Comment & Discussion

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ENTER THE FORUM

We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, mari­time, or military interest for possible publi­cation on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.

Contents:

Are Helicopter Warriors Overlooked? Men of the Iowa

Is the Coast Guard Fit to Judge Exxon?

Saving Carrier Aviation—1949 Style

One Missile for the Triad

The Challenge in Space

The Vincennes Incident

Surface Warfare Is Still Eating Its Young

Do You Have Enough Authority?

Failure to Render Aid Whether to Confirm or Deny?

We Need Leaders, Not Technocrats Special Coast Guard Issue A New Approach for SWOS SSNs: Mounting an Offensive Defense Breaking Through the Arctic Darlan

Vietnam Was Not a Movie

The Medriders: Refueling in Flight

Two-career Families vs. the Navy

“Are Helicopter Warriors

Overlooked?”

(See G.Y. Clark, pp. 92-94, February 1990

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Mark D. Phillips, U.S. Navy, Military Editor, Surface Warfare Maga­zine—When Captain Clark asked, “Is the amphibious navy the smartest place to put all of that [helicopter pilot] talent [for command at sea]?” his answer from the Navy should be “No, and neither is the rest of the surface navy.” Forget about career paths, the Navy must do what is best for the Navy as a whole, not individ­ual communities.

In trying to support the need for anti­submarine warfare helicopter pilots to be captains of surface combatants, not just amphibious ships, Captain Clark states that “clearly, the communities that have the broadest experience on board the var­ious classes of warships are among the best qualified to command them.” That statement validates why the surface war­fare community is the best qualified.

Look at the qualification process of a surface warfare officer. A young officer must first attend surface warfare division officers school and then spend three years on board a ship while earning surface warfare qualification, followed by de­partment head and executive officer tours. The officer must also pass a gruel­ing exam to obtain the qualified-for- command-at-sea designation.

To waive all of this preparation does not seem prudent solely because an offi­cer knows how to fly an aircraft and the intricacies of ASW or has spent time on a combatant at sea. The helicopter is an extension of the ship, not vice versa. Sur­face warfare officers spend most of their career qualifying for command at sea. If aviators want command at sea in the sur­face warfare community, my advice is to get out of aviation, become surface war­fare qualified, and pass the command-at- sea test.

The concept of legitimate authority comes from not only rank, but from qual­ification as well. The person who has the greatest legitimacy as commander of a surface warship is the proven and quali­fied sailor, not the proven flyer.

Captain Clark states that the “Surface/ aviation command opportunity is not bal­anced.” Should it be? Just because there are more surface combatants available for

command in the surface warfare commu­nity than there are at-sea command billets available to aviators is no basis for change, as Captain Clark states. This is a fact of life that the aviation communities will have to live with.

My answer to Captain Clark and the rest of the aviation community is, be happy with carriers, combat logistic force ships, and some of the amphibious ships. To let aviators command surface combat­ants would degrade the combat capability of surface combatants, hurt the credibility of the surface warfare training contin­uum, and lower the morale of surface warfare officers and the crews of surface combatants.

“Men of the Iowa”

(See R.A. Sabo, pp. 119-122, January 1990 Proceedings)

John H. McLuckie—Bravo and well done! Your photo tribute to the men of the Iowa (BB-61) was an outstanding idea and beautifully done. I was particu­larly impressed with the fact that four out of the seven men pictured are from the “black gang.”

The pride reflected in the faces of those fine sailors says something about the Navy and the Iowa that should be trans­mitted to the halls of the Congress.

“Is the Coast Guard Fit to Judge

Exxon?”

(See M.R. Adams, p. 90, August 1989; J.J.

McQeeney and N.C. Venzke, pp. 20-22,

October 1989 Proceedings)

Captain James Drahos, Containership Master—Returning from sea after sev­eral months, I found both the August and October Proceedings in my mail bag- Perhaps this span of time gives me a bet­ter perspective for this comment. The fact that no merchant mariners felt able to comment should not be taken as tacit approval of Coast Guard policies. Most likely, there is a futile realization that the Coast Guard is unwilling to admit its faults, tempered with the fear of retribu­tion due to the extant “adversarial rela­tionship” Admiral Venzke so correctly recognizes.

Is the Coast Guard fit to judge any merchant marine matters, including the case of the Exxon Valdez (in which the Coast Guard Valdez vessel traffic system

IVTS] shared the blame)? Academically— °f course! As regularly attempted, any­one can read the book and become an expert.” Technically—perhaps. It de­pends on the individual. There are some ^Very capable and competent Coast Guard Personnel involved in merchant marine patters. Unfortunately, there are too few. ^r°fessionally— absolutely and unequiv­ocally no! If only by the same standards that the Coast Guard applies to merchant mariners—sea time.

As Lieutenant Commander Mc- vueency correctly observes and Com­mander Adams implies, a license is an indication of experience in ship opera- '°n, both at sea and in port. As the Coast nard operates no merchant vessels (and ew deep-draft vessels), we are then otced to accept the view that its pre­sumed (and enforced) expertise is mainly academic. This is the root basis of the

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Problem of why the Coast Guard is not fit ⁰ Judge—and why an adversarial rela- '°nship exists. It is curious that Admiral ^enzke recognizes the existence of this ^Very real conflict; it is pathetic and in­comprehensible that the Coast Guard ^Seemingly does nothing to alleviate (or otally eliminate) it.

This hypocritical attitude and double standard of words and deeds contributes o the “us and them” attitude and the be- tef that the Coast Guard lacks adequate Qualification in merchant marine matters.

. ^ls all too easy to come away with the 'mpression that many Coast Guard per­sonnel involved in merchant marine mat­ers feel that their uniform confers twice c knowledge with half the experience.

