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And finally, type commanders should give a long, hard look at repetitive inspections that sidetrack a ship’s training program and detract from its more meaningful planning. I suggest a three-year inspection cycle for all surface units. There would be a dedicated three-month period during which all inspections, visits, and assessments would be administered. No underway tasking or major maintenance could be accomplished during this time, unless it was essential to the completion of the inspection (i.e., operational propulsion plant examination); it would be an administrative inspection stand-down. Eighteen months later, the immediate unit commander would have the option to rerun the entire cycle for his own review. Between these heightened periods of inspection tempo, the ship would have the luxury of significant amounts of uninterrupted time to concentrate on the reasons they are there— war fighting, and its inevitable companion. damage control.
The old expression, “Surface Warfare: We eat our young” is alive and well in today's Navy. We must learn to work smarter, and not necessarily longer. Junior officers must become surface warriors, not paper tigers. The community must strive to become more attractive to the top-performing officer candidates. Finally, we in the surface force must be more critical of ourselves. We must endeavor constantly to improve our efficiency and proficiency, and take pride in the knowledge that we are the backbone of the Navy.
Lieutenant McGrath is halfway through his first division officer tour in the USS McCandless (FF-1084).
• •
By Rock Daze
Two-career families vs. the Navy
Many top officers are leaving the Navy because of family stresses that still have not been adequately addressed by the detailing and promotion process. These experienced officers are important to the Navy, and every incentive should be used to keep them. Perhaps the time has come to consider homesteading as a retention tool, instead of a promotion inhibitor.
The two-income household has caused significant changes in the Navy of the past decade. What once was an extended Navy family with strong support and social interaction from the service wife is gone. And as each working wife enters the Navy circle, there is even less Navy involvement by the wives, accelerating the trend toward seeking outside support. If one doubts this erosion of the military “family,” ask a Navy chaplain who must administer the needs once filled by volunteer wives.
Volunteer work alone does not provide the satisfaction for today’s educated spouse that it may have for her mother. Today’s spouse, stronger and more independent, understands the man who serves his country because she too is motivated. Professional accomplishment and peer recognition, often the officer’s prime career motivators, are equally important for her. She can support her husband’s career, but is the reverse also true? The husband can understand his educated spouse, her career, civilian friends, and nonmilitary support group. But when the time comes for a transfer and a career choice, who comes first? Today’s military career includes multiple transfers that are incompatible for most two- career families.
Money is another changing factor in the career decision that can no longer be considered solely from the military viewpoint. There are now combined incomes, and rarely does a move bode well for the civilian-employed spouse. Sales requires customers, management requires seniority, and teaching requires varied credentials. In the long term, it is often extremely costly to transfer, not to mention having to prove oneself time and again. Moreover, the security of a good second income makes it easier for the military officer to transition to the civilian workplace, further reducing an important hold the military once enjoyed.
A male officer at the eight- to ten- year point in his career begins to view his family differently. Now in his early thirties, he becomes more family and friend oriented, and is no longer as career driven as he was in his twenties. He begins to empathize with his wife’s personal support needs, the very ones she developed during his long absences. He realizes that time away is not the only issue (consider the pilots who opt for airline jobs). Transfers throughout a career may make it impossible for him to meet both his and his wife’s needs. As these stresses accumulate, the conflict between a happy marriage and a successful naval career becomes a real one. And a career that openly fosters this continued conflict within the family is contrary to the service ideals motivating most officers.
The current system fosters this conflict.
Any evidence or suggestion of homesteading is a negative reflection for an officer. Rather than use it to entice retention, detailers warn of the dire consequences of staying in one location. In fact, every officer does not need to change geographic locations. The movement of officers is not necessary; it is a tradition that is proving too costly to continue. Why is it bad for a top officer to get professionally challenging jobs if they are all in the same area?
Some will argue that corporations, too, require their top executives to move around. But the difference is that the civilian is given a choice. Rarely must one move or quit, or move now and move later. For civilian managers, retaining recognized expertise is more important than forging every executive into a senior vice president.
Not every officer can be offered a homesteading choice; individual qualifications, geographic area, and Navy requirements must be weighed. But given the centralized location of major activities, why not use an option that is available and applicable to the needs of the 1990s? The Navy must fully address the two-career family problem, using homesteading as a tool, not as a club.
Mr. Daze, formerly a Navy lieutenant commander whose most recent assignment was as F-14 project officer at Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, now sells commercial real estate in Newport Beach, California. The reasons he cites in this article contributed to his departure from the service.
96
Proceedings / January 1990