Professional Notes

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,l_r Naval Reserve P-3A Orion is flying a °f^Up ‘^nterdi^cti°ⁿ patrol 300 miles south °thi^Uert0 Rico. It spots and begins to boat ° ^susP^ected smuggler. The target ■, ^,s carrying a shipment of cocaine b_0gt,^{a stre}?t value of $18 million. The y ^s skipper is under orders to deliver, _hQ$^Ut faHure or excuse. On board, he fj, “ Stinger surface-to-air missile ft . ' launcher, stolen from a Florida li_er °!l^al Guard armory two years ear- smuggler knows that the Orion (;_u ^rQdio his location to the Coast _0ri , tf suspicious. Believing that the tb_e £ ^{s or}bit is a preface to such a call, to I °^{al s} skipper directs a crew member th_e^U_s^Unch a SAM. The Orion never sees ^Sfnu ^ ^fore it impacts and is lost. The b°_affj ^er changes course 90° to star- for_e ’ during he has several hours be- 0_ri(“ⁿy search begins for the missing full ’ ^and makes his delivery success-

Th

^^r°blem: A Defenseless MPA in

plausible threat to the P-3 Orion, the Navy’s long-range maritime patrol air­craft (MPA). As the MPA mission ex­pands, the threat to MPAs reaches be­yond the conventional Soviet antiaircraft threat to unconventional threats, such as those posed by well-armed civilian out­laws or even Third World terrorists.

Under current configurations, the Orion carries no defensive systems. When faced with a surface or air threat, the Orion’s crew has only one response available: evade, call for help, and pray. While evasive action might be successful under the right circumstances and the power of prayer is never to be underesti­mated, calls for help under emergency circumstances are unlikely to be an­swered in a timely fashion.¹ Since the Orion’s long legs allow it to operate alone, far from shore and far from carrier battle groups (CVBGs), the availability of fighter cover and protection from sur­face platforms cannot be assumed. The Orion hardly has a fighting chance under such circumstances.

The Solution: A Sharper Sword for Orion—Depending upon good luck in the air and poor shooting below is one response endowed with the virtue of thrift, since it leads to no expenditures for retrofitting the Orion. But frugality in the short run does not necessarily lead to readiness in the long run.² Leaving the Orion defenseless certainly will save budget dollars, but just as certainly will fail to address the prospect of losing the aircraft to hostile fire. A superior ap­proach would be to retrofit the Orion with systems designed to defend against mis­siles. In particular, it should be equipped with the following systems:

► Flare dispensers to defeat infrared homing missiles

Navy P-3s, like this one fitted with Harpoons and Sidewinders, need firepower and defensive systems now to preempt the high attrition rates they are expected to suffer in the early stages of a future conflict.

eS'

loS^e

A further enhancement would be ^c ^

inboard, offensive weapon systems. , as Sidewinder missiles, to protect ag the air-to-air threat. The British r^etr°.

carr*

four Sidewinders.⁴ Obviously, th^e cannot be relied upon to splash a N*¹ ,

such Soviet platforms as the helicopter and the long-range Tu-2

Mission: Detect, classify, localize, track, and destroy enemy high-performance submarines, and perform sur­face surveillance.

Commentary: The P-3C is a land-based, long-range antisubmarine warfare patrol aircraft. It has advanced submarine detection sensors, such as the directional fre­quency and ranging sonobuoys and magnetic anomaly detection equipment. The avionics system is integrated by a general-purpose digital computer that supports all of the tactical displays and monitors and automatically launches ordnance, while providing flight information to the pilots. In addition, the system coordinates navigation information and accepts sensor data inputs for tactical display and storage. The P-3C can carry a mixed pay­load of weapons internally and on wing pylons.

A number of efforts are under way to upgrade the capabilities of the P-3. One of these is the P-3 Update IV. It will provide vastly improved radar and electronic detection capabilities plus a significantly improved acoustic signal processor for both the P-3C and the forthcoming long range air ASW capability aircraft (LRAACA). Initial Update IV operational capability is expected in fiscal year 1990. The Update III program, which doubles the P-3’s acoustic capability to carry out its vital ASW role, is being introduced to the fleet now.

The Navy plans to begin procuring the production LRAACA in fiscal year 1990. Current plans call for competitive procurement for the 125-aircraft program, which is planned through fiscal year 1995.

Source: The Navy Fad File, October 1987, IV-6.

Speed:

Ceiling:

Range:

Propulsion:

Crew:

Armament:

Contractor:

116 feet, 3 inches 99 feet, 7 inches 37 feet, 1 inch

Maximum gross take-off: 142,000 pounds Empty: 67,486 pounds 324 knots 30,000 feet

Maximum mission radius: 2,390 nautical miles; for 3 hours on station at 1,500 feet 1,346 nautical miles

Four Allison T-56-A-14 turboprop engin^eS (4,910 shaft horsepower each)

15

Mk-46 torpedoes

Harpoon (AGM-84) cruise missile Sonobouys

Lockheed-Califomia Company

Source: Public Affairs Office, Naval Air Systems Command (AIR 07DD2), Washington, DC, 20361-0701.

►  Chaff dispensers to defeat radar-guided missiles

►  Radar decoy dispensers to counter radar-guided missiles

►  Self-sealing fuel tanks, which would increase the Orion’s chances of survival if hit

The effectiveness of such systems de­pends, however, on early warning. Therefore, the Orion’s electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic counter­measures (ECM) capability should be upgraded to provide for early detection. Particularly important would be linkage between the ESM/ECM system and a tac­tical action computer. Such a linkage would enable the Orion to dispense chaff, flares, or radar decoys automatically within specific threat parameters. If an adversary achieved a surprise airborne lock-on, the Orion’s crew might not have time to react, but the automatic dispenser system would.

The ESM/ECM systems currently employed on board the Orion are insuffi­cient to detect and identify a threat in time for the aircraft to respond. Indeed, an unclassified computer simulation study conducted by the Naval Air Devel­opment Center concluded:

“The computer run on the current [Orion ESM] capability produced very high aircraft losses .... When a next generation ESM set [AN/ALR 77] is ‘installed,’ aircraft losses drop dramatically but are still unacceptably high .... Flares and chaff, given rel­atively low effectiveness [without adequate ESM/ECM], produce only small gains .... The first ECM in­stallation [AN/ALQ-126B] yields slightly more significant gains than the flares/chaff CM. With the installa­tion of the final ECM enhancement, aircraft losses approach acceptable rates.”³

Thus, it is not unrealistic to suggest that under current configurations, the first notice to the Orion’s crew of a surface threat will come the old-fashioned way: with the naked eye. The Orion may never know what hit it.

