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1983'
One of the ship’s engineers called the pilothouse and asked if he should shut down the boiler fuel pumps. “Mike, get the hell out of there! We are going down!” Third Mate Eugene Kelly yelled.1
Despite the warning, Michael Price and five other engineers were trapped below when the SS Marine Electric
capsized and sank during a storm on 12 February -- , Thirty-one men died. Seven bodies were never recove from the frigid waters 30 miles east of Chincoteague, , ginia. Only Chief Mate Robert Cusick, Eugene Kelly*an Able Seaman Paul Dewey survived. , g
The Marine Electric was built in 1944 and operated »s
rV *
“I didn’t think anybody expected it to roll over . . . But all of a sudden, the ship just rolled, and I saw the water level start to rise.”
__
until Marine Transport Lines purchased and re-
Hleh,
m>dsection, converting her to a bulk carrier with five J'uous cargo holds. Marine Coal Transport Corpora-
a northeasterly course toward Narragansett Bay, 322 I -away, with 24,800 long tons of coal. She was fully
Slck knew his men could not go on deck once they
re niade to the hatch covers, Cusick felt the ship was J l°r sea.
veee weather worsened dramatically by dawn. The wind wh'ed slightly, screaming from the northeast at 50 knots lj e Ihe seas increased to 40 feet and more, forcing the Spee"* Electric to pitch heavily. Captain Corl reduced
-r starboard bow and foredeck, seas that broke at the
ar>ch.
or -
0r two tows with her nets. Twenty-one hours later, ber windows smashed by heavy seas and her engine Hooding, the Theodora called for help. The Coast rd scrambled a helicopter from its Elizabeth City, (\ypb Carolina, air station while the cutter Point Highland fy “'82333) set out from Chincoteague. The Marine had just passed the Theodora and, true to the tra- fy n °f the sea, Captain Corl volunteered to escort the toward shore. Two hours later, in swirling snow
°Wi
•anker
i,an,led her in 1961. Her bow and stern were sliced off at uem Steel’s East Boston shipyard and mated to a new r ■ •
cavei
bought the 605-foot ship in 1962 for use in carrying ® and grain.
before midnight on 10 February, the Marine Elec- Y eased away from the coal piers in Newport News, ? ?'nia. A veteran harbor pilot, Captain T. J. Wool, a her through the rain-slashed night across Hampton Ch, Past OW Point Comfort, and down Thimble Shoal pi antlel into the teeth of a northeasterly gale. After drop- 8 Captain Wool off at Cape Henry, the Marine Electric
pile
^rew 34 feet, and was riding well. Despite the Pl,..'11- this should have been a routine voyage for Captain ly "P Corl and his seasoned crew. However, the Marine de^|p,c> and 31 of her crew, were less than 29 hours from
Wer0rmaUy, only 16 of the 70 dogs on each hatch cover Ci/6 [astened during the trip to New England. Chief Mate
0n the stormy sea, so he had them put as many dogs |j ae hatch covers as possible before passing Cape j *y. Although half of the dogs were not working and Pair; e hundreds of small holes and the makeshift reoVer^to ease the brutal pounding as the ship took seas
JUst ' w'ndlasses. Her bow rose up and shed this water, $j0as it had done for the past 39 years, while an occa-
nal green sea crashed down on the forward cargo hatch Vers.
Th ■
pe.ne fishing vessel Theodora had also left port on 10 Cre\yUarY ancl beaded into the same vicious storm, her °ne ^0P*ng the weather would slacken enough to make
*ith
r00i
falling darkness, Corl became concerned about his f;an.sbip’s safety.
I 'ne Electric to Coast Guard Group Eastern Shore:
c0u °n’t know if I’m going to be able to keep on this fSe- Cm taking an awful beating out here. I’m going to ln trouble myself pretty soon. Over.”
Guard: “Roger, Captain. Would it be better to just y where you’re at? Over.”
Marine Electric: “Well, I mean I don’t know how I can heave to on this course. I’m rolling, taking water, green water over—over my starboard side, all the way across my deck. Over.”
