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The evolutionary chart of the ship-to-shore Marine movers—from (left to right) the Alligators that stormed Okinawa in 1945 and the present AAV-7A1, to air-cushion craft supported by the iffy MV-22— generally makes sense. But the projected high-speed advanced assault amphibian vehicle, at right, does not fit with over-the- horizon doctrine.
During the lean years of the late 1940s, the armed forces of the United States campaigned hard against each other for every budget dollar. At one point General Omar Bradley, in testimony before a congressional committee, questioned the utility of the seaborne assault; “I am wondering whether we shall ever have another large-scale amphibious operation.”1 Less than a year later, General Douglas Mac Arthur and the 1st Marine Division proved that Bradley’s thoughts were pre-
U.S. MARINE CORPS
mature at best. The landing at Inchon cut the lifeline of the North Korean offensive and dramatically turned the tide of the war. Since then, the Marines have been fond of citing this event whenever anyone challenged the usefulness of the Corps.
The sea services are now undergoing another period of close scrutiny, as Congress, the Executive, and the various branches of the Department of Defense jockey for position with respect to budgets, roles, and missions. As we engage in these debates, we must not lose ourselves in mere self-justification. Instead, we need to take a hard look at the future of amphibious doctrine and the hardware needed to implement it. A prime case in point is the armored assault vehicle and the capability for surface forcible entry.
The concept of forcible entry, “landing in an area defended by an enemy with direct fire weapons,” goes back to World War II and the adoption of the early armored amphibians (designated LVTs).2 This forward leap in engineering allowed troops to attack a defended shore with a fair prospect of success. Prior to this, such assaults had nearly always ended in disaster, from the failed Spartan landing at Pylos to the slaughter of British infantry on Gallipoli’s Beach V. Along with the LVT came shallow- draft, bow-ramp landing craft, which carried the bulky vehicles and supplies that constituted the rapid buildup of combat power ashore once the initial waves had secured the beach. The advent of the helicopter in the 1950s presented a third means of ship-to-shore movement, though vertical envelopment promised to circumvent the carnage and congestion at the high-water mark.
By Captain Jon T. Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps
I Reaching the Beach
Through the 1980s the Navy-Marine Corps team moved progressively closer to the concept of over-the-horizon assaults, a doctrinal development rooted in technology. The speed and endurance of the air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) and the tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22) make it theoretically possible for an attacking force to launch from points 40 or more miles at sea. This technical capability gives an ■ amphibious task force a great deal of tactical flexibility and allows much more use of surprise and maneuver. Nevertheless, neither of these systems is well-suited to the mission of forcible entry. Both are thin-skinned and vulnerable to direct-fire weapons.
As a result, since the dawn of the over-the-horizon era, analysts and engineers have wrestled with the problem of the third leg of the amphibious “triad,” the armored vehicle that can swim ashore while under direct fire. The venerable amphibious assault vehicle (AAV-7), like its World War II LVT counterpart, is a relatively slow vehicle that can begin its operations only from the inshore area, thus negating the advantages provided by LCACs and V-22s. The Marine Corps is currently involved in a program to design and procure a follow-on system that will allow
U.S. maritime forces to land troops across a defended beach from an over-the-horizon starting point. Most members of the naval services consider this project necessary. According to Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Earl, “No major power in the world, let alone a superpower, can afford not to have a forcible entry capability.”3 Because of near-unanimous agreement within the naval service regarding the need for an AAV-7 follow-on, there has been little debate on the subject.4
Certainly, everyone recognizes that a highly capable surface assault system would be a useful asset. The real question, however, should be whether or not such equipment can meet likely enemy threats in the foreseeable future. The Air Force is already in the throes of a divisive struggle over the fate of the B-2, a high-technology manned bomber with a questionable mission and a high price tag. The Marine Corps can ill afford a similar brawl over its most expensive ground hardware project.
Four options afford resolution of the over-the-horizon surface-assault shortfall. The first and potentially least expensive consists of improving both the air cushion and amphibious assault vehicles. The AAV-7, now slightly more capable on sea and land, would be ferried to the inshore area by the LCAC. This would compensate for the AAV’s slow water speed, yet still enable it to swim ashore against hostile fire. The second possibility is a new AAV model that could also hitch rides on the LCAC. A third alternative is the development of an entirely new craft that could ferry an AAV-7 or its replacement to the line of departure. This system would retain the speed of the LCAC, but present a better-protected and less-lucrative
To Hell with Surface Forcible Entry
The Navy-Marine Corps team could gain a great deal by renouncing the doctrine of surface forcible entry. First and foremost, we could immediately suspend research and development expenditures on the advanced amphibious assault vehicle and ax several billion dollars from future budgets. This would signal to Congress that we are seriously reviewing our needs during this difficult fiscal period, rather than blindly seeking a continuation of past practices. The savings might help to restore the V-22, which is truly critical to the future of over- the-horizon assaults. At least the money should allow us to shield other programs that are useful across the spectrum of conflict
If the doctrine of surface forcible entry were renounced, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles could fit the Marine Corps bill and save some money for warrior training.
target to long-range defensive weapons. The final and most expensive option is a high-water-speed advanced assault amphibian vehicle (AAAV) that could make the run from the amphibious task force at 20-plus knots.