Retrofitting the Orion with defensive systems would not enable the aircraft to undertake a counter-strike against a sur­face threat, of course. Since such systems could confuse SAMs, however, they might buy the Orion enough time to

cape and to call in a counter-strike _        ,

systems would also help an aircraft * .. with an air-to-air threat; although la^c any antiaircraft offensive weapons ^ terns, the Orion would continue to the air-to-air environment harrowing-

s«^cl

ted Sidewinders to their MPA pl^at °_A j_s. the Nimrod, following the Falkla lands conflict. Each Nimrod now ^L _ig{i

that tf⁶

in a dogfight, but few would deny m ^ addition of Sidewinders would g’^ve. yy Orion improved survivability, ^eSP® j_S in if the conflict occurs while the Mi^u ^ bingo (or low) fuel state.            ^

armed with Sidewinders, the .^t would be able to defend itself ^a=• $

_                                _ : Tu-20

aircraft, each a more likely blue adversary than the MiG.         _teiTi

An antiship offensive weapon ^sy, to consider would be a Gatling ^r

°Penii

ⁿg scenario. Upon initial detection the ^Conf'^nilat>^on of the surface threat, cle 9^{ri0n cou}ld have turned and fired, I ^ar,ng the decks and preventing the ^nch of a SAM. Obviously, the use of ⁿs by the Orion crew would require i®‘^ui assessment of the legitimacy and utediacy of the threat. But in the con­

of

a confirmed threat, a Gatling gun

^could

Plcltf

0,-- available to the Navy. The

^area_sⁿ

is able to conduct patrols over large

father

hch would enable the Orion to preempt deter an attack by firing on an immedi- _w^{e c}*°se-in surface threat. This capability °^uld be especially advantageous in situ- *°ns where the Orion detects a surface / ^eat from a target too small or too close Justify the use of a Harpoon antiship ^^lssile. For example, a Gatling gun J’uld enable the Orion to attack crews surf^ ^W’^t*¹ Stinger missiles on board a ^aced submarine in a close-in battle

^Scenari₀.

C, ^ Gatling gun might have rescued the ^'°ⁿ from the threat depicted in the

and

text

teal' ^SaV£ G^non and its crew, neu- i>olH^{?e a cor,}fir^rned hostile unit—perhaps f_ace ^lnS the hostile boat at bay until sur- units arrived to detain skipper and l_0sj^W’ ^and save the United States from 'Veil'® ^a.S45 million aircraft and 15 good, "trained men.

a,.® *^oss of an Orion ultimately means Ik.?'^Uctl0n in the number of surveillance day or night, under diverse conditions. It is able to change

ICr^St '                  ^V                 \Jl III

a_nd ^ln response to changing intelligence p_abi|^C°^nirnand priorities. Its loitering ca- ch_tQ- exceeds that of any non-geosyn- ^saten°^{US sate}'hte. Furthermore, unlike a bo^ ^lte’ the Orion carries a crew able a_Ctjy^to 'Monitor surface and subsurface y$j_s ^and to provide “real-time” anal- n_eXi_h^allowin_g the Orion to respond more ci_r„. y than a satellite to changes in local ^stances.

suggested by the “Maritime is _Cn the current threat to the Orion face ^rm°^us» coming from Soviet sur- th_e ^ ^suhsurface, and aviation units.⁵ In ^ ^stages of a conventional war W ‘ e Soviets, the North Atlantic The °^ec°me a place rife with conflict. teter_e^SUCCess °f the Orion ASW patrol of h|A^°^ul.d critically affect the success Ui_{ari f}O in bottling up the Soviet sub- it _at( ^e ^^Cet (which numbers 385) before Atl_ar)(^C 6 U. S. convoys in the mid- ^°^viet^C G- S. counterpunch to the tecit /'Uhmarine threat includes 98 at- str_0y Marines and 184 frigates and de­face ^’.totaling 282 surface and subsur- 0u_tnu n*ts. Since Soviet submarines AS\v °^er U. S. surface and subsurface uits by more than 35%, the Orion can be viewed as a critical asset at the margin.

During an outbreak of hostilities, the Orion might hope for protection from U. S. Air Force F-15s based in Iceland or from F-14 Tomcats flying from U. S. Navy carriers. However, Air Force and Navy fighters would likely have enough to do without worrying about the Orion, especially since Iceland and CVBGs in the North Atlantic would be on the Sovi­ets’ short list of strike targets. U. S. naval surface units would be similarly busy with their offensive missions, not to men­tion self-defense. The best guess is that the Orion would be on its own in this hos­tile environment.

The last time U. S. Navy long-range MPAs were involved in sustained combat was during World War II. When the MPAs were armed, they were enor­mously successful, even in an air-to-air role. The Consolidated PB4Y Liberator was an aircraft similar in many ways to today’s Orion, except that it bristled with guns. The Liberator shot down 306 Japa­nese aircraft for a kill ratio of more than 15:1 from its introduction in 1943 until the end of the war:

“It should be noted that... the over­all PB4Y record would show 15.2 Japanese aircraft destroyed per PB4Y air combat loss, an exceptional per­formance for planes, which normally operated singly and unescorted on long-range searches.”⁸

During one particular mission, a Liber­ator identified and located a six-ship Jap­anese convoy. Having radioed the con­voy’s position, the Liberator—rather than waiting for bomber support— commenced strafing and bombing at masthead level. Acting alone, the Libera­tor sank at least four of the six ships and badly damaged another.⁹ Although it would be presumptuous to suggest that the Orion could match the PB4Y’s rec­ord, the history of the PB4Y indicates that proper retrofitting could bring the Orion out of the “hapless, lumbering grape” category and into the realm of tactical proficiency.

Under current defensive configura­tions, the Navy can expect considerable Orion attrition in the early stages of hos­tilities with the Soviet Union—just when the Orion would be needed most. So the Navy is left to wonder what to do when the Orion is not available at sufficient levels for its mission.

At the Battle of Midway during World War II, three torpedo bomber squadrons attacked the Imperial Japanese Fleet. A total of 41 TBD-1 Douglas Devastator aircraft were launched from the USS Yorktown (CV-5), USS Enterprise (CV- 6), and USS Hornet (CV-8). The Devas­tators had been directed to rendezvous with a flight of dive bombers for a com­bined attack. When they failed to meet, the Devastators went in alone. Only four of the 41 returned, the other Devastators having been devastated by Japanese Ze­roes and surface fire. One of the squad­rons, VT-8, lost every man but one. The Devastator’s vulnerability was known before Midway, but nothing was done to improve its defenses.¹⁰

Like the TBD-1, the Orion performs a critical mission, unprotected by adequate defensive systems to counter surface or air threats. But given defensive and even offensive systems, it might have a fight­ing chance to survive in its varied and hostile operating environment.

'Lt. Mark T. Ackerman, USN, has argued that a P-3 can beat an F-14 on the deck by turning toward it. “Nobody’s Hapless, Lumbering Grape," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp. 101— 104.

²Plans for the long-range air antisubmarine warfare capability aircraft (LRAACA), the next generation ASW platform, may include dispenser systems, but not air-to-air missiles. See Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 October 1988.

³LCdr. J. Camioni, USNR, Naval Air Development Center-0293, “The Venture Evaluation and Review Technique Computer Model Applied to the Surviv­ability and Vulnerability of the P-3C (UIV) Mis­sion,” (unclassified), 1986. (On file with the au­thors.)

