Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

Lighting Lamps, Not Stars

Far From Sinking Our Navy

A Bright Shining Lie

Keep Pilots in the Navy

What Quieting Means to the Soviets

No Quarter for Their Boomers

Our Peaceful Navy

Road to Eighth and Eye

The Navy’s Final Frontier

Splashdown!

Carrier Radar Improvements Blood on the Decks MedEvac

USNI Board Membership?

Safe Ship Control: It Takes Two When in Rome . . . Show the Flag Bulldog Ductus Exemplo The Conventional Arms Control Bottle

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“Lighting Lamps, Not Stars”

(See P. M. Walsh, pp. 92—93, April 1989

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander Thomas E. Tisza, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—With all the articles on leadership over the years, including the inspirational comments of Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, Com­mander Walsh’s account of Petty Officer Cooke articulates what I believe is a “first principle” of leadership.

I speak of “attitude.” It is simple. The military leader (indeed a civilian manager as well) should be endowed with the atti­tude that the people in his charge are serving with him, not under him.

“Far From Sinking Our Navy”

(See M. D. Goldberg, pp. 22-25; March 1989;

A. K. Hayashida, pp. 29-32, May 1989

Proceedings)

Admiral Harold E. Shear, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I do not know what qualifica­tions Mr. Tom Clancy has for comment­ing on the caliber of the commanding of­ficers in the U. S. Navy today. Having served more than 40 years on active duty, and having commanded diesel-electric powered submarines, nuclear-powered submarines, and large surface ships, I believe that I am qualified to comment on Mr. Clancy’s views. He is all wet.

Mr. Clancy seems to feel that the Brit­ish system of selecting commanding offi­cers is far superior to ours. I know the Royal Navy well. I have worked with it closely over the years and have many friends in the ranks. Without question, they produce some fine officers, but I will take our system of the unrestricted line officer qualified for any job at sea any time over the British system.

Any young U. S. Navy ensign worth his salt strives for command from the day he reports on board his first ship. We train our young officers well, both at sea and ashore. We rotate them through all departments in a ship, and we send them to excellent technical schools. Yes, we emphasize the importance of the highest engineering standards. Look at the rec­ord! Nearly 200 nuclear-powered ships have been operating superbly.

Our people know their stuff, and it is by no means limited to the engine room. Tactically, 1 will put them up against the best in the business, in any navy world­wide. We train for war, we exercise f°^r war, and we are ready for war. That I^s our business. Such readiness is the best deterrent against war. Anytime a U. submarine clears the sea buoy for an ex tended deployment, that ship is on a war time footing. Our commanding offi^cers are keen, they are intelligent, they '^^e experienced, and they are ready for ^aI1- contingency. The same applies to °^ur surface ships.

The U. S. Navy officer selection P^r° cess is the envy of all the military, “si t highly qualified boards of experience rank, as well as for command. There ^

attrition for each step of the way. Only ⁰ ^   - - -lual- ified officer slip through. The Amenc public can feel very comfortable with officers who are manning and ope our ships today; they are superb.

Captain Charles W. Rush, U. S. ^^a' (Retired)—When I read Comma'¹ ^ Goldberg’s rebuttal to Tom ClanO^ Washington Post article on attack subn^ fines and their captains, I was not prised by his total rejection of Clan j ideas. After all, Clancy had first pressed his thoughts in a speech ^at Submarine League Symposium on 9 1988; and that speech, “As 1 See Submarine Service,” received imrne repudiation from the chairman ⁰¹ Submarine League’s board of direc

The record shows that Tom Clancy true friend of the U. S. Navy and its^s ^ marine forces. On the other hand, ^ mander Goldberg’s comments were ^ ten by a sincere and dedicated ^a ^ officer. So, where in the great gm separates them lies the truth? . _uS.

First, let us eliminate from the dt _s sion any reference to strategic subm (i.e., SSBNs). Clancy did not men them; Goldberg’s comments about ^ however true, were extraneous, b attack submarines (i.e., SSNs) ^anZ-_cl£(i( commanding officers provide sut scope for differences of opinion.

For example:                 ms

Tom Clancy: “The Los as .^ [(SSN-688)] is probably the best bo ^ the world, but is she as good ^aS should be?”

Commander Goldberg: “The Los An- Reles-class submarine is the best subma- ^r'^ne in the world. ...”

No apparent disagreement exists until ,°^m Clancy goes on to say that the Los is not as good as she should be cause the U. S. Navy has adopted the • ^0st conservative design philosophy in ^lts nistor

annes in the future.

^and h ^or8^anization that ranks research development as its lowest priority d_ea(j^tuaby will run into a technological ^entk That is what was happening in

_r ^lllstory, while Commander Goldberg kj* >es that she is as good as she should _lln.^because the class has evolved in *"ghts.”

_It) Actually, although the Los Angeles y be “the best submarine in the ...^r " (depending on how one defined ^st ), submarine design engineers ₍8^ree that with some hull modification boats could have been better. The and * ^lcat*°ns were not made for political tin ^tecbⁿ°logical reasons. An examina- exh °^- P°btical ploys would be like ^uming a body to obtain evidence of a ^e and would serve no useful purpose _Cai'^V’ ^wbereas solutions to the technologi- ktne ^eticienc'^es are of paramount impor- _S(jl ^{e to} those who want superior attack

^^ririPt; in fka Aitura

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the submarine design world, and that is why Congress established and funded the Advanced Submarine Technology Pro­gram. That policy has the full support of the active-duty submarine community, as evidenced by the establishment in the Naval Sea Systems Command of Ad­vanced Submarine Research & Develop­ment (SEA92R).

Clancy’s and Goldberg’s differences of opinion about submarines are minor com­pared to their arguments about command­ing officers. Clancy advocates radical reform; Goldberg staunchly defends the status quo. Could the answer lie some­where in between?

Tom Clancy, although he has not had submarine combat experience, has used his novelist’s insight to project his thoughts into that arena. By doing so, he has arrived at a universal truth: The quali­ties that make an outstanding peacetime commanding officer do not necessarily make a warrior. Having discovered that truth, he is imploring the U. S. Navy to select and train their submarine com­manding officers to be warriors.

Commander Goldberg has not had combat experience either. He believes that “the commander of the future cannot succeed without the ability to integrate extensive systems demands,” and that the secret to success in submarine warfare can be summed up in three words: know the boat! Further, he points out that knowing the boat is as important today as it was in World War II, although the boat is more complicated now.

While submarine technology has un­dergone a revolution since World War II, there has been no comparable change in the hearts of men who command the ships. For that reason, my thoughts based on seven tough war patrols may be rele­vant—even today.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the experience of U. S. submarines in World War II concerns the commanding officers. “Know the boat!” had been their credo since they were en­signs. Many not only knew the boat but also had advanced engineering degrees. Those who started the war in command were outstanding peacetime COs. Yet I was there when an unacceptably high percentage of those officers became dis­mal failures in combat, usually because they avoided the enemy at all costs.

Even more than two years into the war, 1 saw brilliant officers who had spent their time in safe staff jobs given subma­rine command, although they had zero

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war-patrol experience. It was tragic to see them go to pieces, shattered by a counter­attack or even the possibility of one. They were no longer assets to their sub­marines; but, in all fairness, they were not so much to blame as was the system that sent them into battle without first making them ready.

