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By Lieutenant Commander Paul G. Johnson, U.S. Naval Reserve
Many Americans are bitter toward Japan, not because it attacked Pearl Harbor, where its ships now visit regularly, but because of the feeling that Japan is prospering at the expense of the United States. Clearly, both countries must act to keep their valuable security arrangement on the right track.
The Japanese-U.S. relationship has long been the centerpiece of U.S. Asian security policy. Policymakers in the two countries are now confronting issues that will shape this relationship for the next decade and into the next century. Managing the relationship will be one of the most important U.S. security challenges of the 1990s. The U.S. Navy will play a key role in meeting this challenge because the military partnership between the United States and Japan rests largely on naval issues.
This security relationship is based on the Japanese constitution of 1946 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, which was revised in 1960. Japan’s constitution, which renounces war and limits Japan to self-defense forces, and a Japanese willingness to follow the U.S. lead, have produced a stable relationship. In the past it could best be characterized as a partnership, in which the United States provided a nuclear umbrella and regional security for Japan in exchange for base rights, well-sited intelligence posts, and a series of geographical choke points from which to confront Soviet Far Eastern forces. Japan has prospered under the U.S. protection, while the United States has used Japan as an important base in its forward- deployment strategy, most notably with respect to Korea. As former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield recently wrote in Foreign Affairs, “Neither nation can survive at the current level of economic welfare and security without the active cooperation of the other.”1
The Current Atmosphere
As with any relationship between two strong and independent democracies, the alliance has both positive and negative aspects. In multilateral relations, the two countries share a desire for peace, stability, and the spread of free-enterprise democracy. Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship has become strained over the issues of trade and defense burden-sharing. At present the positive side of the relationship seems to be holding, but there is potential for a serious deterioration if the trade impasse is not resolved and “Japan-bashing” continues in the United States.
Unfortunately, the bitterness from trade disputes has spread into the broader aspects of the relationship. This process has been aggravated by a parallel issue in the defense field—the mistaken notion that the Japanese are getting a free ride in national security at U.S. expense. These negative attitudes about trade and defense reinforced each other in the regrettable Toshiba incident, when a subsidiary of that Japanese company sold sensitive propellermilling machinery to the Soviet Union. Everyone agrees that the two nations must come to terms with these problems, but we should be equally concerned that these issues do not in the meantime poison the mutually beneficial U.S.-Japanese security arrangement.
Several potential areas of risk exist in the U.S.-Japanese defense relationship. First, the Japanese may decide to acquire a military with offensive capability more in line with their status as an economic superpower. This could provide a way to escape dependence on the United States while taking advantage of Japanese advances in military technology. While unlikely, the chances of this outcome
would appear to increase if the Japanese economy faces any kind of interruption from its resources or markets. As one commentator recently put it, “Japanese ambitions for a return to military power in the world are no longer constrained by technology, but only by politics.”2 Indeed, the continuation of a close security relationship with the United States is the best hedge against any reintroduction of Japanese militarism.3
Another risk is that Japan will depart from its present course and retreat into isolationism and neutralism. This process could be accelerated by a change in the ruling Japanese government or by a reduction in tensions between the Soviets and the Japanese. While the new Soviet openness in foreign affairs has not unlocked the dispute between Soviets and Japanese about the Northern Territories, expanded trade and Japanese financing may encourage Mikhail Gorbachev to settle this disagreement. He has already offered to reduce Soviet forces in the region, but has not yet executed these cuts.
The specific challenge for U.S. defense and naval planners is to ensure that Japan stays on its present course and avoids both extremes. A lack of U.S. sensitivity to devel-
oping trends and to the uniqueness of the Japanese situation may encourage Japan to deviate from this course. To keep Japan moving in its present direction, leaders in both countries must avoid taking the security relationship for granted and must continue to work and plan in earnest to confront change. Substantial mutual efforts to understand the other party, to build on the positives, and to adjust to new realities are crucial.
The Changing Nature of the Relationship
Three aspects of the U.S.-Japanese relationship are undergoing such rapid and profound change that, as one expert recently noted, “It is not surprising to find confusion on all sides concerning where Japan is headed militarily—and, indeed, where it should be headed.”4 First, Japan has used its manufacturing and exporting prowess to become the world’s leading financial power, an economic superpower. Its gross national product (GNP) is second only to that of the United States. Japan has positive trade balances with virtually every country with which it does business. This success has not been
SYGMA
without cost; it has alienated several of Japan’s trading partners, including the United States.
Japan, too, has experienced some difficulty adjusting to its new global role. The Japanese have been searching for a way to contribute to self-styled “comprehensive security,” in ways other than through a buildup of offensive military forces; they prefer to contribute to Western security in nonmilitary ways.5 One outlet the Japanese have found is economic assistance, particularly to lesser-developed Asian countries, such as the Philippines. The Japa-
nese are also thinking about participating in peacekeeping forces in various parts of the world. And in time, they will undoubtedly take their place in positions of authority in global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank.