⁴Arthur D. Baker III, Editor, Combat Fleets of the World, 1988/89 (Annapolis. MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 207.

⁵Indeed, LCdr. Kenneth B. Sherman, USNR. has argued that the Orion should be removed from ASW duty. See “Orion the Hunted," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1986, pp. 90-92; Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy,” U. S. Naval Institute Pro­ceedings Supplement, January 1986, pp. 2-17; Flight Lt. P. B. Layton, Royal Australian Air Force, “Keep the Orion a Hunter," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1987, pp. 159-61.

⁶Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, Fourth Edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986).

¹Combat Fleets of the World, 1988/89, pp. 689-690. *Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin (declassified), No. 2-46, April 1946, pp. 7-8.

⁹Ibid., p. 20.

^IQSee K. Munson, Bombers Between the Wars, 1919­1939 (London: Blandford Press, Ltd., 1970), p. 62.

Commander Roscoe serves with Naval Reserve Pa­trol Wing 0593, NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. He was formerly a mission commander with VP-64, with more than 2,000 operational flying hours on board the P-3 Orion. He received his bachelor’s de­gree from St. Leo College.

Lieutenant Hall, a past contributor to Proceedings, serves as an air intelligence officer with Naval Re­serve Patrol Wing 0593. He received his undergradu­ate degree from Dartmouth College in 1978, a mas­ter’s from Yale in 1982, and law and master’s degrees from the University of Pennsylvania in 1985.

Threat Awareness Coast Guard Style

By Lieutenant (junior grade) Timothy A. Cook, U. S. Coast Guard

Drug trafficking is becoming more organized and sophisticated each year. Foreign gangs are influencing drug distri­bution and violent drug-related crime is on the increase.¹ Assaults on law en­forcement officials at both the federal and state levels increased 13% from 1987 to 1988.² Surviving such a critical incident depends on many factors, including use of force and weapons training, equip­ment, mental and physical conditioning, and tactics.³

U. S. Coast Guard units have differing amounts of control over each of these factors of personal survival. Training often spells the difference between life and death in a critical incident. To this date, fortunately, no U. S. Coast Guard personnel have been killed conducting a routine boarding.

The greater law enforcement commu­nity is concerned with all of these sur­vival factors. The Coast Guard’s threat awareness level should be heightened and survival training should be implemented throughout the Coast Guard.

The U. S. Coast Guard’s “Use of Force” policy provides specific guide­lines for Coast Guard missions. The pol­icy will only benefit personnel if its ap­plications to real life survival situations are fully understood. Coast Guardsmen must understand the use of force contin­uum and be trained in defensive tactics that cover contingencies that do not re­quire the use of deadly force. They must be able to articulate the reason(s) why the aggressor “needs to be hurt,” not only for the protection of the assailant, but also for the protection of the Coast Guard in an era when lawsuits against law en­forcement agencies are on the upswing.⁴ The Coast Guard provides weapons train­ing through live-fire practice and judg­mental films. This training is directed solely toward qualification and fails to consider the following facts:

►  Most shooting incidents occur within a range of three to seven feet.⁵

► The average number of rounds ex­pended by law enforcement officials is 2.8 with 15% accuracy.⁶

► The shooting incident takes an average of 2.5 seconds. (A good shooter draws, sights, and shoots in 2.8 seconds.)⁷

► Forty percent of all shootings involve multiple assailants.

► Two out of three shootings occur at night or in reduced light.⁸

It is a proven fact that personnel will react in a critical incident in the same way they perform on the practice range.⁹ Since the service is switching to the nine- millimeter automatic pistol, the Coast Guard could enhance range instruction by providing additional specific training in­formation about how to correct pistol malfunctions, reload with the weapons charged (while covering the assailant), and shoot while moving, for example.

State-of-the-art equipment can be pur­chased by specific units. Quality body armor, PR-24 batons, telescoping batons, hinged handcuffs, and flex-cuffs, though expensive and requiring technical exper­tise for proper use, could make the differ­ence in survival. Regulations specify which items must be on hand but there are other items that can be purchased that may prevent unnecessary injury, such as a small knife, soft knee pads, or a cup (for men and women). A good-quality holster with matching lightweight beh ring could prove invaluable since 15% ⁰ all officers killed each year are disarm#* and killed with their own weapons- A ballistic shock plate in normal bod) armor also has been proven to lessen ⁱ bullet’s penetration, preventing otherWis^e fatal injuries.

Physical conditioning is probably ^ least discussed aspect of Coast Gnat training. Dealing effectively with stress depends greatly on physical conditioning Chemicals released in a life-threatennv situation can provide superhuman strength or total disfunction. The avera?^e person can only marshal a fight at a ^vl®, lent level for about 30-40 seconds- Individuals in good physical condid⁰¹¹ may experience stress-induced symP toms, such as loss of hand-to-eye coom nation, ineffective breathing and/or W perventilation, to a lesser degree.¹'

Mental conditioning improves de^cl sionmaking, which also may increa^se survivability during critical incident' Personnel must confront situations w'¹ out overreacting or rushing into a dang# ous predicament beyond his or her cap⁸ bilities.¹³ State of mind determines ho" ‘ person identifies or interprets a sim⁸

ments.

including hostage situations and

The

lhe^<'i°^nne' ^t0 *^3e P^airec^ °ff ^{as a} subset of Jtfger team. One member of the pair conduct the business of the mis-

^SuPerhi

^aence

uman strength while under the

"ifl,

C₀ ^Ce °f cocaine or PCP.²¹ a\Va_r„ ¹ Guard personnel should be

'°ⁿ- ⁴ Mental self-control and command l ^ence can make the difference be­: ^{een a} rational decision during a critical ^cident—a decision that will prevent Nation—and an inappropriate deci- °^a 'that might lead to serious injury.¹⁵ ^^uefensive tactics must be considered factor in surviving a critical incident, amwork and training that rehearses ^actions in different situations are the Vs to good tactics. To ensure that tac- ^s are sound, training must include indi- ₀j. ^Ua* mental rehearsal and simulations j ^Sltuations. If teams have general and ^e'fic plans for contingent predica­

j|jjasible belligerent responses to arrest, °ces for survival will be greatly in­cased.

