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It’s time to end the expensive shell game being played on Capitol Hill with regard to the type of ballistic missiles the United States needs to maintain the strategic deterrent. Whether SSBN, silo, or railcar, the Navy’s Trident D-5 is ready, willing, and able to fill the bill.
Debate on Capitol Hill about the proposed Midgetman and Peacekeeper (MX) missile programs has yet to address one important budget option that could save the taxpayers a lot of money and provide true commonality for the nation’s missile force. The major question the lawmakers have yet to ask is: “How many types of strategic missiles should we build?’’ The answer favors the Navy, but the Navy has not even suggested it.
In our June 1986 Proceedings article “Trident and the Triad,” we contended that the strategic triad concept needed to be reconsidered. Although we concluded that the disadvantages of land-based missiles had increased both absolutely and relatively to other legs, particularly the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs generally, and, specifically, the Tridents), we suggested that if a land-based missile leg was nevertheless maintained, the nation still needed to decide on the types of missiles to constitute that leg.
It remains a mystery why the most commonsense solution has not been considered. Why not make the Trident II (D-5) a common missile for the Air Force’s land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems and the Trident SSBNs? Despite a recent test failure, the D-5 has experienced few glitches and the schedule still calls for it to be deployed on board the USS Tennessee (SSBN-734) later this year.1
The Ohio (SSBN-726)-class submarines carry 24 Trident I C-4 missiles, each with a range of 4,000+ nautical miles and a payload of eight 100-kiloton Mk-4 multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs), or a combination of warheads and decoys. These missiles can achieve even greater range by scaling down the payloads, and if greater “throw weight” is needed the eight warheads can be exchanged for fewer reentry vehicles carrying greater megatonnage. The Trident I replaced Poseidon C-3 missiles with 10-14 reentry vehicles of 50 kilotons, the number of vehicles depending on range. Thus, the Trident I represented an increase in submarine-launched ballistic-missile (SLBM) throw weight by 240-480 kilotons over the Poseidon missile it replaced. Even with the range and megatonnage improvements, the C-4 has a circular error probable (CEP)—or, loosely, “accuracy”—of fewer than 300 meters.2
All of these statistics will change drastically when the D-5 enters service. Officials originally pegged its range at 6,000+ nautical miles, but during the last two years advances in submarine quieting and survivability, especially with the advanced Tridents, have allowed the Navy to trade off some of the range it thought necessary for patrols in favor of less range with more megatonnage. The immediate effect of the Soviet acquisition of ultra-quiet submarine screws in the Toshiba-Kongsberg affair was not so much a curse to U. S. Navy SSBNs as it was a blessing t° the Soviet Navy’s. When the D-5 was in the planning stages, the Navy projected that the Soviets had made greater advances in antisubmarine warfare and sonar than they actually had. Consequently, the D-5 can carry 8-1 Mk-5 warheads of 150 kilotons, or 10—12 Mk-4/W-7 warheads of 100 kilotons each, or seven maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARVs) of 300 kilotons each. The Navy anticipates that all of this will be achieved with a CEP ° 120 meters or less. And the option remains to change the warhead mix to restore the 6,000-nautical mile range ca pability, which the missile will retain at all times given t e right payload.3
This final feature has been the most overlooked advantage of the D-5. With the potential to achieve 6,000 nauti cal miles in range and CEPs of 120 meters, for all intents and purposes the D-5 can generally match the Air Force s Minuteman II and III and approximate the performance o the MX. The Trident II can deliver 5,075 pounds of thro'' weight, compared to the Trident I’s 2,900. Combined wit the superior accuracy of the D-5, this throw weight advan tage gives it a true “silo-busting” capability.
Critics maintain that the accuracy and throw weigh makes the D-5 a “first-strike” weapon, which is a line o thought that assumes that the land-based missiles are incapable of being “first-strike” weapons. Still, there is some truth to the criticism, and in fact it becomes a truism- Any missile can be made accurate enough to be a ‘ S1 buster.” Consider that a perfectly accurate convention3 missile could take out a silo in the same manner as did tn bomb that sank the USS Arizona (BB-39) at Pearl Harl# (or of the type romanticized in Luke Sky walker’s drarnati single-handed attack on the Death Star in the movie Sta Wars”). The first-strike criticism, in essence, argues against all technological progress. But accuracy of weap^ ons will continue to improve, regardless of protest aga>ns such improvements.4
Nevertheless, the criticism says a great deal about o ICBM force. Why are our Minutemen no longer consi ered “silo busters?” For one reason, they are systemic3 > obsolescent. Assuming that the nation will ultimate y build and deploy a missile (such as the Midgetman) ot ^ than the 50 MXs it has decided to procure, we will ha gained little and possibly will have taken a step down wrong procurement road. Why?
