Book Reviews & Books of Interest

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The U.S. Marine Corps in Crisis: Ribbon Creek and Recruit Training

Keith Fleming, Jr. Columbia, SC:

University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

*75 pp. Photos. Bib. Index. $24.95 ($22.45).

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Merrill C Bartlett, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)

Marine Corps recruit training has a '^Vell-earned mystique attached to it. Gen­^erations of Americans, fortunate to have ^worn forest green and jungle camouflage, nave endured the rigors of entry-level *^eathemeck military training; to the end °f their days, most Marines savor the ^exPeriencc like vintage wine. A veteran nf World War I captured the essence of karris Island, South Carolina, in a letter home: “The first day I was at camp I was afraid I was going to die. The next two '^veeks my sole fear was that I wasn’t going to die. And after that I knew I’d tover die because I’d become so hard that nothing could kill me.” (Kemper F. Con- jng, comp. Dear Folks at Home [Boston: “Oughton-Mifflin, 1919], p. 3.)

Between World War II and the Korean *var, when senior leatherneck officers flowed recruit training to drift almost ^s°lely into the hands of ill-prepared and Poorly supervised junior noncommis- ^s'oned officers (NCOs), physical abuse ^and extortion became the norm. Espe- ‘j'ally after the troops returned from the Korean War in the mid-1950s, problems Occurred frequently at the two recruit ^dePots, Parris Island and San Diego. Al- hough complaints had piled up for years— deluding a sizeable number of congres- *J°nal inquiries—Headquarters Marine h-orps (HQMC) chose to practice “man­^agement by exception” (do nothing— P^erhaps the problem will go away).

The disaster that HQMC never antici­pated—but any prudent individual could ^aave prophesied—occurred on the dark Sunday night of 8 April 1956. Staff Ser­geant Matthew C. McKeon, the duty drill 'bstructor for Platoon 71, led his recruits ^0r> a punishment hike into the murky wa- *ers of Ribbon Creek, near Parris Island. ”^s a result of this feeble and unauthor- '^?ed attempt to instill some discipline into ^a group of recalcitrant “boots,” six men crowned. Fleming’s scholarly study does [|°t dwell on the causes of the tragedy, ^ut instead concentrates on the Marine

Corps’s response to it.

Realizing the potential for a major con­gressional and public-relations calamity, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph McCall Pate, took the initiative to thwart unwanted criticism and inquiry into leatherneck recruit train­ing. One group of senior officers sur­rounding the office of the Commandant— led by Major General David M. Shoup— urged the mercurial (yet uninspiring) Pate to remain aloof, in hopes that the hue and cry from the news media and the mothers of young Marines might subside. Ignor­ing their collective wisdom, however, Pate called in a trusted friend from “the Guadalcanal Gang,” Major General Merrill B. Twining, to extricate the Corps from the situation and fend off congres­sional criticism.

Fleming’s study traces the efforts of Pate, Twining, and HQMC to adjudicate the tragedy precipitated by McKeon, keep the news media at bay, and take steps to prevent a recurrence of the disas­ter. Pate’s meddling confirms the conclu­sion of most observers that he was the most inept officer to hold the reins of the Corps since George G. Elliott (1903-10). Interestingly, the author, who is also Pate’s biographer, suggests that the affair poisoned the Pate-Twining relationship. Most observers, including the eminence gris of Marine Corps historians, Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., have concluded that President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s deci­sion—to bypass Twining and several other senior Marine Corps officers in choosing a successor to Pate—was a pet­ulant example of interservice rivalry, but Fleming suggests that it was Pate himself who urged the chief executive to pick Shoup rather than Twining.

This is a scholarly study and not merely a casual inquiry into an often- overlooked area of Marine Corps history. Dr. Fleming researched and wrote under the critical editorial eye of Professor (re­tired Marine Corps Reserve colonel) Allan R. Millett at Ohio State Univer­sity’s Mershon Institute. Fleming notes that the Marines of the post-Korean War generation were not cut from the same cloth as the generation reared during the Depression years. The Corps continued to insist on volunteers rather than draft­ees, but in truth most young men entered the Marine Corps to avoid the draft. Be­cause the recruits of the 1950s were less motivated and less likely to accept the strict leatherneck code of discipline and its tradition of rigorous training, the drill instructors of the era turned increasingly to harassment and abuse in order to mold Marines out of boys.

