The Path to Tactical Superiority

^ern Fleet and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet yields rough figures resulting in a U.S. numerical disadvantage of almost 3 to F-Thi s simplification probably underestimates the Soviet numerical advantage. (For instance, it fails to account for decreases in U.S. strength as a result of units in drydock or ^shipyard repair at the outbreak of a conflict and omits up ^l° 70 Soviet reserve diesel submarines that may be avail- ^Jble tor bastion defense.)³ Thus, U.S. SSNs may more "ealistically expect numerical disadvantages of 4 to 1.5 to or higher, requiring kill ratios of similar magnitude. I he U.S. Department of Defense admits that the “U.S. ndvantage in submarine quieting is being severely chal­lenged by the Soviets and the allied margin of superiority ^ls being narrowed.”⁴ This narrowing margin may prevent 'bu United States from achieving required kill ratios.

Are U.S. SSN officers optimally prepared to meet this challenge, assuming that the OODs will make the critical Metical decisions in the short-range detection and quick- auction engagements? The wartime OODs on an SSN ^woul(j probably be the three department heads (engineer, Weapons officer, and navigator). Ideally, these three ol'fi- cers _wi]| h_e graduates of the Submarine Officer Advanced ^C°ur_Se (SOAC) with prior operational SSN experience. In *be worst case, the OODs may be two SOAC graduates (weapons officers may not always be SOAC graduates) ^w'th no prior operational SSN experience and a relatively ^Senior first-tour officer. The results of a short-range detec- ^tlon followed by a weapons exchange may hinge upon the ‘‘c'tions of any one of these three officers. The U.S. sub­marine force, with its vital role in the maritime strategy, ^Cannot afford to demand and receive anything but tactical ^suPeriority from its officers in this case.

The U.S. submarine force has several available options increase the odds for success in future engagements. Build quieter submarines and improve the silencing ol 'hose we already have. However, as both U.S. and Soviet designers strive for further sound reduction, they will

'c'ueh levels beyond which efforts yield negligible gain. In uddition, quieting older existing boats is probably not a ?°°d id_ea because of practical and economic constraints.

Increase sensor and weapons capability. As Soviet sub­murines become quieter, we must take advantage of every Section means available and make every weapon count, lure again, without technological breakthroughs, we run ugainst a wall of diminishing returns.

Iniprove or intensify tactical training. Proposals to ac- ^e°nipljsh this have included the formation of an aggressor ^Subniarine squadron (similar to Top Gun), sending officers ^to SOAC during their initial sea tour, or creating a Subma- ^llr>e Combat Development Command. Actual measures of '^''cal capability, such as TREs, are useful, but probably ^{l <)} not go far enough to drive home the necessity for tacti- ^taI superiority.

While all of these proposals attempt to address the prob­lem of tactical superiority, they are not enough. We need to recognize a basic flaw in our fundamental approach to tactical learning. To meet the demands of the future, the U.S. submarine force must raise a corps of officers with sufficient tactical prowess to ensure victories in the under­sea battles of the future. We need to couple operational background with a tactics-intensive learning environment. We may develop better tacticians who will more ably ful­fill the demands placed upon them if we split submarine officers into specialty corps. One option is to develop a force-wide function-specific split for all submarines (such as the British Royal Navy maintains). Another is to mod­ify the current system (with officers receiving nuclear pro­pulsion and tactics training and standing watch in engi­neering and operations spaces) split into platform-specific

specialty corps in either an SSN or a nuclear-powered licet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

The first option would be similar to the Royal Navy's submarine officer program. T his scheme channels an offi­cer early in his career into one of four areas: seaman, marine engineer, weapons engineer, or supply/secretariat. One advantage of this is the intense specialization that each officer acquires within his field. As stated by a former British SSN CO, "the Seaman Officer receives extensive tactical, sensor and weapon training throughout his career, giving him great in-depth knowledge of all as­pects of submarine operations by the time he aspires to command.’’⁵ Likewise, this system trains marine engi­neers who have extensive nuclear engineering back­grounds and must regularly satisfy the Nuclear Safety Di­rectorate of their abilities/’

