, thus contributing to the design of better systems.

Just such a facility, the Center’s com­bat system evaluation and analysis labo ratory, built to conduct interactive sub marine simulation, recently attains operational status.

The laboratory, a one-of-a-kind fac¹ ity, is designed to address submarine combat system operational processes an associated technology performance ^|S sues. It is being used to evaluate technic options for advanced submarine comb' systems. Studies incorporating the disc* plines of human factors, operability. ^d cision theory, performance evaluation, state-of-the-art software developm^cn environments, modem display design- and physical arrangements—includj g attack center configurations—are bcinf pursued. The laboratory’s equipment a software allow a real-time, simulation driven test bed to support experimen ^ tailored to increase the Navy’s know

edge base regarding the submarine com

bat process. This research tool provides rapid prototyping environment in wnt advanced concepts can be developed an evaluated in a cost-effective manner. U of the facility’s key features is a sea-te-^ capability that links laboratory prototype to at-sea systems and allows critical tec nologies to go to sea for early valid³⁰ in an operational environment.

A typical experiment involves the ^e cution and subsequent analysis of a B

-in-m^e- simula^te

mander operating a simulated O^ranJ. submarine. The players give verbal ⁰ ders to the computer-simulated hej man, diving officer, sonar supervi^s

etc., and receive computer-synthest

voice acknowledgements, while ^l,l0nl_|)[Cl- ing traditional and advanced attack c^e displays as the engagement unfolds- simulation allows both players to seam

tactically approach, launch weapons, ^evade counter-fired weapons, and re­^engage under realistic operational condi- ^tlons. As the fidelity of this simulation ^environment matures, combat system ^searchers at the Naval Underwater Sys­tems Center will be able to view the im­pact of proposed technology improve­^ments on board the submarine.

The simulation models provide vehicle kinematics, sensors, combat control, Weapons, ocean parameters, critical op­erator interactions, and information dis­plays and controls. A wide variety of “lue and Orange submarines can be sim­^ulated. Realistic command decisions and ^c°ntrols are implemented at real-world ^ra(es and ordered actions are reflected in lire simulated system performance. These decisions and actions can be automati- eally recorded and several replay options ^are available for analysis. Simulated so­ⁿars lose or gain contacts due to changes ^ln ambient noise levels or speed-depen­dent source signal levels. A contact man­agement function performs multisensor and multitarget tracking and correlation. Mk 48 torpedoes, with pre- and post­launch capability, are modeled. The sys­tem uses sound velocity profiles, bottom slopes, and surface conditions to model acoustic convergence zones, propaga­tion, layer crossings, and deep layer scat­tering phenomena. Provisions are being made to upgrade the simulation models as the Navy standards improve. The design philosophy for the simulator is to capture the best Navy models rather than attempt to develop competitive models that would limit the validity of experimental results.

The combat system evaluation and analysis laboratory represents a valuable tool for:

• Understanding the attack team and submarine system performance interrela­tionships
• Identifying emerging submarine com­bat and weapon system technical require­ments (such as submarine self-defense and submarine operational automation technical requirements)
• Evaluating emerging combat system

concepts and technologies ► Demonstrating newly developed prod­ucts and systems concepts.

Researchers clearly see early prototyp­ing as a key to developing high-perfor­mance and cost-effective combat sys­tems.

The Naval Underwater System Cen­ter’s state-of-the-art laboratory will allow detailed investigations of future attack team and submarine system inter-rela­tionships and the resulting interoper­ability—all in a flexible, computer con­trolled environment that emulates and complements at-sea tests. The investiga­tions will reach well beyond present ca­pabilities and should contribute to the critical performance and cost trade-off studies required to improve future sub­marine combat systems.

Richard W. Russell is Head, Range Development Division and John S. Davis is the Head, Technology and Advanced Systems Division at the Naval Under­water Systems Center in Newport, Rhode Island.

Correcting Coast Guard Records

Congress established administrative ^judicative “boards” shortly after the ^end of World War II, to eliminate the re­quirement for members to introduce bills ^to correct the military records of either serving or separated military personnel.