As the sad tale unfolded, Pate involved himself directly in the court-martial of McKeon by testifying in his defense. Then, the unpredictable senior leather­neck became embroiled in a confrontra- tion with a respected journalist—another Marine—with accusations of a commu­nist-inspired plot. Much of Fleming’s study traces the tortuous path of Pate’s ineptness and HQMC’s intransigence fol­lowing the tragedy.

It would be comforting to think that the leadership of the Marine Corps learned a painful lesson at Ribbon Creek; sadly, such was not the case. By 1959, when both the author and this reviewer passed through Marine Corps recruit training, abusive behavior had resumed in full fury; only now have drill instructors be­come more circumspect. Illegal behavior and extortion even extended to the hal-

Extreme stress and physical abuse crept into Marine Corps recruit training sometime after World War II, and had been virtually institution­alized when disaster struck in 1956.

Six battalions (here, troops from the 82nd Airborne Division) crowding the Point Salines airfield was overkill, says Adkin, and the Grenada operation barely succeeded in spite of itself.

of

devotes an appendix to the comments

to

which resulted in units going into

lowed halls of officer candidate school at Quantico, where some former drill in­structors inculcated the practices they had used at Parris Island and San Diego. In the early 1970s, the post-Vietnam Marine Corps was shocked by a series of mal­treatment cases, including the death of a recruit who was pummelled by pugil- stick-wielding Marines, urged on by a McKeon of another generation.

Only then did HQMC take decisive steps to curb the abuses. To the disgust of generations of marine sergeants, supervi­sion by commissioned officers at the re­cruit depots increased markedly. More importantly, the myth that the Corps could make a Marine out of any young man went by the wayside. After HQMC increased the recruiters’ quotas for high- quality high school graduates, drill in­structors experienced fewer difficulties in training their young charges; conse­quently, they were less inclined to bend the rules to accomplish their mission.

Readers of Marine Corps history will appreciate this view of a long-overlooked era. The author had access to the personal papers of the principal protaganists in the tragedy, as well as official records. The result is a carefully researched and well- written study worthy of a serious read both by Marines and by students of con­temporary sea-service history.

Colonel Bartlett, placed on the disability retired list in 1983 after more than 20 years of service, is twice the winner of the Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Me­morial Award in Marine Corps History.

Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada

Major Mark Adkin, British Army (Retired). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.

391 pp. Photos. Maps. Figs. Append.

Notes. Bib. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

Reviewed by David Evans

This significant public reckoning of the 1983 invasion of Grenada does not even come from an American, but from Mark Adkin, a retired British infantry officer who happened to be a civilian employee on the staff of the Barbados Defense Force at the time of the Grenada opera­tion. He concludes that “a communist nutmeg was smashed by an enormous American sledgehammer,” in an elo­quent passage that captures both the role of nutmeg exports in Grenada’s economy and the massive doses of firepower ap­plied in taking the island.

But such eloquence is occasional, and that is the paradox of this book. It is al­most unreadable, yet it should be re­quired reading for anyone concerned about the fighting skills of the U.S. mili­tary.

The so-called “rescue” of 600-odd U.S. medical students at Grenada, writes Adkin, was for the most part incidental to the larger U.S. motive: “The opportunity for inflicting military defeat on a rigid Marxist dictatorship.”

Adkin devotes nearly a hundred pages to the violent arcana of Grenadan poli­tics, which are interesting only because they set the stage for his principal anal­ysis—that of the U.S. sledgehammer.

Here, Adkin’s account is the dull pris­oner of his sources. What’s lacking are extended interviews with participants whose accounts would have given Ad­kin’s exegesis life. The book is at its best when we read of a soldier’s difficulty fighting under the weight of a 120-pound rucksack, but this account, like many, comes secondhand, although from the Army’s reputable Walter Reed Institute of Research: “We were like slow-moving turtles ... I would get up and rush for 10 yards, throw myself down and couldn’t get up ... I chucked my rucksack and was able to fight.”

