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While an international cast of characters has dominated the stage in the Persian Gulf, a group of regional actors has been engaged in a quiet but potentially explosive shadow play for survival along the western littoral. Against the backdrop of the Iran- Iraq War, the members of the Gulf Cooperative Council ironically have limited their military strength to maintain internal and regional stability, even in the face of threats from their bellicose neighbors across the Gulf—Iraq and Iran, one of whose frigates looms in this Gulf sunset.
The navies of the moderate Persian Gulf nations are potentially important forces for ensuring freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, but some critical factors have hindered, and perhaps crippled, naval development in these countries. For example, the Gulf navies have been conspicuously absent from the Iran-Iraq War not because of some cowardly plot by the Gulf countries to get the United States to fight their battles for them, but because these navies are not yet able to perform strenuous patrolling duties. The Gulf governments simply are unable to suffer the possible consequences of conducting major naval activity in the Gulf.
As a group, the nations that now form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman—face numerous internal and external security threats. The term “nation” here is somewhat inaccurate, however, in that it is the regimes of the GCC countries that are struggling for survival. These regimes must contend with large contingents of expatriate labor, large indigenous minorities, and ambitious faction leaders within the government. While each of these groups share the respective regime’s desire for economic prosperity, each is often indifferent or hostile to the regime’s existence. As long as prosperity and stability exist, each regime is safe. But once economic and political upheavals begin, the individual regimes probably will get no support from any of these groups, and indeed may incur their active opposition.
The Gulf regimes are thus in an unstable equilibrium- Every Gulf leader knows that a relatively small disturbance in the politico-military situation could balloon into coup, revolution, or pretext for invasion. Each leader makes his security decisions with an eye to the calculus of survival in the Gulf, rather than on the basis of immediate need and availability of resources. This calculus warns that any substantial change in the status quo could mean disaster, but also that refusal to change risks the regime’s being overtaken by events.
This puts GCC military planners in a dilemma. In theory, GCC leaders would like to have military forces that will deter an aggressor, without threatening their regimes; in practice, they always emphasize maintenance of the status quo, rather than building their military forces.
A review of the threats facing Saudi Arabia, by far the largest and most influential GCC member, illustrates the problems facing the other member nations, although the latter feel these threats more acutely because they are all smaller and less prosperous.
The threat to Saudi Arabia that most concerns U. S- observers is the one that least concerns the Saudis: the Soviets. The Saudis would like to minimize Soviet influence in the region, but the Soviets pose little direct threat to the Arabian Peninsula. Any overland invasion would have to come through Iran or Iraq, and chances of a naval attack are reduced by the relatively low-level Soviet naval presence in the area. The main threat posed by the Soviets to Saudi Arabia is that the Soviet Union is still Iraq’s major arms supplier.1 Saudis do not worry as much about Soviet influence in Iraq as they do about the shadow that a well-armed Iraq casts across the Gulf. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudis were happy to see arms flowing to Iraq, but that attitude may change now that an armistice appears to be in the offing.
Another way the Soviet Union indirectly threatens Saudi Arabia is through its sole peninsular ally, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)- Saudi relations with the turbulent South Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) have never been without strain; the image of the Yemeni civil war, with hostile Egyptian troops stationed in force on the peninsula,
^always in the minds of the Saudi leadership. South ^Clllen supported the Dhofar rebellion in neighboring ^an* which had to resort to using Iranian troops paid out A i^aUC*' c°ffers t0 restore order. South Yemen’s port at t0Cn ant* 'ts anchorage at Socotra Island allow the Soviets station a larger naval force in the region. n recent years, however, the threat to regional stability n^Se^ by South Yemen has receded. The GCC has helped ediate the long-festering dispute between South Yemen j11 Oman. South Yemen entered the 1980s as an econom- I y stagnant pariah in the Arab world; it began to seek °ser ties with other Arab nations to obtain some advan- §es in its perennial hot and cold war with its mortal versary, North Yemen. The Saudis will continue to utch developments in this corner of the peninsula, but y security concerns that arise in the Yemens will almost Mainly be overshadowed by events in Iraq and Iran.