This system functions effectively for the British. If the U.S. Navy were to adopt it, it might produce officers whose tactical capabilities exceed the average found in U.S. control rooms today. However, implementing this system in the U.S. submarine force would be undesirable for several reasons. First, the U.S. Navy requires that COs of nuclear submarines be trained in nuclear propulsion Modeling the U.S. system after the British system would decrease the COs’ nuclear training level, running counter to current policy. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has an exceptional safety record that is at least partly at­tributable to the CO’s knowledge and constant monitoring of his shipboard program. Only through adhering to the highest standards of excellence can we continue safe oper­ation, ensuring battle-reliable propulsion while maintain­ing the public trust that allows numerous naval reactors to be located near several large coastal cities. Thus, good reasons exist, both operationally and politically, to main­tain a nuclear-trained wardroom, including the command­ing officer. Second, a functional split would remove the retention incentive of aspiring to command for a large por­tion of junior submarine officers (all but the seaman offi­cers). Third, the cost of retraining and the bureaucratic organization needed to support this change are neither de­sirable nor are they likely to win support in these times of defense budget austerity.

Another possible solution is to divide U.S. submarine officers by platform specialty. Officers would serve in ei-

ther SSNs or SSBNs for their entire careers. Unlike the British-style functional split, this proposal is derived from the difference in each platform’s basic mission. The SSNs’ mission is to seek out and destroy surface and sub­surface platforms of interest, while that of the SSBNs is to provide a secure and survivable seagoing leg of the nu­clear triad to deter Soviet aggression. Critics could argue that the SSBN becomes an SSN after it has launched it* ballistic missiles, but the basic missions remain the saniU' The problem arises in the tactical mind-set that logically

develops from each platform's basic mission.

The SSBN' s mission is to remain undetected, always toady to launch its missiles. To ensure this capability, the Plattorm must avoid contacts. While this has led to such derisive labels as the "Hide with Pride" submarine force, •here is no questioning the success of these officers and ^Cl'ews in executing their deterrent mission. The SSBN is •he most secure and survivable leg of the triad today. However, this hiding mentality w ill not ingrain in junior "Ificers (who may subsequently serve on SSNs) the ag­gressive tactical superiority, backed by operational experi- ^0l'ee, required to achieve consecutive victories in wartime encounters with quiet Soviet SSNs. Indeed, many junior "Hicers in SSBNs stand relatively few control room batches, spending their time instead as engineering or nnssile supervisors.

Hie SSN OOD. on the other hand, is prepared for his radically different wartime mission by his wardroom train- ^,riS and experience gleaned from exercises. The officer Will be more apt to develop the patient, aggressive, calcu- Hiting hunter's instinct he needs for success in future un­dersea battles in an atmosphere that dictates investigating ^c°ntacts rather than hiding from them. In addition, junior -TSN officers are able to learn a great deal tactically from ’heir seniors while standing subordinate watches in the ^c°ntrol room. This experience is more likely to prepare •hem to become wartime OODs than avoiding contacts will. Although opponents of this view claim that SSBN °”icers acquire experience in attack trainers during off- ^Cl°w and perform well in tests such as TREs, they must 'dso acknowledge that at-sea experience is markedly dif- ’^e,cnt from fighting a simulator or conducting canned tor- Pc'do firings at predictable range targets. The operational ^Cxperience that first-tour junior officers gain on SSNs pro- ^v’des the firm base upon which they build at SOAC. arriv- ^ln§ nt their department head tour as tactically superior as Possible.