In contrast, I knew many submariners who first had served as executive officers under an experienced, resolute fighting captain. They later became successful skippers themselves, because they were prepared.

There is not so much wrong with what Commander Goldberg says; he simply does not go far enough. Knowing how to maintain and operate a billion dollar computer-driven combat system and being able to maintain a safe nuclear re­actor plant do not in themselves make a warrior.

A wartime attack submarine com­mander must have the nerve of a high- stakes poker player; he must know when to bet and when to fold; and once he bets, he must have the courage and skill to at­tack aggressively—even at short range or in a melee—knowing that his action might trigger a counterattack.

Is the U. S. Navy developing subma­rine commanders with the courage, cool­ness, and the capability to use their knowledge and expertise under the im­mense stress of combat? Tom Clancy says “No!” and recommends the Royal Navy system where “those aspiring to command are trained to do one thing: operate the submarine and kill targets.”

It is tempting to perpetuate a system that works so well in peacetime, but we must guard against repeating our mis­takes of the past. Based on historical pre­cedent, our submariners will be forced to fight in ways for which they have not been trained. This is not a criticism of the U. S. submariners’ advanced tactical training ashore or afloat. It is a statement of what war is like and probably always will be. For that reason, we should iden­tify those officers who can cope with the unexpected and train them for attack sub­marine command. But how do we iden­tify those officers? The Royal Navy does it with their “Perisher” course. A varia­tion of that concept—an “American Perisher”—would select those quick­thinking officers who act unerringly in unexpected, stressful situations. They would progress in the Navy’s advanced tactical training program to prepare for ultimate command of attack submarines. The others would follow other career paths; the Navy has many needs.

We all share the fervent hope that our weapons of war will never be used, and the best way to ensure that they will not be is to develop commanders with the courage and skill to use them effectively if necessary.

“A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam”

(See E. Crews, pp. 121-122, January 1989;

J. S. Kundrat, p. 30, March 1989 Proceedings)

Commander Michael R. Adams, V- Coast Guard—First, I fail to see h°'^v Neil Sheehan “got the United States into Vietnam.” I am sure Mr. Sheehan won be surprised to learn that he, as a begin ning journalist in his early 20s, wield^e so much power.

Second, as Sheehan proves through l"^s “700 pages of details,” the war was no so much “lost” by the United States as¹ was simply “unwinnable” by any ^oU side nation.  ,

Third, having read both of Sheehan ^s published books, listened to him lecturer read many of his news articles, and ha^v ing spent several hours in one-on-o conversation with him at the Naval *^v College in 1983, I have never seen ^n<j heard Sheehan proclaim himself a lih^£r (I might also add that despite the rhet°t present in last fall’s presidential ^ca paign, no one has yet proved that beinS liberal necessarily means being the de incarnate.)        .

Fourth, contrary to Mr. Kundrat’s a gation that Sheehan tries to “off"*⁰ . . . guilt onto the shoulders of ¹³⁰ ^ who fought and died,” Sheehan n¹³^⁶^ clear that he has the utmost respect most of those who fought and die Vietnam.          ^

Finally, it is just the sort of shal ⁰ simplistic, stereotype-casting ¹³⁰ process displayed by Kundrat that h^3S often needlessly cost the lives of of and noble Americans in the past.

“Keep Pilots in the Navy”

(See N. G. Golightly, pp. 32-36, December 1988; J. P. Unger and W. T. Brockman, PP' 16-20, February 1989; E. P. Carroll, p- ² ’ March 1989 Proceedings)

7

Midshipman First Class R. L- .. _ts U. S. Navy—The shortage of naval P¹^, exists for two reasons. The first is addressed by Lieutenant Golightly- _t sions of responsibility and excellent deter veteran pilots from re-uppmS' pg. second concerns the Navy’s pil^ot ^_es fuls. The current system simply ^1,1 flying much less attractive to young cers than it used to be.

ated

taken

at least the next ten years. Under the cur­rent system, with obligated service at about nine years, the Navy cannot expect to retain an adequate number of pilots. Finally, give pilots command opportuni­ties to help convince them to stay. It worked for the nuclear power commu­nity. I am convinced it will also work for aviation.

Naval Academy graduates were to Naval Reactors headquarters for interviews and then welcomed into

token

the

Russell Nevitt, former naval aviator and current airline pilot—Pilots are quitting the Navy. Why is this? If you ask the

Past ihtooi

Si.'

years

ItOiw^/he most competitive. Now pilot

^ent k,^^{1C newc}omer. Drop the commit- ?^care(j ^3C*^{C Io} five years so officers are not ified Then, once they become qual-

^ered the nuclear power community in ^e late 1970s and early 1980s. At that j^ltrie the Navy was forced to draft officers ^r.^Its submarine force. Regardless of ^,r intended warfare specialties, se­

I-, ^submarine community—whether they rath '*• ^{0r not}' Today, however, there is a ^er involved application process sim- _to^{y to} 8^et an interview with Naval Reac- (L ^S’ ^and of those selected for interviews Rejection rate is about 10%.

^ everal incentives brought about this ^ange. First, despite the advanced train- am ^'^{Ven nu}clear-trained officers and the obi°^{Unt t}'^me '* ^ta^^{es t0 tra}'ⁿ them, the onl'^^ateC* ^serv'^ce i°^r these men is still y five years. After one sea tour sub- dn ^r!^nc.^{rs can} leave the service if they mar'*         ®^ut ^ ‘hey do like the sub-

_an ^lne service and are good at it, there is t_en°PP^ortUnity to attain the grade of lieu- yea ^{nt comma}nder in just six-and-a-half _abo^S' *ⁿ other warfare specialties it takes S ^U* 10 to 12 years to make this grade.

itini°ⁿ^ *^S '^{ssue mone}y- When a end°^{r su}0^mari^ne officer re-ups after the h_e j ^0: .It's first obligated service period, year ®'^{Ven a} bonus that after six or eight $2qL ^wil1 make his income nearly pe ’ 00 a year more than that of his the ^S ^^ow> ^very few people are asking Question, “Why go nuke?” th_e^nstead, many ask “Why go pilot?” In cr_ea^^ast ^ree years the Navy has in- avia^ the length of obligated service for tern °^rs thme different times, but pay has Pay ^U'^Ch essentially the same. There are by '^ncenfives for those who re-up, but these h ^t'^me °^ne becomes eligible for Se_rvj °^nuses he has already been in the -p,^Ce f°r nine years.

be_en^e htuval Academy class of 1989 has 2ljj f 'ftteh 279 Navy pilot billets, only ,° ^which are expected to be filled. In aviation billets have been ^are confident that there will be class, °h room for them, regardless of ist_rat₀^Stanc*'ⁿg- The Navy’s chief admin- tre_ncj are concerned about this new •n n ^{Ut t}*^{le so}'^ut'^on is not that difficult, be l . V opinion, the aviator shortage can tiv_e. by making flying more attrac-

Pay ^av'^ators, offer them more attractive ^ke ^Cf^nt'^ves—offer them sooner and "^Vailahi ^{em com}petitive with what is ^a'^rbn_es^e 'ⁿ hre private sector. Civilian ^6><Perie’ .h^>ecause °f deregulation, are Pilots ^ncinS ^an ever-increasing need for ^a ueed that is expected to last for

