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A plethora of articles, papers, and discussions have addressed the combat search-and-rescue mission, a subject that lends itself to microscopic clinical analysis at the tactical level and passionate discourse at all levels. Every military journal and civilian weekly has been quick to dissect each post-Vietnam War mission, usually focusing their analyses on tactics or the hardware involved. Generally though, they touch upon only the tip of the combat search-and-rescue iceberg.
Why concentrate so much energy and study on such a small portion of the search-and-rescue issue? Because tactics and hardware are tangible; you can see them, touch them, put your arms around them. The oddest thing about all this is that within the military, only the rescue practitioners do the writing. Very rarely does a warrior—who may require the service in the future—write an article on combat search and rescue. Blame this lack of interest on the warrior/aviator mentality, which manifests itself in the attitude: "that isn't going to happen to me. I’m good. I’m careful. That’s the other guys’ problem.” Whatever the reason, much of the search-and-rescue iceberg remains uncharted, out of sight. But as with every iceberg, the real danger lurks below the surface.
Part of that danger lies in the failure of the services to identify where responsibility for the mission falls. This assignment and acknowledgment directly affect each commander-in-chief’s (CinC’s) ability to conduct such missions in his area of operations. Fixes for tangible problems
(• ■ e., tactics and hardware) tend to be tangible themselves. As with the iceberg, however, the deeper problem is more difficult to solve. We must define force objectives and mission responsibility from a CinC’s perspective, the one Point of view from which the whole iceberg can be seen and thus reduced.
Combat search-and-rescue is a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the successful recovery ol distressed personnel from a hostile environment.1 The definition applies to all services, joint or combined operations, in any theater or area of operations; it also recognizes that distressed personnel can be someone other than an aviator.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 0-2 clearly delineates the responsibility of individual services to provide combat search-and-rescue forces in support of their own operations.2 Yet this capability essentially no longer exists in any service.
Thus the CinCs are in a real quandary. How can a CinC plan an operation, especially for a contingency environment that might include combat search and rescue, when dedicated aircraft and trained crews are not being provided by the services? Must we regress to ad hoc planning tor this extremely critical combat support mission?
Analysis of military force as a U.S. national instrument of power in the past virtually justifies the combat search- and-rescue mission. Since World War II, America has called upon its military forces more than 250 times to demonstrate American political resolve.3 On many ol
Evolution by Fits and Starts
Combat search-and-rescue is relatively new in the art of war. Today, the Navy prefers to call it “strike rescue,” but servicewide it is still known by its old name. As long ago as World War I no information suggests that the concept existed. The increasing sophistication of the airplane, improved antiair warfare, and the deep-strike missions of World War II gave birth to the idea. Although the United States employed airplanes as weapons in World War I, it seems that any aviator lucky enough to survive a crash was on his own once he was back on the ground.
In World War II, belligerents on both sides developed organized approaches to recovering their own downed aviators.
While this is not unusual, it does seem an odd coincidence that each side in both theaters concentrated rescue efforts on over-water recovery. In the Pacific this overriding concern is understandable, since most of the major battles included sea- based aircraft. But in Europe this was not the case, even though the maritime arena is where combat search and rescue was forged. In the Pacific, submarines, surface ships, and seaplanes could be extended arcoss a line of battle. Indeed, a submarine rescued an aviator named George Bush after he was shot down in the Pacific. In Europe, the majority of both the Allied and German combat search-and- rescue effort concentrated in the English Channel, using similar tactics that had already proved successful in the Pacific. Overland rescue in both theaters was difficult at best. In the Pacific, rescue parties took weeks to hack their way through dense jungle. And in Europe, it took just as long for the partisan network to move an airman through occupied territory.1
The Korean War dramatically demonstrated the utility of overland rescue, which depended largely on the improved capability of the helicopter. Although helicopters had been used in China at the end of World War II, they arrived too late to have any real impact on rescue efforts. In Korea, however, the U.S. Air Force Rescue Service recovered about 10% of the aircrews that went down in North Korea, which was a significant improvement over the virtual absence of overland rescue in World War II.2
The Navy’s role in such operations included aircraft carriers that had their own organic plane guard helicopters, providing them with an overland rescue capability. Later in the war,
Navy helicopters would also fly combat search-and-rescue missions deep into enemy territory.3
Because of decreased military expenditures following the Korean War, the U.S. military essentially abandoned combat search and rescue as a mission. Thus, we had to relearn the same hard lessons in Vietnam.4 During the early years of the conflict, we had no doctrine to fall back on.