most effective training requires

^should

_Co°^a and the other member should be- the ⁶ °bjective observer who assesses changing situation, provides cover, _Sp ^ntains triangulation and the proper j^Ce between Coast Guard personnel j. ^other persons.¹⁶

i_nc|^lrnulations of an arrest will always bw ^{de t}*^{le t}^^{lree most} deadly words in •ph^tiforcement, “You’re under arrest.” the ^ ^are dangerous because they limit _Ca ^Pect’s options for freedom.¹⁷ Es- cufp often occur during the hand- <H, ‘_fⁿ_r^g Process.¹⁸ The suspect lunges at of ^{1Cer w}ith the right hand during 80% giv_e ^{6Se attac}ks.¹⁹ Whenever possible Wfj_en ^exPlicit directions to the suspect ^cUff ^*^acing him or her into the hand- th_et'ⁿ® Position. Once handcuffed, take ^sabi ^{me t0 m}ake a thorough search of the poja!*?’ ^ handcuff key, razor blade, dis- de_n ^e Pen, or sharp object could be hid- do_Ci|®^nywhere on the prisoner.²⁰ Even be_c„ and/or cooperative persons can in_no^{me er|}raged and violent. Seemingly fo_{r C}|^ent items could spell death. Be alert infi_u, ^{6S l}^^{at a sus}P^ect may be under the theot H^{Ce of} drugs. There are many docu- ittg incidences of drug users exhibit- u pti auiiuti aiiuutu ut

m^nt °I ^t*^le iutest threat to law enforce- ^edged °^^ci^al^s—the use of knives and Huiti _t'^VeaP°^ns in assaults.²² Knives are kaipir^ ^r|ke weapons that do not require H_etl ® ^0r Practice, do not make noise ^Jirn_e(]^Used> do not have to be reloaded or Pacha,’ ^C‘° ^not miss, and are able to inca- The f mstantly. Knives are also legal. Ptorg ^ounds sustained from knives are As_Saii ^atTla2iⁿ8 than wounds from a gun. hav_e ^ants stab, slash, and jab until they an opponent’s tendons and ar­teries and he or she can no longer fight back and ultimately bleeds to death. Blocks taught in our basic training are useless because knives move too fast. Firearms are useful against a knife, but in all probability a stabbing will occur any­way. The most effective defense to the knife is to be totally aware of a subject’s hands, maintain a slight distance from the opponent, grab the hand holding the knife, and apply pressure to break the knife free.²³

In the past year, several law enforce­ment officers have been killed by booby traps in or around known drug houses. Coast Guardsmen should be alert to booby traps in their environment. Traps can be used as a diversion during an es­cape from a dock, or even as a show of force by the drug community against law enforcement personnel. Units should be alert to small or unusual items located in odd places, or wires that could lead to a hidden compartment.²⁴

Do not be anxious to unwrap tinfoil balls that might contain drugs. The balls could contain a highly unstable mixture of red phosphorous and potassium chlo­ride soaked in alcohol and mixed with BBs. When the foil is touched, an explo­sion could remove a hand or produce a shrapnel wound.²⁵

Other new unconventional weapons have made an appearance. A fake phone­paging machine with protruding levers containing a mini .22 caliber five-round revolver is now on the market. The levers cock and fire the weapon, which dis­charges through a hole in the bottom of the pager. One gun manufacturer is now installing fully automatic weapons with silencers in briefcases. The gun shoots out of a hole in the side of the case cov­ered by a business-card holder. The toy business has also caused problems for law enforcement officers who cannot dis­tinguish between real and fake weapons that shoot realistic blanks. A safe rule is to treat all weapons as real until proven fake.²⁶

An empty two liter Coke bottle stuffed with newspapers could signal the pres­ence of weapons on board a boat. The bottles, when attached to the end of a weapon, have been used as silencers.²⁷ Another popular weapon is the ballistic knife. The knife is compressed on a spring. When the trigger is pulled, the knife travels up to 30 feet and can pene­trate a three-inch-thick phone book. The ballistic knife is outlawed by federal law, but its component parts are still available by mail order.²⁸

Some law enforcement officers con­sider the worst new threat to be the street- bred Pit Bull terrier. The dogs are vi­cious, unpredictable, and strong. They can exert 1,800 pounds of pressure with their jaws. When the dogs are released, they attack until they are killed or have killed their adversary.²⁹

These new developments indicate that criminals treat their battle to beat law en­forcement officers seriously. The Coast Guard, therefore, must become even more serious about new threats and fight to ensure the survival of Coast Guard per­sonnel.

'Jack Seamond et al “Ethnic Gangs and Organized Crime,” U.S. News and World Report, 18 January 1988, Vol. 104, No. 2, p. 35.

²Charles Remsberg, Caliber Press Street Survival Seminar, Dania, Florida, 20 April 1988. Remsberg was a consultant to the President’s Commission in the Causes and Prevention of Violence and the author of The Tactical Edge: Surviving High Risk Patrol and coauthor of Street Survival: Tactics for Armed En­counters, both published by Caliber Press, North­brook, Illinois.

³Ibid.

⁴Gary Klugiewicz, Caliber Press Street Survival Seminar, Dania, Florida, 20 April 1988. Sergeant Klugiewicz is a defensive tactics instructor with the Milwaukee County Sheriffs Department.

⁵Smith and Wesson Inc., Special Assault Weapons Techniques Course, Coral Springs, Florida, 25 Janu­ary 1987.

⁶Ronald Adams, Northwestern University Traffic Institute Police Officer Survival Tactics Seminar, 12 July 1987, Fort Pierce, Florida. Adams is a special agent with the Riverside, California Police Depart­ment and is coauthor with Charles Remsberg of Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters.

⁷Ibid.

⁸David Grossi, Caliber Press Street Survival Semi­nar, Dania, Florida, 20 April, 1988.

⁹Ronald Adams ¹⁰Ibid.

“USCG Five Week Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) School, Course of Instruction, November 1986.

^,2David Grossi ^,3Charles Remsberg ^l4Gary Klugiewicz ^,5Charles Remsberg ¹⁶Ibid.

^,7Ronald Adams

^l8USCG MLE School and Ronald Adams ¹⁹Ronald Adams ²⁰USCG MLE School ²‘Charles Remsberg ²²Gary Klugiewicz

²³Gary Klugiewicz, and the Metro Dade Police De­partment, Miami, Florida, PR-24 Baton Training, January 1987.

²⁴Charles Remsberg ²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire Arms Train­ing, Miami, July 1987.

²⁷Charles Remsberg ²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Charles Remsberg

Lieutenant Cook, a 1986 graduate of the U. S. Coast Guard Academy, is currently executive officer of the USCGC Manitou (WPB-1302). He was stationed for the past two years on the USCGC Dauntless (WMEC-624). He participated in 11 drug interdict­ions, seven migrant interdictions, and more than 150 boardings.

97

^,n8s / j_une j₉₈₉

Nuclear Torpedoes for New Nuclear Powers?

By Eric H. Arnett

10,000-pound Fat Man dropped on NaS³ saki in 1945.⁵ A proliferant’s warhe^ would have to be significantly small^er;

Clearly, some knowledge of miniat"¹¹ zation acquired through testing or f°^rel- cooperation is necessary before nud^e‘ torpedoes can be developed. It has be , reported that the Chinese have furnish the Pakistanis with the capability to bv' 400-pound nuclear bombs.⁷ It is not

how Israel’s reported miniaturizat'¹ expertise was obtained, though ^a"^e'j tions implicate France and the Uⁿ'^te States

Though miniaturization would to>

Implications—Proliferants

.pi

seV®

their delivery options based on

son to pursue the system. In some - however, the SST’s invulnera jf

n^aC

forces from that requirement ^s° could be used in ways that were wise ruled out, for example, dep^- them further forward. Such balance nerability has been suggested as a AC tic philosophy for the U. S. ^s triad.⁸            Mp

The age and reliability of the

rines and torpedoes that a country -                                        - ■ - ork

Among the technologies that new members of the world’s nuclear club might employ to deliver their first weap­ons is the heavy torpedo and its launching platform, the submarine. Diesel subma­rines with nuclear-armed heavy torpedoes could provide a secure retaliatory force for countries whose principal adversaries had important coastal cities or military installations.