Navy, the answer is always the same. Those committees of senior officers (why are they never junior officers?) produce the old excuses of family separation, higher airline salaries, etc. Recently, two junior officers advanced the novel con­cept that perhaps there are more disturb­ing reasons. Lieutenant Golightly notes a lack of tactical excellence and Lieutenant Unger suggests a scarcity of old-fash­ioned officer qualities. No one can deny their genuine concern about the departure of fellow aviators. Many senior officers will no doubt hasten to brand their com-

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any other energy storage system vanced sufficiently to warrant implemen tation? (See Commander Nelson Bhs U. S. Naval Reserve, “Assault on Battery,” pp. 113-114, October Proceedings.) This question will not adequately answered until a foreign na .

gives

unity

duction of diesel submarines have

costs-

quently centered on development

today'

make this a far less valid argument

Phil Stein, a strategic planner at Boat, recently suggested that the t~-       .

fines. Although there is a weald' ented engineers available to supP , piston engine, that is not necessari ^ design of choice for a modern SS-

the

ments as the disgruntled chatter of idle junior officers. Yet it is individuals such as these two lieutenants who will either fill the fleet seats with their hard-earned experience or exit for greener pastures. But I believe strongly that Lieutenants Unger and Golightly merely scratched the surface of the real reasons that pilots are leaving the Navy in droves.

As a former naval aviator and currently a pilot for a major airline, I can say that the airlines offer a different career oppor­tunity. That first year, 50% pay cut is no joke, and I still spend many nights away from my wife and kids. As with any job, the pay and benefits increase with time in service. Most aviators are a savvy bunch, aware of the drawbacks of changing ca­reers in midstream. So why give up that comfortable, guaranteed income riding in Uncle Sam’s best machines? It isn’t the money. If an individual wanted to be wealthy, he wouldn’t have joined the Navy in the first place. In the airlines, you are an employee, and your seniority relates only to the date that you were hired. Whom you know doesn’t count, and no one cares what you used to fly. Operating professionally in a safe, effi­cient manner is the only thing that mat­ters. Performance standards are set by the company and the federal government, and if you can’t hack it, you’re fired. You do the job, and you get paid. What a unique concept! Professional operations, rigid standards, and appropriate recogni­tion for job completion. Perhaps the mili­tary could learn a thing or two from the civilian sector.

There seems to have been an erosion of trust—a sense that our superiors may not be keeping the faith with the junior officer ranks. Aviation bonuses and in­creased commitments are certainly not the solution. As they send pilots out to serve their country, the bean counters had better make sure and “check six.” A real pilot shortage may get them from behind.

“What Quieting Means to the Soviets”

(See R. R. Pariseau and L. F. Gunn, pp. 46­48, April 1989 Proceedings)

“No Quarter for Their Boomers”

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 49-52, April 1989 Proceedings)

“Our Peaceful Navy”

(See G. O’Rourke, pp. 79-83, April 1989 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Christopher J. Carver, U. S. Navy—Once again Proceedings has fo­cused on antisubmarine warfare (ASW), the most important and controversial as­pect of the maritime strategy. In Captain Gunn’s and Captain Byron’s articles there was a common thread that warrants some discussion from the perspective of available technology. They challenge the complete forward commitment of ASW assets.

Captain Gunn raises a taboo question. “What will recent innovations in Soviet submarine technology mean tactically to our ASW forces?” Captain Byron fol­lowed that with the suggestion that larger numbers of units are needed to defend the carrier battle group. The elements of evolving technology seem clear. A ques­tion of mutual interference is not the heart of the question but rather the effective­ness of U. S. nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Captain Gunn points out that technologically U. S. SSNs are at a disadvantage.

In tempering our thoughts Proceed­ings coincidentally published Captain O’Rourke’s article. He suggests there is a pending role for smaller warships “with a steadily declining emphasis on submersi- bles.” Others may question if a shift in Soviet tactics is mistaken in his article for a shift in Soviet strategy. I am unsure. Chief of Naval Operations Carlisle A. H. Trost recently said, “[If] glasnost and perestroika . . . succeed the military po­tential of the Soviet Union could eventu­ally be even greater than today.” In spite of this apparent conflict, I do agree with Captain O’Rourke that emphasis on a more coastal orientation of our Navy de­serves some serious thought in light of today’s political arena.

At a time in our naval history when investment in new technology and larger numbers of ships is no longer in vogue, what are the alternatives? Can we afford to build up an exclusively deep-water navy? The answer appears two-fold. The first, hidden in the back pages of the same issue of Proceedings, is a cheaper platform—the diesel or nonnuclear sub­marine. (See Norman Polmar, “Diesel Boats, Forever and Ever,” pp. 129— 130.) The second half of the answer is even more universally ignored—inte­grated weapon systems, combat systems based on more universally available tech­nology. We need to use our superior methods of training and doing everyday business to advance the use of off-the- shelf technology. The day of developing new and innovative technology exclu­sively for the military is past. The Japa­nese are attempting to make inroads in this realm with military aircraft. Funda­mentally, they are again mimicking and improving on what has already been pio­neered here in the United States. Since few people recognize the benefits that have come from such innovations, there is no alternative but to change the priority on research and development (R&D)- Antithetically, it seems few submari­ners took note of the recently release investigation into the accident on boar the USS Bonefish (SS-582) (possibly even the Soviet Mike-class Plark tha sunk in April 1989 in the Norwegian Sea). Even fewer probably have gi^ven much thought recently to the last majo^r U. S. submarine accident on board t USS Scorpion (SSN-589). Both of these tragedies centered around the battery Has recent fuel-cell or gel technology

the

takes the lead. Are we putting oursi into position of “mimicking”? Ingen has led us to our current apex in sub fine technology. We must press on m investigation of new technologies- ¹ very unlikely and technically illogi^ca test a completely new battery technol°r on board a nuclear submarine. Clea r we need the lower-cost diesel, at le^aS a test platform.    ..

Traditional arguments about the P

Recent advances in computer-aided d^ sign and manufacturing of subma

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.                     _            : the tech^

ogy exists to build diesel submarine is dwindling fast. He also pointed ^ollt _r the procurement time is about ^a shorter for a diesel boat than for an The first of the Seawolf (SSN-21) ^c^.|| will come on line in 1993 and a y^ear^ _a lapse during the natural evolution “new-con” nuclear submarine. Wi . any new submarines in production year, the delay should be used to de^v a diesel or hybrid design.           _v|Ce

The nature of the submarine must shift away from a strictly ⁿ . j_n mind-set. The diesel (SS) ratings ^VV^ ^ the submarine service must be restore is time to prepare for the integration enginemen (EN) rating back into the marine service before they are all g ^ There are currently only 29 EN ^s£₀v with the active submarine Navy, ^elt _,_a-

submarine tenders or on boaro •

-         ._____ ,                 . ......,1th Ol ^; .

Personnel is the first step in comple­menting our submarine force with a non- ''eelear defensive and coastal contingent ^ofSSs.