The MX has an estimated range of 6,900 nautical mi ®‘ ' The D-5, downloaded, can nearly match this, and Navy has looked at improvements other than range cause it no longer considers the range issue as critical as did when D-5 design and planning began. There is vi ^ ally no target that will require the additional 900 miles range from the D-5. If such a need should develop, 1 ^ likely that the D-5 at sea could cover those particular ta gets. The MX’s warhead load includes 10-12 Mk-1 W-87 MIRVs of 340 kilotons each. With its MARV l°a ing, the D-5 is already scheduled to pack warhead reen chicles that are nearly as potent as those of the MX.
Thus, the MX offers minimal tradeoffs simply for the Purpose of maintaining an independent ICBM capability 0r the Air Force. On a dollar-for-dollar, missile-for- uhssile basis, the MX offers few, if any, advantages over the D-5. The costs will be far lower for the D-5, especially when the number of D-5s that the Navy already has to Procure for the submarines is taken into account, regardless of what the nation decides to do with the MX.5
Why are we deploying the MX when a Navy missile that the Navy is committed to build anyway can do the same job? In fact, the dimensions of the D-5—44 feet utgh and 83 inches in diameter—might make it possible to replace Minuteman missiles in their silos with D-5s. The Minuteman is 60 feet tall, but smaller in circumference— five to six feet; the MX is roughly the same diameter—92 tttches. Thus, D-5s could be substituted easily for the MXs, and with a minimum of redesign or adaptation they eould fit in Minuteman silos.
The proposed Midgetman missile, which reached a full- scale development decision in December 1986, is favored °y President George Bush in a mix with “rail garrison” MXs. As envisioned, the Midgetman was to have a range °1 7,000 nautical miles, necessitated by its mobility throughout the interior of the United States. Each Midgetman would carry one 250-kiloton warhead, but ^'ght have a CEP of almost twice that of the MX.
The Midgetman’s drawbacks are budgetary and conceptual. While the next 50 rail-mounted MXs will cost about $200-600 million, the 20-year life-cycle cost for a Midgetman mobile launcher system has been estimated to he $44 billion, making it almost as expensive as early Variations of the Carter administration’s MX.
Conceptually, the Midgetman is an orphan. It fits into n° long-range defense goal other than the Air Force’s de- Slre to obtain a missile. Proponents originally argued for j'Uiall missiles that could be moved around on truck-like punchers called “hard mobile launchers” (a strategic ver- S|°n of the Soviets’ SS-20). Proponents cited the lower c°st and claimed greater numbers could be built. On top of hese arguments, congressional moderates reportedly entered into a 1983 agreement to support the 50 MXs, which he Reagan administration badly wanted, in return for the ^ministration’s support of the Midgetman. If that is true, Resident Bush has kept his end of the so-called Scowcroft bargain.”6
Rut simply adding more missiles does not guarantee sUrvivability, and the Midgetman would be more vulnerable than any other missile now under consideration. Its ard mobile launchers might encourage the worst type of Preemptive strike—a barrage attack with blast effects to trv to render the launch vehicles useless, although the attack would have to be reasonably accurate. If the most effective dispersion methods are used, and Midgetman is sPread over an area of 28,000 square miles, the Soviets br’ght not have enough warheads to barrage the missiles effectively. But if the warning time were insufficient, the Whicles might cover only 4,000-8,000 square miles. °mpare either case with the number of warheads needed 0 barrage one Trident submarine using Trident I, with a
cruise operating area of 14.5 million square miles, which is 290,000 reentry vehicles, or a Trident II with a 6,000- nautical mile range and a cruise operating area of 42.5 million square miles, which is 850,000 reentry vehicles. The latter number is 50 times more than the known world inventory today. At any rate, the survivability of even the hardened vehicles has been questioned.7
If anything, our goal should be to encourage the Soviets to use fewer missiles more specifically placed. However, some contend that the Midgetman would enhance the uses of antiballistic missiles (ABMs)—but not the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Such ABMs could be used^to defend one sector of the Midgetman vehicles’ cruisins area, and not another. The Soviets would not know which area was unprotected. This would require a violation of the ABM Treaty, and while it would have advantages over a missile defense system designed to defend fixed"ICBMs (say, MXs), it would not have advantages over an SDI
defense, and, as suggested above, could invite unfocused barrage attacks instead of “funneled” attacks, which are more defensible.8
Obviously, the fewer nuclear impacts this continent is subjected to in the event of war, the better. Strategically, however, if the national direction is to pursue SDR even halfheartedly, then we should put our ICBMs in fixed silos that can be protected more easily by fewer SDI satellites. Recall, also, that an SDI-type defense network has a great advantage if windows of approach for enemy missiles can be identified and defensively targeted. This has obvious
budgetary advantages as well.1'