. hen a retired Coast Guard captain (sail- ^lng as third mate) expresses amazement ^aml surprise at conditions encountered °ard merchant vessels (reduced man- regulatory requirements, poorly ^esigned lifesaving equipment), one be­come suspicious. When a uniformed th°^aSt ^^uard VTS watchstander presumes ^at years of pilot experience can be . ^Ualed in mere days of observation (rid- !ⁿ§ a few trips with pilots will make “us ^st as qualified”), suspicions are con- Q^rmed. When the Commandant, with espect to the Exxon Valdez, seems un- ‘^e to understand the problems at hand ⁿd from that single aberrant incident (in ^hich the Coast Guard shared blame), °t only impugns by association the dem- Ustrated professionalism of the other fl h'cated mariners involved, but implies ^aWs in an ongoing, long-successful pro- |^{ra 111} (navigation in Prince William _c°^und is so simple that “your children _b°uld drive a tanker through it”), credi- _e' 'ty is strained. It is only with the great- ^st difficulty that I remind myself of the

Coast Guard’s law enforcement role, when the head of that agency and subor­dinate officers, by their statements, assist the media in trying the case in public (Much was made of Captain Joseph Hazelwood’s blood-alcohol content, but interestingly enough, no similar com­ments were made regarding the reading of the Coast Guard’s VTS watchstander.)

As Commander Adams points out, a double standard exists. The Coast Guard was not held accountable for action that would see revocation or suspension pro­ceedings against the license of a merchant marine officer. Anecdotes abound that serve only to reinforce the image by mer­chant mariners that the Coast Guard need only say, “Sorry, it was a mistake,” to absolve itself, when similar errors would result in prosecution of the mariner.

What has caused this situation? While the Coast Guard is expert in many areas, such as search and rescue, its members lack intimate knowledge of merchant marine operations. There is no oversight. Much like any bureaucracy, the Coast Guard believes its people are experts in this field, therefore, they do not need any advice. If one were to pay heed to experi­enced mariners, one would quickly come to doubt that contention.

Yes, the Coast Guard will judge the Exxon Valdez (the third mate has already had his license suspended for nine months). As regulators, as again recog­nized by Admiral Venzke, the Coast Guard must be capable of meeting a higher standard than the industry. It can­not do so with license examiners who cannot answer questions, inspectors who are unable to understand how vessel sys­tems work, desk-bound officers at head­quarters who fail to consider that events at sea may not be in accordance with their optimistic scenarios, and VTS operators who fail in their responsibilities while simultaneously seeking expanded author­ity. Until the Coast Guard is willing to be held responsible for the actions stemming from their authority; until the Coast Guard’s knowledge of the merchant ma­rine is derived from realistic sea time; and until the Coast Guard is willing to lead by example—no, the Coast Guard will not be fit to judge the Exxon Valdez.

“Saving Carrier Aviation—1949 Style”

(See E.P. Stafford, pp. 44-51, January 1990 Proceedings)

Captain Carl H. Amine, U.S. Navy (Re­tired)—Captain John Crommelin, the spark plug of the 1949 Admirals’ Revolt who actually won the war before Con-

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gress, was without doubt one of our greatest naval leaders. He inspired a whole generation of naval aviators. The transcripts of the hearings before the House Armed Forces Committee attest to Stafford’s conclusions. The following anecdote reveals a lighter side of this great man’s life:

The Japanese Zero that flipped over on its back at Akutan Island while landing near Dutch Harbor during the attack was salvaged and sent to be repaired in the states. Crommelin was director of train­ing at North Island for the Commander Fleet Air West Coast. He flew the plane frequently. One day, a new tower con­troller saw the Zero take off the matting and do a slow roll over Point Loma. He demanded, “The pilot who just took off in the Zero, give me his name and rank!” Crommelin calmly responded, “Captain John Crommelin.” The tower operator paused, then asked, “Captain in the Navy or Marine Corps?” “Captain in the Navy,” responded Crommelin. Tower operation did not hesitate: “Nice take off, Captain!”

Captain R.D. Hooker, U.S. Army, Assis­tant Professor, Department of Social Sci­ences, U.S. Military Academy—I read this article with alarm. The 1949 “Revolt of the Admirals” is widely considered to be the most serious challenge to civilian control of the military in the modem era. Far from a simple policy dispute about control of strategic bombing or the vir­tues of a unified national military estab­lishment, the B-36/Supercarrier contro­versy exposed to national scrutiny the spectacle of professional military men attempting to remove their civilian supe­rior as a solution for an unpopular policy decision. 1 find it deeply disturbing that such conduct might be thought praise­worthy during today’s scramble for de­fense dollars.

Commander Stafford affords Captain John Crommelin a protective coloration that obscures the true heart of the matter. Cedric Worth’s letter charging Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington with serious “conflicts of interest”—charges widely interpreted to mean outright criminal cor­ruption—was calculated to drive both men from office. It also had no basis in fact. No one ever provided independent corroborating evidence to substantiate the charges. To complete this squalid affair, the investigation revealed that Worth had received significant assistance from a number of uniformed naval officers in preparing his memorandum—the same memorandum Crommelin advised Con­gressman James Van Zandt (R—PA) to release immediately.

Did Crommelin have a professional responsibility to take steps to verify the authenticity of the Worth memo before publicly (and falsely) smearing the civil­ian secretaries? Should he have at least alerted his superiors? Or was his support for carrier aviation so absolute that pro­fessional ethics and military subordina­tion to civilian control became, for him at least, irrelevant? The episode truly was, as Phillip S. Meilinger wrote in the pages of the Army War College Journal, “an alarming display of insolence and insub­ordination.”

Crommelin was no hero, no martyr in the cause of freedom. A few years later, the Army would find itself in similar straits, its budgets cruelly slashed by an administration committed to the doctrine of massive retaliation. One Army Chief of Staff, Matthew Ridgway, resigned after failing to reverse the Eisenhower/ Dulles strategic policy, followed closely by James Gavin, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and perhaps the Army’s keenest strategic mind. Ridg- way’s successor, Maxwell Taylor, argued and cajoled for his entire tenure in an at­tempt to correct what he sincerely be­lieved to be an unsound defense policy. All these men did their best to work within the parameters of the civil-military relationship.