As tensions diminish in the world, the ^ed for diesel submarines to pursue So- ^et Tangos sold to Third World countries ^c°mes of increasing importance. I can- ^1Jt help but speculate what might have furred in April 1986 had the two So­: ^et'huilt Libyan Foxtrots been used dur- ■ 8 the “contingency operations.” Hav- . been on board a submarine in the ^editerranean at the time, I have thought

aboi

^ut the potential problems. It seems

!l^{y nu}clear submarine is at a distinct dis ^antage attacking a diesel-electric sub-

adv_;

lj^ar'ne in those relatively shallow waters. ^e hi. S. Navy would have suffered if

Th,

(\!''^Cond^er°ga (CG-47) or the Saratoga _lv 'hO) had been torpedoed. What _s: m*d the public have thought of the ^ 'ⁿg of a new ship by a Third World y- Would they have been able to ap- _r^^c'^ate what Captain Gunn infers to be a ■ nt overemphasis on submarine- jjQ^Ched cruise missiles? Or, is a _bi„.’000 mine a fair exchange for a $1 [v^l0n submarine. (See Commander ^n,el Corley, “Don’t Discount the ^Sel>” pages 74-81, October 1987 'feedings.)

ability to test our nuclear boats ^nst diesel-electric boats will better

hi

P,

^he

th^_^are both for the forward mission of 0,, ^utUrc. It is naive to rest comfortably

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>1

knowledge of tactics. As Captain

ch, " P°ints out, tactics are destined to '"no

,„?ⁿge radically in the near future and the

' ^ehective counter tactics is to place a ity emphasis on our tactical flexibil- Tlj_e his entails a return to the basics. rp_a ^Suhmarine force has overcome the tiu_h,J'ⁿg problems of the 1970s. The of sea tours per average career

"as

dec

^a"d '~^Creased. The level of seamanship th_e ^actical proficiency will drop unless Scj_e . ¹marine community makes a con- C_0nt^t,aus effort to stem the tide of ennui. "Is i^ltlUe(^ emphasis on tactics at all lev- i,^s,.^still needed. ^ve|₀ ^lglu °f ^ter ^{ntS our nava}* °ffi^{cers nee}d ^to be Vd ^r *han ever. A fleet of diesel or hy- "o_ns ^ectric subs that do not require time- C^ing, but necessary, nuclear in- V)u_rc°^ns would be a tremendous re- ⁽b_evn ^^or the development squadron

°ⁿb Commanding officers would •. e>OVe t

V|

0y.

^lac_ti_c^^llVe tactics and operations. The

' ^yet n key ingredient. ^e also is clearly a growing need

recent worldwide ASW de-

*0u_{r nn}^e tactically if they spent an initial ^a diesel. COs of SSNs would be

'Lv,

%j_v. Performers and qualified to try hqj ^IVe tactics and operations. The Sy Gaining value of such ships is ter-

for inexpensive diesel submarines to ex­tend our ASW capabilities. We may no longer be able to afford a 100% nuclear force. Some members of the press and Congress recently did a fair amount of SSN-21 bashing. Admiral Bruce DeMars did a commendable job defending the conceptual design, but there were not any alternatives. It is time to consider the next step now that the SSN-21 is on its way to fruition. Fundamentally, both sides are right. The SSN-21 needs to be built for the future of SSN development; the Los Angeles (SSN-688) has reached a devel­opment limit. There are areas, however, where ASW and computer technology could not be sufficiently researched in a timely manner to achieve operational design for the SSN-21 effort. The diesel electric or hybrid submarine might fill the gap created by a lag in technology, par­ticularly computer technology.

The second half of the emphasis on submarines revisiting technology is the question of automation. One of the toughest challenges facing the junior of­ficer today, on the conn, is data overload. There never seems to be enough informa­tion available from the contemporary fire-control system at firing in a narrow channel or on the way to periscope depth. The ship’s crew spends an inordinate amount of time keeping tedious manual plots. The question should not be “why aren’t ships keeping these plots?” but “why does the DevRon put so much emphasis on the plots?” The answer is quite clear. They are the only source of quality integrated fire-control informa­tion available to the officer-of-the-deck (OOD) in a manageable format. They in­tegrate all sensor data, and are tailored by the OOD to his changing needs. It takes considerable experience for an OOD to recognize how and when to do this. There is a lesson to be recognized. The correla­tion and assimilation of data all too fre­quently eludes the average OOD.

The contemporary fire-control system, for all its monolithic elegance, eludes the problem of data assimilation. Regretta­bly, it is almost a dinosaur of electronics. The same or better results are obtainable on one or more PCs with less fanfare. Because of the relative cost, it can be accomplished with duplicity. The Navy has recognized the strength of this tech­nology but has failed to carry the need to a logical conclusion.

The United States is the leader in PC design and software development. Mod­em microcomputers can easily handle the data flow commensurate with a modem fire-control system. This, most impor­tantly, is achievable with off-the-shelf technology. Sure, there are better ways to

build a fire-control system, but can they be cheaply integrated with the other sys­tems on board? By using the everyday interfaces available from numerous ven­dors, we can avoid the analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog conversions of in­formation that are so prevalent in conven­tional military systems. If the military can no longer afford to lead technology, let us at least stay current by lowering the price tag on innovation and progress. We simply cannot afford the cost of custom- designed system development and inter­faces.

The problem of growing data is joined by the problem of a shrinking crew. Crew size probably can be reduced through au­tomation, but automation may be unrelia­ble. This is a residual fear from the days when redundant systems were too bulky to install and engineers feared the opera­tor would be the only backup. For train­ing reasons, the operator must replace a primary automated system. However, this does not have to be a 100% occupa­tion. Job satisfaction will improve with justified automation. Several recent and reliable studies document the effect of automation on personnel reliability. Im­proved reliability of equipment and per­sonnel can be achieved today with auto­mation. For today’s hostile environment, it is possible to build an automated sub­marine that can “play hurt,” as Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee says. Senior officers who value their careers are not going to test this concept on a nuclear submarine. Possibly this was the source of the well- heeled resistance to former Secretary John Lehman’s push toward automation. (See John F. Lehman, Command of the Sea [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988].) (He also had not endeared himself through politics with the subma­rine community.) The obvious need is for a less politically sensitive but equivalent full-scale platform, one that can go head to head with a fully capable SSN and prove an integrated combat system’s ef­fectiveness.

Few of the obvious fears of automation are well-founded. Are they all, however, a phobia of automation or is it a fear of innovation? It is easy to endorse im­provements but it is not as easy to accept innovations which at first glance may appear as change for the sake of change.

So many operational restrictions today are the outgrowth of human error. We are mired by policy that can blind us to tacti­cal windows of opportunity. In the sub­marine force we have a naval warfare publication (NWP-74) that documents this too clearly. As I alluded to earlier, the NWP could be replaced by seamanship and the phrase “follow your mission,

Ijtarine in those relatively shallow waters. theV^ ^ Navy would have suffered if

o_n ^Ure. It is naive to rest comfortably p °Ur ’              '

,^uin

out, ittcuwj aiu u^oiitiV/U tu

>nly®^e radically in the near future and the gr_e ^e^^ective counter tactics is to place a " emphasis on our tactical flexibil- TL *ⁿ‘^s entails a return to the basics.

a ^Sub

Hu,^'ⁿ§ problems of the 1970s. The ha_s ,^er sea tours per average career and _t^ecreased. The level of seamanship the _s ^hcal proficiency will drop unless «ci_e . Marine community makes a con- C_0ntj '°^Us effort to stem the tide of ennui. els j_s emphasis on tactics at all lev­

^vel,

in

hght

°PlTll

l>‘han

°^ri(l

^c°n:

^e'ectri_c ^Sumi

Personnel is the first step in comple- ^er>ting our submarine force with a non- °f SS^&r ^^e^^ens'^{ve anc}* ^coasta^ contingent