"^e Secretary of each military depart- ⁿ'^ent and the Secretary of the Treasury Were authorized to correct procedures ^an<T “through boards of civilians,” to ^c°rrect any military record if it was “nec­tary to correct an error or remove an

^justice.”¹ '

The U.S. Coast Guard has since been Transferred to the U.S. Department of ^ransportation, but the intent of Congress teuiains the same. Any past or present G)ast Guard person, officer or enlisted, tegular or reserve, or his or her next-of- xin-—j_{n case 0}f <i_eath, incapacity, or un­reliability—may apply to the Board for tecord correction by completing and sub­mitting a standard application form.^{2 tac}h applicant, in order to obtain relief, must allege and prove to the satisfaction °kthe Board that (1) an error or injustice committed by the Coast Guard, and . ) that the correction of that error or in­justice is “necessary.”³ The applications received by the Board ^ate requests for:

. Revision or removal of reports evaluat- ^lr|g the performance of officers, and ac­tions allegedly taken or likely to be taken as a consequence of such reports

• Assignment of, or an increase in, a dis­ability rating
• Upgrading of less-than-honorable dis­charges and changes in the reason for a discharge
• Changes in reenlistment codes that inhibit a person from re-entering any mil­itary service
• Monetary reenlistment bonuses or in­creases in awarded bonuses
• Changes that make an applicant eligi­ble for special compensation, such as sea pay, or that establish an earlier date for his or her advancement
• Miscellaneous changes

Lawyers, accredited representatives of recognized veterans’ organizations, and nonlawyers of competence are authorized to serve as counsel to applicants for cor­rection. Counsel can be very useful to applicants in describing events and show­ing why particular alleged conduct on the part of the Coast Guard constitutes an error or injustice. Unfortunately, few of the applicants choose to be represented by counsel.

The Coast Guard Board's process: Upon receipt, an application is reviewed by the Chairman of the Board to be sure that it meets certain threshold require-

By Robert H. Joost and Nancy Battaglia

ments: that it concerns a U.S. Coast Guard military member, has been signed by the applicant, is not vague or ambigu­ous, is not correctable by routine Coast Guard action, and that all available ad­ministrative remedies have been ex­hausted. If these conditions are satisfied, the application is docketed and a letter of acknowledgment, a docket number, and instructions are sent to the applicant. In­complete applications are returned to the individual with instructions to correct and refile them.

The Board also sends a copy of the application to the Coast Guard. After re­viewing the applicant’s military record, the Coast Guard may respond with an advisory opinion recommending whether or not relief should be granted. Advisory opinions are not filed in all Board pro­ceedings because the Coast Guard is not required to submit its written views to the Board on any particular case. Written re­sponses are submitted in approximately 75% of the cases.

The advisory opinion is not binding on the Board. The applicant receives a copy of the advisory opinion and may respond to it, agreeing or disagreeing, in whole or in part, with the Coast Guard's recom­mendations.

Any applicant may request a hearing— a personal appearance before the Board in

Ceding

s

April 1990

115

the to

the primary judge and either endorses the decision or recommends changes. primary judge may accept the reviewing judge’s changes, in whole or in part, he or she may convince the reviewing

judge to withdraw the recommendation*’

in whole or in part. As an alternative, * two judges may agree to present sever options to the critiquing judges.

The reviewing judge then examines draft decision and the sources available

final decision. The critiquing judges mally meet once a week to const roughly ten decisions. The primary

Washington, D.C.—and the chairman may grant such a request if the applica­tion, military record, and any other docu­ments show that the hearing might pro­duce additional information that is material to the case. Such requests are rarely granted by the Chairman or recon­sidered by the Board, because the written record almost always contains enough information for an informed decision.

In any event, a hearing is unlikely to change the outcome of a case, except for the small number that fall into the gray areas. Such cases are generally those in which credibility is an issue, or where the applicant, or the Coast Guard—through oral testimony, cross-examination, or oral argument—can move the Board to a different conclusion than it would have reached on the basis of documents alone. The Board also has the power to obtain information or assistance on its own mo­tion, by requesting further information in writing from the applicant or the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard Board acts as a clear­inghouse as well as a courthouse. It re­ceives applications, responses, and addi­tional evidence, and in turn sends copies to the Coast Guard. It receives Coast Guard advisory opinions and other re­sponses and sends copies to the appropr¹' ate applicants, explaining that the Coast Guard submissions are only recommen­dations, not binding on the Board. If ^aP' plicants not represented by counsel were to receive legal documents directly fr^orn the Coast Guard, their willingness to challenge such “official” recommenda­tions or arguments could suffer consider­ably.

The Board’s decision makers: The Coast Guard Board provides professions accountability for judges without infring' ing on their independence. In this con­text, the term “judge” refers to a person who is authorized to make or contribute to decisions on matters of determining facts, applying relevant law, and issuing orders, whether or not the term “judge appears in the title or job description. Each case docketed by the Coast Guar Board is considered by five such judge*’ each of whom is an attorney—a primary judge, a reviewing judge, and a panel o three critiquing judges.