Nevertheless, Adkin has carefully doc­umented his sources and, in the stark light of the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu’s elements of the art of war, Adkin’s account of the Grenada operation is a stunning revelation.

Sun Tzu cautioned, “Know the enemy.” In this respect, the U.S. troops dispatched to Grenada knew almost noth­ing, according to Adkin, of whom they were fighting. To be sure, U.S. troops and the officers over them had been given general estimates that somewhere around 1,500 armed troops awaited them, but where were they? Nobody seemed to know.

One result of such tactical ignorance was the hugely unnecessary assault of Camp Calivigny, purportedly defended by 600 heavily armed Cubans and a half­dozen antiaircraft guns. Three Rangers were killed in helicopter crashes while seizing a barracks compound that turned out to be empty.

How could the Americans have known their enemy, though, if they hardly knew each other? Recall Sun Tzu’s great corol­lary to knowledge of the foe, “Know yourself. ’ ’

In this regard, Adkin recounts how the planners cobbled together a team ⁰ strangers in a tactical scheme that # eluded all four military services, P*^uS newly created Special Operations Forces- These forces literally met each other i°^r the first time on the battlefield. Adkin military reformer and critic Willi^arn Lind, who characterized the plan ns> “The standard JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff) . . . pie-dividing contest among all tn Services.”

The U.S. forces, uncertain of ^tfie enemy but desirous of offering action everybody, opted for overkill. At °^ne point, the Army had six battalions crow ing the Point Salines airfield. It was tn^e very opposite of the venerable Sun Tzu ■ admonition that the most elegant victor# are those attained with minimum forces ■

Indeed, one gets the impression fr^otrl Adkins’s account that the Army’s troop deserved better than the leadership mw. got. With fully six battalions of some the Army’s most renowned infantry hand, Major General Edward Trobaug hesitated to attack, “seeing no reason speed things up,” according to Adkin- His attitude recalls that of Genera George McClellan, the Civil War corn mander of the Army of the Potomac, w always overestimated General Robert Lee’s strength and never moved until a sured of overwhelming strength.

In the end, Grenada was clumsily o° by Adkin’s account, almost botched sa for fantastic luck. As Adkin said:

Despite the dearth of intellig^en^_e

island blind; despite serious planning errors; despite an absence of strategic or tactical surprise; despite the failure to achieve concentration at decisive points; despite continuous communi­cation snarl-ups; and despite the lack of interservice coordination or an overall ground commander, this large-scale operation succeeded.”

The stark facts were wallpapered over ^with a flurry of award citations, including M2 Bronze Stars awarded to Army com­batants and a further 272 Bronze Stars handed out to Air Force personnel.

The latest U.S. venture into Central America makes Adkin’s book all the ^m°re relevant. As in the earlier Grenada °Peration, one gets the impression that if the planners of these operations were dentists, they would use dynamite to drill for cavities.

^ retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, Evans is A*^e military affairs correspondent for the Chicago •^ribune.

Soviet Military Power:

Prospects for Change, 1989

fkpartment of Defense. Washington, D.C.: povernment Printing Office, 1989. 160 pp. ‘■'us. Charts. Maps. $11.00 ($9.90) paper.

Reviewed by Norman Polmar

This eighth edition of Soviet Military Power, published amidst the political and ^economic turmoil of the Soviet Union ^an<J Eastern Europe, attempts to outline *he changes taking place in the Soviet defense establishment. It is a difficult ^task and this latest edition gets mixed hiarks.

Strangely, there is less detail about Soviet force structure in this edition than •h previous years. There is a certain irony Mien one considers that vast amount of ^formation being released by the Soviet ^Ur>ion on its military forces.

