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By Rear Admiral J. Guy Reynolds, U.S. Navy
Some issues seem impossible to resolve. The question of diesel submarines for the U.S. Navy is one such matter. Proponents desire an easy solution to a very difficult problem. Many of these proponents have deep-seated emotions that overshadow their logic.
This is comparable to the people who continue to put out cookies for Santa Claus and leave carrots for the Easter Bunny. Even though logic relegates these fun creatures to “The World Is Flat” category, a few cling to the fantasy because it is comforting.
I was privileged to command the Pacific Submarine Force, which consists of more than 50 submarines, including the Navy’s last three diesel electric submarines: the USS Darter (SS-576), the USS Barbel (SS-580), and the USS Blueback (SS-581).
Diesel electric submarines were keys to our country’s success in the Pacific during World War II. Employment and tactics then were bold by any measure. Reflection on our World War II experience provides valuable insight that can help in resolving the “nuclear- versus-diesel” issue:
► Our submarines took the war to Japan, while the rest of the Pacific Fleet was rebuilding after the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, many Navy submarines were on patrol in hostile waters, far from our shores, when the
war started.
- U.S. submarines sank 1,326 enemy ships in the Pacific during World War II, more than half of all Japanese vessels sunk. Their primary mission was antisurface warfare (ASUW).
- World War II diesel submarines were essentially surface ships that could submerge for short periods. Snorkel improved the situation but fell far short of solving their problem.
- The U.S. Navy lost 52 submarines in World War II. Only one was sunk by an enemy submarine. Nearly 70% of the submarines lost went down with all hands. Six times as many officers and enlisted men gave their lives in combat than any other warfare community.
These facts reflect several unchanging principles of submarine warfare. First, submarines are most valuable to a wartime effort when they operate in a “target- rich” environment. They must patrol near the enemy’s shores. Early in a conflict, forward-operating areas may not be accessible to other U.S. forces. Submerged submarines have the unique ability to conduct operations in hostile waters when enemy forces have air and surface superiority. Second, submarines are in greater danger when they operate on or near the surface where surface and air antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces
Until a nonnuclear technology appears with the capability to deliver sustained high submerged speed with limitless endurance and low radiated noise, the defense of the United States is best served by nuclear-propelled submarines. Building any other type of submarine, severely limited in just those features required for successful employment, would represent a waste of precious defense resources and a disregard of modern realities.
'Cdr. Daniel Conley, RN “Don’t Discount the Diesel,” Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1987, pp. 74-81. .
Capt. Gerald O’Rourke, USN (Ret.), “Our Peaceful Navy,’’ Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1989, p. 82, 83.
Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine vs Submarine (Salt Lake City, UT: Orion, 41988) p. 23.
Harold C. Hemond, “The Flip Side of Rickover,” Naval Institute Proceedings, ;[uly 1989, pp. 42-47.
Norman Polmar, “Diesel Boats, Forever and Ever,” Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1989, pp. 129-130.
Richard Compton-Hall gives an excellent summary of current efforts in Submarine Submarine.
Michael G. Fulgham, “A Fuel Cell Submarine,” Submarine Review, January *986, p. 56.
Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 91986), pp. 148-151.
Capt. John L. Byron, USN, “No Quarter for Their Boomers,” Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1989, pp. 49-57.
°Assumed for these purposes as 20 knots; obviously, communications and security requirements could have an impact on this speed. No competing technology can even theoretically generate this sustained speed.
“Hughes, Fleet Tactics, p. 176. l2Ibid, p. 272.
,3Sce J. E. Moore and R. Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare (Bcthcsda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1986), pp. 40-41 for a discussion of this characteristic of closed cycle and fuel cell systems.
“Hemond, “The Flip Side of Rickover,” p. 47.
,5Consider USS Triton's (SSN 586) circumnavigation of the earth submerged, a feat that has been repeated (with some stopoffs but limited resupply) by many nuclear-powered attack submarines.
K’Moore and Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare p. 61.
“Consider the probabilities of British success had the Royal Navy been forced to defend against carrier air strikes from the southwest (stretching the antiair warfare defensive perimeter to maximum) and night surface attacks.
18Thomas Stefanik, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 144-145.
,9Moore and Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare, p. 287.
20Ibid, p. 79.
2'Byron, “No Quarter For Their Boomers.”
“Rarely are the life-cycle costs of fuel figured into price comparisons of conventional and nuclear submarines.
Lieutenant Commander Gillespie is a member of the mathematics faculty at the U. S. Naval Academy. After commissioning at Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island, he completed nuclear pipeline and submarine training and reported to the USS Nathan Hale (SSBN-623). Commander Gillespie completed submarine and engineer qualification and later attended the Submarine Officers’ Advanced Course in 1984. He then served as engineer officer on the USS James Madison (SSBN-627).
Pose a threat. And third, submarines are hard to tind and damage; but when a submarine loses an engagement, frequently the ship and entire crew are lost.
Today’s advocates of diesel electric submarines routinely ignore these principles. Their argument generally starts with some combination of the following “facts.”
^ Diesel electric submarines are quieter.
^ Diesel submarines are more cost-effective.
^ Diesel submarines are needed to train our ASW forces to face the enemy diesel submarine threat.
^ Diesel submarines are well suited for coastal defense of the United States.
The facts refute each of these claims:
^ In any realistic wartime encounter between a diesel submarine and a nuclear submarine, the nuclear submarine would have the acoustic advantage and prevail. Modern nuclear submarines, operating in their quiet Wartime mode, virtually are undetectable by most ASW forces. Diesel submarines can be very quiet when they are operating in the battery-electric mode; however, when operating on the battery, speed limitations are severe. After a predictable period of time, the batteries must be recharged with diesel engines, making the ship vulnerable both from an acoustic and surface surveillance standpoint.
^ To evaluate “cost-effectiveness,” one must balance dollar value against capability in conducting missions assigned. Diesel submarines were a cost-effective platform for the missions assigned in the 1940s and 1950s. The modern diesel submarine is a cost-effective platform for nations with limited maritime objectives. Strategic deterrence, strike, mining, special warfare, and Arctic operations round out the tasks assigned to U.S. submarine forces of today. Nuclear-powered submarines
have the capability to accomplish all of these missions because of their inherent endurance, speed, stealth, fire power, and acoustic capabilities.
- Training of our ASW forces to face the spectrum of enemy threats is clearly important. Since we cannot practice with enemy submarines, we must simulate enemy submarine capabilities. We can make our nuclear submarines sound and act like diesel submarines. We cannot make a diesel submarine perform like a nuclear submarine. It would be a mistake to allocate scarce resources to build diesel submarines just so they could simulate the low end of the enemy threat.
- We will need submarines for coastal defense only if we are losing a war. The United States has air, submarine, and surface ASW platforms. In each phase of a conflict, we must match the capabilities of our platform types with the tasks at hand. The waters close to our coasts can be efficiently defended by maritime patrol aircraft and surface forces without risk from similar enemy forces.
Our submarines must be able to confront the entire spectrum of enemy threat platforms. The United States needs submarines that can challenge enemy combatants in their home waters—and win. Let us honor the accomplishments and traditions of the past, but let us build the best submarines for the future, uninhibited by emotional attachment to technology of the past.
Admiral Reynolds, until late last year Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is now serving as Director of Research and Development Requirements, Test and Evaluation (OP-098), in Washington, D.C.