All left the service having failed to achieve their aims (though Taylor was to receive a second chance under John F. Kennedy and ultimately serve as the architect of Flexible Response). They did not attempt to discredit service rivals or civilian superiors, to leak classified docu­ments, or to attack opponents in the press. Our system provides a way to reg­ister the dissent that is bound to occur and communicate alternative points of view within a framework of accountability and consensus. It is inappropriate to glorify the actions of Crommelin and those who, like him, would treat the constitutional and statutory process with such con­tempt.

“One Missile for the Triad”

(See D.D. Dalgleish and L. Schweikart, pp. 73­77, August 1989; S.J. Tangredi, p. 82,

December 1989; W.B. Davitte, pp. 20-22, February 1990 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral Kenneth C. Malley, U.S. Navy, Director, Strategic Systems Pro­grams, Trident II Program Manager— General Davitte takes issue with the au­thors for using a series of incorrect as­sumptions and information to support their arguments. Although I have no de­sire to enter the general fray, I am com­pelled to correct some of the information that General Davitte implies for the Tri­dent II (D-5).

I participated in the two separate inter­continental ballistic missiles (ICBM)/ submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) commonality studies conducted in 1975 and 1978. Full-scale engineering did not commence for Trident II until September 1983, and development was concluded in February 1990. The general apparently used the 1975 study as his data base. The 1978 study concluded that a common missile, based primarily on the Trident II, was technically feasible but further concluded that no common mis­sile approached or equaled the baseline MX system in performance. Neither study suggested that a sea-based missile could, or should, be used in a land-based mode without modifications. The study provided estimates that showed that costs for a common system would range from 3% below to 6% above combined base­line costs for both the sea-based and land- based systems.

Trident II completed development this year, and its true capabilities are now es­tablished. Trident II’s performance is much better than envisioned in either 1975 or 1978. Some erroneous or mis­leading specifics in General Davitte’s comments are:

• “The D-5 is not nuclear hardened.’ Not true—every sea-based missile sys­tem has been nuclear hardened since Po­laris A3T. While the specification levels may differ from land-based systems, it is incorrect to imply a lack of nuclear hard­ening.
• “Normally the D-5 guidance is dor­mant and requires a few minutes to acti­vate; therefore the reaction times would not be as good as with current land-based ICBMs.” True—but it should be under­stood that the sea-based systems need no¹ concern themselves with the “use or lose” dilemma. Because the submarines are virtually undetectable prior to launch, guidance activation time is not a lin¹' itation for a sea-based application. Sub­marine “silos” have the inherent flex­ibility to move closer to the targets, s° that time to place warheads on targ^et would be approximately the same f°^f both systems.
• “A silo-based D-5 would not have the needed accuracy to hold hard targets ^at risk.” Not true—given the accuracies demonstrated in the development pro­gram and the higher yield of D-5 war­heads, there is adequate probability ^ot kill to hold hard targets at risk.

I agree completely with Genera¹

^existi

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ⁿg shipboard radars, modified to space objects, in ^ ^sea"based ASAT capability, residing _v ^each battle group, would provide ad­vantages not possible with other ASAT ucepts. For example, considering the pr'Ual deployment of battle groups fj'rldwidc, the system would be wide- _noⁿg^|ng, robust, and survivable. It would constrained by a mixed, immov- e location, making it difficult to locate ^and disable.

lit ^ ^Sea'*^3ased ASAT could destroy satel- laT ^S°°^{n a}^^ter l^aunch • This is particu- lau^ '^mP^ortant the target is an ASAT, ^ached to disable one of our satellites, lau ^3V!^{ng an} ASAT at sea on existing ^ ^aching platforms would result in a _as^ghly survivable, low-cost national ^et- Further, it would give the service tic°T ^dlreatcncd by LEO satellites the tac- ^a rneans to defend itself from intrusive ^Urveillance.

avitte’s observation that the triad has ^een the bedrock of our deterrent strat­^egy- It is a bit late to start considering Using Tridents in a land-based mode in heu of Peacekeepers.

The Challenge in Space”

P‘^otrowski and W.J. Holland, pp. 32­. February 1990 Proceedings)

Commander Matt Rogers, U.S.Navy—A ^sea-based antisatellite (ASAT) system ⁰ fers the naval battle group significant satellite warfare capabilities. Although uaval battle groups rely heavily on space communications and surveillance, and ^are themselves vulnerable to space sur­veillance, they do not have the capability ° defend their space assets, or to take ⁰ tensive action against satellites threat- f^n,ng battle group operations. A sea- ^ased ASAT would provide the battle group commander with the capability to counter the space surveillance threat as he °es other surveillance threats, and to Protect the space assets he depends on. It Would increase his flexibility of action, ereby improving defense, existing shipboard weapons and radar psterns can be modified, at relatively °w cost, to provide battle groups with an ^'herent ASAT capability. Such a ^eaP°ⁿ system would be effective ^gainst low earth orbit (LEO) satellites d can be launched from the vertical (hn^{Ctl s}y^stem (VLS) system on Spruance , "'963)-, Ticonderoga (CG-47)-, and

Burke (DDG-51)-class ships oth °^{Ut s}*8ⁿ'ficantly affecting the mix of Uer VLS-launched weapons. Target pgagement could be coordinated by ^lng either remote tracking stations or

“The Vincennes Incident”

{See N. Friedman, pp. 72-79, May 1989; D.R. Carlson, pp. 87-92, September 1989; D.L. Molnar, B.L. Brown, J.H. Odegaard, A.E. Rondeau, and R.C. Benitez, pp. 16-20, November 1989; M.R. Adams and A.R. Banks, p. 14, December 1989; F.G. Hoffman and M.C. Agresti, pp. 14-24, January 1990; R.W. Covey, J.T. Gillick, and W.G. Key, pp. 22-28,

February 1990; M. Eckhart and F.C. Johson p. 32, March 1990 Proceedings)

Captain David Judson Gray, U.S. Naval Reserve—I wish to voice my disagree­ment with the contention of Commanders Odegaard and Rondeau that Commander Carlson of the USS Sides (FFG-14) should have used a different forum for his criticism of the conduct of the USS Vin­cennes (CG-49).

