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^ne cannot simply put ‘deception” on a checklist, deception requires an intriCate, deliberate effort to lead the enemy down the wrong path— a°d then suddenly spring out and Surprise him.
Cover and Deception: Some Definitions
In the military, we often use the terms “cover and deception” to mean “hide and deceive.” Barton Whaley, a former associate professor of world politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, says there are only three ways to cover (“hide the real”) and three ways to deceive (“show the false”).[1]
Deceivers may use:
Masking: to use camouflage or electronic measures to make the plan or operation invisible. It may conceal all the characteristics or cause them to blend in with the surrounding physical, electromagnetic, or spatial environment. For example, in Tom Clancy’s novel The Hunt for Red October (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984) the Soviets “masked” the development of a prototype propulsion system. One form of military deception, department/service deception (actions to deceive the enemy about doctrine, tactics, or techniques), might be used to hide research and development into capabilities, force structures, and tactics.[2] Planners might use deception in reporting program development, schedules, test results, and operational successes or failures. Repackaging: to disguise an operation as something else by adding or subtracting features. Warships, for example, can be made to look like freighters. In World War I “mystery ships” allowed themselves to be torpedoed and then uncovered their guns to destroy surfacing enemy submarines. Placing canvas or rubber trucks over tanks is another example.
Dazzling: to hide the real by confusing the observer. Military codes and ciphers, randomly generated, though unreadable, are fully recognizable for what they are—encoded traffic. But by overloading an adversary’s intelligence collection assets, we could confuse him. In her work on Pearl Harbor Roberta Wohlstetter discusses “noise” and its impact on intelligence collection and analysis.[3] Generated to hide telltale signals, “noise” prevents the enemy from clearly seeing preparations and activities.
Having hidden the real, now we must show the false. Again, Whaley says there are three ways to accomplish this: Mimicking: to use a double, to have one thing imitate another. Whaley used this example:
“General Otto von Emmich attacked the great Belgian fortress of Liege in 1914 with six brigades totaling only 20,000 troops; but, because this was a mixed force drawn from five corps, Belgian intelligence concluded from prisoners taken that they faced all five corps, an overwhelming force of 150,000, and accordingly withdrew their infantry screen.”[4]
A tactical example occurred in the Vietnam air war when electronically disguised F-4 Phantoms imitated slower, lumbering F-105s on a standard bombing
to develop a defensive U. S. strategy that either precludes surprise or, if that fails, reduces its consequences. Instead, we must explore the offensive potential of strategic and operational military deception. Effective deception is a force multiplier.
A Model: The straightforward idea of hiding the real and showing the false finally gives substance to the vague list of steps in existing doctrine. Missing has been the thought process that must accompany the development of a deception plan. Too often personnel see deception as a requirement to be crossed off a checklist. But deception is not a requirement; it is an opportunity to prolong the enemy’s indecision until any decision he makes is too late to have significance. Planners must consider deception early and continuously.
In the process of deception, the planner must ask himself a series of questions.4 First, what does he intend to accomplish? Second, what reaction does he desire from the enemy? The planner must know which individual (or target) makes the necessary decisions and develop the ruse to influence him. Britain’s most experienced World War H deception planner, Brigadier General Dudley Clarke, head of the so-called “A” Force deception planning team in Cairo, recalled:
“In the first Deception Plan I ever tackled I learned a lesson of inestimable value. The scene was Abyssinia. . . Gen [Sir Archibald] Wavell wanted the Italians to think he was about to attack from the south in order to draw off forces from those opposing him on the northern flank. The deception went well enough—but the result was just the opposite of what Waved wanted- The Italians drew back in the South, and sent what they could spare from there to reinforce the North, which was of course the true British objective. After that h became a creed in ‘A’ Force to ask a General ‘What do you want the enemy to do,’ and never, ‘What do you want him to thinkT”[5]
■mission into North Vietnam. Enemy MiGs took the bait and ^even fell in 12 minutes.5 inventing: to show the false by ^eating something entirely new. Examples include rubber tanks, folse radio traffic and radar Missions, notional units, orders °f battle, and the like. Deployed °Pposite the Pas de Calais dur- lng World War II, General George Patton and a fictitious army (complete with fake *°ading docks, support facili- tles, and communications traffic) were part of a arger deception effort for |Ee Normandy invasion. Decoying: to divert atten- tl0n, to offer misleading or mul- llPle options to the enemy. For cxarnple, an enemy can be made to wonder whether a forward- deployed amphibious task force W'U land, and if so, where and ln what strength. Similarly, an °ff-shore carrier battle group c°uld launch a diversionary a'pha strike, complete with elec- lr°nic jamming and radar, to dWert attention from an insertion Gsewhere. Other government a§encies must be able to give
plausible explanations for otherwise visible events.