Life-cycle costs per warhead have been estimated at $28 million for the Trident submarine with Trident II missiles and $88 million for the Midgetman. If the cost per surviv- able warhead were used, these ratios would change drastically, because perhaps all of the Tridents would survive, but if only half of the Midgetman force survived, the figure for each Midgetman presumably would double. Even these numbers suggest, however, that if we need an ICBM, the D-5 placed in existing silos would be cheaper than the alternatives. Compared to 100 MXs in Minute- man silos, the D-5’s cost per warhead is $19 million, which does not take into account the economies of scale associated with the fact that most of the $28 million of the A D-5 missile’s cost reflects the cost of the Trident submarines.10
J$H The best place for the D-5 is at sea, and we can find no long-term convincing reason to retain the land-based leg of the strategic triad. Advances in submarine command, control, and communica- eSwHI l'ons as we^ as t*ie Potent'a' offered by cruise I missiles in a forward-based nuclear-powered attack submarine mode, for example, make most of the ICBM’s past advantages obsolete, fl For example, greater accuracy, once one of the B main advantages of ICBMs over SLBMs, has I all but disappeared. With the NavStar satellite I navigation system, submarines can pinpoint B their positions more accurately than ever be- I fore. Given the accuracy of fixing the firing location, the CEP of the missile, especially with in-flight adjustment, is guaranteed. Command and control, another past problem, is rapidly being reinforced by updated take charge and move out (TACAMO) aircraft, the emergency rocket communications system carried on each Trident, and the extremely low frequency transmitters in Wisconsin and Michigan. Blue-green laser transmitter tests begun in late 1987 have shown significant progress. In short, land-based missiles retain no relative advantages.
Another advantage of the D-5 concerns imminent overhauls scheduled for the Ohio- class boats. a In 1992, the Ohio, once pilloried in the press for “cost overruns,’’ launching delays, and scandalous ancestry at Electric
Boat, will begin hull-life extension and general overhaul. Her original suite of 24 Trident I missiles will be replaced with D-5s, and new launching cradles and firing mechanisms will be installed. Each of the Ohios carrying C-4s will be similarly transformed at a more or less annual rate. By the year 2000, the C-4s will be replaced by a total ot 192 D-5s. Only 12 earlier, non-Trident SSBNs will continue to carry (retrofitted) C-4s. In addition, most of the administration, research and development, planning engineering, and even production costs for the integrated program will have been paid out. This will be a significant accomplishment, especially in light of the accelerate retrofitting program. Beginning this program with the Tennessee rather than the Nebraska (SSBN-739) alone has saved about $680 million (1982 dollars).11
The deployment of 500 Midgetmen at 250 kilotons per warhead/reentry vehicle for $25-45 billion would m0^'„ ize about 250 megatons at a cost of approximately $9 million per mobile unit.12 Compare this with the Poseidon C-3 16-tube SSBNs and its 8-11 megatons (some C-3s were up-loaded), or the 24-tube Trident carrying C-4s with six Mk-4 100-kiloton warheads, or six Mk-500 Evader MARVS of 100 kilotons per SLBM, giving it 14.4-19-2 megatons. Each D-5-loaded Trident will deploy 25.2' 50.4 megatons if loaded with seven MIRVs of 150 kil° tons or 14 simpler MIRVs of 150 kilotons. Still a more potent loading could be attained with eight 300-kilot°n MIRVs, giving each Trident 57.6 megatons. Or, to make a final and even more direct comparison, if the D-5s were loaded with six to eight Mk-12A MIRVS of 475 kilotons each—the same warhead loaded in the MX and some Minuteman Ills—every Trident would then deploy 68. " 91.2 megatons.13
Therefore, beginning with the 1992 upgrade the ad • tional Trident flotilla will carry elevated loads of 201- • 403.2, 460.8, 547.2, or 729.6 megatons, depending °n the warhead mix in excess of what would have been on board had the Navy stayed with the C-4s. Viewed in tm way, the Midgetman’s addition to the firepower would c equal only the lowest level of the D-5 upgrade and no quite a third of the highest. Thus, the D-5 represents ' quantum leap over its naval predecessors and the yet-to be-deployed mobile land systems as well.14
But no system is perfect. The recent flight test failure ° a D-5 should remind us that caution and full testing jr^ required of any system. Indeed, the Tennessee will ser as a submersible laboratory until all of the minimal critem for the missile have been fulfilled. To be completely su^ cessful, the D-5 must achieve several improvements ove the C-4, many of which will make it the equal of the M • These must include operational capabilities such as:
► A higher level of gas-generator firing re 1 a ability for tube expulsion
► A higher level of fire availabd1. than the current 85 + %
► Improved expulsion capability 1 ensure deeper subsurface launches ^
► A more reliable rate of first-stage prime booster ignition, burn, and flight-path predictability ► Improved reliability for second- and third-stage per 0
__________________________________________________________________________ ___ A I?*9
U. S. Naval
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j^ance, including absolutely timely separation
* More accurate reentry vehicle/bus aiming capability ‘nan that of the C-4
£ A higher level of assured reentry vehicle release capacity, both as to individual reentry vehicles and in tandem . High levels of reentry vehicle fuzing and flight reliability following bus departure
* Improvements in reentry vehicle flight-path prediction and overall accuracy.