he Gulf war forced Iraq and Saudi Arabia into an un- SV alliance that probably will prove to be a diplomatic otnaly. The end of the war almost certainly will bring °ut renewed tension between these two nations, what- Cr the war’s results. Until the fall of Shah Pahlavi’s Irani r°Vemment in 1979, the Saudis walked a diplomatic tight- 'Pe between Iraq and Iran. They used their essentially good relations with Iran to counter Iraq’s aggressive intentions in the Gulf, while counting on U. S. influence to restrain Iran’s ambitions.2 The Shah's collapse plunged the Saudi leaders into a panic, causing them to throw their moral and monetary support behind Iraq’s ill-conceived plan to deliver a knockout blow to the fledgling revolutionary government in Iran.3
Despite this unusual alliance, however, Iraq remains a major security threat to the Saudis. Iraq, like Saudi Arabia, aspires to be the leader of the Persian Gulf states, and indeed of the Arab world. Early in 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein announced his grandiose Charter for Pan- Arab Action, a sweeping call for Arab unity in the face of external aggression—with Hussein, naturally, as the leader of this unified front.4 The Saudis are just as suspicious of Hussein’s brand of pan-Arabism as they were of that of Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser (President of the United Arab Republic), seeing it as a thinly veiled effort at regional hegemony. A Hussein unbound might have the military wherewithal to topple the Saudi regime if he so chose; he would certainly be able to use the threat of such action to extract political and economic concessions from the Saudis on a wide range of regional issues, not the least of which would be the oil price level.
Iraq’s irredentist claims against Kuwait are a further source of concern for the Saudi leadership. The Saudis spearheaded the formation of the GCC in 1981 as much to contain Iraq as to contain Iran, and though Kuwait joined the organization, it remains the most lukewarm member, partly because of continued Iraqi pressure.
The threat to Gulf shipping is the major, but not the only, component of Saudi Arabia’s biggest external security problem—Iran. Formerly the linchpin of Saudi defense policy, Iran has been transformed into a virulent enemy capable of putting strong internal and external pressure on the Saudi regime. Iran has exerted internal pressure on Saudi Arabia in a number of ways. The Khomeini regime incited extremists to seize control of the Grand Mosque at Mecca, resulting in a long and bloody siege that cost Saudi Arabia dearly in lives and prestige. It has also unleashed a propaganda barrage aimed at the country’s large and restive Shi'ite Moslem population.
It is these internal threats that the Saudis view with the greatest alarm and act as the greatest motivators of their defense policy. The overriding Saudi worry is that some enemy will combine an external threat with internal rebellion.5 The most likely such enemy is Iran. This paranoia also acts, however, as the principal restraining agent on Saudi activities. The Saudis are very reluctant to commit the military to any action for fear of an embarrassing defeat that might result in a revolt or a coup.6 This reluctance is reinforced by the knowledge that in any major military confrontation with Iran, the Saudis inevitably will lose.
The threats that Saudi Arabia faces are, for the most part, shared by the other GCC nations. Oman, however, is a special case in that internal constraints do not prevent it from having an extremely close relationship with the West; Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia are alone among Arab states in cooperating with the U. S. military. Because of its long and eventually successful efforts to put down the Dhofar rebellion, Oman has a relatively large army that has been tested in battle. It is thus the only GCC nation besides Saudi Arabia that can lend military assistance to its neighbors.