Theodora to Marine Electric: “Yeah, this is the Theodora. I don’t think I’ve got any problem right now. We’re running pretty good and I imagine we’ll be able to make that rendezvous there with the Coast Guard. So if you want to take off, old dog, 1 imagine you can.”
Coast Guard to Marine Electric: “Captain, if you wish to assume your original course to your destination, you can. Over.”
Marine Electric: “Roger on that. Thank you very much. He doesn’t seem to be in any problems there. So I’m going back to head for Breton Reef and Newport, Rhode Island. Over.”
Coast Guard: “Roger, Captain. Appreciate much your assistance and have a safe trip. Over.”
Theodora to Marine Electric: Thank you very much and good luck to you.”
It was 1824 and the Marine Electric was handling well with no signs of distress. The Theodora was met by the Point Highland and moored safely in Chincoteague. The Theodora's good luck wish was for naught; she was the last vessel to see the Marine Electric alive.
Captain Corl napped on a settee near the pilothouse that evening, awakening periodically to check with Kelly on the Marine Electric's headway. The ship moved only two miles during Kelly’s four-hour watch. Kelly, a 1975 graduate of Massachusetts Maritime Academy, watched 25- foot seas climbing on board with eight to nine feet clearing the main deck, striking the number-two hatch and frothing back to the number-four hatch. The Marine Electric rolled heavily to each side, but she had no list or trim and her bow was still rising and shedding seas normally. All appeared to be well when Richard Roberts took over the watch at midnight.
At 0115, Roberts noticed that the bow was sluggish and not rising out of the water as it should. Within an hour, solid water was rolling down the main deck to the number- two hatch.
At 0230, a worried Captain Corl went to Chief Mate Cusick’s room. “Come up to the bridge, Mate,” he said. “I believe that we are in trouble. I think she’s going— settling by the head. This may be my imagination,” he continued, “with the way the seas are running, I can’t really tell, but I think she’s settling by the head.”
Cusick woke Chief Engineer Richard Powers. “The two of us went right back to the bridge, took one quick look and it was apparent that she was settling by the head. The seas were staying up there. They were not—the bow was not lifting up properly,” Cusick said later. With most of her 13 feet of freeboard at the bow gone, the Marine Electric was mortally wounded and her crew was powerless to help her.
Increasingly concerned about the survival of his crew and ship, Captain Corl radioed the Coast Guard at 0251. Marine Electric to Coast Guard Station Ocean City: “I’m approximately 30 miles from Delaware Bay entrance and I’m going down by the head. I seem to be taking on
and four drowned. Most people submerged in 32° to water without an exposure suit will become exhausted^
Coas>
weren’t on the life ring,” Kelly said during the
don’t know how long it was on the life ring before 1111
the radio operator. The radio operator kept saying he ^
S
Id see
“The helicopters arrived, and it seemed like I coui them passing over me two or three times before they SP j| ted us. When they lowered the basket, I turned to ^
Gu^
dawned on him when he spotted dozens of life prese
:fver
eritf
sCene
filled with debris and lifeless bodies and set to the
the
“So after I couldn’t get them in [the life raft], and t^-
all—the Second Mate, he was the first one to drift a . I kept on looking for something to help them ^
grip on a wooden pallet could not be broken.
tenant Olin, two hours and 45 minutes after the Electric capsized. _
‘So I was still hanging on and hanging on. The
that I had it made then. I looked up and there was^ ^
water forward. I’m going to try to head for Delaware Bay. Over.”
Coast Guard: ‘‘Roger, Captain. Can I have a brief description of your vessel and number of people on board. Over.”
Marine Electric: “I am a coal carrier, five-hatch coal carrier. I am loaded with 23,000 tons of coal. I have 36 [m ] people on board. We are positively in bad shape, positively in bad shape. We need someone to come out and give us some assistance if possible. Over.”
Captain Corl ordered Radio Officer Albion Lane to broadcast a Mayday. The Coast Guard communication station at Portsmouth, Virginia, the tanker Tropic Sun, and the Norwegian ship Berganger picked up the SOS; both ships headed for the Marine Electric with all possible speed.
