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By Lieutenant Janies L. Grandfield, U.S. Navy
The cannibals of the Navy
It s two days before the operational Propulsion plant examination (OPPE) and it’s coming down to what the engineers call crunch time. A final check °f damage control (DC) gear reveals Slx oxygen-breathing apparatuses lOBAs) inoperative, three boxes of Draeger tubes out of date (and were when they were received on board), a,'d the thermal imager acting funny a§am. jn addition, the main propulsion assistant tells the engineer of three faulty circuit cards for the shaft torque computer. With so little time remaining before the OPPE, the engineer cashes 'Jt on some favors he’s built up around ■he waterfront. A few phone calls are ■hade, and a few hours later the much- teeded items are on board, all with the stipulation that they be returned first thing.
Different ship, same week. The inspection and Survey team will walk on hoard in three days. The chief boatswain’s mate has just given the first ■outenant a list of missing items—a flooring shackle, 20 Kapok life jackets, and 150 Chem-lite light sticks. Chiefs make calls, and the next mom- ,n8 the first lieutenant gives the opera- h°ns boss a completed checklist, show- ln8 all required items as on board.
Different ship, same week. The combat systems assessment visit has been going off without a hitch. Training, Planned maintenance system, and all administrative areas were graded satisfactory . A blown circuit card in the yIk-116 underwater fire-control system ls the only obstacle preventing a grade °f outstanding. Once again, help is °n|y a phone call away.
One week later, the group commander is pleased. Three of his ships nave not only passed major inspections; fhey all did extremely well. Readiness *n the group, he proudly thinks to himSelf, has never been higher.
. Cannibalization solely for inspec- ftons’ sake is wrong. It presents a false Sense of readiness to the chain of command from commanding officer through ■ype commander. Moreover, can- btbalization cheats sailors on ships, Specially when it involves damage c°ntrol gear or “per man” items of protective clothing or safety gear. Let’s take a closer look at the three ships used as examples.
The first ship passes the OPPE, and the fleet and type commanders think they have a fully ready ship at their disposal, when this in fact is not the case. By borrowing the needed items, the first ship has, in effect, lied to the fleet and type commanders about its true state of engineering readiness. In addition, the ship’s chain of command has lied to the six repair team members whose OBAs are inoperative. Should a real emergency occur after the inspection, the sailors will dutifully go to their repair lockers, confident that their equipment will be ready to go.
On the second ship, the consequences of cannibalization may not be felt until several months later. The first lieutenant, having returned the borrowed gear, ensures that a new mooring shackle is ordered. His boss, while reviewing supply requests on the SNAP II computer, is forced to deal with ever-dwindling operating target funds. With no real need for a “spare” mooring shackle, he hits the disapproval key. Three months later, the ship is on deployment, preparing to refuel alongside. The after-rig will have to be shorthanded, since there are not enough Kapoks and team members would violate safety rules if they did not wear life jackets. As a result of the undermanned rig team, the fueling probe suffers a casualty that will take three hours to repair. So as not to disrupt the oiler’s schedule, the ship’s commanding officer decides to take his vessel into port, moor her to a buoy, and take fuel from a barge.
The third ship, like the first two, passes inspection with flying colors. Three weeks later, the group commander is understandably perplexed when the ship performs extremely poorly in an antisubmarine exercise, suffering many casualties to its Mk-116 system. “Better in an exercise than in the real thing,” he muses.
If preinspection cannibalization is wrong, why is it so widespread and how can it be stopped? And in the real-world conditions of limited resources and increasing commitments, if cannibalization is to continue, how can it be practiced with minimal adverse effect on licet readiness?
The answers to the first two questions are closely related. Both the senior chain of command (squadron, group, and type commanders) and the ships’ senior operators (petty officers, chiefs, division officers, department heads, and COs) must realize and reemphasize the purpose of all inspections—to assess fleet readiness and correct discrepancies as they are discovered. For the ships’ operators, this means an introspective look at their moral obligation both to seniors and to subordinates to expose problems, not hide them. For the senior chain of command, inspections should be assessments, not pass/fail tests with results used as fitness report bullets. Just as a ship’s CO wants the officer-of-the-deck to call him when in doubt, squadron and group commanders should foster that same sense of responsibility in their ships’ COs. The captain who calls attention to a problem should have at his disposal all resources of the chain of command to get it fixed. One who passes an inspection on clandestinely borrowed parts is not doing his job.
In certain cases, cannibalization is the best course of action. The battle- group commander should use all the assets under his immediate control to maintain the material readiness of as many ships as possible. The casualty summary reporting system already provides a line to address whether or not ships in company have been screened for the necessary part. Cannibalization in this case meets two important criteria—operational commitment and the informed consent of the chain of command. Cannibalization might also be justified when a limited training opportunity might be lost; for example, a gun mount part should be transferred to allow a ship to continue naval gunfire support shooting.
Parts will always fail unexpectedly. Some will be carried on board or readily available, others will not. But all levels of the chain of command must reemphasize what should be our single peacetime goal—combat readiness.
Lieutenant Grandfield is with Assault Craft Unit Four at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Virginia. He served on the John Hancock (DD-981).
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Proceedings / December 1990