To understand the capabilities and limitations of the Persian Gulf nations’ navies, we must inspect the peculiar geographical constraints that the Gulf itself imposes on them. The desert and the Gulf both severely restrict land operations on the Arabian peninsula; while this restricting terrain partly alleviates the effects of the severe manpower shortage that characterizes GCC armies, it also forces the Gulf regimes to guard their seaward flanks.7
It is no easy task, however, to maintain freedom of navigation in a small and congested sea area such as the Persian Gulf. Rear Admiral Jprgen P. Rasmussen, Danish Navy, has identified three key missions—surveillance, countering hostile moves, and coast protection—that set off warfare in coastal seas from other types of naval warfare.8 Though he cites these in reference to the Baltic approaches, they are equally applicable to the Persian Gulf.
Surveillance: First and most vital among missions that the Gulf navies must perform, traffic analysis is crucial for quickly spotting the movements of suspicious vessels in the Gulf, as in the Baltic/7 This task is complicated in the
Gulf by the extremely high density of sea and air traffic, the bewildering number of nationalities involved, and most seriously by the Iran-Iraq War.
Recent events have demonstrated the difficulty imposed on commanders operating in such a restricted environment. A ship may identify an innocent ship or plane as an enemy (as did the USS Vincennes [CG-49]), or it may misconstrue the intentions of an identified intruder (as did the USS Stark [FFG-31]). In addition, mining operations and seaborne guerrilla raids can easily escape early detection because of the sheer number of ships that must be watched.
Countering Enemy Movements: In coastal waters this mission is performed ideally by fast attack craft and patrol boats that act essentially as small, highly mobile missile launchers.10 Fast attack craft have limited range, but this is of little consequence in the Gulf, where the distance to target will always be relatively short; the maximum ship- to-shore distance in the Gulf is about 95 miles.11 Indeed, a countering operation such as this demands that these small ships move quickly to their targets, deliver their missiles, and then rapidly withdraw; in short, they must perform their missions much as aircraft do. More than one authority echoes the sentiment that the threat posed by small attack craft and patrol boats “must be considered similar to an air threat.”12
Coast Protection: In his Baltic analysis, Admiral Rasmussen refers to protection against invasion; in the Gulf, there are additional worries: raids against shore installations (such as refineries and communications facilities), terrorist attacks, and mines.
The GCC has made the most progress in the surveillance mission. Saudi Arabia is now developing the “Peace Shield,” an integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence and air-defense system that will cover Bahrain, Qatar, and eastern Saudi Arabia.13 In the future the network may extend to include Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Though progress has been made in air surveillance, the GCC has not launched a similar program for surface ships, and surface patrols remain minimal. Oman, guardian of the Strait of Hormuz and the GCC’s most active member, has been urging the organization to initiate joint patrols of the Strait, but so far none of the other members has been eager to begin such a program for fear of antagonizing Iran. (The end of active Iran-Iraq hostilities has reduced, but not eliminated, both the necessity for such patrols and the probability that they will occur.)
This fear pervades GCC defense thinking. The Gulf states want to defend without offending, and thus are timid about taking any action that might serve as a casus belli or involve their navies in actual hostilities. In Saudi Arabia this concern stems from the leadership’s considerable fear of the consequences of a military defeat.14 (It is possible the Saudi government fears a spectacular victory almost as much as a defeat. This might make the military popular and give it more prestige and power than the government wants it to have.) The other Gulf regimes almost certainly share this fear.
The only exception is Oman, which has already sur-
as patrolling the Strait) that carry with them the pos-
Vlved a serious uprising. Sultan Qabus, knowing full well at his army could not stand alone against the Soviet- and Jr0uth Yemen-supported Dhofar tribesmen, invited in the anian troops that quelled the rebellion. Having already eceived direct foreign assistance, Qabus will not be reluc- ^nt to ask for it again. This explains why Oman is willing 0 develop close ties with the West and advocate positions
' 111 ty of requiring foreign troop assistance.