The crew hurried to ready the starboard lifeboat for launching. Cusick, Kelly, and Able Seaman Paul Dewey put on as much heavy, warm clothing as they could— clothing that would save their lives—and, with the rest of the crew, donned life preservers.
At 0414 Captain Corl talked to Coast Guard Station Ocean City one last time.
Coast Guard: ‘‘Captain, just prior to abandoning ship request you contact me just to notify, notify me you are abandoning. Over.”
Marine Electric: “Roger. We are abandoning the ship right now. We are abandoning the ship right now.” Coast Guard: Marine Electric, Ocean City. Roger. Out.”
One minute later, with most of the crew mustered at the starboard lifeboat, the Marine Electric rolled suddenly to starboard, casting the men into the deadly cold Atlantic as she capsized.
Third Mate Kelly recounts the terror of that moment:
“I didn’t think it was going to roll over. I thought she was going to go down straight by the head. I didn’t think anybody expected it to roll over. . . . But all of a sudden, the ship just rolled, and I saw the water level start to rise, and before the releasing gear was even released on the lifeboat, the seas picked it up, brought it right in front of me against the stack. And I just watched the ocean level come up and grab me. As I went into the water, I looked up and I saw Captain Corl on his deck, climbing over the railing, trying to get into the water. That is the last time I saw the Captain.”
Captain Corl’s body was never found. Also not found was the body of the engine cadet, George Wickboldt, whose death was doubly tragic for the Wickboldt family because his older brother Steven was lost 11 months earlier when the Golden Dolphin exploded and sank.
“I could hear people around me,” Kelly said. “I could hear them calling out. It was the Chief Engineer; the Third Mate, Richard Roberts; one of the ordinary seamen, his first name was Harold—I don’t know his last name; the day man, Joe—I don’t know his last name; and it was the radio operator, Al; and myself. We were on the life ring.” “ ... we could tell that the older, ordinary seaman, Harold, was going into shock. His eyes were wide, and he
was gasping for breath, real quick breaths.”
The air temperature was 29° Fahrenheit, the water bone-numbing, killing 37°. Hypothermia killed 20 n^
unconscious in only 15 to 30 minutes; death occurs inj1 30 to 90 minutes.
No one knows how long the men trapped in the eng1 room survived. Death stalked each man with a slow, h° fying relentlessness as the cold turned minutes into hours and hours into a lifetime.
“And I don’t know when I started to notice that
Guard investigation. “I noticed that Harold wasn't the^ And then I turned around and the day man wasn’t there ticed that the only one there was the Chief Engineer
cold, and he was stiffening up. He kept saying, I’m c° I’m cold. Help me.” . f
“ . . . there was no response from the Chief Engin^ ... his flashlight floated away from him, and I was n to grab that, and use that as my signal. ... I kept talk to Sparks.2 Sparks was the last one on the ring with me'
Sparks that the basket was here, and Sparks wasn’t on life ring anymore. It was just myself. That’s when t lowered the basket into the water, and I was able to e in.”
Lieutenant Scott Olin, pilot of the first Coast Du , helicopter on scene, had expected to find lifeboats t* with Marine Electric crewmen. A sickening realiz3
lights bobbing in the water. Olin flew over a grisly
task of retrieving the dead and the survivors—mostly dead. a
Paul Dewey later explained how he clambered >nt° j life raft after being thrown into the water. Four others t . to board the raft with his help, but the effects of the c overwhelmed their desperate efforts.
and then they all started drifting away one by one. • ' They would all just drift away.”
Olin’s men recovered four dead seamen; one was m turned to the sea for retrieval by a vessel when his d
• .-Co.