Prom the front and back covers— phich show Soviet troops withdrawing ^r°m Afghanistan—to the listing of So- ''^,et and other Warsaw Pact nations’ cut­^backs in personnel, ships, tanks, and air­^Craft, one gets the feeling that the Soviet ’breat is declining. But the report is not °^verly sanguine. In his preface, Secretary °f Defense Richard Cheney observes:

‘‘The most striking feature of So­viet military power today is the ex­traordinary momentum of its offen­sive strategic nuclear force modernization. The Soviets are de­ploying the new silo-based SS-18 Mod 5 heavy ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]. These SS-18s have at least ten nuclear warheads each, and possess greater accuracy and throw-weight than earlier versions, increasing the Strategic Rocket Forces’ capability to destroy hard tar­gets such as US ICBM silos.”

The United States does not have any “heavy” ICMBs. Cheney’s litany of Soviet strategic improvements goes on to describe the completion of the sixth (and apparently last) Typhoon and the sixth Delta IV strategic-missile submarines, new strategic bombers, and other force increases.

With respect to general-purpose forces, the report contends that the major Soviet cutbacks are mitigated by first, the deliveries of new weapons, and second, the decline in real terms of U.S. defense spending. As if to confirm Cheney’s as­sertions, within weeks of the publication of Soviet Military Power, the Soviets were conducting flight trials with their new carrier Tbilisi and officials in Wash­ington were debating whether to cut two or three aircraft carriers.

The Defense Department has tried to provide a balanced presentation. The book has special sections outlining the reductions in troops and weapons in the Eastern Bloc. Other sections use hard data to prove the increases in the annual Soviet production of tanks, bombers, short-range ballistic missiles, long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, and sur­face-to-air missiles since Mikhail Gor­bachev has been General Secretary of the Politburo. But even in categories where the Gorbachev-era numbers have de­clined, the annual production rates are impressive: 4,600 armored vehicles (in addition to tanks), 900 self-propelled ar­tillery pieces, 1,000 towed artillery pieces, etc.

Overall, according to the report, Soviet military spending has increased by 3% each year after inflation since 1985. In the same period, U.S. defense spending was cut by 11%.

However, some of the data in the new Soviet Military Power are questionable. For example, the book credits Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) with having 160 Tu-22M Backfire and 175 Tu-16 Badger strike aircraft. The Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) publication Unclassified Naval Order of Battle, dated June 1989, credits the Soviet Navy with 130 Back­fires and 135 Badger strike aircraft, while the DIA Force Structure Summary of February 1989 credits SNA with 120 Backfires and 150 Badgers.

While the different publications had different cutoff dates, the increase of

SNA Backfires by 30 aircraft in less than a year exceeds the total Backfire produc­tion for both naval aviation and Soviet strategic aviation. Similarly, the number of Badger strike aircraft is declining, not increasing. There is similar confusion in other data as well.

In addition to recounting various as­pects of Soviet military power, the book assesses relative NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities. There is no simple bottom line: “[U.S. and Soviet] National security objectives vary from region to region, and the number of other vari­ables, contingencies, and inherent uncer­tainties increase dramatically as the focus of an assessment is widened.”

Particularly interesting in the balance section is an area-by-area review of polit­ical-military situations and an assessment of U.S. and Soviet technological compe­tition. While the United States is ahead of the Soviet Union in more measures of technology applied to deployed systems (15 of 31 for the United States and 6 of 31 for the Soviets, and equality in 10), many of the arrows are pointing toward future Soviet superiority.

The book concludes that

“today the likelihood of conflict be­tween the United States and the Soviet Union is perhaps as low as it has been at any time in the post-war era. . . . [But] prudence . . . dictates that we maintain our defenses while we wait to see if Soviet capabilities to threaten our security are brought into line with their stated benign intentions. Our experience in this century has shown again and again that, especially with totalitarian states, seemingly friendly relations can change very quickly at the decision of a few powerful indi­viduals.”

The graphics and layout of this eighth edition continue to improve. At the same time, there are questionable efforts to jazz up the book—such as a thoroughly confusing inverted map of the Far East, allegedly from the Soviet perspective, presented next to a “normal” map of the area, which appears to be what the Sovi­ets in fact use. The glossary, index, and, especially, the index of illustrations de­mand improvement to make them useful. Gone are the most fascinating and useful commercial satellite photos of Soviet bases, ports, and test facilities that ap­peared in the past.