The primary judge examines the dence and drafts a decision, on the basi^s of the applicant’s military record and the evidence submitted. The primary judg^e may also discuss the application inf°^r mally with the reviewing judge. It shod be emphasized that the decision of tn primary judge is only a draft decision

Nor­mally, however, the primary and review ing judges settle their differences ^an present an agreed-upon text to the criti<l^u ing judges. A reviewing judge’s evaln* tion of the work of a primary judge take- place informally and privately—the t judges seek to persuade each other abo the merits of their positions and the l^an guage to be used.

The three critiquing judges evalu^a ^ the proposed decision individually- *¹¹ they meet, discuss the case, and is*^ue , final decision. If the outcome and the t of the proposed opinion are acceptable them, this text will generally stand as ^

idef

afld

reviewing judges attend to answer ques- ^tl()ns and respond to criticism. To encour- ^a8^e frank and uninhibited debate, the meetings are closed to the public. No transcripts are made.

Critiquing judges receive advance cop- ^les of each draft decision and have an opportunity to examine the Board file and military record of the individual prior to meeting with the primary and reviewing judges.

The critiquing judges have the author- 'ty to change the outcome of any draft decision, or any aspect of a decision sub­mitted to them. No decision is binding Unless at least two of the three Board members agree on the outcome and text ^ar>d sign the decision. Critiquing judges may decline to sign a decision until ac­^Ceptable text reflecting their comments ^and conclusions is prepared by the pri­mary judge and circulated for review among the members of that panel of cri- hquing judges. A change in the outcome °f a case is rare but possible;⁴ a change in ^lhe rationale of a decision or in one or more particular findings in that case is more common; and changes that make a decision more readable are quite com­mon.¹’ The informality and privacy of the feview, and the ability, experience, and ^care of the critiquing judges frequently bring about a significant improvement in foe draft decision.

One of the keys to the success of the Coast Guard Board is the caliber of the ^Critiquing judges and their meticulous at­tention to detail. Each is a lawyer with many years’ experience in researching, Presenting, and analyzing legal issues.⁶ bach is able to question and on occasion !° confront, the primary and reviewing Judges from a roughly equal level of ex­perience.

The Board is not bound by its earlier decisions, but does pay careful attention ^to them. Over the years Boards have been duite consistent in applying the law.

Recent developments: On 13 Decem­ber 1989, the President signed the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1989, which contains a provision that could have far- reaching effects on the operation of the Board. The act directs the Board to amend its regulations (33 CFR Part 52), not later than 13 June 1990, “ ... to ensure that a complete application for correction of military records is pro­cessed expeditiously and that final action on the application is taken within ten months of its receipt.”

Some applications now take more than ten months to decide from the time an application is docketed, because the Board’s process involves a number of time-consuming steps, to ensure fairness to applicants. Given the complexity of some cases, decisions cannot always be reached within ten months. Under the new requirement, the Board would often lack the time to raise new issues on its own motion. Applicants might not be able to make necessary amendments to their applications, and hearings (which are time-consuming) would seldom be possible.

So far, Congress has not imposed a deadline on the Board for Correction of Naval Records or any correction author­ity other than the Coast Guard Board. Any attempt to impose time limits should be reversed, not continued, to preclude inevitable conflict between ensuring due process for each applicant and complet­ing a decision by an arbitrary deadline. The Board process should not be driven solely by artificial restrictions.

Conclusion: The usual civil mecha­nism for the adjudication of a small law­suit is the same as the mechanism for the adjudication of a large or substantial law­suit: a Federal or State court of general jurisdiction or a Federal or State adminis­trative tribunal; one or more plaintiffs, complainants, or applicants; one or more defendants or respondents; and a judge. The parties generally reside or do busi­ness in the same geographical area, and the mechanism for adjudication generally involves oral discovery, an oral hearing with cross examination, and a right to a formal appeal from the judge’s decision. It is slow and expensive, probably be­cause oral discovery, oral hearings, and appeals are time-consuming and hard to conduct without the assistance of an at­torney.

The Coast Guard Board system is much simpler than the traditional civil system and therefore much less expensive for all. It has few of the traditional re­quirements, such as one-judge, trial-level adjudication, oral discovery, required hearings, and formal appeals. Instead, there are several tiers of judges who are expert in the subject matter, and who re­view each other’s work. The Board’s process dispenses with many traditional requirements and yet retains the “judi­cial” independence so vital to a fair and just result.

'Act of 2 August 1946, ch. 753, paragraph 207. The statute was codified as paragraph 1552 of title 10 of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. 1552).