Proceedings is a proper place to com­ment on the use of naval forces at any level, from individual units to the entire fleet. The U.S. Naval Institute is our pro­fessional society. Every profession needs a forum for the candid and unofficial ex­change of ideas concerning the needs of that profession and the proper use of its tools. I emphasize the unofficial nature of this forum as essential, because com­ments in any official publication can be construed by the public as official Navy policy, whatever the intentions of the writer or the publisher. No disclaimer can overcome the public perception that such comments are indeed policy statements.

In other professions, disagreement with the established opinion of a profes­sions’ leaders can be expressed by resign­ing and going to another employer, and by disagreeing on the pages of that pro­fession’s journals. If military profession­als resign, we lose standing—and credi­bility—in our profession. For us, therefore, the right to criticize in an ac­cepted and unofficial forum is even more important. In my opinion, that is what our founders wanted when they started the Institute in 1873.

As an ensign, I was told that Proceed­ings was a proper forum for professional criticism. I have been told the same many times by many senior officers since then. I want to see it remain such, and that is why I disagree so strongly with Com­manders Odegaard and Rondeau.

“Surfare Warfare Is Still Eating

Its Young”

{See B.G. McGrath, pp. 95-96, January 1990

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Gary D. Pash, U.S. Navy— Lieutenant McGrath is keeping the sur­face warfare officers’ (SWO) community soul-searching alive. I would like to an­swer some of his points from a post­division officer’s perspective.

He narrows his first premise, that the SWO community is frustrated, so far as to only encompass first-tour SWOs. This categorization is accurate but irrelevant. No matter what groups they initially join, the strong competition for department head school indicates the high quality of division officers applying. SWOs are professionals and enjoy the challenges of their un-sexy jobs.

Inequality of financial rewards for SWOs is often discouraging but as long as the laws of supply and demand oper­ate, the situation is not likely to change.

Time to train underway is as important as ever, especially for shiphandling. But realistic canned scenarios played through shipboard computers are increasing. The Naval Tactical Game (NavTaG) is being used more often at the shipboard level. Shore damage-control trainers are great and provide more realistic and taxing training than on board a ship. But SWOs must still conduct training on board ship to ensure familiarity. Constant underway training does not mean perfection. Ships are most ready during the initial half of a deployment, after refresher training, than they are toward the end of a deployment;

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operational concerns get in the way of their training. Soviet ships spend most of their time at anchor or in port, and we don’t claim they are unprepared for con­tingencies.

SWOs are more than techno-warriors in direct control of weapons. They must work with their people. When they make a decision in battle, their sailors may hes­itate if they have never had to follow or

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trust their leader in day-to-day affairs.

There are many small tasks in running a division that can be delegated. Delega­tion is not telling someone, “Do it,” and then, yelling at the individual when an inspection finds it has not been done. Delegation is making a plan to accom­plish a goal, assigning someone to take charge of the plan and training that per­son how to do it, and constantly checking to ensure the task is accomplished.

To comment on McGrath’s specific suggestions:

• Standards must rise; there must be en­trance requirements for SWO: The only problem is that a SWO cannot be mea­sured by a simple exam, by eye-hand coordination, or by math and physics knowledge. The only way to discover if someone will make a good SWO is to let the person try.
• We should establish a longer and more intensive SWO division officer course: This would supply more information but also a longer time to forget it. The only way really to retain knowledge is to get the basics and apply them again and again in real-life situations.
• Give SWOs sea pay if they are as­signed in a seagoing billet: This idea is very nice, but doesn’t change the SWO equation, it doesn’t change the motiva­tion, and it doesn’t change the supply of personnel.
• Commanding officers must be aware of their junior officers’ collateral duties: The “special trust and confidence” the President places in commissioned offi­cers makes them the choice for many col­lateral duties that can be managed with some planning and prioritizing. Shoving your duties on the enlisted ranks prevents them from doing their primary technical and maintenance duties.
• Look hard at repetitive inspections: The type commanders have done a good job of limiting the overlap of inspection areas. Instead of trying to get all the in­spectors to come in one three-month pe­riod, space them out. An eight-month pure operational period would be condu­cive to letting standards lapse. It is better to run the division correctly all of the time with constant checks by the chain of command. This would require only fine- tuning as each of the inspections ap­proached. Rather than trying to be an expert on everything all at once, become an expert on one thing at a time.

The phrase “surface warfare eats its own young” to me conveys the inability or unwillingness of those higher in the chain of command to help the junior offi­cers who are expected to lift themselves by their bootstraps. We need a command atmosphere that actively trains and coun­sels the new division officer.

Going through the last year of Pro­ceedings indicates that SWOs are more critical of their community and are trying more ways to make it better. This is nol because we are less capable, but because we have to be experts at air, surface, and submarine warfare and are proud of the challenge.

“Do You Have Enough Authority?”

(.See J. Miller, pp. 69-71, February 1990 Proceedings)

Lieutenant S.L. Heaster, U.S. Naval Reserve—Admiral Miller’s discussion of authority is excellent. Especially insight­ful are his four “lessons.” Having served as an enlisted man during the early 1970s however, I believe that Admiral Mille^f omits some crucial facts. First, many en­listed men responded positively to Admi­ral Zumwalt’s style. From my own expe­rience, he was perceived as a Chief of Naval Operations who concerned himself with the status of the lowest ranks. This boosted morale, encouraged discipline, and fostered improved performance. The legitimate chain of command did not change. The skipper was still the skipper. The most vocal (and in my opinion the most detrimental) reaction to Zumwal¹ originated in the senior enlisted ranks, where people were convinced he was “ruining the Navy.” I think their opposi­tion to a progressive CNO was rooted if their naive expectation that the Navy should, in some manner, have been insu­lated from the most socially turbulen¹ period in U.S. history.