_n tensions diminish in the world, the ea for diesel submarines to pursue So- tangos sold to Third World countries ^ponies of increasing importance. I can­° help but speculate what might have furred in April 1986 had the two So- et-built Libyan Foxtrots been used dur- f the “contingency operations.” Hav- been on board a submarine in the abo ^{terTanean at tbe} t'^nle’ I have thought ^ut the potential problems. It seems ady ^nuc*^ear submarine is at a distinct dis- antage attacking a diesel-electric sub- (QV ^>Conderoga (CG-47) or the Saratoga -60) had been torpedoed. What si I¹, the public have thought of the na_v ^ln" ^{a new s}h'P by a Third World pr_e Would they have been able to ap- r^ciate what Captain Gunn infers to be a |_a ^nt overemphasis on submarine- ”ted cruise missiles? Or, is a bj,,.’⁰⁰⁰ rnine a fair exchange for a $1 [y'°ⁿ submarine. (See Commander Dj'^e Corley, “Don’t Discount the V,^e >” Pages 74-81, October 1987 °^^ed‘ⁿ8s.)

a„ ■ ^e ability to test our nuclear boats p_r'^nst diesel-electric boats will better Ik, _f^are both for the forward mission of ^e futun

°^Ur knowledge of tactics. As Captain cb_a ' h°^mts out, tactics are destined to

°^nlyf

'he ^*8

^t'ian-^SUbmarine force has overcome the still needed.

of recent worldwide ASW de- ^lents our naval officers need to be

ever. A fleet of diesel or hy- subs that do not require time- ^spe_C(^ⁿⁱⁿg’ but necessary, nuclear in- ^s0ur_Ce ^{ns w}ould be a tremendous re- ⁽be_V(y *^0r 'he development squadron >_ro^0nb Commanding officers would ^l(4i_r ^Ve tactically if they spent an initial Pr_0Ven^{n a} diesel. COs of SSNs would be ^lr,,i()v_ac^'formers and qualified to try Si_Cai^1Ve 'actics and operations. The ' training value of such ships is ter- is clearly a growing need for inexpensive diesel submarines to ex­tend our ASW capabilities. We may no longer be able to afford a 100% nuclear force. Some members of the press and Congress recently did a fair amount of SSN-21 bashing. Admiral Bruce DeMars did a commendable job defending the conceptual design, but there were not any alternatives. It is time to consider the next step now that the SSN-21 is on its way to fruition. Fundamentally, both sides are right. The SSN-21 needs to be built for the future of SSN development; the Los Angeles (SSN-688) has reached a devel­opment limit. There are areas, however, where ASW and computer technology could not be sufficiently researched in a timely manner to achieve operational design for the SSN-21 effort. The diesel electric or hybrid submarine might fill the gap created by a lag in technology, par­ticularly computer technology.

The second half of the emphasis on submarines revisiting technology is the question of automation. One of the toughest challenges facing the junior of­ficer today, on the conn, is data overload. There never seems to be enough informa­tion available from the contemporary fire-control system at firing in a narrow channel or on the way to periscope depth. The ship’s crew spends an inordinate amount of time keeping tedious manual plots. The question should not be “why aren’t ships keeping these plots?” but “why does the DevRon put so much emphasis on the plots?” The answer is quite clear. They are the only source of quality integrated fire-control informa­tion available to the officer-of-the-deck (OOD) in a manageable format. They in­tegrate all sensor data, and are tailored by the OOD to his changing needs. It takes considerable experience for an OOD to recognize how and when to do this. There is a lesson to be recognized. The correla­tion and assimilation of data all too fre­quently eludes the average OOD.

The contemporary fire-control system, for all its monolithic elegance, eludes the problem of data assimilation. Regretta­bly, it is almost a dinosaur of electronics. The same or better results are obtainable on one or more PCs with less fanfare. Because of the relative cost, it can be accomplished with duplicity. The Navy has recognized the strength of this tech­nology but has failed to carry the need to a logical conclusion.

The United States is the leader in PC design and software development. Mod­em microcomputers can easily handle the data flow commensurate with a modem fire-control system. This, most impor­tantly, is achievable with off-the-shelf technology. Sure, there are better ways to build a fire-control system, but can they be cheaply integrated with the other sys­tems on board? By using the everyday interfaces available from numerous ven­dors, we can avoid the analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog conversions of in­formation that are so prevalent in conven­tional military systems. If the military can no longer afford to lead technology, let us at least stay current by lowering the price tag on innovation and progress. We simply cannot afford the cost of custom- designed system development and inter­faces.

The problem of growing data is joined by the problem of a shrinking crew. Crew size probably can be reduced through au­tomation, but automation may be unrelia­ble. This is a residual fear from the days when redundant systems were too bulky to install and engineers feared the opera­tor would be the only backup. For train­ing reasons, the operator must replace a primary automated system. However, this does not have to be a 100% occupa­tion. Job satisfaction will improve with justified automation. Several recent and reliable studies document the effect of automation on personnel reliability. Im­proved reliability of equipment and per­sonnel can be achieved today with auto­mation. For today’s hostile environment, it is possible to build an automated sub­marine that can “play hurt,” as Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee says. Senior officers who value their careers are not going to test this concept on a nuclear submarine. Possibly this was the source of the well- heeled resistance to former Secretary John Lehman’s push toward automation. (See John F. Lehman, Command of the Sea [Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988].) (He also had not endeared himself through politics with the subma­rine community.) The obvious need is for a less politically sensitive but equivalent full-scale platform, one that can go head to head with a fully capable SSN and prove an integrated combat system’s ef­fectiveness.

Few of the obvious fears of automation are well-founded. Are they all, however, a phobia of automation or is it a fear of innovation? It is easy to endorse im­provements but it is not as easy to accept innovations which at first glance may appear as change for the sake of change.

So many operational restrictions today are the outgrowth of human error. We are mired by policy that can blind us to tacti­cal windows of opportunity. In the sub­marine force we have a naval warfare publication (NWP-74) that documents this too clearly. As I alluded to earlier, the NWP could be replaced by seamanship and the phrase “follow your mission.

There were seven field-grade ofb^cer'

Sec-

issue

reco^nV

for a month before deciding to

don’t be stupid.”

We in the submarine force feel a need to program officers with so much guid­ance that they react by becoming merely operators. They in turn compartmentalize the enlisted ratings. Their actions have encouraged “unionization” of the ratings whose jobs they encroached upon. Team­work and team spirit are dwindling within the ships’ parties. Life can be breathed back into these members by a breath of history. There are two key lessons from the wartime use of submarines. First, only 6% of the skippers will be effective in the combat scenario. This will proba­bly hold true in the future because they must be the integration point of so much data. World War I and II data clearly sup­port this. Second, officers who have risen in rank in wartime did so because they recognized that the enemy operated dif­ferently than he ever had before. They were professionally competent enough to be innovative. The price for innovation in a peacetime democracy is very high. If an innovative officer rises, it is not coinci­dence. Somewhere along the way he had an enlisted rating, chief, or another offi­cer who had the competence, knowledge, and experience to prevent his demise.

The submarine service must control and manage the future stakes carefully within the present defense budget. Tradi­tional ASW thinking deserves review now, in light of the current ten-year de­sign development cycle.