Second, Japan clearly has become more of a military factor by taking advantage of its increasing ability to produce technology with military applications. The Japanese have coproduced U.S. systems such as the P-3 and F-15 uircraft for years. Japanese know-how, particularly in the areas of advanced electronics and miniaturization, has Placed them in an excellent position to take advantage of foe trend toward the manufacture and sale of smart weap- °ns. Agreements with the United States along the lines of foe FSX project, which represents a technological and production partnership between the United States and Japan t° develop a new fighter aircraft, appear to be next.
And third, as allies, the Japanese are clearly accepting Utore of the burden of their own defense. Their defense budget has been increasing at an average rate of 6% per year for the past ten years, within the constraints set by foeir constitution and by the tolerance of their neighbors, to the point where it is now the third highest in the world. The size of the Japanese defense budget is exceeded only by that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The ■Japanese also pay 40% of the cost of keeping U.S. forces ln Japan.6 The concept of self-defense has expanded to encompass a broad range of military activity. The Japanese are now responsible for a wide variety of defense fasks in and around the Japanese islands.
These changes in the relationship are all the more important because of the worldwide shift in emphasis away from reliance on military prowess and toward economic Power. This trend increases the stature of second-tier mili- fary powers such as Japan that are also blessed with strong economies. With its democratic free-enterprise system, its strategic location, and its financial strength, Japan is a uutural U.S. ally. Before long, the United States is likely to reduce its NATO commitment and to deploy its forces utore widely and flexibly. These factors will tend to inurease the importance of Japan to U.S. security, with its Proximity to the still-volatile Korean peninsula, to China, and to the Soviet Far Eastern forces.
U-S. Actions to Strengthen the Relationship
It is important to remember that the United States has a security treaty with Japan because it is in U.S. interests to do so. The United States must do as much as possible to lengthen its alliance with Japan. Both countries share an Important interest in continuing Asian stability. Neither an isolationist Japan nor a Japan with greatly increased offence military capability would be compatible with U.S. interests.
Most important, the United States must understand and accept the political constraints on the Japanese military. The constraints are found in Japan’s constitution, the atti- fade of its people, and the wariness of regional neighbors, and they stem directly from the excesses of Japanese mili- farism that culminated in World War II. While a repeat of this type of experience is extremely unlikely, Japan’s neighbors treat any movement in that direction with alarm and concern, even to the point of overreaction. Most Japanese favor peaceful contributions to foster security, perhaps because of a low sense of any outside threat, and the Japanese government is somewhat reluctant to publicize its defense efforts. This policy may be wise domestically, but it results in the American people being uninformed about Japan’s important defense efforts. This, in turn, contributes to the perception that Japan is not pulling its own weight on defense and, worse, that Japan is prospering at the expense of the United States. A recent study concluded that the best solution to this problem is the “building of a domestic consensus in both nations behind a reasonable approach to security issues” but warned that this requires “astute political leadership and skillful alliance management.”7
Second, any linkage between the trade and security issues must be discouraged. The trade dispute has the most potential to harm mutual security arrangements, because it will take years of patience to resolve—during which the security relationship must be preserved and strengthened. The defense relationship, in fact, may be able to set the example for trade negotiators to build a better relationship with more projects such as the FSX. Such an arrangement could be useful in developing a new antisubmarine warfare frigate or a class of diesel attack submarines. While the United States must exercise care with respect to its most sensitive military technology and processes, failure to engage in these sorts of joint development projects would be problematic. At present the United States is the only authorized recipient of Japan’s military technology, but as Japan becomes a major producer of this technology, no one can be certain how the knowledge will be used and what other countries will acquire access to the technology.8
Finally, Americans must recognize the contributions that Japanese have been making in the nonmilitary security areas. Before long, Japan will be the world’s leading provider of overseas development assistance, much of it going to Asian countries. Japan can also play a significant role in solving the Third World debt crisis. Japanese contributions to peacekeeping forces would be welcomed as well.
The U.S. Navy is in an excellent position to assist in this process of enhanced awareness. Through imaginative use of ship visits, exchange programs, and joint operations, the Navy can help foster mutual understanding while increasing the efficiency of both countries’ naval forces in the northwest Pacific. One idea for integrated operations that deserves serious consideration is the idea of a U.S.-Japanese standing force of surface vessels, which could be assigned to antisubmarine warfare duties.
Japanese Contributions to the Relationship
The Japanese also have a strong contribution to make to the continued strength of the security relationship. In 1987, Japanese defense spending exceeded 1% of its GNP for the first time since World War II.9 There is certainly room for the Japanese to spend more on defense, so that their eventual contribution reaches the range of 2-2.5% of GNP. These additional funds can enhance and, if appropriate, expand the Japanese military capabilities while easing the burden on the United States, at least to some degree.
