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The Soviet Navy—like its U. S. coun- •5Part—is a major user of space activity. ne Soviet Union has a large, dynamic, expanding space program, most of aich is oriented toward the military. In , ct> Western intelligence considers about ree-quarters of all Soviet space finches to be primarily military. The fusions include:
[ Antisatellite (ASAT)
^ ballistic missile launch detection ^ Communications
Communications and electronic inter> (Ellnt)
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Navigation 9cean surveillance
^ Research j actical missile targeting the offing are other military missions, eluding antisubmarine warfare and radar
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and communications jamming.
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All of these activities will have a pro-
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impact on future naval warfare.
^ cording to the U. S. Chief of Naval .^rations, Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, espite our [spacej successes in the
despite our superior technological 7 we are today farther behind the 0jAiet Union in the military application vsPace technology than we were when Putnik first went up” [in October ge T].1 The head of U. S. naval intelli- ‘‘mCe Predicts that in the near future, p e can also expect the Soviets to ex- ]C;i “ their manned program, building at
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^ • or|c large space station, which sup-
3nd ASAT. ’
fnilitary missions, including ASW
is t ilace't)ascd ASW has two goals. First s0 deny Western submarines the use of tia 1'tes and space for their own naviga- , n and communications. Admiral Trost ^ observed, “Although some thought ,p.s given to their vulnerability to jam- pUl 8’ nuclear EMP [electromagnetic (jtSel’ laser destructors, or antisatellite lbe '[?*’ t*le v*ew was that in peacetime Wa . S.] systems were safe and that in
, 'me we would not need them for very lj I’ If the Soviets can interfere with thr Use °* satellites and space, they can cai>aten t*le ability °f U. S. submarines to Jy out their missions.
Th,
e Soviets’ second goal is to use
space-based devices to detect submarines. The rapid search rate of spacecraft is only their most obvious advantage.4 Little has been said in public by U. S. officials about space-based submarine detection. Reportedly, the U. S. intelligence community agrees that the Soviets have experimented in detecting submerged submarines with side-looking synthetic aperture radar (SAR) on board the Salyut manned spacecraft and on various types of aircraft. The Soviets apparently use the radar to detect surface “signatures” of submerged submarines.
According to Soviet statements, in the Okean-R satellite program, the Kosmos 1500 satellite—launched in 1983—could process radar images and transmit realtime images to more than 500 Soviet ships and ground stations. The radar is said to be able to detect or measure sea surface winds, surface effects of naturally occurring internal waves, surface oil slicks, and ice.
The Soviets have written extensively about the potential of space-based submarine detection. One scientist stated,
“it is now becoming clear that, because of satellites, we can know not only the surface patterns of phenomena in the ocean, but also the volumetric, deep picture. Interval waves occur very extensively in the ocean. Their manifestations at the surface can be registered from aboard satellites, and it is possible to judge what is occurring in the upper layer of several hundred meters, which is most important to us.”5
Soviet naval officers have also commented on this subject. Citing “materials published in the open press” as a means of avoiding the security issue, one officer stated that SAR “seems especially promising to American specialists for space- based detection of comparatively small (with respect to underwater relief elements) objects in the ocean depths, above all, submerged submarines.”5 Although acknowledging that “a host of problems are being noted in the . . . practical realization of this possibility,” the author, a doctor of technical sciences, believed that
those problems could be surmounted.
The Soviet Union currently maintains some 110 to 120 operating satellites aloft, almost the same number as the United States. By virtue of longer satellite orbital lifetimes, however, the United States can maintain this number of satellites with about one-fourth the number of launches as the Soviet Union, which sends up almost 100 per year. While the larger num
ber of Soviet launches may indicate less technical efficiency than the U. S. space activities, the need for more launch vehicles and satellites has resulted in larger production runs of boosters and satellites. Thus the Soviets probably have more hardware available to replace accidental or operational casualties as well as combat losses.
The number of Soviet space launches can be expected to increase to support the growing volume of space activity. U. S. officials estimate that by the mid-1990s some 200 operational Soviet satellites will orbit the earth—about 150 having purely military missions, 40 supporting joint military-civilian functions (communications, navigation, weather), and 10 for scientific missions. In this period the lifetimes and survivability of Soviet satellites also will probably increase.
The manned space stations, interplanetary probes, and a probable manned flight to Mars will be the most ambitious projects. The manned space stations are highly significant from a military viewpoint. Soviet cosmonauts have accumulated three times as many man-days in orbit as have U. S. astronauts. Last December, two Soviet cosmonauts returned to earth after spending 366 days in space
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101
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largest operational launch vehicle is [1] SL-13, which can lift a payload rt>° than 21 tons to an altitude of 115 n“‘e*' (The U. S. Titan 34D can lift 16.5 tons that altitude, while the U. S. space shut can lift as much as 28.5 tons). On 15 1987, however, the Soviets conduct the first flight test of the SL-17 Energy (“energy”), a massive lift vehicle e mated to be able to place more than tons in orbit! (That payload is sin11 ^ to the discontinued U. S. Saturn vehicle.) „
A Soviet space shuttle with a lift capacity is in the offing. An SL- successfully launched an unmau^
of a powerful, compact nuclear P^.
