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By John M. Collins
Obviously, there have been and continue to be many options in the Middle East for both sides. In the September Proceedings, we published an author’s Proposal that President Bush urge “the Soviet leadership to undertake a joint military operation, under the auspices °f the United Nations,” to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. At the same Erne, John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense, Office of Associate Director for Research Coordination, Library of Congress, identified and developed eight Iraqi and eight U.S. and allied options for Congress which he also delivered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
These assessments weigh probable risks and costs against potential gains, but do not predict which alternatives might prove most attractive and do not imply how well (or whether) any course of action might succeed.
We publish these courses of action to demonstrate a range of possible political and military actions and to advance the level of understanding in this complicated situation, which may be a precursor of conflicts in the post-Cold War world.
Iraqi Options
U.S. and Allied Options
- WITHDRAW: Political isolation, economic sanctions al- feady imposed by international opponents, and a naval blockade could inflict intolerable pressures on Iraqi citizens already Wearied by the recent Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years. Saddam Hussein might choose to withdraw from Kuwait and abandon other aggressive acts to avoid domestic upheavals, Particularly if he felt threatened by coups and/or insurgency. There is no evidence, however, that he is currently considering this course of action seriously. All of his public statements are to the contrary, perhaps because voluntary withdrawal might expose him to strong opposition by hard-line military officers and continued demands for his ouster by the United States and its partners.
- STAND PAT: Saddam Hussein, having accomplished initial objectives with little effort, could consolidate his hold on Kuwait, continue his psychological warfare campaign, prepare his people for a long period of sacrifice, and wait lor multinational opponents to make the next physical move. A military counteroffensive against him could be quite costly in terms of damage (including oil installations), casualties (including noncombatants), and political capital in the Arab World. The U.S.-led coalition could collapse, unless success
- WITHDRAW RECIPROCALLY: Reciprocal withdrawal probably would be the preferred U.S. and allied course of action, provided Iraqi forces departed Kuwait and the Iraqi government abandoned bellicosity, particularly if rivals ousted Saddam Hussein. Incremental costs of operating and maintaining multinational armed forces that oppose Iraq would begin to decline almost immediately. So would wear and tear on respective military establishments. The United States thereafter would be better prepared to cope with other potential contingencies that could impinge seriously on U.S. security interests. Saudi Arabia could restore the status quo ante bellum within its borders.
Caution, however, would be advisable, because Iraqi forces could return much more readily than their adversaries if progress toward true peace unexpectedly reversed. Residual U.S. forces, perhaps mainly afloat, might remain in the region until stability appears assured. Pan-Arab contingents seem better suited to continue any foreign military presence inside Saudi Arabia. Expanded U.S. security assistance to Arab participants would be beneficial, but Israeli objections probably would follow if programs improved ollensive as well as defensive capabilities.
- STAND PAT: The United States and its associates, preferably with U.N. approval, could continue (perhaps tighten) political and economic pressures on Iraq, buttress them with blockades, augment military power in the Persian Gulf region, and otherwise improve their relative position. Resolve would be clearly evident to all adversaries. Close collaboration with Arab states under conditions that serve their interests could strengthen ties that have suffered from repeated disputes over Israel. The will of Iraq might weaken as deprivation deepened, followed by reduced objectives, even withdrawal from Kuwait without further bloodshed.
Several adverse prospects nevertheless could accompany a prolonged stalemate. Any U.S. hopes for a “peace dividend” would disappear. Many proposed U.S. force reductions probably would be deferred. Additions, including expensive airlift and sealift, could increase rather than reduce future U.S. defense costs. U.S. reserve components mobilized for this contingency could expect long periods of federal service. A stalemate might also strain the multinational alliance in ways were swift and/or comparatively painless. There is considerable evidence that Saddam is enticed by this course of action and may persist until political, economic, and military pressures make his position untenable.