Chief Mate Cusick had climbed into a water-filled 1 boat. He was the last of three survivors recovered by
thing I heard was the whir overhead. At that time I
Coast Guard helicopter over my head. They dropped do ^ the basket—dropped it right in front of me. They ne
°f life
within the hull 120 feet below, straining to hear a
tbade sound to feed their hopes that the engineers
of
sm U^’ anc* ^ could see the small orange lifeboat getting I. a"er and smaller all the time. The next thing I knew ey Were pulling me in the helicopter.” usick, Kelly, and Dewey were flown to a hospital, kd tor hypothermia, and released several days later. n. Coast Guard cutters Cherokee (WMEC-165), Point ‘Shtcind, and Point Arena (WPB-82346), the USS Jack ^‘arns (FFG-24), the USS Seattle (AOE-3), the Tropic "• Berganger, and three Coast Guard helicopters f0UH in vain for more survivors. The Jack Williams ^Und the sunken wreck and dropped an antisubmarine °buoy; her sonar operators listened anxiously for signs
tian-
'ere still alive. All they heard were the creaks and groans a tying ship.
this terrible tragedy.
The Coast Guard is required by law to investigate a marine casualty to determine: the cause of the incident; if evidence exists of negligence or misconduct by a Coast Guard licensed mariner; if civil or criminal laws were violated; and if there is a need for new laws or changes to existing ones to prevent the casualty’s recurrence.3
Most investigations consist solely of a casualty report. However, several casualties occurring each year sometimes indicate safety problems or technically important areas. A marine board of investigation is usually convened to delve into every aspect of these casualties. Most maritime safety laws are developed from marine board of investigation recommendations.
Captain Lauridsen’s marine board of investigation convened 16-24 February, 18-26 March, and 25-28 July
|
| n | rj rr |
|
| ~f.. rr.. [ |
|
| - ■ . | •Jill ■J 1 M J |
Th
pi ne storm that pounded the Marine Electric also crip- pr- Washington, D.C., dumping 18 inches of snow by ,heUay evening. Two Coast Guard officers drove through dr storrn to Coast Guard Headquarters on Saturday and jrted a message ordering Captain Peter C. Lauridsen, |C’ Captain Domenic A. Calicchio, and Lieutenant Com- l^ader Edward F. Murphy to convene a marine board of est*gation to inquire into the circumstances surrounding
The coal carrier SS Marine Electric is seen in port before she sank during a winter storm, taking 31 of her crew with her. Her owners, Marine Transport Lines, plea- bargained and were charged with one criminal violation. They were fined the maximum—$10,000—for not reporting outstanding ship defects to the Coast Guard, as required by law.
99
,nRs / October 1989
defect
Guard’s lack of consistently maintained records on
,keeP
the
poia1
United States Merchant Marine Academy in Kings
id
New York; small plaques memorializing graduates
Wiclc'
'Witness statements and descriptions were extracted from 1 Marine lAtfr port, SS MARINE ELECTRIC, O. N. 245675, Capsizing and Sinking inthe ^ tic Ocean, on 12 February 1983, with multiple loss of life,” Report No- . ^ 0001 HOS II R fViact OiinrH 9S Inlv 1 OR A Availohli* thmuoH thC N**
1983. The National Transportation Safety Board also participated in the investigation. The marine board questioned: the survivors; James K. Farnham, the vessel’s permanent master (Captain Corl was the relief master); the owner’s fleet manager; a marine superintendent and structural steel engineer; American Bureau of Shipping surveyors; Coast Guard inspectors; divers who examined the wreck; persons who surveyed or assisted in loading the vessel; and several technical witnesses. Thousands of pages of sworn testimony were taken; more than 100 exhibits were entered into the record; and several stability, loading, and hull-strength studies were completed.
The board removed all doubts about the Marine Electric's condition. Citing evidence of hundreds of main deck and hatch cover patches and the use of epoxy to repair holes in the deck, the marine board concluded that the “ship was poorly managed and horribly maintained with respect to repairs to the hatch covers, main deck and holes in the cargo hold area caused during offloading.”4
The board also said the casualty was probably caused by “progressive flooding of the vessel’s forward spaces. The sequence most likely commenced with flooding through sections of the deteriorated and wasted top plating of the dry cargo hatch and wasted main deck plating subjected to the dynamic effects of the striking sea, resulting in filling the dry cargo spaces, stores spaces, and the deep tanks.