Norman Polmar, a frequent contributor to the Pro­ceedings, is the author of the Naval Institute’s Guide to the Soviet Navy and conceived and edited the first edition of the U.S. Navy’s Understanding Soviet Naval Developments.

Books of Interest

By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy

Counterattack: The Continuing Saga of he Corps

Black Odyssey: The Seafaring Traditions °f Afro-Americans

James Baker Farr. New York: Peter Lang, 1989. ³¹⁰ pp. Notes. Bib. Ind. $45.00 ($40.50).

Parr’s history, both scholarly and readable, documents the often overlooked participation blacks in American maritime activities. I'rom colonial times to the present, enslaved and free, blacks have crewed merchant ships ^and fought in the nation’s wars, playing an ■ntportant role in U.S. maritime history.

Brats: Children of the American Military ‘'Peak Out

^ary R. Truscott. New York: E.P. Dutton. 1989. ²⁵⁶ PP. $18.95 ($17.05).

truscott, descended from three generations of Army families, explores the unique way of life ^enjoyed, and sometimes suffered, by children U.S. military personnel. She relies upon her °Wn experience but the majority of the insights r°me from the 40 other brats she interviewed.

discusses the assets of the military up- ringing—such as the ability to make new iriends quickly—and the deficits—such as the difficulty in making long-term commitments— '^Vlth candor and feeling.

Chained Eagle

J"^Verett Alvarez Jr., and Anthony S. Pitch. New ^ork: Donald 1. Fine, 1989. 308 pp. Photos. Illus. ^M8-95 ($17.05).

In August 1964, Lieutenant (junior grade) ^‘Varez became the first American pilot to ^ecome a prisoner of war in Vietnam. His or- ^e;|l lasted for the duration of the war— p8ht-and-a-half years. This is his story—the °neliness of his first year without seeing or nearing another American, the physical trials brutal torture, and the mental anguish of earning on Christmas Day of 1971 that his "die was divorcing him. It is nonetheless an Uplifting and inspiring account of triumph in ne face of great trials and of the potential of he human character.

A'-E.B. Griffin. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, '"0. 444 pp. $16.95 ($15.25).

■Cje third book in Griffin’s The Corps series, his fast-paced novel is set in the early months p! U.S. involvement in World War II, from ^earl Harbor to Guadalcanal. Publishers

Weekly says the series combines “the best ele­ments of military history and the war story.”

The Court-Martial of Clayton Lonetree

Lake Headley with William Hoffman. New York: Henry Holt, 1989. 240 pp. Photos. $19.95 (17.95).

A “blatant case of entrapment and justice mis­carried.” So says Headley, chief investigator of the defense, about the prosecution of Clay­ton Lonetree, the only U.S. Marine brought to trial in connection with the Moscow embassy “sex for secrets” scandal.

Management of Marine Design

Stian Erichsen. Stoneham, MA: Butterworths,

1989. 239 pp. Illus. Tables. Figs. Bib. Ind. $105.00 ($94.50).

This technical treatise comprehensively guides one through the design process in both ship­building and offshore engineering. Among the information included are explanations of office organization, staffing, market evaluation, de­sign attitudes and tactics, cost assessment, and estimation of weights and volumes.

Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century

John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan, editors. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 373 pp. Photos. Gloss. Notes. Ind. $55.00 ($49.50).

This is a collection of essays by notable ex­perts that examine the similarities, both histor­ical and current, in British and U.S. maritime strategies and the role of navies in maintaining the world balance of power. The concluding essay by the editors is especially thought- provoking: “Maritime Strategy and National Policy: Historical Accident or Purposeful Planning?”

Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years

John M. Collins. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1989. 236 pp. Photos. Illus. Maps. Tables. Figs. Append. Gloss. Notes. Ind. $24.95 ($22.45).