- CONDUCT TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: Iraq has intermittently employed terrorist tactics against neighboring states, but lacks a strong global network. Saddam Hussein probably could expect scant support from Syria and Iran, which have global capabilities, since they apparently oppose his power grab. The Soviet Union seems to support U.S. and U.N. initiatives. Saddam, however, has little hesitation and plenty of money to hire notorious mercenaries such as Abu Nidal, with whom he reportedly has contact. Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) may also be sympathetic to his cause. Most likely potential targets are in the Middle East (hostages could become a major problem); but it should be noted that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) receives Iraqi assistance against Great Britain, a U.S. ally. Saddam, even so, must be concerned that crippling military retribution might follow concerted terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and property.
- INVADE SAUDI ARABIA: Saddam Hussein initially may have intended to invade Saudi Arabia, and thereby seize control of that country’s oil industry, but there is little evidence that he now entertains this alternative. Chances of success diminish rapidly in direct proportion to the arrival of multinational armed forces in blocking positions. Iraqi reinforcements needed to compensate would be very difficult to sustain logistically over tenuous, exposed lines, would weaken Iraq’s defense along the Iranian border, might encourage Kurdish separatists to intensify their rebellion, and otherwise exacerbate potentially crippling internal security problems. Risks and costs of this course consequently seem high for Iraq.
The influx of multinational armed forces into Saudi Arabia would seem to have blocked the Iraqi option to move beyond Kuwait.
5-BOMBARD SAUDI ARABIA: Iraq might choose to bombard multinational armed forces in Saudi Arabia from present positions, employing aircraft and missiles based in the homeland and Kuwait. Missiles might be most effective, since neither U.S. military services nor their allies possess credible defenses. This option could supplement or replace Course of Action 4, would require fewer Iraqi reinforce-
that put a practical time limit on “standing pat.” Public approval in the United States almost surely would wane without there being visible and significant progress. Support from Saudi Arabia, inundated by foreigners, also could erode, with anti-American and/or antiregime agitation as probable results. The united front that now favors sanctions against Iraq eventually could crack; if not, Saddam Hussein in desperation might take irrational steps.
- DAMPEN ARAB DISCONTENT: Saddam Hussein calls for rebellion against pro-Western Arab governments, which he contends seldom promote their own people’s welfare and aspirations. Jordan seems most susceptible, Saudi Arabia much less so at this moment, partly because its sizable alien population is segregated and tightly controlled, but revolution in one or more Arab states could have a ripple effect.
Each Arab regime vulnerable to Saddam Hussein’s arguments is primarily responsible for its own internal security, j which bears directly on multinational abilities to deal effectively with Iraq while protecting Persian Gulf petroleum installations. Short-term solutions center on timely, accurate intelligence, control over dissident groups, and methods that avoid counterproductive uses of force. Long-term solutions depend heavily on political, economic, and social reforms that reduce or eradicate serious causes of unrest. U.S. officials, on request, might facilitate improvements in both respects by providing advice and material support, but would be well advised to forgo uninvited overtures or patronizing attitudes.
- RESCUE HOSTAGES: More than a million foreign nationals detained in Iraq and Kuwait currently are designated as “restrictees” rather than hostages by Hussein, to acknowledge their ambiguous status. An estimated 3,000 Americans are among them. Some are interned at known locations, but the whereabouts of most remain a mystery. None thus far apparently have been harmed, but Saddam Hussein plans to use them as a shield and perhaps “bargaining chips” that could help him achieve objectives without resorting to a shooting war, since he well understands the high value each adversary places on its citizens.
Diplomatic and humanitarian benefits could accompany successful steps to extract those hapless individuals. Collective hostage rescue capabilities of the United States and all its allies might safely extract a small percentage, provided intelligence was timely and accurate, but any attempt to establish priorities, no matter how objective, would be subject to sharp criticism. Risks would be high and reprisals against the re- , mainder are possible. This course of action consequently seems unattractive. (Uncertain political relationships between Iran and Iraq, which are ameliorating, eventually could interconnect Saddam Hussein’s “restrictees” and hostages long held by Shia radicals in Lebanon, but that possibility is beyond the scope of this report.)
- ASSIST IRAQI DISSIDENTS: Top leaders of the multinational alliance all hope to rid Kuwait of Iraqi armed forces and oust Saddam Hussein from power without resorting to large-scale armed conflict accompanied by severe casualties and damage. Covert actions and psychological operations could encourage and abet coups, insurgent groups, or both inside Iraq. U.S. specialists could contribute best during planning phases, but Arab allies are much better positioned to implement any covert operations, because they speak the language fluently, have superior intelligence concerning Iraqi
Merits, and present deployments, which are well dug in, would be less exposed to retaliation. Iraqi citizens unfortunately might fare less well, if counterstrikes unavoidably hit Population centers.