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1990s. Still another potential use of1 .
yji u |juwuiiui, vwmpuvi nuvivv *
module may be a critical step toward ^ velopment of a space-based ASAT. P j, sibly employing a laser, by the
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TOTAL PAYMENTS (breaking the previous Soviet and world record of 326 days set one year earlier). These lengthy space missions are intended to develop techniques for space stations as well as a manned flight to Mars, which would last two to three years.
The Soviets’ year-long habitat was the Mir, (“peace” in Russian), a third- generation space station launched in February 1986. Since the first Salyut was launched in 1972, the Soviet Union has had a space station in orbit almost continuously. Used extensively to conduct military experiments, the Mir has solar panels that provide nearly ten kilowatts of power. It is fitted with six docking ports, which enable resupply craft (eventually the Soviet shuttle) to mate with the Mir, and research and other mission modules to be attached to form a space station. It is expected that when properly configured by attaching modules, the Mir, or a planned, larger Mir-2, will be able to house as many as 12 cosmonauts. The Soviets have discussed developing modular space stations for as many as 100 persons in the foreseeable future. Cosmonauts have already demonstrated many of the techniques needed to assemble such a large structure in space; for example, in 1984 two men spent a total of more than 200 hours in space repairing a fuel line on the Salyut-7, and the following year another two cosmonauts conducted a dramatic salvage mission on that spacecraft after a malfunction of its electrical system left it “dead” in orbit. The Soviets have also conducted complex space transfers of men and equipment between the Salyut-7 and Mir stations.
The Soviets abandoned the Mir after a three-man crew returned to earth in April 1989. A planned relief crew was not launched and Soviet officials said that the Mir will be unmanned for several months because of a technical problem with new modules being prepared. “It is just going to be a regular interval, nothing more,” said the director of Moscow’s space research institute.
Experiments conducted from the Mir space station and its predecessors of the Salyut series include cosmonauts using cameras, spectrometers, and multispectral electro-optical sensors. The U. S. Department of Defense states that these activities “suggest the Soviets are evaluating their ability to locate, identify, and track targets from outer space. This could be the first step toward designing a space weapons platform for use against targets in space and on Earth.”7
Three “cosmodromes” in the Soviet Union support this impressive space program; Plesetsk, 500 miles north of Moscow on the Yemtsa River; Tyurata111 (Baikonur), 150 miles northeast of tn® Aral Sea; and Kapustin Yar, west of Caspian Sea. There are about 20 laun® pads at these three sites, including 1 e largest in the country. Tyuratam has tw launch pads and extensive storage spaC for ASAT interceptors and launch veh* cles. Several interceptors could launched each day from those pads. 1 SL-11 ASAT boosters are regular launched with other payloads, ensunA the reliability of that component of 1 ASAT system.
Soviet launch vehicles can lift rn°r.
than comparable U. S. systems.
Buran space shuttle on 15 Noven' 1988. The first manned space shut^ flight is planned for the third flight, no set for no earlier than 1992. Thus, Soviet shuttle program appears to ren1 significantly behind the U. S. effort- In addition to the space shuttle, Soviets are developing a smaller, ret* ble “space plane.” This craft could valuable for quick-reaction, real-U^ reconnaissance missions, emergency ellite repairs, space station defense. a if necessary, another means of sate destruction. Like the shuttle, the c would be carried into space by the *a c SL-series launch vehicles. ,y
The Soviets can be expected to upP.( their heavy lift capability to improve t current, low-earth-orbit ASAT syst®^ At the same time, the recent develop11^
id*'
technologies could be satellite and sp^j station jammers to defeat sPaceV';1rii communications and possibly ship171’ radio and even radar transmissions- Today U. S. Navy ships at sea are s jected to periodic observation by 5 5
radar ocean reconnaissance sate (RORSat) and the Ellnt ocean reconn‘ f sance satellite (EORSat). These and 0
102
Proceedings
/ July 1
the
■lift
eve of the first launch of the heavy SL-17 vehicle: “We do not intend relax our efforts and lose our vangua' positions in the conquest of space.
intelligence collection means and their supporting infrastructure constitute what Western intelligence officials call the Soviet ocean surveillance system (SOSS). The Ellnt satellites seek out transmissions from ships and cue in radar satellites to suspected naval targets. The latter require considerable electrical power and are nuclear powered.