Each of these solutions has significant drawbacks. The problem with the first two is the use of LCACs to ferry assault vehicles within range of defended beaches. Aside from the immediate requirement to modify the landing craft so they can actually offload amphibians into water, an LCAC can carry no more than three AAV-7s, using less than their full capacity when loaded with troops, fuel, and ammunition. Therefore, it would take at least four LCACs (more likely five) to land just one rifle company embarked in ten AAVs. This is a substantial investment of a scarce commodity, within any task force. (Even with the new assault and dock ships, a typical three-ship amphibious ready group will be able to carry just seven LCACs.)
With the air-cushion craft so employed, they cannot be preloaded with their typical cargo of tanks, light armored vehicles, or artillery. Thus they will be forced to return to the ships, go through a time-consuming loading process, and only then make their first dash for the beach. Under this scenario the rapid buildup of combat power ashore will be significantly slowed.
Second, the use of unprotected LCACs close to a hostile shore during the initial assault will place these precious assets at considerable risk. Given their limited numbers and their importance to the overall mission, it seems unwise to use them in the initial assault waves. If, on the other hand, the AAVs launch farther from shore, then problems arise with fuel consumption and troops becoming debilitated by long exposure to engine fumes and rough water.
The third alternative seeks to overcome these concerns. Procurement of a separate craft to carry the AAVs would allow the air cushion craft to proceed with their normal missions and avoid much of the danger of the initial assault. Candidates vary from a small surface-effect ship to a low-profile sled. In any case, these craft would also have to drop their piggy-backing AAVs some distance from the beach in any opposed assault. High-riding armored vehicles would present too big a target for enemy weapons.
This solution seems to be a reasonable one, but significant costs must be considered, namely the additional equipment and manpower required. Theoretically, the capability of these craft to supplement the workhorse LCACs in succeeding waves may justify the expense. Depending on the exact nature of the system, however,
I
Initial landings against weak or nonexistent enemy forces would reduce the requirements for air nnd naval gunfire support and thereby allow more of these overworked assets to be directed toward other missions. Moreover, we would not have to solve the problem of bringing effective firepower to bear against beach fortifications. Future amphibious ships, as well as embark/debark plans, could he optimally configured for LCAC and V-22 operations alone.
The Marine Corps would still require an armored vehicle to accompany its tanks into battle ashore. And many good candidates are available. But this ueed could be filled best by obtaining Bradley IFVs. The vehicle is designed for just that role and has proved itself in extensive operational employment.
Some would argue that a Marine Corps with Bradleys and without a surface-assault capability would be nothing more than a second Army, and therefore an anachronism. Several important differences would remain, however, that would ensure the continued existence of the Marine Corps. First, our combined-arms structure means that we are especially well-suited to the amphibious role, since we can rapidly place a complete combat package ashore. Even if the Army assumed the mission, it would first have to capture an air field and wait for Air Force planes to be ferried into the area before it could operate without naval support. Second, our long association with the Navy ensures that we will be better able to plan and execute seaborne assaults on short notice.
An example of both these features at work is the deployment of Marine squadrons on board Navy ships. Our F/A-18s could sail to the objective area on carriers and play a dual role of providing close air support and fleet defense until the battle group departed. Harriers on board amphibious platforms would be able to go ashore rapidly, even before the seizure of an airfield. The Army could obtain similar capabilities only by absorbing the Marines and all of our equipment. Of course, the Air Force would then demand possession of the Harriers and F/A- 18s, which would make the whole transaction irrelevant in the first place.
More important, the Corps is unlikely to meet its end as long as it maintains a significant competitive edge over its landbound counterpart. Preparedness does not necessarily consist of having everything that one could possibly ever need, but of being ready to make the most of what one can reasonably expect to obtain. If the Marine Corps can demonstrate to Congress and to the people of the United States that we are able to adapt quickly and correctly to shifting challenges, then we need have no fear of extinction.