As a midshipman, I listened to naval analyst Norman Polmar speak of nuclear versus diesel submarines. Today he is saying the same thing to us. In 1979, I was much less convinced then I am today that he is right. What is it that causes one of the world experts on naval forces to advocate a single topic so vehemently for ten years? The rapid growth in Soviet ASW technology appears to be slowing. This is our window of opportunity to move away from purely strategic ASW. In the end, let us all hope Captain Gunn is right. Let us ensure that the U. S. Navy’s commitment to technology and excel­lence will cause economic warfare to re­place nuclear warfare.

“Road to Eighth and Eye”

(See M. L. Bartlett, pp. 73-80, November 1988; A. I. Lyman, p. 82, February 1989 Proceedings)

Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired)—In citing the selections of 1910 and 1959, wherein “a weak CMC [Commandant of the Marine Corps] and a series of untoward events involving the USMC” led to increased civilian involvement in the selection pro­cess, Lieutenant Colonel Bartlett coul have used another example: the problem of selecting a successor to Colonel Coi" mandant John Harris in 1864.

Harris himself had been a phlegmatic- desk-bound Commandant, and the rine Corps suffered through his undistm guished and frequently embarrassing ^ten ure during the Civil War. At the time ⁰ Harris’s death, the Lincoln administn¹ tion faced a desperate reelection can' paign as the war entered its fourth a bloodiest year. Viewing the replacem^en of Harris as an unwelcome chore, Na• < Secretary Gideon Welles noted in diary for 14 May 1864: “Attended *

funeral of Colonel Harris; his death g^f

The

embarrassment as to a successor. ¹ higher class of Marine officers are not men who can elevate or give efficiency the Corps.

in the Corps at Harris’s death. Many unremarkable or checkered careers.

retary Welles dodged the succession mend “deep selection” of Major Jac° Zeilin, fourth on the seniority list- ' les’s diary entry for 9 June 1864 refl^eC^ little of the rationale: “Concluded to * tire the Marine officers who are pas¹ ^ legal age, and to bring in Zeilin.” ,y a good choice—Zeilin was untainted. ^ the political infighting and heavy boo^z -

SEE

THROUGH IT.

WITH STHI VIDEO FROM

“figadi,

djjj J^acterized many of the other can- lier ^CS’ 'ⁿ Edition he had a decent ear- an₍| ^r,^eeord of naval service in California ^^JaPan.

Of

c₀|_n ^much greater importance to the Lin- Se]_e ^ministration, however, was the C^{ee s s}°dd backing from the entire Tb_e f.. ^Var,ia congressional delegation.

Lincoln had barely won re­nomination by the Republican Conven­tion in Baltimore just two days before Welles’s decision is probably more than mere coincidence. In this case, however, both Corps and country benefited from the deep selection of Major Zeilin.

I look forward to a second installment on this subject by Colonel Bartlett, giving us the same analysis applied to the CMC selection process over the past 30 years!

“The Navy’s Final Frontier”

(.See A. Skolnick, pp. 28-35, January 1989;

G. B. Thamm, p. 31, March 1989; R. C. Burk, p. 25, April 1989 Proceedings)

Captain Alfred Skolnick, U. S. Navy (Re­tired)—Mr. Thamm’s remarks are both cogent and debatable. Giving the Air Force, alone, governance of space be­cause it lacks other missions is a form of decision-making; whether that hypothesis is true and whether decisions should be made on such a basis is moot.

As to the comments of Captain Burk, one hardly knows where to begin. Cap­tain Burk observes that tactical com­manders dislike relying on nondedicated assets and notes that central management of military spacecraft is the only practical choice. But my article underscores these points and the difficulty solving them.

Just because the service that bears lead responsibility for spacecraft equipment benefits does not mean that the other ser­vices’ needs are not satisfied. And in terms of motivating military personnel and acknowledging career path realities, it makes sense to seek serious parent ser­vice involvement and support. The origi­nal article simply states “the Navy must provide the opportunity to work on space systems that (largely) satisfy Navy re­quirements.” The real solution is routine interservice cooperation. We can have joint commands operating equipment designed and built by more than one ser­vice for multiservice use; that is what technical specifications and standardiza­tion should control.

Captain Burk’s logic throughout his commentary is remiss. He brings his guns to bear and gives his sequential order: ready, fire, aim! The point is not to build, in his words, “service-unique space­craft’ ’ but to encourage and nurture full- fledged Navy participation in space- based activity. This will require multifac­eted programs meeting the Navy’s core requirements and will have to be done in trying fiscal times. To have Navy engi­neering design personnel and Navy ac­quisition management people in such programs implies serious Navy involve­ment and knowledgeable Navy participa­tion. How is that bad?

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active into the first decade of the ne century. '

they naturally ask questions after such incident. They asked, “Why doesn t

stress' •Id,

cease. Trauma care is demanding, ful, wasteful, and, even in the real

ev^el f Cl

hospitals can get good at this type oi

“Splashdown!”

(See D. Chamberland, pp. 36-43, January 1989

Proceedings)

Senior Chief Quartermaster Joseph A. Patton, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The near­est recovery ship during the recovery of Ham the Chimp on 31 January 1961 was the USS Harold J. Ellison (DD-864), not the USS Ellyson (DD-454). By all rights, our ship should have picked up Ham but the backwash from our propellers pushed the capsule away from the side of the ship and let the helo pick up the capsule. Our crew was very irritated at the time. I know these facts are true because I was a quartermaster second class at the time and directed the vessel to the landing lo­cation.

“Losing Out on Carrier Radar Improvements”

(See S. Truver, pp. 118-119, April 1989 Proceedings)

Scott Truver—Mea culpa! I let one slip through in the galleys! The reference to the two conventional carriers that will be

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retired no later than 1999 mistakenly >ⁿ' eluded the Ranger (CV-61); the origin^ manuscript identified CV-41, the Af"' way, which is slated to be retired in 199'- when the John Stennis (CVN-74) j^011lS the fleet. The Saratoga (CV-60) will b^e retired by 1999, 15 years after she com pletes her service life extension program (SLEP) overhauls. The Ranger has no'' been dropped from CV-SLEP and receive an “incremental maintenance program, perhaps as the Navy’s cari^1L’^r homeported in Yokosuka after the way leaves active duty, thus keeping ■>

“Blood on the Decks”

(See A. M. Smith, pp. 62-66, July 1988;

R. W. Savage, p. 26, September 1988; S. L- Oreck, p. 16, October 1988; T. G. Doneker. p. 19, November 1988; J. W. Tyson, p- 88. December 1988 Proceedings)

“MedEvac”

(See J. C. Astle, p. 66, July 1988 Proceeding»

Captain C. F. Ward, Medical Co^rP^s' U. S. Naval Reserve—I am an anesthesj ologist at the University of Calif^ornl ’ San Diego Medical Center, the ^s° ^ level-1 trauma center in San D^|ej\, County, and I am getting tired of ha^vl to answer questions about Navy m^e cine. Recently, an F-14 was lost h^e The folks that I work with know that 1 ^ associated with the Naval Reserve,

a¹'

the

Navy take care of its own?” The avia¹¹’, who ejected from that plane, other ^c j cally injured aviators who have eje^c , from other planes, and severely Marine pilots from Marine Corps Air tion Yuma in Arizona appear in the ^c> . ian trauma system. Civilian medical "^ copters also are called upon to transP‘_f naval personnel to our facility for ^elt> gency care.            ^.