Maneuver warfare is another
example of decoying (although maneuver warfare is much more than this). In his 180-mile march to Atlanta in the Civil War, General William T. Sherman maneuvered his two corps on either side of the single, narrow railway line. Although he was narrowly constrained, Sherman retained the initiative because he had the option of attacking to his right or to his left. His enemies found themselves continually in danger of being outflanked and therefore were never able to establish a fixed defensive position to confront him. The Southern generals were unable to discern his operational objectives. * 2 3 4 5
Next, the planner should decide what he wants the edemy to perceive about the facts or event. This deception Pr°posal must be credible. It also must be verifiable from other sources, consistent in presentation, and simple.6 hen the deceiver must decide what to hide about those a«s or impending events and, perhaps, what to show in heir stead. The planner analyzes the pattern of the opera- h°n he wants to hide. He must identify what to delete or ahd, and then create another pattern using masking, rePackaging, or dazzling. He does the same for the false Plan to give a pattern that plausibly mimics, invents, or ecoys. These choices are not mutually exclusive; one can more than one for each desired effect.7 The planner mould realize that resources will be expended with each choice and the ruse may warn the adversary.
At this point the deceiver must explore the means available for communicating the deception to the enemy. Even ‘Jno operation exists, the enemy must be made to believe bat one does. To be credible and verifiable, the enemy must see an illusion or ruse from more than one intelligence source. The greater the number, the more opportunities the enemy has to “see” the proposal, and the greater the chance for success. If military planners have limited deception resources or communication channels and little time to secure additional ones, they must reevaluate what they want to hide or show.
Having decided on the effect and the means, the deceiver enters the operational phase. Sometimes planners and operators communicate the false characteristics to the enemy’s sensors; sometimes they will not. Common sense should prevail. There is no need to pass dummy radio traffic over radio nets that the enemy does not or cannot monitor.
Finally, feedback is essential. It is the only way the planner can tell if he is having the intended effect.8
Can Deception Work? Critics of deception argue that technological advances in intelligence collection have made surveillance so sophisticated—with “smart” weapons, satellite surveillance, and “real time” intelligence— that it is no longer possible to hide anything from an adversary. But it still may be possible to make an adversary see something that is not there or to shield from him something that is there. In fact, increased surveillance by the enemy may provide the additional communication channels needed to reach him. In addition, this type of scrutiny may improve some types of deception and make others obsolete. For example, recent evidence shows that modern codes and ciphers may not be any more secure than those available in the past. The Walker spy case showed that secret submarine operations, some of the most protected operations, were not so secret after all.
Deception is not a panacea that can replace other military actions. The enemy might not be deceived simply because he might not see the evidence. This is especially possible in Third World countries, where perceptions or intelligence and collection assets may be mismatched, overwhelmed, or failed. Like everything else in war, deception requires that one know the enemy—his tactics, techniques, and predilections; what he knows and what he does not know. Finally, one must know what he believes, what he wishes to believe, and what he is prepared to believe. Answers to these questions will often determine the success or failure of the deception plan.
Lastly, deception may be counterproductive. Resources used in the ruse may have been needed in the actual operation. General Waved’s deception, for example, worked too well, causing the Italians to deploy exactly where the British did not want them.
Conclusion: Planners need to contemplate the inherent advantages of military deception at the strategic, depart- ment/service, and operational levels. They need to understand its impact on competitive strategies. At the strategic level, deception is implemented through decisions made by the National Command Authorities or Unified Commands. “It includes a broad range of measures for clandestinely securing the preparations of strategic operations or campaigns, as well as for disorienting the enemy with regard to . . . actual intentions.”[6] The stakes are high. Deception at this level can affect the outcome of wars and campaigns.
It is at the strategic and department/service level that the military can use disinformation to redirect enemy reconnaissance activities to false representations of both intentions and capabilities. False information can be disseminated through technical means of communication, radio-electronic means, and false documents.[7] The goal of strategic deception is to prevent the enemy from providing himself with enough warning to mobilize politically, diplomatically, and militarily or to position his strategic reserve. At the operational level, commanders conceal the preparation of major operations. Coordination across theater boundaries is critical. An amphibious demonstration, for example, requires careful consideration of the forces used, their proximity to the actual landings, and their impact on adjacent commands.