. * he Gulf regimes have made some impressive progress ln lhe mission of countering enemy movement. The with- rawal of British influence in 1971 forced these states to e*Pand their navies’ strength, and the oil price explosion 0 lhe 1970s made it possible.15 Throughout the 1970s, naval expenditures ballooned as Saudi Arabia and the ”er Gulf countries strove to correct years of neglect, ^he Royal Saudi Navy now boasts a complement of >800, including 1,200 marines—a four-fold increase Slnce 1975.16 Four French-built frigates, four U. S.-built fissile corvettes, and nine U. S.-built missile boats form e core of the combatant fleet, supported by three torpedo , °ats, four minesweepers, 16 small landing craft, and two arge fleet oilers. The Saudi Coast Guard operates more ,an 110 patrol boats and craft, 24 hovercraft, and 15 ser- lce craft.17 This is a good balance of ships to counter eriemy movements; the frigates and corvettes can act as communication and air-defense centers for the smaller ships.18 Most of the naval patrol boats and all of the larger ships have antiship missiles, ideal weapons for the sort of hit-and-run attacks that are the staple of countering strategy. The antiship missile also is accurate, powerful, and relatively easy to use. Its operators need only minimal training, a feature that Gulf naval officers find particularly attractive.19
The other Gulf nations have a combined total of 27 guided-missile patrol boats and more than eight times that many smaller patrol boats of various types.20 Thus, on paper the GCC can employ a respectable fleet, capable of harassing any enemy attacks and turning back all but the most determined assaults.
The reality is less encouraging. Although naval growth has been large in percentage terms, actual numbers remain small. Until 1979, Saudi Arabia (and the other Gulf regimes) relied primarily on Iran to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; while defense planners recognized the need for a navy, there was little urgency in their task until the Iranian revolution. Even the number of forces the Gulf regimes have achieved are less impressive than they appear, because morale is low and training programs are inadequate.21 Military service generally is unpopular in the Gulf countries, and the navies are the least popular of the services because of their junior status and the generally slapdash way they have been administered.
That the Gulf countries have extremely limited manpower pools further reduces the number of high-quality recruits, which in turn limits the usefulness of the complex weapon systems they must purchase to offset their limited manpower.
This vicious circle could be broken, or at least its effects reduced, if the Gulf regimes pooled their resources for mutual defense, but even under the aegis of the GCC this goal remains more a dream than reality.22 The Gulf regimes are almost as afraid of their own militaries as they are of those of their potential adversaries. A truly func-
81
PrnCMdinRs / March 1989
tioning and integrated mutual defense structure would give a hypothetical combined Gulf force more autonomy than any Gulf leader (with the exception of Oman’s Sultan Qabus) would now tolerate.
The absence of interoperable arms and a coordinated purchasing strategy also hinders cooperation. Each Gulf regime has made naval purchases without regard for what the others have bought.23 This lack of specialization is expensive, and puts additional strains on the limited manpower because tasks are duplicated. The wide variety of equipment makes communication and quick repair, essential for a low-manpower high-tech navy, more difficult.
Protecting coastal installations is much more within the abilities of the GCC navies, which are well stocked with coastal patrol craft (but not with sufficient minesweepers). The success of this protection depends, however, upon the surveillance environment and the vigor with which patrols are maintained. Completing the “Peace Shield” project will aid the Gulf regimes immeasurably in their efforts to protect coastal installations and sea lanes.
All this suggests four conclusions. First, the navies of the Gulf Cooperation Council operate under political constraints as severe as those imposed by any other nation. Operations are constrained by fear of an embarrassing defeat and fear of antagonizing potential adversaries. Procurement is constrained by a fear of creating a military bureaucracy capable of unduly influencing internal politics. (It is only with the advent of the oil glut that procurement has also been constrained by a limited budget.)
Second, the principal naval threat in the Gulf is the threat to freedom of navigation posed by Iraq and Iran. This will continue despite the apparent winding down of the war between these two countries. A sizeable fleet has been built for Iraq in Italy, including four frigates, six missile corvettes, and an oiler, but they remain in Italy and Egypt.24 Iraqi naval forces remaining at the end of open hostilities with Iran are few: as many as ten old Soviet- built Osa-class missile boats, a similar number of Soviet- supplied patrol boats, and eight mine countermeasures ships and craft.25 The end of open hostilities may allow delivery of the Italian-built fleet, though the ships have not been paid for. It is possible that Hussein will decide to sell the four frigates to help pay off his crushing war debt.