Rescue mission planning was virtually nonexistent, and tactical commanders looked upon combat search and rescue as “have helicopter, will travel.” Accident rates were high and combat losses were heavy among the rescue forces.5 The Navy alone lost one rescue aircraft for every 1.4 overland rescues and lost one crew member for every two rescues.6 A total of 109 aircraft were lost during such missions.7 These statistics do not in any way question the heroism of the rescue crews involved or besmirch their efforts to redevelop the tactics and doctrine abandoned after Korea. But they
PHOTO PREVIOUS PAGES; D. KRUSHELL
these occasions, combat search-and-rescue was necessary. Demonstration of military force has long been a powerful element of American diplomacy and surely will continue to be. The Bible’s New Testament appropriately asks;
”... [Wjhat king marches against another king for war, without first sitting down to consider . . . will he be able to cope with the enemy.”4
If that king were a U.S. CinC, he had better also consider whether or not he has sufficient combat search-and- rescue capability.
If U.S. soldiers or airmen are captured and held hostage, they can easily negate any leverage created by the use of military force. Vietnam, Lebanon, Iran, and now Kuwait and Iraq, provide examples of the impact that hostages can play in U.S. foreign policy. During the 1986
Libyan raid, had the Air Force plane that was lost gone down over land and the airmen survived, our meager combat search-and-rescue capability would probably not have extracted them successfully. Imagine the impact and leverage Moammar Gadhafi could have achieved by showing up on the six o’clock news with two U.S. airmen. The thought is chilling. Given American preoccupation with hostages, such an incident could create turbulence in public support for government policy.
With the current probability of a come-as-you-are war, combat search and rescue becomes even more important. If we are able to pick and choose the time and location of conflicts, then we can marginally make do by calling up reserves and reallocating resources among the CinCs. But if we get drawn into conflict not of our own choosing, then we are heading for disaster.
When an opposing force captures a U.S. soldier or air-
serve to point out the painful waste of human and material assets when lessons once learned are subsequently ignored.
Combat search and rescue today has taken advantage of new technology. In order to survive in a modern threat environment, it must continue to do so. Search and rescue is a complex operation requiring rapid response, extensive coordination, and sophisticated equipment. As time progresses, the mission will become more difficult and will require increasingly specialized aircrew skills. Today’s propensity toward contingency response does not provide for a long learning curve, and historical lessons indicate that we cannot afford the personnel or platforms to relearn history.
What has happened since Vietnam? Have we in fact learned from our previous mistakes? The answer is not entirely affirmative. As in the two previous conflicts, the combat search- and-rescue capability was systematically dismantled following Vietnam. By 1975, the Navy had transferred all such assets to the reserve component.
On the other hand, the Air Force maintained an adequate capability until the late 1980s. Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps, however, has had a dedicated combat search-and- rescue capability since Korea.
Unfortunately, in 1987 Air Force combat search-and-rescue capability was gutted when the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service was required to transfer assets to the newly formed Air Force Special Operations Force, which is a part of the United States Special Operations Command. This left the Air Force with only 17 primary authorized aircraft dedicated to the combat search-and-rescue mission, the lowest number since the inception of the service in 1946.8 Although the assets transferred are capable of performing the combat search-and-rescue mission, special operations command forces are not responsible or expected to perform a combat search and rescue mission, unless it involved the rescue of their own special operations
forces. These reorganizations present a real problem for each one of the geographic CinCs.9
Two reserve squadrons are assigned the Navy’s combat search-and- rescue mission: HCS-4, the Red Wolves, from NAS Norfolk, Virginia; and HCS-5, the Firehawks, out of NAS Point Mugu, California. Each has nine new Sikorsky-built HH-60H helicopters, but only a two-plane detachment from each is part of the presidential call-up order of 22 August 1990.