When developing a deception plan, planners and operators should take advantage of the Boyd cycle or Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action loop.[8] Boyd believes every decision maker must go through four steps before he can react. The goal is to go through the cycle faster than one’s opponent. As the adversary observes the deceiver’s maneuver, orients on it, comes to a decision, and begins to act, the deceiver has already made a second move. The enemy hesitates and begins the thought process again. As this cycle continues, the adversary falls farther and farther behind, and his actions become irrelevant.
Nevertheless, as one writer points out, advanced technology will indeed make deception more difficult:
“Inevitably deception will become less of an art and more of a science. . . . Modern deception will require much greater skill in highly technical areas. . • ■ Greater efforts for the preparation of deception plans will have to be made in peace-time so that they will be available if war breaks out. Thus it appears that deception will be left less and less in the hands of amateurs and again more in the hands of professionals, intelligence bureaucrats, and ‘engineers.’ Such a trend may be unavoidable but may also limit the scope of deception operations primarily to supersophisticated electronic warfare, neglecting the more traditional classical ruses de guerre. This should be avoided at all costs, so that the advance of modern science of deception does not exclude the ancient art of deception.”[9]
In the limited wars and political and diplomatic missions faced by the U. S. military, deception operations, which are comparatively cheap, can be decisive.
‘Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh. “Part I: Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought,” Military Review, June 1982, p. 4.
2See especially Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whaley, “Understanding Strategy Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases,” in Daniel, et al., Strategic Military Deception (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 189. The analysis of deception data collected by the authors shows the probability of achieving victory, given surprise- is 93% while the probability of achieving victory, given no surprise, declines to 50%.
3George Edward Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military Strategy (Washing' ton, D. C.: National Defense University, 1984), p. 338.
4Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War, Cambridge, MA: MU Center for International Studies, 1969 , p. 135.
5Ibid.
6Military Deception: Operational Handbook 7-13 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Development and Education Command, 1986), p. 5-4.
7Whaley hypothesizes that masking is the most effective way to dissimulate or cover an operation. If masking fails, the next resort is to repackage the operation- Dazzling would be a last-ditch effort to at least confuse the enemy. Similarly’ mimicking is the most effective way to simulate followed by inventing, and lastly- by decoying.
“Whaley, p. 189.
9Jennie A. Stevens and Henry S. Marsh, “Part II: Surprise and Deception in Soviet Military Thought,” Military Review, July 1982, pp. 25-26. The authors were examining deception from a Soviet viewpoint, though I believe these sentiments apply equally to the United States.
10Ibid., p. 33.
'‘John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing (Unpublished), p. 5. 12Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1982, p. 145.
In striving for victory and low attrition to friendly forces and materiel, military planners must recognize the important j^le of surprise actions and deceptive prac- jees.1 Surprise can neutralize much of the nreat’s capability. Deception leads to surprise and can enable forces to take advantage of^ e enemies’ weaknesses and overcome i neir strengths. Studies show that when „
Secrecy and deception combine to surprise the Cnemy, chances for victory nearly double.2
Because it almost always works, one must wonder ^ wny U. S. military planners do not spend more time study- 'ng the role of deception in military operations.3 Perhaps the 1 ’^formation on the subject results from the natural reluctance of i petitioners to reveal their secrets. Other than the Marine Corps’s current *°rt (OH 7-13, Military Deception) and the Army’s more recent attempt in uly 1988 (FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception), little analysis of deception has purred since the early 1980s. Much of what has been done has dealt with • S. susceptibility to surprise and deception. These works have attempted
‘Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 1969), p. 135.
[2]JCS Pub 1.
[3]Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
[4]Whaley, p. 185.
[5]Col. H. L. Trimble, USMC, “Lecture on Deception,” National War College, Washington, D. C. (26 January 1988).
John D. LeHockey
Major LeHockey, an artilleryman, is currently assigned to the 2d Marine
Division. Before that, he was the Marine Corps Fellow at The Mershon Center, The Ohio State University. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps
Amphibious Warfare School and the Command and Staff College. He
holds a bachelor’s degree in mass communications from Arizona State University and a master’s degree in business administration in systems management from Baldwin-Wallace College.