In 1976, Herman Kahn and Lewis Dunn advanced the concept of using nu­clear torpedoes in new nuclear arsenals. They suggested that a submarine carrying a nuclear torpedo—an SST—could serve as a “strategic system at low cost,” granting that it “is sufficiently exotic that it is likely to appeal only to a very few states.”¹ More than a decade later, the following discussion clarifies the credi­bility of this threat, describes the force posture necessary to support it, and as­sesses the probability that any of the countries likely to acquire nuclear weap­ons in the near term will actually deploy such a force.

The SST in Action: In general, an SST patrolling off an adversary’s coast would receive a “go code” and launch one or two nuclear torpedoes at its target from a distance of several miles. The torpedoes could have timed fuses or contact fuses, which would allow the submarine to es­cape. Given the slow progress in shallow-water antisubmarine warfare and torpedo defense, such a weapon would easily penetrate to its target. As Kahn and Dunn note, torpedo netting is an ineffec­tive countermeasure in the face of a war­head of sufficient yield. Destruction from blast and overpressure (the blast from a warhead detonated at a shallow depth would vent to the surface) would extend over several thousand yards, given a 25- kiloton first-generation weapon, but the effects of high water and radiation borne by base surge would reach for miles.

The SST’s most serious operational complications arise in getting it to its tar­get undetected and in authorizing the at­tack. Submarines typically make between 5 and 15 knots when transiting quietly. At that speed, an SST might take several days to reach any but the closest targets. For a small SST, there may be no target within its limited range. The alternative would be to maintain SSTs on patrol, much like today’s nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) do. There would be important differences between the two, however. First, the nuclear torpedoes’ range would be less than 30 kilometers, so an SST would have a much smaller area to hide in than an SSBN does. Second, some diesels can only run submerged on batteries for a matter of hours before they need to re­charge. While recharging, they must run their engines and snorkel, leaving visual, radar, infrared, and sonar signatures. If they are in communication with com­mand authorities, they will also leave a brief radio signature.

Even while snorkeling, their endurance is less than when they are traveling on the surface, the mode for which they were hydro-dynamically optimized. For exam­ple, the French Daphne-class submarine, operated by the Pakistanis and the South Africans, has a range of 10,000 miles on the surface at seven knots, but only 3,000 miles when snorkeling at the same speed.² A Daphne SST might have to transit to its station on the surface before submerging to patrol. Countries limited to these SSTs would thus have a less se­cure sea-based deterrent than they would if they had SSBNs, or even a more capa­ble SST. For example, an SST based on the Soviet Foxtrot class, once it reached its patrol area, could stay completely sub­merged for more than six days, but could only make two knots during that time.³ An adversary’s ASW forces would there­fore have a limited search area to cover.

An SST based on newer “third-gener­ation” diesels would be less vulnerable. For example, the TR-1700, built by Thyssen Nordseewerke, can remain com­pletely submerged for ten hours at 15 knots or for 30 hours at ten knots. If it were to risk snorkeling, it could operate at five knots for as long as seven months. Even then it would only need to snorkel 10% of the time, and so would face a rel­atively small risk of being discovered.⁴ Argentina is the only proliferant that op­erates the TR-1700 at present, but the TR-1700 and other third-generation die­sels and the means to build them are spreading rapidly through direct sales and licensing agreements.

Heavy torpedo technology is readily available to most countries. Such torpe­does, originally intended to blast through the sides of major surface combatants, have always been designed with massive warheads. Even so, the warheads on cur­rently deployed models, ranging between 200 and 340 kilograms (440 and 750 pounds), are quite a bit smaller than the

i#

nuclear torpedoes possible, it would $ undercut incentives to deploy them by . multaneously making smaller nuc missiles and their proliferation poss¹ The difference between an independea j designed 1,000-pound atomic bomb ^ a 400-pound one built with foreign ad^v‘ is the difference between an arsenal ^ nuclear missiles as large as a Scud-B one with nuclear missiles as small as Exocet. Some proliferants might eh⁰ to deploy small nuclear missiles oⁿ ^ craft or patrol boats rather than pursue SST option.

Pursuing SSTs: Considerations .

-   ^r>-”^r-- *- will J^u

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criteria, including feasibility and “ j|. ability, utility, invulnerability, ^rel1 ity, assurance of control, security- organizational imperatives, such ^aS ._(V portunity cost, economy, and famn¹ ^ Some countries that may have ^sU for rines, for example, may have little ^u'„- an invulnerable, relatively \onZ~' ft nuclear capability that could only ^ coastal targets. For such countries, have scant utility.   .           /

For countries whose adversaries^ unlikely to be able to preempt *^ts . jjjty nuclear forces, the SST’s invulne^ra ^ advantage would not be a compel!'¹¹-

' ^ieCh

invulnerab¹

would free a country’s other ^u"^

allocate to an SST force could W¹

^{ar are} no doubt representative of those ^r countries would face with an SST on older models. Newer models

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force.

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be assured without a communica-

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h_av; b'bBNs. The proliferant would also

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j>^u'nst establishing such a force. Ar­an | '^na'^s Problems with older submarines W_ar ^torPedoes during the South Atlantic

°thei based also be in high demand for other niissions.

Co ®^eneral perception in the strategic _abi|.^mty is that a submarine’s surviv- ati₀ • ^c*^{ecreases as} control over its oper- f_ec₍^{n lnc}reases. This perception may af- ^an P^r°bferant’s willingness to deploy ’^VL but the issue need not rule out an 'itn "ⁿ^^c- Snorkeling at prearranged '^vou ^{t0 rece}'^ve authorization to attack sib| ^ °ⁿ^ briefly expose an SST to pos- s_Ch⁶. ^^etection. Such times could be _r eduled frequently enough that control system as sophisticated as that used

ties ^l° be confident that authorization e|_e„ ^a8^es could be received in a hostile -p^’nic environment.

* 'SST could provide the same level N|_av ^{c ear} weapons security that the U. S. fo_r ^ ⁿ°w claims for its submarine Ss^- There is little chance that an 'he ^{s ,or}pedoes would be captured by tiirnc l ^{Cf side}’ ^st0,en by terrorists, or ^against the governing elite by the military. Other nuclear delivery options may not be able to make the same claim with as much certainty.

Organizational imperatives can cut ei­ther way for the SST. For a country that has a navy that is familiar with subma­rines and is considering an SSBN capa­bility for the distant future, an SST force is a philosophically familiar venture and a way to begin developing some of the technologies and procedures needed to deploy SSBNs. For such a country, the navy may have reached prominence be­cause there is a regional naval foe (so submarines could not be spared for an SST force), but it may also have aging submarines that would not be missed if used in an SST force.