G. HALL/COURTESY OF HCS-5
'Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Search & Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 3-8.
'Ibid., p. 13.
’Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea, Baltimore: The Nautical Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986, pp. 5556.
"Tilford, p. 15.
’Maynard M. Rccd. Combat Search & Rescue (CSAR) Within This Carrier Battle Group, Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 1981, p. 3.
'■Michael J. McCartin, “Crossing the Beach . . . and Bringing ’em Back,’’ Annapolis:
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1988, p. 109.
7U.S. Department of the Navy, Strike Rescue Manual Navy Supplement to NWP 19-2, Washington: July 1989, p. 1-1 “Gary L. Copsey, “Rebuilding the Air Rescue Service,” Airlift, Fall 1989, p. 11.
’’John R. Bone, Combat Search Rescue—
Military Stepchild, Maxwell AFB: Air War College, April 1988, p. 18.
J. W. Mullarky
hian, the CinC, his staff, the public, and the media will become preoccupied with U.S. combat search-and-rescue capability. Such concerns will surely redirect strike force assets to that mission. In 1969, 336 sorties were flown in support of a single rescue operation.5 Given the extraordinary political clout hostages provide to an enemy today, any CinC could likely be obliged to do the same, above and beyond humanitarian and morale considerations.
A well-trained and fully equipped combat search-and- rescue force can limit the possibility of hostages, and thus be a combat multiplier for the CinC. Not only would such a force return an experienced warrior to the CinC and deprive the enemy of a hostage, but it could also significantly reduce the amount of collateral support required from the striking forces. They, in turn, would be free to Pursue their primary mission. Unfortunately, the services treat combat search and rescue in the same manner as sealift: during peacetime, no one wants to spend limited dollars on a support capability that will likely grow obsolete before being used. But in wartime, no one can get either enough sealift or combat search and rescue.
Both the Air Force and Navy are taking steps to improve their combat search-and-rescue capability. In May 1989, the commander-in-chief, Military Airlift Command, ordered the reestablishment of the Air Rescue Service. When it is implemented in 1994, the Air Force plan will provide a dedicated, modern combat search-and- rescue capability under the direct operational control of the Military Airlift Command headquarters. What remains to be accomplished is to establish command structures within the theaters, to decentralize command and control and provide the CinCs with a credible capability. With some organizational modifications, this plan has the potential eventually to meet the CinCs’ requirements and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Navy, on the other hand, has chosen a dual-track approach. It is modernizing and expanding its dedicated combat search-and-rescue capability in the reserves, while training a limited number of helicopter flight crews from each active-duty squadron in combat search-and-rescue tactics. While this is certainly an improvement over previous capability, it is probably not the answer to the CinCs’ dilemma.
Combat search-and-rescue capability will not improve by itself, and there are no real signs of improvement, from the CinC’s perspective, in this vital mission area. Both the Air Force and Navy combat search-and-rescue modernization programs are being implemented to satisfy the requirements of the Joint Chiefs and the individual services, but they still fail to address the larger scope of operations and the requirements of the CinC. Combat search and rescue and the manner in which it is handled are enigmatic. The requirement has been there in every conflict since World War II (at least in the beginning) and it remains so today.