Captain Carvel Blair, U.S. Navy (R⁽” tired)—Vice Admiral Miller asserts that “The primary role of leaders is to acquit as much authority as possible from those above.” Important as this concept may be, Admiral Miller did not even mentiof an equally important concept: with abso­lute authority goes absolute responsibil­ity. In my opinion, the failure of some commanding officers to accept this re­sponsibility in all its aspects did more t° cause a “breakdown in respect for . • 1 authority” than did Admiral Elmo Zufl¹' walt and his Z-grams.

My criticism of these cornmandm? officers (COs) centers on their disregard

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of two basic tenets of leadership. First, some COs put themselves above the law. They expect 100% compliance with their own directives while flaunting the laws and regulations that supposedly bind the commanders themselves. Second, they do not measure up to General Robert E. Lee’s maxim that “the officer who fails to show his subordinates the same con­sideration which he shows his superiors is unfit to command.”

Why did crew members in the 1970s write to their congressmen about lost al­lotment checks rather than look for help from their division officer or their CO? Because they thought—correctly or in­correctly—that the ship didn’t care. Why didn’t these sailors take their shipboard problems up through the chain of com­mand? They probably felt they wouldn’t get a sympathetic hearing. I do not be­lieve that a sailor expects every gripe to be squared away, nor should they all be, but on good ships, a man knows his boss will listen to him. Too many COs failed to meet this aspect of command responsiblity. As Admiral Miller writes, “Respect down begets respect up.”

If all COs were perfect, Admiral Mil­ler’s concern that they have sufficient authority should in fact be paramount. But not all COs are perfect. The article “Failure to Render Aid” is about a ship’s captain who was found to have broken “international law, Navy Regulations, the customs and traditions of the sea—■ and humanity.” His dereliction cost the lives of 31 refugees and,—the greatest understatement in the February issue— “had ramifications for the crew of the [USS] Dubuque [(LPD-8)] as well.” Pro­fessional competence is essential for COs but it needs to be accompanied by an equal ethical concern for their subordi­nates and others who come under their control.

As a final criticism of Admiral Miller’s thesis, his “personal visit, usually at sea, to the commanding officer” of every Sixth Fleet ship bypassed the squadron and unit commanders no less or more than Admiral Zumwalt’s rap sessions bypassed ship COs in the 1970s. In both cases, the senior commander felt so strongly that a situation needed his per­sonal attention that he took the unusual step of talking in person to people several echelons below him. Both Admiral Zum­walt’s and Admiral Miller’s visits were justified and necessary. And the prob­lems of the 1970s probably would have been far worse had they been handled by any other Chief of Naval Operations.

“Whether to Confirm or Deny?”

(See N.L. Flacco, pp. 52-56, January 1990

Proceedings)

Peter Samuel, national security corre­spondent, the New York City Tribune and North American correspondent for Defence 2000, published in Melbourne— I doubt the major foreign policy and po­litical benefits Commander Flacco pre­dicts will result if the neither-confirm- nor-deny (NCND) policy is discontinued- His political analysis is naive in assuming that the antinuclear movement is simply antinuclear in motivation and objectives, and that a source of tension with seg­ments of the polity among U.S. allies will be assuaged by compromising this U.S- Navy policy.

I began observing the antinuclear movement’s leadership as a sympathizer and participant in the Australia and New Zealand Congress for International Coop­eration and Disarmament around 1959 as a university student and activist at Mel­bourne University. Then as a reporter and commentator, I attended their rallies, read their publications and pronounce-

ments, and followed closely associated “peace” and “antinuclear” organiza­tions. These organizations are not funda­mentally antinuclear; they are basically anti-American and anti-Western. If So­viet warships proposed visiting the South Pacific, most of those protesting U.S. ships on the grounds that they may have nuclear weapons on board would orga­nize welcoming ceremonies and hospital­ity arrangements. The core of the antinu­clear groups are people who hate U.S. commercialism, its popular culture, in­equality, the messiness of parliamentary democracy, and, therefore, U.S. power. They exploit fear of nuclear weapons to undermine alliances with the United States and U.S. political power in the world.

Even if unilateral nuclear disarmament removed the nuclear issue, these groups would find other political sticks with which to beat the U.S. Navy and all it represents, since they are motivated by more fundamental antagonisms. They will say that even nonnuclear U.S. ships represent an affront to national sover­eignty, that conventional high explosives represent a danger in port, that their pres­ence is unnecessary, provocative, and offensive. The arguments are endless. They will not be appeased by fiddling with where you keep your warheads.

Flacco asserts that there is a “rising tide of antinuclear sentiment worldwide” and that allied governments face “mounting pressure.” There must be a political accommodation, he suggests, or alliances with the United States will be tom asunder. I’m not so sure. Sometimes appeasement works; sometimes it merely legitimizes and emboldens opposition.

As to this “mounting” strength, these movements have been around for dec­ades. They have a distinctly mixed rec­ord. They have had successes, most nota­bly in New Zealand, which grabbed U.S. attention. But elsewhere they often seemed on the brink of success only to be beaten politically. The outcome has re­volved around the political standing of the United States and U.S. values, and on how well the case for the Western alli­ance and nuclear deterrence has been made by both local and U.S. leaders.

If diplomats without the stomach for a public argument use NCND to avoid making the case for nuclear deterrence, it plays into the hands of those who want to weaken the United States. New Zealand is a case in point. U.S. leaders should have said bluntly at some point in the debate: “Sure, we have nuclear weapons on many of our warships. We need to bring those warships through your ports from time to time because that is part of

maintaining the naval readiness that con­stitutes effective deterrence. Of course there is some element of risk to you— though more to us—but the risk is far less than the risk of giving away deterrence.” NCND was used to avoid the fundamen­tal deterrence issue and so was politically unhelpful. It gave the impression that the United States and its supporters were duplicitous. Reportedly, Secretary of State George Shultz once told the New Zealand Prime Minister privately that the United States needed to bring nuclear­armed ships through New Zealand occa­sionally, so NCND was not the issue. He should have said that publicly. Then there could have been a debate of the real is­sues. It might not have persuaded New Zealanders, who never got the fright Australians got in World War II, when they thought they were going to be over­run by Japan. This is the psychological basis for Australian defense conscious­ness. But I think greater U.S. candor in the New Zealand debate would have im­proved the chances of holding together ANZUS.