. . . The additional weight from flooding forward significantly reduced the freeboard at the bow, allowing greater amounts of sea water to board the vessel. Eventually, the force and weight of the boarding sea striking the top plating of No. 1 and No. 2 cargo hatch covers exceeded the strength of the deteriorated and wasted sections of the unsupported plating, resulting in the collapse of these plates, wholly or in part. Sea water then entered No. 1 and No. 2 cargo holds. . . . ”5
The flooding eroded the ship’s stability until she capsized.
The marine board also faulted inspection procedures used by the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping.6
The Marine Electric's crew was also criticized. “A number of officers and crewmembers were aware of the condition of the hatch covers, and at times expressed their concerns among themselves. However, due to the lack of seagoing employment, and the desirable nature of the voyage being made by the Marine Electric, they were content to sail the vessel on coastwise voyages without further complaint. They were largely under the belief that should a serious casualty occur, they would be evacuated in a timely manner.”7
The marine board recommended some changes in Coast Guard inspection policies, and most were adopted. The board also recommended that the ship’s permanent master, James K. Farnham, and company fleet director Joseph Thelgie face criminal prosecution for sending the ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition likely to endanger lives.
Farnham and Thelgie were not prosecuted because of insufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) differed with the Coast Guard regarding the casualty’s cause; the NTSB blamed the sinking on an an determined structural failure.8 This difference cast graV's doubts on the government’s ability to prove that the ship unseaworthiness triggered this accident. The C°a
reports complicated the effort to prove failures in report111-' the ship’s defects. Because of these problems, Assist U. S. Attorney Robert W. Wiechering allowed Mar1^ Coal Transport Corporation to plead guilty to concealing material fact when it failed to tell the Coast Guard abou ^ hole punctured in the vessel’s hull during cargo operate ten days before she sank. In exchange, the corporat' would not be prosecuted further. _ .,
On 30 September 1988 in Norfolk’s Federal D>str‘ Court, Marine Coal Transport Corporation pleaded gu’ - to violating Title 18 United States Code Section 1^ , Judge John A. MacKenzie levied the maximum f'ne $10,000 for this felony.
On 6 August 1984, the Coast Guard announced classes of commercial vessels would be required to ca ^ exposure suits for their crews when operating in cold ^ ters. Ironically, the Coast Guard announced plans to ^ quire exposure suits and asked for public comments g this issue nine days before the Marine Electric tragedy^
A new collier, the SS Energy Independence, reP^C j the Marine Electric on the Newport News to New Eng‘a coal run. Chief Mate Robert Cusick returned to the nie chant marine. Captain James Farnham voluntarily re quished his master’s license on 22 January 1988 to a'° the ordeal of a Coast Guard hearing into his fitness to that license
And, finally, there is a stone wall in an arbor at
an1
their families adorn that wall. The name of George boldt, the Marine Electric’s engine cadet, is inscribed one of the plaques along with the name of the vesse which he’s entombed. Below that is the name of brother, Steven.
Marine Casualty^.
’ .6732;
0001 HQS 83, U. S. Coast Guard, 25 July *1984. Available through the I Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA, 22151.
2“Sparks” is a nickname for radio operators.
3From Title 46 United States Code Section 6301.
4Marine Casualty Report, p. 117.
5Ibid., p. 111.
6Ibid., pp. 115-119.
7Ibid.,p. 119. RiC
8‘‘Marine Accident Report—United States Bulk Carrier MARINE ELL .^3, Capsizing and Sinking About 30 Nautical Miles East of Chincoteague, \revj February 12, 1983, Report No. NTSB/Mar-84/01, National Transportation ^ Board, 19 January 1984, p. 56. Available through the National Technical In 0 tion Service, Springfield, VA, 22151.
9Ibid., p. 51.
Commander Walter is assigned to the Marine Safety Division at the j Coast Guard District in Portsmouth, Virginia. He has served as the ^ of the investigations department at Marine Safety Office HaflW'qp Roads, on board the cutters McCulloch (WHEC-386), (WHEC-40), and Duane (WHEC-33), and at the Marine Safety OR Toledo, Ohio.