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far k ,^ut a five-inch gun would be
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I the u recent'y begun modernization of Gua 1llton (WHEC-715)-class Coast
rePia CUtters includes a provision to
I- ^-caliber mount with a new Mk St). . dO 76-mm. gun. While this er-bore gun will, perhaps, im- antih" "le ant‘a>r warfare (AAW) and "'ill -3t caPabilities of the cutter, it
find a means to deliver naval
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ti[J(^lre support for amphibious operant ^ They must also find a way to -°ast Guard cutters effectively they are under wartime Navy °T Arming them with five-inch q Can solve both problems.
able to maintain station within a Cr task force or a surface action
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JJlamilton’s new 76-mm. gun is 2,H but;
' better.
|Ce the antiquated Mk 30 five- 1 :38-ca 5 ModO
Proveer^°re 8un will* perhaps, im-
•oat i
Prelude the cutter from participat- De]ln naval gunfire support missions. Sevet,a8 such a significant capability of *!% limits the war-fighting utility 3 class of ship.
I’ab | IS *SSUe 8oes beyond the fleet re- f0r 'tati°n and modernization program °f ri CSe cutters- Indeed, it is an issue „ ^ strategy. Naval strategists
Cootr0, 8U0:
than'*rTent naval gunfire assets, other four battleships, consist of or aSbjPs designed primarily for AAW $pe ''submarine warfare. Any time c^- °n the gun line by one of these O or destroyers effectively re- ff0es a scarce AAW or ASW asset '"ith t'le defense of the fleet. Faced fe . 'his kind of choice, it seems per- Ulnf reasonable for low-tech naval prj lre support missions to have less laskri>y than high-tech AAW and ASW adeS' On the other hand, an absence of ^lUate naval gunfire support may proere'y limit the Navy’s ability to pJCct seapower ashore through am- '°us operations.
ve "effective naval gunfire support c9d . does not need a fleet-air-defense ^ability Qr abiUty to hunt and kill ti0( "test modem submarines. It need group. A ship of lesser capabilities will do just as well.
An effective naval gunfire support vessel just needs to:
► Provide a relatively stable platform for one or more guns that are five inches or larger
► Keep formation with amphibious shipping—make approximately 20 knots
► Solve a relatively simple fire-control problem
► Defend itself from air or missile attack while in transit or performing its mission
The minimum requirements for an effective naval gunfire support vessel fit in quite well with the primary mission requirements for a Coast Guard cutter. With relatively minor alterations, such less capable classes of vessels as the Hamilton and Bear (WMEC-901) classes can be ready to provide naval gunfire support.
Like other gunfire support vessels, Coast Guard cutters have no need for sophisticated AAW or ASW capabilities to perform their primary missions of law enforcement and service to mariners. The cutters do not have a peacetime need for great speed or for a crew trained to seek out and destroy subs or mines. Instead, the cutters require:
► A moderately capable gun system as a contingency against the friskiest of smugglers
► A speed fast enough to intercept fishing boats—approximately 20 knots
► An adequate fire-control system
► The ability to provide self-defense from air or missile attack
► A crew trained primarily in search and rescue (SAR) and law enforcement
The replacement of the Mk 75 76mm. weapons and the old five-inch/ 38-calibers with Mk 45 five-inch/54- caliber mounts on the Hamilton- and Scar-class cutters would not detract from their ability to perform their peacetime missions. But such a replacement would enable them to perform in a wartime naval gunfire support role. The cost of such a modification would be modest when compared with the cost of building additional frigates or destroyers to provide adequate fire support for the landing forces on a part-time basis. In addition, these cutters—with their expertise in rescue operations—would provide a much-needed SAR resource for the amphibious force, both in transit and in the amphibious area of operations. (The British experience in the Falklands Conflict indicates that the ability to pull survivors from burning amphibious ships or from cold waters can be an important factor in reducing casualties during amphibious operations where the air- and sea-control capabilities of the opposing forces are almost equal.) An additional mission for these helicopter- capable vessels is the refueling and rearming of small helicopters such as the AH-ls and UH-ls of the landing force. Such a helicopter-servicing function would provide some relief for the very busy flight decks of amphibious assault ships.
Current literature seems to agree that a next war will be a come-as-you-are party. If, in fact, that is the case, it is doubtful that attempts to reconfigure today’s fleet of peacetime Coast Guard cutters to effective submarine or mine hunters would be any more appropriate than attempting to convert Cessna 180s for the air-interceptor role. But if five- inch guns are added now, the cutters could be rapidly deployed as valuable naval gunfire support ships with the addition of a little haze-gray paint. (An optional dark blue racing stripe could be retained to maintain the Coast Guard identity.)
When one compares the relatively modest cost of a Mk 45 gun system to the cost of diverting an AAW or ASW vessel from fleet defense, little must be truly sacrificed to gain 25 valuable amphibious fire support vessels (12 Hamilton-class and 13 Bear-class Coast Guard cutters).
Mr. Althaus is a former U. S. Marine Corps artillery officer.
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