Incidentally, Flacco is wrong in claim­ing that NCND was breached in the case of B-52 flights over Australia. My recol­lection as a reporter of the controversy is that the United States wanted to make regular B-52 training flights to practice land navigation over the virtually unpop­ulated northwestern part of Australia. Since the flights were for navigation training, the B-52s did not need to carry weapons. U.S. spokesmen said the B-52s would be unarmed and the Australian government has accepted many years of such flights. NCND did not enter the debate until antinuclear propagandists sought to find an example of double stan­dards, with which to whip the United States on the nuclear-port-visits issue.

“We Need Leaders, Not

Technocrats”

(See J.E. McFadden, pp. 84-86, January 1990;

K. Montor, p. 72, February 1990 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Terry L. Johnson, U.S. Naval Reserve—The problems Lieutenant McGrath notes are real. We do not give enough emotional or technical support to our junior officers.

I was fortunate to have two mentors while I was an ensign. One was an unre­stricted line lieutenant commander and the other a limited duty officer lieutenant. Both were genuinely concerned about my professional development during the two longest years of my life. I am convinced that their support helped to keep me in line.

The most important thing a lieutenant can do to help the Navy is to become a mentor to an ensign. Likewise, the best thing an ensign can do is to seek out a mentor.

Rear Admiral A.F. Campbell, U.S. Navy Commander Submarine Groups Six and Ten—Once again a very junior, inexperi­enced, obviously unhappy officer is re­warded in the Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest for taking on his seniors and lecturing them on the froth of leadership. In tracing what he perceives to be the ebb and flow for con­trol of the minds of U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen, between “technocrats” and “leaders,” he demonstrates a firm lack of understanding as to what it takes to be either, or both, in today’s technically advanced and oriented Navy.

I am sure that today’s leaders, particu­larly Chief of Naval Operations Admiral C.A.H. Trost, are distressed to learn that they have “abandoned the ageless per­cepts of military professionalism” and that “emphasis on technical competency will prove to be as deleterious to the offi­cer corps of the 1990s as Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s corpo­rate managerial approach was in the 1960s.” Anyone who lived through the McNamara game and who understands Admiral Hyman G. Rickover understands that comparing the effects on the officer corps of technology and management is naive.

To justify his own opinions, Lieutenant McFadden has lost sight of the fact that to be a successful naval officer and leader one must master both technical and hu­manistic knowledge. No one knew this better than Admiral Rickover and proba­bly no one in our modern navy was better grounded in the humanities than he. ft can never be said that he demanded tech­nical training and education to the exclu­sion of the liberal arts. He expected his people to gain that grounding on a contin­uing basis, but on their own initiative- The Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Alfred M. Gray, espoused a sim­ilar philosophy in setting forth his reading program for leaders of the Corps.

Officers must be grounded in the tech­nical details in order to be competent enough to carry out safely their watch­standing duties, and to gain and maintain the respect of their sailors, who are tech­nically competent. Even senior officers, somewhat removed from day-to-day de­tails, find that lack of adequate technical competence will stifle their effectiveness-

Much of leadership is style and person­ality, either real and inbred or mastered

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through self-control. Leaders must know and care for their people—a concept completely ignored by Lieutenant Mc­Fadden. They cannot learn this from any book, either technical or humanistic. Just as one cannot become a good composer without studying Mozart, merely study­ing him is not enough. There are rules to be learned, technical aspects of music to be mastered and followed. The inspira­tion may come from Mozart’s music, but the ability to compose lies in the mastery of details. So it is with a leader, he may be inspired by reading about the life and deeds of John Paul Jones, but without a firm base in the technical aspects of the assignment inspiration will be insuffi­cient to achieve success.

Captain Leonard R. Wass U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Lieutenant McFad- den apparently misunderstands the mes­sage underlying Admiral C.A.H. Trost’s and Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s re­quirements for “deep technical knowl­edge” in a leader. His suggestions for increased knowledge in philosophy, poli­tics, and humane studies are valid, but he underestimates the extent of detailed knowledge necessary for effective leader­ship, as well as the sequence in which leadership knowledge and skills are ac­quired in a person’s development.

Had I read Lieutenant McFadden’s essay in 1969, upon leaving active duty and enrolling in graduate school, I proba­bly would have agreed. At that time, I considered my Rickover training and experience excessively narrow, techni­cal, and only marginally useful in formu­lating strategic business concepts and business policy. I even wrote a student paper suggesting that leadership evolves from Admiral Arleigh Burke’s guidance to “know yourself, know your people, know your stuff.” I now know that I failed then to understand what “31-Knot Burke” meant by “stuff.”

Aspiring young naval officers (or busi­nessmen) should be educated about the value of learning “stuff”—or deep tech­nical knowledge. They should also study ethics, morality, psychology, history, and related topics, mandatory for per­sonal growth and development. The problem is finding enough time. The highest priority item is and should be to provide them—early—with depth of knowledge in the very sophisticated tech­nology and operations of the Navy. Only in this way will they be able to act re­sponsibly when making decisions which affect lives, property, and the national security responsibilities with which they are entrusted. The rest is up to them.

Lieutenant McFadden would do well to reflect on the relative success of commer­cial nuclear power, compared to the Navy’s program, and determine the un­derlying reasons for the difference. I would urge him to read Rickover and the Nuclear Navy—The Discipline of Tech­nology (Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1990). From first-hand profes­sional observation, I can assure him that commercial nuclear power would have succeeded if that industry had followed Rickover’s suggestions.

Lieutenant McFadden correctly points out that a balance of technical depth and breadth of vision and knowledge are needed. His analogy of President Jimmy Carter’s failure, and the linkage to tech­nical naval training, is somewhat arbi­trary. It was not the attention to detail that derailed some of President Carter’s deci­sions, but rather his excessively narrow scoping of broad issues that led to ques­tionable decisions. To imply that his questionable decisions were a direct re­sult of his naval nuclear experience is to disregard other valid contributing factors.