However, implying that platform specialization will develop a mind set that will itself ensure tactical superior­ity' high kill ratios, and U.S. SSN success is ludicrous, -'illy operational experience must be accompanied by and ^L>xPanded upon by an intensive training program led by the ^c°nimanding officer. It should include all aspects of tacti- ^C;d submarining, presented in the form of small group ^s°iviinars. Confronted with a scenario, the junior officers ^niU!>t quickly analyze the data, decide upon a correct solu- ^ll°n, and detail a plan to execute their actions. A critique ⁰¹ questions could follow an explanation of the reasoning ^l|sed to arrive at the solution, with the CO evaluating per- "^rniance and correcting errors. These could be short (45 'nmutes to an hour) sessions held several times each week.

goal is to produce officers who can make consistently W’und decisions based on rapid, rational tactical data anal- Tsis. COs have effectively used this method to supplement °ⁿgineering training for junior officers, and it should be ^c<4ually effective in a tactics forum.

In addition to tactical training seminars. SSN COs ^sHouId implement a continuous program of one-on-one ^Iac,ics interviews with their officers to ensure that they "mintain the highest standards of performance, similar to those already conducted for some enlisted watch stations. The executive officer or a department head designated by the CO could also conduct these sessions. This approach will immerse the SSN officer in tactical thought. Although this plan places greater demands on already busy sched­ules. it will lead to an SSN officer corps of tactics experts, who spend less time conducting basic training and concen­trate on more advanced war-lighting scenarios. With the officers concentrating more on tactics, the chief petty offi­cers will have to be more involved in the day-to-day run­ning of divisions and equipment maintenance. However, as the technical experts, that already is their responsibility. Let the officers, who are supposed to be the tactics experts and warriors, perfect their skills, while the chiefs super­vise material readiness and equipment maintenance. An officer who can expertly manage a division or department but cannot win a battle also cannot be an effective wartime OOD.

This is a radical approach, which many people are likely to oppose for a number of reasons. It will be a lot of work, particularly in the transition period. Yet the declin­ing U.S. margin of superiority over Soviet submarines demands action to ensure the tactical superiority necessary to achieve the high kill ratios that will be required of U.S. SSNs executing the maritime strategy.

The appropriate action may well be platform specializa­tion for submarine officers in order to develop tactical superiority at all levels of the SSN officer corps. Com­placence with the current system should not blind us to alternatives that may yield greater long-term benefit for the submarine force.

Trank C\ Carlucci, Soviet Military Power: An Awesunenl of llte Threat PISS, 7(h 0.1. April 1988 (Washington, I).C\: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 155. 'Force levels are based upon the following assumptions: U.S, SSN strength is drawn from Norman Polmar's The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. licet, 14th edition (Annapolis, Ml): Naval Institute Press, P)K7). p. 17. Soviet SSN and active SS strength is as listed in Combat Fleets of the World IVSS/SV: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament edited by C'ouhat and Prc/clin, (Annapolis, Ml): Naval Institute Press. 1988), p. 562. Soviet SSBN strength is taken from the U.S. Defense Depart­ment's Soviet Military rower: An Assessment of the Threat /9«S‘<S‘ (Washington, D C’.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 4K. Soviet strength is modified for Rear Admiral William O. Studeman's statement that the “Soviets are expected to operate about 25 percent of their Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet attack subma­rines beyond sea control sea denial areas” found on page 10 of “Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues” of I March 1988, The author assumed that the other 75^f4 of Soviet submarines will protect the bastions and. further, assumed for simplification that the Americans would match the Soviet threat with 75',; of its SSN force to assault the bastions. The result is 38 U.S. SSNs confronting 38 nuclear and 30 diesel Soviet attack submarines that will guard 38 Soviet SSBNs.

\lane s I iyhtiny Ships IVSS-SV, ed. Capt. Richard Sharpe. DBF, RN. (London, Fnglund: Jane's Publishing Company Limited), p. 544.

‘‘Carlucci. p. 130.

⁵Cdr. James F. Pcrowne, OBL. RN. “The Officer Structure in a Royal Navy SSN.” The Submarine Review (October 1984). pp. 42 43. ^fibid., pp. 43-44.

Lieutenant Siegrist, a nuclear submariner, is currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School, working on a master of science degree in the intelligence curriculum. Prior to that, he served on the USS Minneapolis- Saint Paul (SSN-708). Before entering nuclear power training. Lieuten­ant Siegrist served in the Europe/NATO Plans and Policy Branch (Op- 614), Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.