The U.S. Congress commissioned this study to help it and the White House understand the military implications of space and formulate a sensible U.S. space policy. This book concen­trates on the earth-moon system and incorpo­rates both current and projected technology as well as the complexities of an integrated strat­egy. The authors discuss problems such as the insufficiency of some current military termi­nology (the use of terms such as “front” and

“rear” come to mind) and recommend creat­ing a Supreme Allied Commander for Space.

Prints in the Sand: The U.S. Coast Guard Beach Patrol During World War If

Eleanor C. Bishop. Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing, 1989. 81 pp. Photos. Illus. Maps. Bib. Ind. $9.95 ($8.95) paper.

Sailors on horseback, coastal picket boats, and canine sentries were all components of this unusual element of the nation’s defense during World War II. Charged with guarding thou­sands and thousands of miles of U.S. coastline from foreign invasion, this little-known arm of the Coast Guard was manned by boys and men ranging from 17 to 73 years of age who lived all around the country.

ES Retiring From Military Service: A Commonsense Guide

Captain K.C. Jacobsen, U.S. Navy (Retired). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

220 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($18.36).

Practical and often humorous, this guide leads the retiree through each step of the process— from deciding to retire to life after. It simpli­

fies the process, encourages the reader through some of the more difficult stages, and makes this potentially traumatic transition as painless as possible. With many useful features—such

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as a flexible timetable that includes all the important milestones; a discussion of the pros and cons of working in the private sector or in the government; and advice on writing re­sumes, evaluating job offers, and adjusting to civilian life—this is mandatory reading for anyone of any service approaching retirement.

A Treasury of Military Humor

James E. Meyers, editor. Springfield, IL: Lincoln Herndon Press, 1990. 348 pp. Illus. Bib. $19.95 ($17.95) hardcover, $10.95 ($9.85) paper.

G.I. jokes and cartoons from the Civil War, World War I, World War Ii, Korea, and Viet­nam provide not only humor but insight into the thoughts and feelings of the soldiers, sail­ors, airmen, and Marines of these wars.

Video

Wings Over Water

David Hoffman, director. Camden, ME: Varied Directions, 1986. $59.95.

Integrating historical film footage with inter­views of veteran aviators, this dramatic docu­mentary recounts the role of naval aviation in the U.S. rise to world power. John Corey of The New York Times writes that Wings Over Water is a “provocative look at the history of naval aviation” and is a “spectacular film.”

Other Titles of Interest

The ANZUS Crisis: Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence.

Michael C. Pugh. New York: Cambridge Uni­versity Press, 1989. 285 pp. Tables. Key. Append. Notes. Bib. Ind. $44.50 ($40.05).

8303

Qty-

Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence

Robert E. Harkavy. New York: Oxford Uni­versity Press, 1989. 389 pp. Maps. Tables. Figs. Notes. Bib. Ind. $74.00 ($66.60).

Comprehensive Security for the Baltic:

An Environmental Approach

Arthur H. Westing, editor. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1989. 148 pp. Ta­bles. Append. Key. Notes. Ind. $39.95 ($35.95).

Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, 1989-90

Bernard Blake, editor. Arlington, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1989. 207 pp. Photos. Ta­bles. Figs. Key. Ind. $140.00 ($126.00).

Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1989-90

John W. R. Taylor, editor. Arlington, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1989. 808 pp. Pho­tos. Tables. Figs. Key. Ind. $170.00 (153.00).

Memoirs of a Counterrevolutionary: Life with the Contras, the Sandinistas, and the CIA

Arturo Cruz, Jr. New York: Doubleday, 1989. 266 pp. Gloss. 19.95 ($17.95).

Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician

Roger Morris. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990. 1005 pp. Photos. Key. Notes. Bib. Ind. $27.50 ($24.75).

Silver Stallion: A Novel of Korea

Ahn Junghyo. New York: Soho Press, 1990. 269 pp. $19.95 ($17.95).

The South Pacific: Political, Economic, and Military Trends

Henry S. Albinski, et al. Washington, DC’ Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1989- Maps. Tables. $9.95 (8.95).

U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s

Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez, editor. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989­324 pp. Notes. Ind. $38.00 ($34.20) hard­cover, $14.95 ($13.45).

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