Not all “leaders” achieve the balance of breadth and depth needed to succeed. Admiral Rickover also said, “The Devil is in the details but so is salvation.” Per­haps the time has come for us to separate the warts of his management style and personality from the management and leadership principles that produced such great success in one of the most techno­logically, politically, and managerially difficult programs in history.

Special Coast Guard Issue

(See October 1989 Proceedings.)

Rear Admiral Stephen G. Yusem, U.S. Naval Reserve, Deputy Commander Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic (Mobili­zation)—Your special issue commemo­rating the Coast Guard bicentennial failed to cover adequately the newest and most defense-oriented Coast Guard-supported mission: the Maritime Defense Zone (MarDeZ). Although one section of the issue was entitled “Maritime Defense,” MarDeZ received little more than a par­enthetical mention.

In 1984, a joint Navy/Coast Guard in­struction designated the two Coast Guard area commanders as Commanders, Mari­time Defense Zone Atlantic and Pacific, reporting to the Fleet Commanders-in- Chief (CinCs). These Echelon III Navy commands are responsible for coastal defense, habor defense, port security, port breakout, inshore undersea warfare, and habor clearance.

The Atlantic and Pacific zones are di­vided into maritime defense sectors com­manded by active-duty Coast Guard or Navy flag officers. Sectors are divided into subsectors, generally corresponding to our strategic outload ports.

MarDeZ is supported by a fully inte­grated Navy/Coast Guard active-duty and reserve command-and-control network. Under the CinCs’ war plans, forces as­signed include virtually all Coast Guard ships and aircraft, a number of frigates and destroyers, several squadrons of mar­itime patrol aircraft, all mine warfare as­sets not deployed overseas, airborne mine countermeasure squadrons, craft of op­portunity units, inshore undersea warfare units, explosive ordinance detachments, mobile diving and salvage units, and other assets.

In view of the threat posed by the So­viet capacity for mine warfare, submarine warfare, and special operations (threats which come right up to our shoreline), MarDeZ is absolutely critical to the suc­cess of our maritime strategy. Our sea lines of communication (SLOCs) begin at our coastlines. The 200-mile-wide coastal section of our SLOCs must re­main open to ensure timely deployment, reinforcement, and resupply of our forces. That is the MarDeZ challenge-

“A New Approach for SWOS”

(See K.P. Weinberg, pp. 103-105, January 1990

Proceedings)

Captain Norman J. Pattarozzi, U.S- Navy, Commanding Officer, Surface Warfare Officer School Command— Surface Warfare Officers School (SWOS) Command has a history of excellence spanning nearly 30 years. It is the one institution that teaches surface warriors the fundamentals and fine points of their profession through a continuum of train­ing that begins with junior officers en route to their initial sea tours and ends with captains bound for major com­mands.

As with any institution that stands as the paragon of professional training for its community, SWOS is always open to criticism. Content and methodology are sometimes assailed. New approaches and suggestions for change are frequently tendered, some periodically appearing if the pages of Proceedings. When there are problems in the fleet (e.g., a grounding, ³ collision, a series of accidents), inquiries will usually be made to find out what we teach on the subjects of navigation, fire­fighting, or explosive safety, for exam­ple. Commanding officers write to ask why their division officers have not been taught to lead or their department heads have not been taught to manage.

There are a few points that we at

SWOS should make clear, not only for the benefit of outsiders, but also to keep ourselves in focus as we train the present and future of surface warfare.

Keep the Feedback Coming: We wel­come inputs from the fleet, and need to hear from commanding officers and oth­ers in a position to observe our product.

are not thin-skinned, and we need criticism to keep our courses fresh, fluid, and progressive. We are well aware that the best way to ruin an outstanding repu­tation is to sit on it.

SWOS Is Not the Total Solution: Often ^We are criticized for not providing the complete officer to the fleet. Individual makeup—intelligence, persistence, in­dustry, and common sense—as well as ^experience level, are baggage brought in the schoolhouse door and carried out to the fleet. Only knowledge level is signifi­cantly changed at SWOS, and work hab- 'ts and interpersonal skills to varying degrees. Our charter is to provide knowl­edgeable and motivated officers with the ^requisite baseline of professional knowl­edge to succeed over the long term as sur­face warriors. Our courses are not the ul- tunate billet specialty training, and they ^are not substitutes for the CO’s continu- ^lng obligation to train his officers.

The Division Officer Course offers 15 ^Weeks of basic junior officer fundamen­tals, designed for the new ensign to begin ms or her role as division officer and ^WO trainee with confidence. All gradu­^ates receive the same training and there is ⁿ° attempt to specialize by billet or ship type. Billet Specialty Training (BST) en- ^r°ute to the ship is the first exposure to ^sPecialization, and even with that, the ^new division officers simply don’t know ¹¹ all when they get there.

The Department Head Course gives considerable attention to billet and ship type specialization, but its primary mis- ^Sl°n is to prepare midgrade officers for career service in surface ships. It is no Incident the core curriculum is twice the ^ength of the specialty curriculum. The commitment to an extensive core ensures cat graduates leave with a baseline back­ground that will stand them in good stead Regardless of what ship or in what billet /'ey may find themselves (this also gives ^oth the Naval Military Personnel Com- !"^and and the commanding officer flexi- mty to reassign department heads when ^Urgency so dictates), and permits the Pro­tective Commanding Officer and Pro­tective Executive Officer courses to be ^argeiy an update, built on solid ground­work previously laid.