Saddam threatens to employ chemical weapons in any evcnt. U.S. forces nevertheless may possess a potent deter- rer>t, since he could not rule out retaliation in kind, even if given contrary assurances that he probably would not trust. Neither side could function well for long in the heat wearing roasks and protective garments. Both would face insuperable decontamination problems if hit with persistent agents in the Waterless desert (daily wash requirements for one division could exceed 200,000 gallons).
- ATTACK ISRAEL: Iraq might deliberately bombard Israel, even invade via Jordan, to provoke strong Israeli retaliation. (A feint in that direction might suffice.) Public collaboration between “Zionists” and the United States could cause some U.S. Arab allies to abandon multinational opposition to Saddam or switch sides. Either outcome would undermine ITS. Persian Gulf interests. Saddam finds this course attrac- rive, if his public pronouncements are an accurate indication, although the possibility of Israeli nuclear retaliation may give him pause and U.S. responses might be more painful than he atlticipates. He consequently would have to weigh risk- versus-gain ratios with great care before electing this course.
- ATTACK OIL INSTALLATIONS: Saddam Hussein, if frustrated in his efforts to control Persian Gulf petroleum, might decide to destroy oil installations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia so that adversaries could neither take comfort or reap substantial economic benefits from his defeat. U.S. and allied a'r defense forces that feature AWACS early warning aircraft and state-of-the-art interceptors are well suited to cope with Iraqi bombers, but could not stop ballistic missiles. Security against sabotage would be porous, because pumping stations, Power centers, refineries, and terminal facilities are very vulnerable. Fires on offshore platforms would be easy to start and especially hard to stop. Even modest destruction could cause the price of oil to soar, which was one of Saddam s °riginal aims. Unacceptable costs and risks could accompany this last-resort course, however, if it provoked massive military retribution against Iraq. Saddam most likely must take the possibility of such adverse action into account.
8-INCITE ARAB UPRISINGS: Saddam Hussein calls for the “oppressed” people of pro-Western Arab states to overthrow their governments, which he contends are corrupt and irresponsible. In turn, he promises to promote pro-Arab interests, spread the wealth more equitably, and protect Islam against foreign and domestic infidels. Those inflammatory
dissidents, and blend more easily into the local environment. Those attributes are critically important for teams that seek to penetrate the Iraqi security apparatus without detection.
Action to replace one government with another by surreptitious and coercive means always is risky business for foreign instigators. Possible pluses and minuses seldom are clear-cut, even under optimum conditions. Plans to eliminate Saddam Hussein therefore should carefully consider which prospective replacements to support, with attention to their probable policies and programs. Outcomes otherwise could be undesirable rather than beneficial.
6-RETALIATE IF ATTACKED: U.S. and allied armed forces in Saudi Arabia, which are rapidly gaining strength, occupy moral high ground as long as they maintain defensive postures. They can select, prepare, then improve the most favorable positions from which to fend off Iraqi bombardments or an Iraqi invasion. Containment, as opposed to rollback, also constrains multinational force requirements and financial costs. Saddam Hussein would remain free to pick the time, place, and mode of initial engagements, but initiative thereafter would pass to the allies, able to elect responses that range from positional defense to operations deep inside Iraq.
The United States and allies have little choice in this case: they must meet Iraqi assaults, should they occur, or suffer defeat. Successful defense would depend much more on U.S. armed forces than those of their partners. U.S. casualty lists thus likely would be longest. Damage to Saudi Arabian assets, including cities and oil installations, could be severe, since none of the allies possess credible defenses against Iraqi missiles.
Iraqi military aggression against Israel probably would put the United States on the horns of a dilemma, especially if Israel proved unable to handle the problem without active U.S. military intervention. The President in concert with Congress at that point would have to decide whether U.S. interests in Israel take precedence over those in the Arab world, because no Arab nation seems likely to sympathize with Israel’s cause. On the contrary, the multinational coalition probably would collapse if U.S. armed forces counterattacked against Iraq and might dissolve even if U.S. responses were limited to large-scale logistic support to Israel.