Other navies may have bought subma­rines for other reasons, but find the need for an SST more compelling, especially if they are “dual-capable” (that is, using both conventional and nuclear torpe­does). Finally, some navies may not command sufficient prestige among their country’s military and the government in general to convince them that SSTs are a good idea, even if they are applicable to national security. An SST would be less familiar than bombs and missiles, making it hard for the force planner to imagine and the advocate to justify. (The SST would also make for a less visible subject

The devastation possible from an underwater blast in a naval harbor, like San Diego, would reach for miles. Nuclear torpedo technology is here—and spreading.

for prestige-boosting photographs.)

For any proliferant considering an SST option, economy and the opportunity cost of the warhead would be key considera­tions. SSTs are limited operationally in that they are nearly useless for warfight­ing, which may be reassuring to constitu­encies preferring deterrence-by-punish­ment to deterrence-by-denial and appall­ing to constituencies set against the pros­pect of targeting civilians.

Proliferants that deploy dual-capable SSTs may be reluctant to sacrifice them if they become embroiled in the naval war. If a dual-capable SST runs out of conven­tional torpedoes in the heat of battle, the decision to stock nuclear torpedoes that are useless against surface ships will be regretted.

Other delivery options will have to face the same criteria, though some may benefit by being so familiar as to be se­lected by virtual default. Those options that might be available to a proliferant with small nuclear warheads are: air- launched weapons, including bombs and missiles; ground-launched missiles; atom­ic demolition munitions, perhaps planted along troubled borders; and less conven­tional means, for example terrorism.

Potential Proliferants: Seven countries bear discussion here. All either have nu­clear weapons they will not admit having, or are aggressively pursuing the capabil­ity. Among India, Pakistan, Israel, Libya, Argentina, Brazil, and South Af­rica, only Pakistan and Israel have been cited as having the capability to make small nuclear warheads. However, that capability will be assumed for all seven for the purposes of this discussion.

Of this group, India has perhaps the best organizational environment in which to develop the SST. The Indian Navy is politically strong, is in the midst of a tre­mendous build-up, is reportedly inter­ested in eventually acquiring SSBNs or using its nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine in a similar role, and has sev­eral submarines. At the same time, its principle threat comes from Pakistan. In past Indo-Pakistani wars, the naval cam­paign was quickly won by the Indians and submarines could probably be spared given the other capabilities that could be brought to bear. But Pakistan has a negli­gible coastline. The only real target for an SST would be Karachi, the destruction of which would be a devastating blow to

that

And

have air superiority over any targets Libyan jets might be sent to attack. Libya would need those aircraft for ^c°ⁿ ventional operations. In contrast, j^ust.j few torpedoes on one or two SSTs wou give Colonel Gadhafi a secure capa’

haw

Argentina and Brazil are caret

fuiiy

avoiding a nuclear arms race, accoi to most accounts, but may be headed a nuclear boat race. In an ironic tw their pursuit of nuclear-powered suu ^ rines may demand most of their big refined fissile material, thereby avert their acquisition of nuclear arms

Some observers are nonetheless

operational experience. Both Arg^en and Brazil would be seeking to deter another, and both would have se

Nuclear torpedoes would give Paki­stan, with its Daphne-class subs (above), an ability to check Indian carriers, and Libya, with its Foxtrots (facing page), an ability to threaten U. S. installations in the Med.

Pakistan, but which could be attacked much more easily by other, more fungi­ble means. At the same time, submarines will be needed to counter Pakistani threats to the Indian Navy’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers.

An SST capability would also provide India with an interesting new threat to China, but the length of the transit and the predictably incredulous responses of the Chinese leadership would combine to make the project a low priority for the Indian Navy.

Moreover, the results of an extensive series of interviews recently conducted with Indian political and military leaders and prominent academics indicate that no one among Indian decisionmaking elites finds nuclear deterrence based on any­thing other than military use (that is, de­nial) morally acceptable.⁹ Since this is exactly the opposite of the capability SSTs provide, their procurement is likely to be ruled out.

Pakistan, however, might well make good use of an SST force. The long In­dian coastline contains several targets, and it would be difficult for the Indian Navy to protect them all. If Pakistan really intends to acquire nuclear subma­rines, and succeeds in getting them, they could serve as SSTNs and threaten Indian targets as far east as the Andaman- Nicobar Islands.

It is generally accepted that the Chi­nese have furnished Pakistan with minia­turization technology. But Pakistan’s ability to control SSTs or SSTNs, espe­cially at longer ranges, would be limited by its lack of satellite communication equipment. The opportunity cost of sacri­ficing both submarines and warheads might be perceived as quite high, espe­cially since the Pakistani Navy does not command the clout in Islamabad that the Indian Navy does in Delhi. Blockade has been a prominent weapon in past Indo- Pakistani wars, and Pakistan could use submarines to attack forces—especially the Indian aircraft carriers—that threaten resupply from abroad.¹⁰ Warheads de­ployed on air- or ground-launched mis­siles would be a much more flexible force for the Pakistanis, but also more vulner­able. Ultimately, the need for a secure retaliatory capability of a few nuclear tor­pedoes could be compelling enough to a Pakistan worried about Indian air superi­ority that it would deploy an SST.

Israel also has a fleet of submarines that have seen little action in its war-tom past. Some of these might well be armed with nuclear torpedoes to threaten Syrian, Egyptian, and Libyan targets. The sur­vivability argument could be especially compelling to Tel Aviv, because the Syri­ans are expected to open a future war with an all-or-nothing preemptive attack on Israeli airfields and suspected nuclear sites. Israel’s Type-206 submarines only carry eight Mk-37C torpedoes, including reloads, so while a dual-capable SST could find itself out of conventional ord­nance quickly, a dedicated SST would only cost the Israeli Navy the capability to deliver eight torpedoes from what is likely to be a low-key naval campaign. At the same time, the Israeli Air Force and Army, which have had the lion’s share of the glory from past wars, already have aircraft and Jerico-2 missiles that can cover the same targets an SST would.

Libya, on the other hand, is rather lim­ited in its options. The U. S. Navy has humbled the Libyan Navy and Air Force while Chadians (with some help from the French) have humbled the Army. All of Libya’s services are in equal need of re­pair, with regard to their equipment and their prestige. The Libyan force of six Foxtrot submarines is, perhaps, an ex­ception. It is intact, but reportedly does not spend much time at sea, and even less time undetected. The survivability argu­

A Libyan SST might be used for ³ strike against Israel, but also again^st U. S. installations in the Mediterranean- Colonel Moammar Gadhafi has repeat' edly threatened to turn the Med into ³ sea of fire,” and to attack Europeaf power reactors. Thus far, Colonel Gad' hafi has not had the capability to carry oat his threats—even his retaliatory raid on the Lampedusa Loran-C station after the Eldorado Canyon bombing failed—but is clear where his imagination runs.