^ SWOS Has Changed Considerably: As ^ardware, procedures, policies, and our Potential adversaries change, we change

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• Tactical Employment Training has been added to the Department Head Course. This training teaches the student the detect-to-engage sequence for all warfare areas in his or her assigned ship type, and the combat systems doctrines, tactical manuals, and battle orders of that ship.
• Shipboard Readiness and Training and Management curricula have been strengthened in the areas of planning and execution, training, and supply manage­ment, responding to fleet feedback indi-

to keep pace. Change is urged by forces ranging from periodic flag-level audits to student critiques. The staff remains in constant touch with the fleet and the sys­tems commands, and a full-time program exists to maintain the currency of the syl­labus and its instructors. Some highlights of the changes in the past two years are: ► The Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course emphasis has shifted from matrix memorization to the detect-to-engage sequence and enlightened tactical deci­sion making.

eating that many department heads and division officers showed pronounced weakness in those areas. Likewise, the Department Head Course has introduced tailored billet specialty tracks targeted toward those aspects of specific billet performance where department heads have experienced difficulty (e.g., opera­tions officers in planning, training strate­gies, scheduling, etc.).

• A new Tactical Computer Lab has been established, featuring devices and pro­grams, to provide increased hands-on training and up-to-date tactical informa­tion. A working Navy Tactical Data Sys­tem (NTDS) suite exposes all students to tactical data systems at varying levels.
• Underway training in yard patrol craft (YP) at Newport has increased, including out-of-area cruises of several days’ dura­tion. YPs for Surface Warfare Officers School Command, Pacific, are a future improvement.
• Damage Control Training has flexed to meet the numerous changes in equipment and procedures induced by the combat experiences of the 1980s.

SWOS Must Keep Changing: Most change is needed. As weapon systems get faster, deadlier, and more sophisticated, time lines get shorter. The machiner does more and does it faster, but the human being in the loop has little time to respond and virtually no margin for error. Train­ing systems at SWOS must keep pace, and students must be trained on realistic devices, in real time, and under real stress. Use of such systems should pro­vide sustained and repeated exposure to the students. Show-and-tell devices, or trainers where each student gets a few minutes of hands-on time are of minimal value. As Captain Weinberg correctly stated, the key to learning is learning by doing. Hands-on training has proven it­self; the realistic, computerized propul­sion plant trainer at SWOS has shown that for 13 years.

In addition to schoolship support, SWOS must have the best in simulated systems to reinforce classroom training. The FFG-7 (guided missile frigate) Com­bat System trainer at Ronkonkoma, New York, will move to SWOS in the next two years. An Aegis suite is planned for later this year to replace the venerable NTDS equipment now in place. A modern bridge/combat information center trainer for the Division Officer Course is under construction, as is a state-of-the-art, en­vironmentally compatible fire-fighting trainer.

One of the best advances in the area of training applications in development is the Command Tactical Trainer (CTT), now being built under the auspices of the Naval Training Support Center, Orlando. CTT is the first large-scale device to in­corporate real-time artificial intelligence, and will be a tactical decision-making trainer designed to train and test PCOs and TAOs in realistic stress-filled scenar­ios. Seated at a console emulator, the stu­dent can learn the art of combat at sea operating with and against intelligent platforms of any type, all without the in­tervention of an instructor.

SWOS is on track, on target, and ap­plying spots as necessary. The best and brightest officers return here to instruct; total commitment to excellence is limited only by technical and fiscal realities.

“SSNs: Mounting an Offensive Defense”

(,See P.K. Peppe, pp. 39-41, September 1989; W.E. Christman, p. 24, November 1989; J.T. Hayward, pp. 24—25, November 1989; J.M. Hasik, p. 78, December 1989; T.N. Stewart, pp. 29-32, January 1990 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral W.J. Holland, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant            Commander

Peppe and Lieutenant Commander Stew­art, both of whom know better, perpetu­ate the perception that a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is a plodding dinosaur that will be slaughtered easily if ever found. That may be true for subs of other countries, but U.S. SSBNs are very quiet

ships equipped with superb sonars— usually as good as those in U.S. attack q submarines (SSNs) and vastly better than any employed by submarines of other countries. Their torpedofire-control sys­tems are as agile, and the weapons they carry are the same “best-torpedoes-in- q the-world,” as an SSN. The SSBNs of the U.S. Navy are capable submarine platforms with crews that are practiced and skilled in sensor employment and torpedo shooting. At submarine school Q ten years ago, it was not unusual to pit an SSN crew against an SSBN crew. In the attack, teachers with the SSBN often emerged victorious—much to the chagrin [J of their attack brethren.

It is virtually impossible to concentrate forces against a submarine that evades engagement. Encounters with SSBNs become ones of chance and, in such cir- U cumstances, U.S. SSBNs continue to enjoy advantages of stealth and firepower over any opponent—including most other U.S. subs.

U.S. SSBNs do not need “shotguns” (J or guards. No ship at sea is more capable in defense than a Trident.

“Breaking Through the Arctic” Cl

(,See R.M. West, pp. 57-60, January 1990

Proceedings)

Commander John A. Youngquist, U.S- Navy (Retired)—As an old polar hand, I especially appreciated Captain West’s il­lustrated article on the Arctic cruise of the Polar Star (WAGB-10), but the state­ment referring to the Greely expedition of 1881-84 deserves clarification.      Cl

Although “starvation and cannibal­ism” may have constituted some of the events of that expedition, six of its mem- U bers did survive. A.W. Greely himself went on to a successful career in the U.S■ Army, becoming its chief signal officer in 1887. He was awarded the Medal of Honor in the year of his death, which was ^ 1935.

_________________________________________________ Keelhauled-------------------------------------------------------

On 23 April 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson canceled the construction of the aircraft carrier United States. Some months afterward, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Creed C. Burlingame— one of the most-decorated submarine skippers of World War II, with three Navy Crosses and two Silver Stars—was invited to speak at the Air University in Montgomery, Alabama. During the question-and-answer session that followed his talk, when an Air Force colonel asked what the Navy was going to do with the keel of the just-canceled carrier, Creed replied:

“Colonel, the keel will be cut up in small pieces and sent to every colonel in the Air Force, as a memento of the only aircraft carrier the Air Force ever sank.”

Rear Admiral F. Julian Becton, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Comment and Discussion