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‘repose special trust and confidence” in a com-
’'lissi,
■ There is no question about the proper path of action. The °I cadet training always prevails.” But is it that simple? t>erseS ke§m to creep in when respect for authority wanes. Mem- reSD 'he military are not alone in witnessing an erosion of Cw(ct 'or the authority vested in the civilian politician, either on Prof °lLIM or in the halls of the Pentagon. So, when the military f0r ®Ss’°nal comes to Washington he finds that the stage is set ratj00mething less than the full story. He turns to a variety of al]va es to justify a coloring of the truth—rationales that usu- p Pr°ve faulty.
sitjQr)example, consider a political appointee holding a key po- pr0c,n the Department of Defense. Suppose that during the lr(Jrr] ^ment process—which involves considerable pressure Wea he political world—the appointee concludes that a certain Ptopr°n *S ProPer f°r the military. Getting authorization and ap- quirelatecI funds from Congress to produce the weapon will refill wearmgs by at least four congressional committees. They assyr, 3nt t0 see a rnilitary officer in the witness chair, to receive W(iat |h.ces that the weapon is what the military really needs.
Hi|h »ln<I °f witness will the political appointee send to Capitol ■ ■ Not — • • • •
!nsti
Lying to Congress
^ Lying to Congress” became an often-raised charge during £ Iran-Contra investigation and its aftermath. The idea of an >cer resorting to the lie is especially onerous to members of the I'll' Particularly combat veterans. The lie puts in question a Co liamental °f the profession, the tenet of “special trust and ,l n *dence” discussed at length in these pages earlier. How can
e ^resident
>oned officer who will lie? n combat, the requirement to tell the truth is so essential that d0nL Relieve it is the most important aspect of any military in- fit^k'1131'00 Procram- L°r officer candidates, emphasis on integ- Pr h 6®'ns ear|y 'n tra‘n'n8- The reason is simple: In combat, ^ Pably more than in any other human endeavor, failure to c ?w 'he truth can lead to disasters of immense proportions. So a j et will neither “lie, cheat or steal” nor tolerate anyone who
S' h is hard to understand how any combat veteran would ever lie
ter^evertheless, lying to the Congress—like most political mat- ls not as clear-cut as telling a lie in combat. When military haCers enter the political world of Washington, D. C., they may "Tq6 3 Pr°hlem adjusting. The distinction between right and lje,,n^ soon becomes blurred. Is withholding part of the truth a 0f .. -’cs protecting the boss prevail over the personal scruples d- e Prospective liar? Will the consequences of the lie be more Pers^*0® t0 society thnn the consequences of the truth? Has the rig..011 or group to whom the lie is told earned the respect and gre$to hear the truth? Shouldn’t people lie to members of Con- Uct)ts;)s°me of whom allegedly lie to each other and their constit- lhanS *Sn t the lie, in some instances, a higher form of service ^ 'he truth?
lCar °st military professionals, particularly those who have is a 15*1 Jhe hard way, will say, “The truth is the truth, and a lie
cod,16' ean °If'ccr wIt° 's strongly opposed to the weapon; is^ ’ a witness who supports the appointee’s position. Now, really sending the true picture to Congress? Isn’t sending
such a “directed” position a form of lying? Isn’t this depriving Congress of full information—just as much as they were allegedly deprived of all the facts in the Iran-Contra case? And isn’t that a form of falsehood? If so, who is the liar? Is it the military witness or the civilian appointee who sent him to take the directed position? Furthermore, who will bear the ultimate responsibility for the consequences of the lie? Judging from recent history it certainly won’t be the political appointee.
Any military officer faces his toughest situation when he personally opposes the position of the administration, but is still placed in the witness chair to testify in support of it. If an astute member of a congressional committee decides to get at the truth by pushing for the personal opinion of the witness-—not the official directed position—the officer is in trouble. At that point, the military officer faces the strong possibility that his truthful views might terminate his usefulness to his civilian superiors in the executive branch. If he testifies against the directed position, he knows that news of that testimony will reach the office of his boss before he can return to his own office. And he cannot look to the legislators for support. Congress is not in any position to help, nor has it ever shown much evidence of wanting to. As the truism goes, “If you want a friend in Washington—buy a dog.”
The record contains many cases of officers who stood their ground in their beliefs, maintained high standards of integrity, and later found themselves on the way to the boondocks, in professional exile. Even retired status affords no protection from retaliation by civilian authorities. As long as the witness is receiving a check from the government, he remains vulnerable.
Ultimately, the witness bites the bullet in the way his experience has taught him to respond, and bears the consequences of his action. Basic tenets for the military profession dictate that the witness always opt against the lie, going down the drain if necessary, riding the tide of truth and waving the banner of special trust and confidence. But again, the pressures involved are unlike the clear-cut ones of combat.
Compromise is a political process. As political overtones creep into military situations, an atmosphere for something less than the truth develops. That is the situation the military professional faces when he enters the political arena. It is alien to the straightforward world from which he came—a world he is eventually tempted to compromise. If he does so with a lie, he has taken an amateur’s course of action and will find himself in trouble—at least with his conscience—in later life.
The ever-increasing numbers of political appointees holding positions of power in our national security system set the stage for more compromised positions, more coloring of the truth, and more lies—especially to Congress. But let us hope that the Iran- Contra debate will eventually help to reintroduce and reinforce the principle of special trust and confidence for the military, and that actions to improve ethical standards on Capitol Hill will result in more respect for the politician, especially from the military. That should bring about more truth and less falsehood, more light and less heat. Everything—even Iran-Contra—is good for something, if only to serve as a horrible example.
Admiral Miller saw combat in three wars. He also had some interesting experiences with testimony for congressional committees, both on active duty and in retirement. A Secretary of Defense once threatened his retired pay as a result of frank and full testimony before a committee.
13
tdlnRs / July 1989