J. T. Hoffman
Ihere may be no room for another landing craft within an already crowded task force. If these new craft displace LCACs from the limited number of welldeck slots, then lough comparisons of relative value will need to be made. Each lost air-cushion craft is one less delivery system that can land its cargo beyond the beach rather than on it. We are also then back to square one, because LCAC replacements will be off carrying assault vehicles instead of circling with pre-loaded items that will be in heavy demand after the initial waves.
The final option is the high-water-speed advanced assault vehicle, a system that obviates the same problems of other self-deploying craft. It would occupy the same footprint in an amphibious task force now held by current AAVs, so there would be no need to reduce the number of LCACs. Nor would any time be lost in landing subsequent Waves after the armored amphibians cleared the beach. The speed of the advanced vehicle would make it compatible with the other two legs of the amphibious triad in a true over-the-horizon assault.
The primary problem with this advanced, high-speed vehicle is cost. Current projections are just that, since the system has not even been designed. A recently published figure cites $6.6 billion for research and development and
procurement.5 That figure is eight times the size of the Marine Corps’s entire fiscal year 1991 procurement budget.6 Given the apparently lean years ahead and the current problems in obtaining the similarly expensive V-22, the odds do not look good for acquisition. Moreover, the system’s postulated operational date is 1999, which means that the Marines will have to wait more than a decade for complete over-the-horizon capability. Budget stretch-outs in design and purchasing could push that date far into the next century.
Even if the sea services could muster the political muscle to push the full program through Congress, significant questions remain about the vehicle’s combat effectiveness. Backers argue that new technology is already making it possible to incorporate high water speed with improved performance on the ground. These developments include everything from lightweight materials to new suspensions. Each of those improvements may mean that a “high-water-speed AAAV is [not] mutually exclusive from a highly capable land vehicle,’’ but this view overlooks the substantial tradeoffs that still must be made.7 Weight savings gained from new materials can be used to incorporate improved water-propulsion systems, but they can also be used to increase firepower, armor, fuel and ammo loads, and engine power. With the same limits on technology and size, an infantry fighting vehicle has to be better on land than its amphibian cousin. Since most fighting will be done on the ground against well-equipped foes, the performance penalty for an advanced amphibious assault vehicle may be too high. Another problem is the additional maintenance required to keep a more complicated land/sea system in operating condition.
Of course, the final arbiter of procurement decisions should not be budget constraints or comparisons with single-use systems. The most important criterion is need. Must the Marine Corps have “something to deliver assault troops under fire,” a vehicle which they can ride “through the gates of hell when the next real D-Day occurs”?8 This question applies to all the surface assault options under discussion.
There is no doubt that it would be useful to have the capability to storm every hostile shore. However, even if we possessed an advanced craft, that would not necessarily give us the potential to attack defended beaches. One must remember that victory in World War II required much more than armored amphibians. The LVTs made it ashore because they were backed by a heavy investment in naval gunfire and close air support. Without that firepower to break down enemy defenses, both fixed and mobile, the amphibious campaigns in both theaters of the war would have been impossible.
We are now in the process of losing half, and potentially all, of the few big guns left in the fleet. While the 5- inchers that remain are excellent weapons, their capability against strong fortifications must be questioned seriously • Naval guns are only accurate against small targets when they can fire with flat trajectories at relatively close ranges. Given the proliferation of cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions, the Navy is unlikely to risk its limited number of cruisers and destroyers on close-in bombardment of shore targets. There is no technological solution to this problem on the horizon, either. Land- attack cruise missiles are too few and too expensive to provide an answer. Laser-guided weapons rely on a platform that can linger offshore, designate targets, and survive under the same hostile fire that would drive other surface forces from the area. Gunfire ships may even be so far from shore that they will be out of effective range in any case.
The problem would be compounded by the enemy’s use of camouflage, which would make it impossible to spot fortifications before they actually opened fire on incoming
assault waves. During World War II, close-in destroyers could duel with these surprise defenses and generally win; the same will not be true in any conceivable future scenario. The ships will be far out to sea and the enemy’s first salvos of precision-guided weapons will take a heavy toll on our much smaller number of assault craft.
Close air support is inherently incapable of the pinpoint accuracy required to knock out small, heavily fortified targets. Saturation bombing made up for some of this shortcoming in World War II, but the next time around we will
have significantly fewer aircraft available for such hamhanded tactics. The environment will also be much less henign. The improved accuracy provided by modern technology will dissipate when the air is filled with surface-to- mr missiles and radar-directed gunfire.
At some point, the Navy-Marine Corps team may de- Vclop the means to provide adequate fire support for an °Pposed surface assault. But will such an operation be necessary? True, even Third-World nations are acquiring the potential to defend their shores with advanced ground Weapons, which would seem to make an armored surface assault the only choice. Libya, for instance, boasts a well- quipped army that would be difficult to defeat at the water’s edge if we did not possess AAVs of some sort.