The Japanese are currently responsible for the air and land defense of Japan, as well as the security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) out to 1,000 nautical miles. The United States should encourage this quiet expansion of Japan’s concept of self-defense by which it could strengthen its army and greatly increase its reserves of fuel, ammunition, and stores.10 It should explore a system of army reservists based on the Swiss model.
Japan has already embarked on an ambitious program of modernization and expansion of its naval and air forces. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces already consist of 14 diesel submarines (six of which are Harpoon- equipped), 37 destroyers, and 16 frigates, along with light forces, mine countermeasures units, and support ships." More surface units and submarines are under construction, including the first of four or more Aegis-equipped ships, which are strikingly similar to the U.S. Arleigh Burke (DDG-5 l)-class destroyers.12 As Royal Navy Captain Richard Sharpe recently wrote in the foreword to the 1988-89 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships:
“Japan has some of the highest paid sailors in the
world, a long maritime tradition and access to the technology industries of an economic superpower. It is a
formidable platform from which to expand.”13
Japan’s current submarine force could be expanded and improved. The Japanese could also upgrade their air warning and intercept network by using ground-based radars, airborne-early-warning radar, and Aegis coverage to provide a complete air defense for Japan and surrounding waters. SLOC protection could be improved by acquiring more mobile logistics support vessels and aircraft.14 The Japanese also have a long way to go to reduce the vulnerability of key defense installations.15
There has been some recent talk about Japan Requiring an aircraft carrier. Such a ship could make significant contributions to antisubmarine warfare and SLOC defense, but should be strictly limited to that role (with an appropriate mix of aircraft), to avoid developing an offensive capability. Another welcome Japanese contribution would be an increase in its payments to support U.S. forces in Japan. The Japanese do currently pay more of these costs on a percentage basis than any other U.S. ally, but this kind of expenditure presents the ideal allocation of Japanese resources—a way to use defense dollars effectively without an offensive force buildup.
Japan must also continue to increase its commitment to comprehensive security through aid programs and debt relief to improve overall Western security. These transfers should be based on need, divorced as much as possible from Japanese export assistance. Another helpful step in this regard would be indirect Japanese suggestions to the Philippine leaders that if they were reasonable in renewing
U.S. base rights, Japan could ensure continued and increased foreign aid.16
Meeting the Challenge
The Japanese-U.S. security arrangement that has endured and served well since World War II will need careful nurturing and guidance through the coming years of change. Both sides need to find ways to adjust their approaches to the relationship to take account of global changes and Japan’s emergence. Each must make an effort to understand the other and to build on the positive elements of the relationship. The United States must guide Japan and educate the American public so that Japan can increase its defense expenditures to work in close harmony with the United States and to satisfy U.S. critics, without unduly alarming its Asian neighbors. More important, the United States must accept Japan as an equal partner in the defense field and treat it that way.17
In this vital defense partnership, each country’s navy plays a key role by interacting with the other country’s forces. While the policymakers press Japan to increase its capabilities, it will be largely up to the two navies to ensure that all new Japanese capabilities are properly integrated with U.S. forces.18 This puts a special responsibility on the two navies to work together for increased understanding and operational integration.
‘Mike Mansfield. “The U.S. and Japan: Sharing Our Destinies,” Foreign Affairs. Spring 1989, p. 3.
2Steven K. Vogel, “Japanese High Technology, Politics and Power,” Research Paper No. 2, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, March 1989, as quoted in Dower, note 4, p. 22.
3Francis McNeil and Seizaburo Sato, The Future of U.S.-Japan Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1989, p. 14.
4John W. Dower, “Japan’s New Military Edge,” The Nation, 3 July 1989, p. 18- 5Saburo Okita, “Japan’s Quiet Strength,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1989, p. 145- 6James Baker, “A New Pacific Partnership: Framework for the Future,” Current Policy No. 1185, U.S. Dept, of State, Washington, DC, 26 June 1989.
7McNeil and Sato, pp. 16-17.
8Harold Brown, “The United States and Japan: High Tech is Foreign Policy,” SAlS Review, Summer/Fall 1989, p. 17.
9Norman D. Levin, Japan's Changing Defense Posture, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1988, p. 13.
“‘Ibid., pp. 16-17.
"Capt. Richard Sharpe, RN, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1988-89, p. 307.
12Ibid., p. 308. l3Ibid., p. 117. l4Levin, p. 26.
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1988-89, London, 1988, p. 123. l6Levin, p. 31.
17Kenneth Hunt, “Japan’s Security Policy,” Survival, Volume 31 Number 3, May/ June, 1989, p. 205.
18Levin, p. 30.
Commander Johnson is a lawyer in private practice in Phoenix, Arizona. After graduation from the Naval Academy in 1976, he served on board the USS John Young (DD-973) and in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He is a graduate of the Naval War College and Harvard Law School, and has taught national security policy at Tufts University.