²33 C.F.R. paragraph 52.10- 1(a). The required form, Department of Defense (DD)-Form 149, is used for correction of military records by each of the armed services.

³The Board thus far has ruled in favor of the applicant in approximately 62% (206 out of 330 cases) of the applications filed in fiscal 1988.

⁴There were 476 cases closed in fiscal year 1989; the outcome in in nearly all of them was that recom­mended by the primary and reviewing judges. Approximately five% of the decisions of the Board must, under special Department of Transportation rules, be reviewed and approved by the delegate of the Secretary, before they can be issued.

^he 32 Board members are all attorneys for the Gen­eral Counsel’s office or one of the Chief Counsel’s offices within the Transportation Department, except that, as a matter of policy, no attorneys from the Of­fice of the Chief Counsel of the Coast Guard are members of the Board.

Robert H. Joost is the Chairman and Nancy Battaglia is the Deputy Chairman, Board for Correction of Mil­itary Records of the Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Transportation.

Radar Range-Ring Navigation

By Chief Quartermaster Richard E. Kabrick, U.S. Navy

When piloting, the bridge navigation team normally uses visual lines of posi- ^tlQn to fix the position of the ship for the ^r'^avigator, officer of the deck, junior offi- ^^Cr of the deck, and the commanding of- ■cer. While the accuracy of these posi- ^l'°ns is dependent upon, among other tengs, a properly functioning gyrocom­^pass and a trained observation team, a visual fix usually provides the most accu­rate position. The prudent navigator will, however, use the radar at every opportu­nity. A navigator who takes one radar range from the radar scope to plot with each round of visual lines of position can provide an important piece of the naviga­tion picture and raise his comfort level considerably.

The careful navigator will also use radar fixes from the ship’s combat infor­mation center (CIC) and compare them to the visual fixes at every opportunity. Plotters in CIC, using ranges obtained from the radar and swinging the corre­sponding arc to form a fix, are also pro­viding an important piece of the naviga­tion picture. But the conventional radar

Chief Kabrick wrote this professional note

The plotter moves the template around until the range rings coincide with the picture on the radar scope: Point A—.8 nautical mile; Point B— 1.7 nautical miles; etc. The ship’s position is at the center of the tem­plate.

plotting technique of swinging an arc can create a problem when the operator tries to interpret the echoes painted on the radar screen. The shapes presented on the screen depend upon many factors, in­cluding the size, shape, aspect, and com­position of the land mass being dis­played. For these reasons the conventional radar technique often leads to triangles of ambiguity from which a fix must be selected. While an experienced C1C piloting team usually has no diffi­culty using conventional radar tech­niques, other procedures exist and should be applied when the need arises.

The radar range ring technique is one such procedure. It relies on an easily con­structed plastic template with concentric range rings drawn to represent the range rings on the radar scope. The range rings are drawn to the same scale as the chart that is being used for plotting. The plotter simply turns the range ring selector on the radar scope to the appropriate range— corresponding to the distances drawn on the template—and observes where the range rings are painting in relation to landmarks presented on the radar re­peater. At the command “mark,” the plotter simply maneuvers the plastic tem­plate to coincide with the picture on the radar repeater. The ship’s position is then marked by the hole in the center of the template.

A log recording ranges for repetitive transits can be made by recording prom¹" nent landmarks and the range ring rela­tion to them. (See Figure 1.) This method can be of great benefit to small craft oper­ators who use radars without bearing and range strobes and with few or no crew to assist in navigating. I have taught this method of radar navigation with gre^at success at the Surface Warfare Offi^cer School’s Division Officer Course >ⁿ Newport, Rhode Island, presenting it^t0 newly commissioned officers who have little or no radar experience. These p^r0' spective surface warfare officers become quite adept with the radar within minutes of trying this method. It is easy to lea^rtl and employ and has proved as accurate as the conventional method. I recomrnen this technique to every ship’s navigat°^r and navigation team.         „

Ernest Brown, who edited the 19' edition of Bowditch while with the Navi gational Science Division of the Oceano graphic Office, first suggested this tech nique after listening to testimony ⁱⁿ Federal District Court concerning the e fects of limited personnel on the use ⁰ small craft radar. The technique app^earS in the Radar Navigation Manual, Hyd^r0 graphic Office publication 1310.

serving as the lead navigation instructor at the face Warfare Officer School, Newport, Rhode ^ land. He was selected as the top enlisted instructor ^ the Navy in 1988 by the Chief of Naval Educati and Training.

Matching LCAC Capabilities to Requirements

By Lieutenant Colonel Melvin R. Jones, U.S. Army, Retired