Nevertheless, it is numerically impossible for the Libyans to station significant forces at every conceivable landing site along their littoral. And the very nature of 0ver-the-horizon doctrine allows us to choose an objective somewhere along a wide stretch of an enemy’s coastline. An amphibious task force should be able to land at some undefended point, or use an airlanded force of light armored vehicles to get behind a weak point and clear a site f°r LCACs to bring heavier forces ashore. The task force Would then not be faced with the necessity of attacking a Wrongly held beach.
Over-the-horizon doctrine also applies to the Soviet Union, should that threat ever re-accelerate. The Soviets have few overseas facilities, and we have several, many of which are on the Soviet periphery. Therefore, we would only be forced to neutralize those few and ignore them in much the same way that we allowed most Japanese forces >n World War II to wither on the vine. Theoretically, we might have to retake some geographic choke points cap- tered by some sort of Soviet naval offensive, but over all, an over-the-horizon assault should be effective without meeting strong resistance at the water’s edge.
An evaluation of present threats and capabilities shows that we cannot execute a forcible entry in any but the most henign situations. In fact, we have been unable to conduct such an operation for years. Any attempt to land AAV-7s against a shore defended by antiship missiles and other Precision-guided munitions would become a debacle. The tactic of underway launch has not reduced the danger appreciably.
Amphibious forces have not had to make a surface assault against serious opposition since World War II. The Inchon landing was a bold stroke against comparatively light odds. Moreover, the same success could have been achieved without a risky frontal attack on the harbor. The Marines conducted several amphibious landings along the coast of Vietnam, but none met the kind of resistance on the beach that made AAVs necessary just to get ashore. Marines also used their armored vehicles on Grenada, but again faced no significant opposition at the water’s edge. The British succeeded in the Falklands Conflict without an AAV-type system because they purposely selected a lightly defended landing site. (Had they possessed LCACs and V-22s, their casualties would have been much smaller.)
The sole instance where an armored assault force might have been useful was during the 1975 operation against Koh Tang, since several helicopters were lost there to heavy groundfire. But AAVs were simply unavailable, because of time and distance. On the other hand, had they been there, they might themselves have become casualties to mines and handheld antitank weapons. Only a heavy pre-landing bombardment would have reduced opposition to an assault, and that would have been detrimental to the purpose of the mission, which was to free hostages, not to seize terrain. Given that same situation in the future, a night landing by V-22s or rubber boats would be more effective than a full-scale attack by advanced amphibious assault vehicles.
We should adopt the tenets of maneuver warfare for the amphibious assault. Future operations will depend mainly on the use of deception and the over-the-horizon capability to hit the enemy at a weak point. Air and naval gunfire could then effectively support the initial landing against any counterattacks. An opposing ground force on the move is less able to defend itself against aerial attack and is much easier to find. Cluster bomblets and armor-seeking warheads would also be more effective against an enemy in the open instead of one shielded by fortifications. Amphibious forces would then, by definition, become the leading practitioners of maneuver warfare.
The present situation in the Persian Gulf provides a ready example. The U.S. Navy is unlikely to place amphibious ships or combatants close enough to the Kuwaiti coast to make a traditional surface forcible entry possible. But an amphibious presence, even far offshore, will force the Iraqis to place strong forces along the coast in order to prevent an over-the-horizon landing. This would weaken their capability at the Saudi border, while we would retain the option of rapidly landing those forces behind friendly lines to support other operations. The presence of AAAVs would not materially improve our position, since these thin-skinned vehicles could not realistically face Iraqi armored units without tank support. If LCACs can get ashore with tanks, then the capability of AAVs to “fight” their way ashore is wasted. If LCACs can’t bring in the tanks immediately, AAVs will not be sent at all.
'LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC, First to Fight (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 71.
2LtCol Robert L. Earl, USMC, “The Over-The-Horizon Alternatives,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1988) p.37.
3Ibid.
4For one of the few contrary views, see LtCol Ky L. Thompson, USMC, “Some Thoughts on the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle,” Marine Corps Gazette (January 1989), pp. 14-16.
5Col Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), “The Next Assault Amphibian,” Proceedings (November 1989), p. 42.
6Gen A.M. Gray, USMC, “The Annual Report of the Marine Corps to the Congress,” Marine Corps Gazette (April 1990), p. 69.
7Walter Zeitfuss, “Some Facts on the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle,” Marine Corps Gazette (April 1990), pp. 46-7.
Alexander, pp. 41, 43.
Captain Hoffman is an infantry officer currently serving as a senior instructor in military history at the U.S. Naval Academy.