When the service life of these Kosmos- series RORSats is complete, the section carrying the radioactive fuel is designed to be boosted into higher orbits—more than 550 miles—where they will circle the earth for more than 500 years and then cause no danger when they do come down and bum in the atmosphere. (They normally orbit at a height of about 130 miles.) But three reactors have malfunctioned and plunged into the atmosphere: Kosmos 954 in January 1978, Kosmos 1402 in February 1983, and Kosmos 1990 in . . . 1988; they scattered uranium fuel particles when they reentered the atmosphere. The reactor section weighs about one ton and carries some 100 pounds of enriched uranium (U-235).
Since early 1986 Soviet experimentation in ocean reconnaissance has been unprecedented. Both RORSat and EOR- Sat satellites have exhibited variations in orbital planes, periods, and inclinations. In addition, several of the Kosmos-series satellites are said to have characteristics suggestive of new or significantly modified surveillance satellites, possibly introducing new sensors.
U. S. officials have referred to other types of ocean reconnaissance satellites, but have released no details. In the 1990s these and other Soviet reconnaissance devices should be able to detect all target ships at least once a day, regardless of the ships’ location and passive countermeasures. Satellites, much like land-based Bear-D aircraft, can already target ships for antiship missiles.
To quote Admiral Trost again, “In short, the Soviets are prepared to go to war in space, and we’re not. They’ve thought about it, they’ve developed a competitive strategy that exploits their advantages, they’ve procured the hardware to execute that strategy, they’re organized, and they’re getting better.”8
This is not to imply that there are not problems in the Soviet space program; there are. Earlier this year the highly publicized Probos-2 probe to Mars failed, reportedly because of a malfunction of an on-board computer. The Probos-1 probe to Mars was lost last year when an erroneous command was transmitted from the Soviet ground control center. There is said to be growing strife within the space program between scientists and engineers. One Soviet scientist characterized the design of the ill-fated Probos craft as
“an accident waiting to happen.
Many questions about the Soviet space efforts remain for U. S. military p'an ners. A key one is: What will be the in’ pact of the Gorbachev reforms and fense reductions on the space program- General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev himself may have answered it in 1987 when he visited Tyuratam on
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This unique collection of limited-edition lithographs commemorates significant events in U.S. naval, maritime, and aviation history. These p° are signed and numbered by the artist and co-signed by famous person who played key roles in the events depicted Each print is accompanic ■ a document of authenticity that provides a full description of the event, brief biographies of the signatories, and complete print specifications.
Third in the series:
High-Side Attack Over Leyte Gulf
By Ted Wilbur
This print depicts Cdr. David McCampbell and his wingman Ltjg. Roy Rushing as they maneuver their Hellcats into an attack position against formation of fortyjapanese fighters over Leyte Gulf on 24 October 17 McCampbell's nine confirmed kills set an American and Allied record the most enemy aircraft downed in one sortie.
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TED WILBUR is a naval aviator, combat artist, editor, and writer with more than thirty years experience. His illustrations and articles have appeared in numerous military and civilian magazines. His paintings hang in the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. and are part of the U.S. Navy’s permanent collection of art.
CAPTAIN DAVID McCAMPBELL, USN (Ret) became a naval aviator after graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1933. During World War II he scored thirty-four confirmed aerial victories and became the U.S. Navy’s leading ace. In addition to the Medal of Honor, Captain McCampbell’s decorations include the Navy Cross, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit and the Distinguished Flying Cross.
TO ORDER: Call Toll-Free: 1-800-233-8764 - or - in MD: 301-224-3378/9, 8 to 4 EST, Monday to Friday Customer Service (2190), U.S. Naval Institute, 2062 General’s Highway, Annapolis, Maryland 21401
'Adm. Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN, speech before ^ National Security Industrial Association, 20 -
1987' rNaval
[2]RAdm. Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director 01 ^
Intelligence, statement before the House Arme vices Committee, Congress, 22 February 1989-
[3]Trost, op. cit. . Afi
[4]See Capt. William D. O’Neil, USNR, “Winn111* ASW Technology Race,” U. S. Naval Institute ceedings, October 1988, pp. 86-88, 91. gcj.
[5]B. Nelepo, Member, Ukrainian Academy 0 ences, Izvestia, 29 July 1981. e.
[6]Capt. 1st Rank A. Partala, “Possibilities of based Radar Detection of Submarines,” M°r ' Sbornik, No. 8, 1985, p. 89. .
department of Defense, The Soviet Space Cha (Washington, D. C., November 1987), p- 9-
[8]Trost, op. cit. jgjjs
[9]Craig Covault, “Soviet Program Strife Th Mars Mission Plans,” Aviation Week & Space nology, 22 May 1989, p. 19.
[10]The Soviet Space Challenge, p. 4.