In the Libyan case, availability m³- actually work in favor of the SST opti°ⁿ Thus far, Libya has been unsuccessful tⁿ its quest for medium- or intermedia^ range ballistic missiles. Small warheads- perhaps built from Pakistani- or Chinese furnished plans, could be placed °ⁿ bombs or Soviet-supplied short-range missiles already available for Libyan P³ trol boats and attack aircraft, but thes platforms have already proven to be ^v nerable. Libya’s two main adversaries- Israel and the U. S. Navy, are likely

against Israeli ports and bases and 0- ^ installations that might appeal to him

rding

for

com

cemed that nuclear propulsion will all⁰ these countries to remove fissile m rial from International Atomic En^e Agency observation, providing tunity for weapons development. ** _e is so, these two countries could p^UI , SSTs and SSTNs. And if either coU»^ envisions an SSBN in their futu^re’ ,y quiring an SST would give them ^e^_a

ⁿ₀fl^e vetf¹

other delivery technologies from whm ^ choose, including missiles and am But both have prestigious navies and ^ adversaries whose coasts, lined ^wlt j_f. gets, are longer than their missile an craft ranges will ever be.

In addition, Argentina will be b°P^j for additional leverage over Britaⁱⁿ _a Chile. Closer analysis suggests that.^ second South Atlantic crisis with E^rl

?^Uclear bombs would be much more use­, ^lhan nuclear torpedoes, which would ^have little i

ball

_l(te ^ld not give Libya a capability to U .j/the continental United States, but itist_a]i ^!^{Ve 11} the option of striking U. S. Mentj ^atlons in the Mediterranean, as Trip₀]°^ned- Though it is unlikely that Vaf* ^Would ever resort to such a pro­be w'q^{6 nieasure}> the U. S. Navy would ^altogg_th ^ad^vised to foreclose the option her. Unfortunately, shallow-water hot b_e^{and tor}Pedo defenses probably will *c_tion ^ahle to do the job alone, so any _s ^ag^ainst a nuclear Libya armed with ^SuLerv' • ^Wou'd have to include careful Po_Ssib,^ISl°h °f Libyan submarines and

<_gh^Preempti0n-

■ positive effect, but the nuclear ^ance between the two contestants °uld probably be irrelevant.¹² ^outh Africa’s troubles are largely in- ⁿ'al, and it is hard to see how nuclear

JJj ^can be brought to bear on them.

_Sj?«heless, the dearth of targets for an * force and the low probability of any

Dim ^rSai"'^es P^reemP^t'ⁿ8 ^a more flexible clear arsenal based on aircraft or mis-

C

ljhu ^make it clear that an SST will be of q ^Use to South Africa, optj ^l^e countries for which the SST cijr_r ^{n ma}kes some sense, only Libya is UjJ^y °n unfriendly terms with the $_tate^ed States. Fortunately for the United pr₀fa^{s an}<l several other countries, Libya °ns f^b ^ ^w'^ ⁿ°t acquire nuclear weap- th_ere°^r ^nite a while, if ever. However, th_ern ^{ls s}°me chance that it will develop th_at j_t^Sorne day, and even some chance ^^ctt<j^V>1'l ^deve*°P them sooner than ex-

Th ^-

tn_ies^0u8h Libya is surrounded by ene- to _r ’ ^{lts two} main adversaries are likely ^a.^ln tft^e United States and Israel. An strik,'¹'"'           '           ' “

superpower nuclear torpedoes

are ASW weapons, Libyan SST-launched torpedoes would not provide a capability against U. S. submarines, nor against U. S. carriers. Any ship that a small navy can hit with a nuclear torpedo may as well be hit with a conventional torpedo: big carriers cannot be hit and smaller vessels can be sunk with conventional weapons.

A greater concern for the U. S. Navy would be guaranteeing the security of Is­rael. If we assume that the Israelis are not successful in preempting the deployment of the Libyan nuclear arsenal (as they have the Iraqi one), they are not likely to have sufficient ASW forces to ensure that a Libyan SST attack can be defeated. In time of crisis, the U. S. Navy would no doubt keep tabs on Libyan submarines, but it might also be put in a position of preempting a possible strike. That level of involvement in an Arab-Israeli dispute would be unprecedented, but certainly justified.

Similar dilemmas may arise in other regional wars. Though Pakistan, Brazil, or Argentina are unlikely to threaten the United States or its allies with their SST, the U. S. Navy may feel it is appropriate to interpose itself in the theater to prevent SST-launched strikes. Since the SST’s weapons could not be turned against the U. S. interposition force, there would be little risk to the ships, which would be deployed in an otherwise expressive way. If conditions allowed U. S. ASW forces to monitor SSTs, they could destroy them when they appeared ready to strike. If the proliferant’s foe were not nuclear-armed, this action would be the fulfillment of the nuclear powers’ commitment to defend non-nuclear states from nuclear foes ex­pressed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Clearly, the preferable course would be to avoid the predicament altogether by curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and miniaturization technology. If it is true that China passed miniaturization secrets to Pakistan or that Israel has re­ceived them from whatever source, every effort must be made to prevent them from spreading them any further.

It will be more difficult to limit the spread of heavy torpedoes and subma­rines that could be used for the SST mis­sion. If miniaturized fission weapons do spread, it is not clear that SSTs are a bad way for them to be deployed, from the international point of view. Like the su­perpowers’ SLBMs, they are useless for much beyond basic deterrence, and are likely to be virtually invulnerable. Unlike SLBMs, they can only inflict limited punishment, not destroy entire societies.

‘Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, Trends in Nu­clear Proliferation: Projection, Problems, and Pros­pects HI-2336-RR/3 (Croton-on-Hudson: Hudson Institute, 1976); The Soviet Union may have de­ployed a similar capability before the development of their arsenal of strategic missiles, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958).

²Robert L. Scheina, “The Santa Cruz—A Record Setter,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1985.

³A. D. Baker III and J. L. Couhat, Editors, Combat Fleets of the World 1986/87 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987).

⁴Scheina, op. cit.

⁵Bemard Blake, Editor, Jane’s Weapon Systems 1987-88 (New York: Jane’s Publishing, Inc., 1987). ⁶Leonard S. Spector, “Foreign-Supplied Aircraft: Will They Drop the Third World Bomb?” Journal of International Affairs; Dunn and Kahn, op. cit. ⁷Hedrick Smith, “A Bomb Ticks in Pakistan,” The New York Times Magazine, 6 March, 1988.

⁸See, for example, Peter J. Sharfman, “The Future of Landbased Strategic Weapons: Part I,” New Tech­nology and Western Security Policy, R. O’Neill, Edi­tor; and Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbrunner, and Charles A. Zraket, Editors, Managing Nuclear Oper­ations (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987).

⁹Neil H. A. Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and Na­tional Security in India and Pakistan (Los Angeles, CA: Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, 1986).

¹⁰There are likely to be older torpedoes available. Pakistan is reportedly replacing its older Model F-17P stocks with the newer Z16.

“Jozef Goldblat, “Submarine Proliferation” (letter), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1988.

¹²This closer analysis is presented in Eric H. Arnett, Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Prolifer­ation and the U. S. Navy (New York: Praeger Pub­lishers, 1989).