Multinational retaliation would be politically more palatable if Iraq encroached on geographically isolated Jordan to punish King Hussein for facilitating U.N. sanctions or to support domestic uprising in Jordan. Military operations, however, might be limited to air strikes, because the most favorable land routes traverse Israel.
7-BOMBARD IRAQ: The multinational alliance might choose to prevent Iraq from augmenting or even maintaining its present military capabilities in and near Kuwait, as well as along Turkish and Jordanian borders. Potential targets for air strikes include choke points along principal land routes (especially bridges and causeways), supply depots, maintenance facilities, and formations on the move. Mainly U.S. land- and carrier-based aircraft also might conduct preemptive attacks on Iraqi bomber bases and missile sites to preclude any long- range bombardment of defenders or oilfields.
The United States and associates nevertheless should balance desired results of such offensive action against a possible political backlash generated by adverse public opinion in the United States and abroad. Failure to neutralize all intended targets quickly could precipitate the Iraqi bombardment we sought to avoid, resulting in widespread devastation.
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messages conceivably could accomplish all of his objectives at minimum costs and risks. Arab potentates now linked with industrialized nations would be on the run, if widespread revolution erupts. Petroleum production and distribution could proceed only on Saddam’s terms, since the work force would respond to his instructions. No amount of multinational military power could prevent or reverse such developments.
This worst-case scenario is worth serious attention. Few pundits in the West predicted that revolutionaries would oust the Shah of Iran, but it happened. Several Arab regimes are equally unpopular. Groups who see a great gap between ruling elites and men in the streets are Saddam’s main audience. Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini failed to spread radical Islamic fundamentalism, primarily because he was a Persian who represented Shias, a small minority of Muslims. Saddam Hussein, a secular Arab, presents appealing political arguments before wrapping them in a religious flag. “The Arab Empire will rise again” is his central theme. A hero image is thus emerging.
Traditional Arab disunity nevertheless mitigates against success. Many Middle Easterners distrust Saddam’s motives. The time required to foment revolution frequently is long and failure would solidify opposition. Iraq accordingly seems unlikely to rely on this course of action exclusively.
WRAP-UP: The eight Iraqi options identified above are not mutually exclusive. Transnational terrorism, for example, could accompany any other option. Courses 2 and 8 currently proceed concurrently. This list is subject to adjustment as situations unfold. Additions and deletions both are likely. Priorities probably will become more apparent. Contingency plans designed to counter each course before Saddam decides what to do next seem appropriate.
8-INITIATE A COUNTEROFFENSIVE: A counteroffer! sive to alleviate threats to Saudi Arabia, root Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and perhaps overrun their homeland, seems attractive for several reasons. It would exercise initiative and reduce the likelihood of a lengthy stalemate. A frontal assault against strong Iraqi defenses in Kuwait might not be necessary. Amphibious forces perhaps could outflank them on the east, land forces could envelop them on the west, and parachute assault forces could straddle their lines to the north- Deep U.S. air strikes conducted concurrently could disrupt Iraqi attempts to reinforce or withdraw.
A major counteroffensive, however, would require somewhat more combat power than the allies had deployed by late August 1990, when this report was written. The cost in life' blood and treasure likely would be high on both sides. The fate of foreign nationals restricted in Iraq would be in serious doubt. Adverse reactions by Arab people, particularly in Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, and some Maghreb states, could be anticipated. Most importantly, any opportunity for a peaceful settlement acceptable to the United States and its associates would disappear. Iraq might remain a threat to U.S. and allied interests, unless the conflict terminated in total defeat ot Iraqi armed forces and removed Saddam Hussein from power.
WRAP-UP: The eight U.S. and allied options identified above are not mutually exclusive. Course of Action 2 currently is in effect. Courses 3-5 could proceed concurrently without military escalation, or accompany Courses 6-8, which in turn might be implemented sequentially or independently. Additions and deletions to the list are probable as the crisis unfolds. Contingency plans to accompany each alternative seem appropriate.
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