I don’t have answers for my ^c°^vv°_afit ers’ questions, and frankly, I don’t^v ^ answers. I want this line of question!¹¹®

it loses money. After a while, how® j,

-           - -                       . die

cal care, and people who used to t without it don’t anymore. A local ot ¹ ^ suggested recently that the Navy wish to explore participating (offi^cia ^ in the San Diego trauma system- . opined that he doubted that the ^n1t’^_rr people, and commitment would be ¹ p Interesting thing for a former suU general to say!

Comment and Discussion

(Continued from page 30)

Doesn’t the USNI Board ^Present the Membership?”

u'^e ^ C. Scharfen, p. 102, April 1989 ^roc<*dings)

^‘enant Michael J. O'Donnell, U. S. ^ast Guard Reserve—As Colonel ^arfen points out, the Naval Institute’s

^h! gov,

ttiore

Qffi

||_c ^Cers than regular active-duty officers. ^activ°^{teS t}*^{le ma}j^or'ty has not been _ac(. ^e |n claiming a “piece of the in °ⁿ' ,®^{ut w}hh the fact that his interest ^_a^°^ntrihuting to the guidance of the d_en l institute, and mine, arose indepen- Wid ^and simultaneously suggests that t°_rs, ^n,n8 the eligibility for elective direc- «** may be an idea whose time has

An

1V_0U| ^easy first step in such an effort all _r to extend elective eligibility to c_illd^eS^ular members on the Institute, in- hi₎|₍j^ln8 reserve and retired officers who tatj₀ ^'^{S status}- As for enlisted represen- Scp,J¹' i absolutely agree with Colonel of _Se ^en iitat the experience and maturity t_esou^ni0r enlisted personnel make them a Po_in.^rce not to be ignored. Maybe ap- f_0r^Ve directorships are the proper route _Sti,i„^eir inclusion. Unless the Naval In- ■ ^u'e is i

jffance lies with a privileged minor- "'as surprised to learn that there are Members who are reserve or retired

^v0ti

^;,n_g)

¹ Prepared to extend regular (i.e.,

<it| '^b> membership to enlisted person­ae '^Vould otherwise be faced with .9 tangly of a membership group able ofr,_Ce ^0r office, but not vote for the same

T^hip Control: It Takes

p

1$89 p ‘ ^Deutermann, pp. 90-93, January

^r°ceedings)

^^c>a^ⁿ^!^u William J. Rogers, U. S. beu_tp ⁽’^Uard—I disagree with Captain

to.

:^ermann

s emphasis on increasing the

IfKL

^‘information center’s (CIC) re- ^adv_a "ity for ship control. The inherent ^,fjQ|j₎^a"^es of the officer-of-the-deck >ic, ^and trends in ship design and tac- V^a"^{date that the OOD reta}in final 't’he n'iity ^^{or S}^'P control.

^Cer, _Ca OD, unlike the CIC watch offi­ce! ^See and hear what is going on tot tr...,. ^sbip. His view of the world is

totali

y dependent on electronic sen-

sors that may fail, go out of tune, be set to the wrong range or frequency, or fail to receive a return from a target. In addi­tion, because he is not closed off from the outside world, the OOD can better judge the impact of the environment on the ship.

Of course, none of this is new, and the open bridge/closed bridge issue was de­cided a generation ago. What is changing is the tendency in destroyer and frigate designs to separate the CIC from the bridge (for example the Hamilton [WHEC-715]-class Coast Guard cutter after her fleet rehabilitation and moderni­zation or the Arleigh Burke [DDG-51]- class destroyers). Captain Deutermann’s lieutenant commander is not going to be able to get to the bridge to relieve the lieutenant (junior grade) who loses the big picture without losing the picture himself. Moreover, if the ship is restrict­ing electronic emissions, the CIC may not have a picture to begin with.

Improvements in ship control will come when OODs are again trained to make maximum use of the view from the bridge. A well-trained “seaman’s eye” can be a valid check on the accuracy of the navigation plot or on CIC’s ship con­trol recommendations. While not ignor­ing CIC, radar, or the other tools avail­able, the OOD should be able to reach correct ship-control decisions indepen­dently. Chapter one of Naval Shiphand­ling (R. S. Crenshaw, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), is an excel­lent starting point. Crenshaw’s discussion of the radian rule, three-minute rule, and various methods of measuring distances by eye should be familiar to every OOD. In addition, the OOD should be able to identify common naval and merchant ships by their silhouettes and navigation lights (and deduce the class of ship by the placement of its standard navigation lights). The OOD must know all the ship’s tactical data, including the turning radius for most speeds, rudder angles, acceleration and deceleration rates, and helm and engineering lag time.

Finally, the OOD must have all the rules of the road down cold; it is not enough to know where to find a particular rule in the book (with its red cover you can’t find it on the bridge at night any­way). He also must know how and when

to depart from them.

The CIC will always have an important role in ship control—that of adviser to the OOD—and Captain Deutermann has some excellent ideas on how to improve the information flow. The sheer volume of information passed, however, can be a detriment to safe ship control. Any CIC can easily overwhelm an OOD with in­formation of marginal value. In addition to needing people and equipment to han­dle information, people in the CIC do not have to cope with the black-out restric­tions necessary for those on the bridge to maintain their night vision, and they don’t face the challenge of breaking sig­nals with 25 knots of wind blowing through the bridge. The CIC watch offi­cer’s goal, therefore, should be to strike a balance between providing the informa­tion the OOD needs and reporting unnec­essary information that is a distraction. For example, course and speed informa­tion on a contact unneeded whose closed point of approach will be eight miles is a distraction to the OOD of a stand-on ves­sel in a crossing situation when the bur­dened vessel does not appear to be taking any action.

Properly training the OOD will lead to safe ship control. Recommendations from CIC are a help, but are not enough by themselves.

‘‘When in Rome . . . Show the Flag”

(See M. T. Hall, p. 33, February 1989

Proceedings)

Captain Robert C. Stroud, U. S. Air Force, Senior Protestant Chaplain, Taegu Air Base, Republic of Korea— While Lieutenant Commander Hall’s in­sights were particularly applicable to as­signments to a “sister service school,” I believe the ramifications extend far be­yond such a setting. A tour with a sister service truly can be likened to a journey to a foreign land. To a lesser degree, it is incumbent upon every member of the U. S. armed forces to become acquainted with the most significant traditions of the various branches. After all, we are all cit­izens of one nation, united in a common defense, serving with a single purpose.

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“Bulldog Ductus Exemplo—The Platoon Commander”

(See G. K. Holcomb, pp. 115-118, November 1988; P. F. Donohue, pp. 20-22, February 1989; A. DeNunzio, p. 30, March 1989; G. A. Allen, pp. 28-29, May 1989 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Estes, U. S. Marine Corps—Last summer, U. S. Naval Academy midshipmen first-class trained for six weeks at Officer Candidate School (OCS), Quantico, in lieu of their normal first-class cruises, in order to qualify for commissions in the Marine Corps. This alteration of the normal training and education program at the Naval Academy formed amid the conflu­ence of three different concepts. First, many Marine Corps officers stationed at the Naval Academy wanted to institute some form of screening process that would allow them to select midshipmen seeking commissions, obtaining some­how a “purer” officer who would reflect better on the Naval Academy and its staff. Second, certain officers in the re­cruiting division at Headquarters, Marine Corps, desired to standardize officer ac­quisition in the Corps through a single “pipeline”—OCS to The Basic School (TBS). Finally, then-Secretary of the Navy, James Webb saw the Naval Acad­emy as a school for centurions which had somehow gone astray and could not pro­duce the same anymore. In addition, other agendas are now in play, including ones that would overturn the public law and withhold the regular commission from any Marine Corps officer until sometime after an officer completed TBS and his first duty assignment.