Dr. Arnett is a program associate with the Program on Science, Arms Control, and National Security of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He completed the work for this paper at Car­negie Mellon University’s Department of Engineer­ing and Public Policy under the auspices of the Pro­gram on International Peace and Security. Much of the material is derived from his forthcoming book, Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Prolifer­ation and the U. S. Navy (New York: Praeger Pub­lishers, 1989).

Hardware, Software, and Midwear

By Karl Lamb

also

mensions. Social science classrooms

hie¹¹

defi­

midshipmen with compositional

lasef

front. Interactive video tutorials use

and the author’s identification will¹

The explosive technology offered by computers is changing the way midship­men are educated and trained, and chal­lenging us to exploit the new systems fully.

The development of both equipment and personnel needs in the Navy is tech­nology-driven. The greatest technologi­cal change has come in the last ten years, and the fleet is now a computer environ­ment. It is stocked with 90,000 Zeniths, plus other small, networked computers.

As a result, junior officers must be thoroughly at home with computers, able to exploit their possibilities and under­stand their limitations. The information systems are in hand; our task is to facili­tate the human interface so that officers can use computers in their daily tasks and also be able to sort relevant from irrele­vant information quickly and make sound decisions in the few seconds available in real-time combat situations. The educa­tional challenges thus deal with people and computer software programs more than with the development of more capa­ble hardware.

Incoming plebes for the past three years have purchased personal computers (PCs) upon arrival at the Naval Acad­emy. When members of the fourth class are issued their PCs this fall, the entire Brigade will be equipped with computers that are compatible with each other, with the administrative systems of the Naval Academy, and with most of the equip­ment used in the teaching departments.

One can make an analogy with the sliderules and hand-held calculators of an earlier era. The PC is a tool that the mid­shipman has bought, will master, and then take to the fleet. The members of the class of 1991 are equipped with a Z286, which has a footprint no larger than the monitor, and a hard disc to assure com­puter responsiveness. The miniaturiza­tion is proceeding, and we expect that plebes entering the Naval Academy in 1990 or 1991 will purchase a lap-top computer with a hard disc and a desk-top color monitor to enable them to master signal flags and perform other simulation exercises. When this happens, the anal­ogy with the sliderule will be complete; when the lap-top can be taken to class, we will no longer be dependent upon the electronic classroom. Then, too, new ensigns can carry their lap-top computers to the fleet and still have plenty of room for other items in the seabag. We hope to achieve this breakthrough to the lap-top for a cost not more than $1,500 to $1,800 per person.

The Naval Academy also is updating its facilities by installing a fiber optic net­work, which should be completed this summer. This system will increase enor­mously the familiarity of Naval Academy personnel with the PC.

But even now, before completion of the network, a fall 1988 usage survey showed that students are using their PCs in 75% of the core courses. Word pro­cessing accounts for 45% of the use, fol­lowed by spread sheets (16%), tutorials (17%), and programming (22%). Some classes require midshipmen to use com­puters in more than one mode.

Some senior officers believe that PCs used for word processing are nothing but “glorified typewriters.” Such critics nor­mally do not use PCs themselves and do not understand that word processing, once one has mastered its mechanics, is a tremendous facilitator of thought pro­cesses and creativity. It provides the abil­ity to shift blocks of text from place to place at will, check spelling instantly, and type far faster because of the small cost of correcting typographical errors. Most important, word-processing experi­ence simply leads the student to feel at home with the computer.

Of course the Naval Academy’s net­work will increase potential usage vastly. Midshipmen will be able to access the library catalog from their dormitory rooms and learn if specific volumes are on the shelves. Through the library, they will be able to access data bases. They can send classroom assignments to the instructor by electronic mail, and the in­structor can comment and even grade via electronic means. The Academy time­sharing system has been used for many years for class registration, examination scheduling, and student record keeping. The midshipmen will no longer have to find a freestanding terminal to conduct such essential business, but will be able to accomplish it from their dormitory rooms in Bancroft Hall.

In addition to PCs, many mainframe computers at the U. S. Naval Academy approach state-of-the-art. The engineer­ing departments are served by a Center for Computer-aided Design (CADIG), which uses the latest equipment and tech­niques. Engineering students haven’t la­bored over drafting tables for years. CADIG computers can view elements of a design from every conceivable angle, rotating an object in three simulated d* electronic classrooms, as do the 1>^U manities. Our Writing Center, to W ciencies are referred, teaches the delig ’ of word processing. The Naval Acaden') language department is truly at the f°^r£

disc technology to expose midshipmen interactive tutorials in Spanish, Germ French, and Russian. They will soon ^ on line in Chinese. We have recently ' stalled a ten-meter satellite antenna f can receive signals from any commum tions satellite in the northern hemispm We can record news broadcasts n Moscow, Beijing, Paris, or Bonn, wl" become immediately available for an³ - sis by language students. We can record the Chinese or Russian equi^va of soap operas so that language stiid® can analyze truly native dramatic p^eI^ _((J mances. The antenna will also be use track satellites for the aerospace e^ neering department; of course, it^vV1 ^ remotely controlled by computer. A^s^_£ move into the 1990s the computer sets ^ department will be working with systems and investigating the phenom called artificial intelligence.  ^

The students obviously receive exposure to computers during the'^r . , at the Naval Academy—and many ⁿ _lS grown up with the technology- S^uC _c{ not the case with the faculty, ^soTnC_}it whom must be convinced to computers fully into the courses- dressing this generation gap is ^{a c},^ lenge for us. The civilian faculty ^s ^ schedule is one tool; instructors ^at ^ Naval Academy are paid on a ten-u¹ j basis and generally seek salaries d the summer intersessional period, r last several years, our Instruction^¹ - velopment Program has funded sot ^ development so that faculty will 4^. develop original software or modify ^ isting software. The beauty of this software that the faculty member duces for his or her own class wm nitely be appropriate to the class S ^

product assures that it will be used - the last three years, we have held ³ ^ ware fair at which the faculty hav^l played the products of their instruc ^ development efforts for inspection > _cf grants committee and the inspiraU^^ their colleagues. Paying faculty ^sU _s [-' salaries to develop software allows

$

bet'

ers

^many purposes. The students’ immersion

^{c a}'^m vast savings, at least on paper. The Provision of $200,000 in summer salaries ^Saves millions in potential licensing fees ^and in the cost of commercial software.

In all of this we make no distinction

Ween education and training. Comput- nre used in many modes and have in this total information processing envi­ronment contributes greatly to the goal of making the junior officer ready for real­time decision making. The informational system hardware is here and more is ar­riving; the educational challenge for the Naval Academy is to realize its potential. It is a human problem more than a techni­cal or scientific one.

Dr. Lamb graduated from Yale in 1954, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the U. S. Army Reserve. His active duty was deferred as he was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship. In 1957, he received a Doctorate of Philosophy in Politics from Oxford, and returned to the Army and eventually attained the rank of captain. Dr. Lamb served on the faculty of the University of Michigan and the University of Cal­ifornia at Santa Cruz before being appointed by Sec­retary John Lehman to his current post as Academic Dean of the U. S. Naval Academy.

jactical Thinking for Damage Control

% Captain P. T. Deutermann, U. S. Navy