Iran will also remain a naval threat, though a less menacing one owing to its clashes with U. S. forces. The regular navy will not be a factor in the near term. It had only partially recovered from the shortages of equipment that were results of the revolution; the further disasters of the past year have damaged severely the morale, prestige, and military capability of this force. The large (numbers are very uncertain) fleet of Swedish, North Korean, and U. S.-built speedboats operated by the Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards, will constitute the greater threat, although recent developments in Iran suggest that the Pasdaran is fading as a political and military force.
It must be emphasized that these threats are long term. Both Iran and Iraq are war weary, and in variously estimated stages of economic collapse. Further, Iran is teetering on the brink of political chaos. For the immediate future, at least, the last thing either nation will want to do is
to take any action that would reduce its oil revenue.
Third, Admiral Rasmussen’s Baltic analysis translates well to the Persian Gulf, and reveals that on paper the Gulf countries have taken numerous correct strides toward developing their shallow-water navies. The analysis also reveals, however, the degree to which events have restricted this development. Limited manpower and fear of rebellion are facts of life for each of the Gulf regimes; these two facts will always constrain operations and procurement. The only way to alleviate their effects is through the GCC: Joint training and joint purchasing could integrate the disparate parts into a single, effective Gulf naval police force. Prospects for such cooperation are dim at the moment, but without it the Gulf navies will never be able to do more than deter and repel small-scale raids and terrorist operations.
Fourth, the navies of the GCC will continue to grow, though the growth will be slow as long as oil prices remain depressed. It is likely that with this growth and the increasing professionalism of Gulf naval officers will come the realization that mutual cooperation is essential. This kind of cooperation has just begun in the past couple of years among the GCC armies, though the GCC was formed in 1981. Those who wish for the Gulf navies to take a more active role in defending freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf hope that naval cooperation will be achieved with greater dispatch.
'Robert Gaunt, “War in the Shallow Seas,” Defense and Foreign Affairs, October 1985, p. 26.
2Nadar Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (1985: Cambridge. Harvard University Press), p. 214.
3Ibid., p. 361.
“Ibid., p. 360.
5Ibid., p. 195.
6Ibid., p. 443.
7Mahzer A. Hameed, Saudi Arabia, the West, and the Security of the Gulf (London- Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 113-114. jt
"Adm. Jdrgen P. Rasmussen, Danish Navy, “Combat in Straits and Narrows, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, February/March 1986, p. 38.
"Ibid., p. 38.
,0lbid. „
"Adm. Nikos Pappas, Greek Navy, “Fast Patrol Boats in Enclosed Waters, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, April/May 1984, p. 54. l2Ibid.
13Michael Collins Dunn, “Can the Gulf Secure Itself,” Defense and Foreign Af' fairs, June 1985, p. 10.
14Safran, p. 443. ..
15William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and O' (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1981), p. 102.
I677te Military Balance, 1988-89 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 112.
I7J. L. Couhat, B. Prczelin, A. D. Baker III, eds., Combat Fleets of the World 1988-89 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 469-473;' The Mil'' tary Balance, p. 112.
'"Rasmussen, p. 36. l9Hameed, p. 195.
20Combat Fleets of the World 1988-89; The Military Balance, p. 112.
2'Safran, pp. 210-211.
22Ibid., p. 454.
23Hameed, p. xix.
-'Combat Fleets of the World 1988-89, pp. 290-293; The Military Balance, P112.
25Ibid.
Mr. Johnson is attending law school at Washington University in St. Louis. He graduated with a B.A. degree in history from the University ot Illinois in 1985, concentrating on Middle Eastern history, politics, and government.