When the need for combat search and rescue surfaces, the initial solution is to throw money at it. After the services acquire new platforms and ultimately concentrate on training and tactics, the process ends. Rarely do the solutions leap ahead to the operational level, toward a macro view of the combat search-and-rescue mission. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 0-2 adds to the problem, because it fails to address combat search and rescue from the CinC’s perspective and instead addresses only service requirements at the tactical level. Thus, even when the Joint Chiefs’ requirements are met, the problem remains. The enigma here is that, in spite of spending more money, increasing training, and improving tactics, the capability has not improved. Combat search and rescue is a CinC’s responsibility, and it clearly will take a solution mandated by the CinCs themselves to improve it.
Over the past two decades the capability available to the CinCs has eroded seriously. Current U.S. mission posture is woefully inadequate compared to requirements. Contributing to the problem is the general lack of understanding by the service planners of what the mission is about and what its future should be, as demonstrated by their efforts to resolve the capability gap. In order to create the type of force required to execute the mission in a preemptive strike, wartime, or contingency environment, the warfighting CinCs must establish combat search and rescue as a high priority on their list of funded requirements.6
From the CinC’s perspective, combat search-and-rescue force objectives must be:
- Assigned to the deployed forces and within the CinC’s area of operations, to facilitate rapid response and force integration
- Capable of operating in the same environment as the striking force
- Able to perform in joint or combined operations
- A well-trained and equipped ready force, rehearsed in all scenarios for operations under the CinC’s control
The CinCs already have the means to improve their combat search-and-rescue capability for the near term. But such efforts may have a somewhat deleterious effect on other mission areas. The bridge over this gap can be provided by the CinC temporarily assigning his special operations command and Marine expeditionary unit forces to the combat search-and-rescue mission. Both are the best- trained and equipped forces under the CinC’s purview to accomplish the mission today. Although these elements are sure to “cry foul,” this mission has many similarities to missions for which they already train. They are also ideal, because they belong to the CinC and are capable of operating with the striking force, since they already are a part of it. These steps can provide the CinC with a capable combat search-and-rescue force now, while compelling the services to take the necessary steps to rectify their individual lack of present capability. This would be a temporary arrangement, because as the services acquire the platforms and trained crews necessary to accomplish the mission, they would reassume the tasking from special operations and Marine expeditionary forces. The bottom line here is that in spite of good intentions and improving capabilities, the CinCs must keep combat search and rescue a funded priority. With major budget reductions looming, the Air Force plan may fall victim to the fiscal ax before 1994, and the Navy must be persuaded to realign its combat search-and-rescue capability under the active forces.
Warfighting CinCs must respond quickly and decisively to meet and defeat any threat to the United States or its interests. They need a well trained, equipped, and rehearsed combat search-and-rescue capability, today and in the future. They have not always recognized their need for combat search and rescue, but the CinCs have always needed it. Rear Admiral Jeremiah Denton, U.S. Navy (Retired), a former naval aviator and Vietnam prisoner of war, insightfully summed up the importance of combat search and rescue. He noted, “Those of us not rescued in Vietnam but fortunate enough to survive the mental and physical rigors and anguish of prisoner internment know first-hand the costs of inadequate combat search and rescue—costs measured in human spirit, morale, lives and dollars. Difficult as it may be to project those costs precisely, it is predictable that the cost in possible future conflict will greatly exceed those of past wars, unless actions are taken to accord a high peacetime priority to the combat search-and-rescue mission.”7 If we take heed, lessons from the past will pave the way for future success.
1 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, Washington: 1 December 1986, p. 4-10, Sect. 4-23b.
2Ibid., p. 4-12, Sect. 4-25.
3Amos A. Jordon and William Taylor, Jr., American National Security, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, p. 37.
4New Testament, St. Luke 14:30-32.
5Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Search & Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 3-8.
6Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 4-12, Sect. 4-25.
7C. E. Lassen, “Combat SAR - Past and Future,” Wings of Gold, Fall 1982, p. 21.
Commander Mullarky is presently assigned to the Joint Staff, National Emergency Airborne Command Post, Offut Air Force Base, Nebraska. He is a naval aviator, former commanding officer of HC-4 in Sigonella, Sicily, and is a graduate of the Army War College. He also holds a Master’s degree in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School.