The fundamental change in the Naval Academy program seems flawed, how­ever. It says that the Naval Academy’s training and education program is some­how inadequate entry-level preparation for commissioning into the armed forces. Otherwise, it presumes special conditions governing combat for U. S. Marines that do not play in the preparation of officers of other services. Is there, for instance, a lesser brand of courage that keeps a main propulsion assistant at the control station when he knows a torpedo warhead may blast through his compartment at any moment, or a lesser command presence in the submarine skipper directing his boat through a minefield to attack war­ships in a harbor?

Equally flawed is the assumption that six weeks of stressful indoctrination at OCS will mold a Marine Corps officer. No officer can be developed fully at OCS or TBS. Real leadership grows from ex­perience, observation, and trial and error (especially the latter). Leadership contin­ues to mature over the succeeding y^ear* as proven leaders share their wisdom Ml younger officers.

What, then, caused the Corps to tak^e such a drastic action to modify the train ing and education of Naval Academy midshipmen? The watershed for Marin¹ Corps recruiting at the Naval Academy may have been 1974 when the Corp^s shifted from an informal effort to a ded> cated campaign. Retiring Commandan of the Marine Corps General Robert •

graduated from the Naval Academy,^t0<^ great exception to the poor showing the class of 1974 at the Marine CoT' table. (Only 88 midshipmen selected t ¹ Marine Corps, and 66 of them were g^lUl1^ anteed aviation.) Hence, the Marm Corps elevated its senior position at Naval Academy to colonel and locked the directorship of the English and H^|S_ tory Division for him. The Marine should have gone for Commandant ^ Midshipmen on a 1:5 rotation with Navy.     i

Whether the Marines at the Na^v^ Academy campaigned for the mid^s

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tion com­bat aircraft; the Marine law and g^ra^^U_sca education programs; “life-style;” ⁿ° duty and to the fringe types, the odd ^SP cialties: law, intelligence, data syste air control, etc. Service selection P^. dered to the “what’s in it for me? tude that already was taking hold ^at Naval Academy. The Marine Corps got a basic law of nature: in any P ^ class, 80 midshipmen are die-hards^.

incentives.

In the 1980s, the Marine Corps to oversubscribe the graduating ^L ^ and had to turn a few prospects a ^ The movement toward “screening j midshipmen for the Corps then r-¹^.

tern will improve the Naval '^^cag_asi^c graduates’ performance at The   _a|

School and beyond. Apparently,   ^ nvuuvinj giuuuuivo ivhu iw

top or at the bottom of each TBS ^c j

in the Naval Academy product, ,_s argue that all Naval Academy g^ra should finish near the top of eacn . class. But this notion makes no all⁰ for the quality of many U. /■Joes' graduates who can jump from

plus Marine Corps officers at the Academy can use the time they save salesmanship efforts to inform the 1 better about the Corps and how it ^w°^r

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Platoon Leaders Class basic training or the personal instruction of the Marine officer and NCO in his NROTC unit into TBS and do quite well. Many of these officers can outperform the Naval Acad­emy graduate in intellect, drive, or physi­cal prowess. The rub for some serving Marine Corps officers is that the Naval Academy graduate already possesses a regular commission. The existence of some outstanding reserve officers makes some Marine leaders want to turn back the clock and redistribute the regular commissions on a merit basis more to their personal liking. But Naval Academy graduates make a more intense and early commitment to the Department of De­fense and contract for their commissions in the manner provided by Congress, the ultimate authority in such matters. These and other reasons make it clear that the Marine Corps should not get into a posi­tion of tampering with the Naval Acad­emy graduate’s commission (regular ver­sus reserve) based on the individual’s performance at TBS.

TBS standing may no more indicate future in the Marine Corps than Naval Academy grades, Marine Corps physical fitness scores, or the like. The Naval Academy split at TBS may reflect merely the soft- or hard-core levels of determina­tion of Naval Academy graduates when they made their service selection. Many Naval Academy graduates (even in Webb’s class of 1968), enter for the free education, have no service interests, see only a five-year contract, and never catch fire. The Corps can still use some of these people, since requirements for company- grade officers far outstrip the needs for more senior officers.

TBS may be an additional rite of pas­sage not welcomed by many Naval Acad­emy graduates and actually reduces their motivations. There is also a tendency for the Naval Academy cohort to remain in­tact at TBS, because of its size, in a given TBS company. Breaking up the Naval Academy class and more evenly distrib­uting its people across several TBS classes might compensate for the divisive aspects of the cohorting. There seems lit­tle doubt that TBS continues to relegate new officers to “third lieutenant” or “lieutenidate” status or that macho pos­turing remains endemic to the TBS expe­rience. These conditions disappoint good and poor officers alike. The TBS classes of Mr. Webb’s era were run by newly re­turned combat veterans who dropped much of the typical TBS martinet style in order to bring a practical, mission- oriented atmosphere into a shortened training period.

In approving OCS training for Naval

Academy midshipmen, Mr. Webb migh have presented the Navy with its i'^rs clear victory over the Corps at the Nav^a Academy in more than a decade. ^,n Marine Corps always has benefited fr^onl previous errors made by the Navy at tn U. S. Naval Academy: aviation cap^s' flight school backups, oppressive nuclei power officers, sea time, etc. This situa tion now seems reversed. The Corp* alone requires an early commitme (second-class year) to Marine Cotf training at OCS, at a time when 25% ⁰ the class has doubts about service sele^c tion that many of them will carry >ⁿ their last year. What if midshipmen ex^er cise their rights to change services at last minute? The OCS trainee must g° ^ sea; the first-class cruise trainee must g to OCS instead of commissioning ^v|* his class? If the Naval Academy lew^e ship likes and supports this OCS schen^’ it is because it gives Navy service P grams enormous advantages over Corps’ at a critical juncture in the m shipmen’s experience.   . _s

If the Marine Corps is really ^serl° about TBS performance complaints, t * it only needs to turn down the heat on Naval Academy Marines to p^r0^^uC® 16%% quota of each class of the C^orP₀ Allow Marine Corps selection to re^turI% the historical 12-13% levels. Th^ ^

“Avoiding the Conventional Arms Control Bottle”

(,See J. A. Winnefeld, pp. 30-36, April l?⁸⁹ Proceedings)

“Bravo Zulu” to Proceedings For your always outstanding ^w°^r ' On occasion, though, it seems,

Comes forth a little quirk.

Page 32 this April issue Has a pix to puzzle one . ■ •

Of CVs, FF, and an oiler

Seen o’er the flag on turret one-

Something looked amiss, you see,

A little out of sort,

For the Midway-class of carrier Had her UnRep ship to port!

And also looking a little strange Was our beloved Stars ’n Strip^eS' _ti The red ’n white ’n blue looked g But the star field was on the rig

Alas, could be your editor

Was in his work immersed. . _g(le. Thus, working hard, he missed this Methinks the picture is reversed- Doug SJ°

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