It is by these criteria that the MX and Midgetman must also conform, yet the Midgetman has nowhere near the development and testing that the D-5 has. A robust comparative test program need not delay the D-5; it will Merely make it more reliable. We have contented ourselves with the performance profiles from the C-4 and the Minuteman that were adequate for earlier generations of ‘fi'ssiles. But we must set higher operational standards for ‘heir successors. The D-5 can be that missile. The nation Can no longer afford multiple test programs for several variations of missiles when one missile can accomplish the ‘ask. Moreover, as compliance with SALT SSBN requirements progressively reduces the number of larger capabil- “y SSBNs at sea for the United States, the premium on comparative performance, accuracy, and reliability will ecome more crucial, as will, consequently, the corresPonding savings in personnel costs, systems diversity, and overall budget reduction.
More than 200 years ago, John Adams and Thomas efferson argued similar strategic issues. Adams favored a e'v powerful high-seas frigates. Jefferson advocated ‘‘‘any more small gunships, each armed with a single or °uble cannon. Adams argued for more and bigger cannon |'n bigger boats, or “more bang for the buck.” Adams’s eet sailed victoriously on the high seas; Jefferson’s gun- .°ats were sunk, abandoned, burned, or never deployed.
a budgetary sense, we now have a chance to refight that attle. How many types of strategic missiles should we udd? We have three missiles vying for the affections of e services and the lawmakers. We only need one, one at can do the job of all three. The Navy cannot apologize 0r having the most cost-effective and sensible weapon available for strategic purposes. We must build a common fissile—the D-5. The nation will get an effective weapon and save the country a lot of money.
. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, "Trident and the Triad,’ '•ute Proceedings, June 1986, pp. 73-"'
2See Dalgleish and Schweikart, “Trident and Credible Deterrence," in Stephen Cimbala, ed.. Challenges to Deterrence in the 1990s: Resources, Technology, and Policy (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 248-267.
’Ibid. Also see Walter Slocombc, "Why We Need Counterforce at Sea,” Arms Control Today, September 1985, pp. 10-12, and Robert Norris, “Counterforce at Sea: The Trident II Missile,” ibid., pp. 5-10; and Jonathan Medalia, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB73001, 27 June 1985.
4Norris, pp. 5-10; Harold Feineson and John Duffield, “Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat," International Security, Summer 1984, pp. 187-202’ Thomas Downey. “Against Trident II,” The New York Times, 11 February 1982; and William Arkin, “Sleight of Hand With Trident II," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 1984, pp. 5-6.
’Dalgleish and Schweikart, “Trident and the Triad.”
6“How Debate on the Fate of Midgetman Missile Shapes up in Congress,” Wall Street Journal. 4 March 1986, and Jonathan Medalia, “ ’Midgetman Small ICBM Issues Facing Congress in 1986,” Congressional Research Service, Report No. 86-58 F., p. 23. Another version of Mcdalia’s article appears as “Midgetman Small ICBM: Issue for Deterrence in the 1990s,” in Cimbala, ed., Challenges to Deterrence, pp. 225-247.
’Medalia, "Midgetman,” pp. 8-14 discusses these issues.
"See Dalgleish and Schweikart, “Trident and Credible Deterrence,” passim. Other budgetary material appears in Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984). A different approach to SDI is found in Dalgleish and Schweikart, "Why the Soviets Really Fear SDI,” National Defense December 1987, pp. 64-69.
^Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, p. 223.
U)Medalia, “Midgetman,” pp. 21-23.
"John F. Morton, “The U. S. Navy in 1988,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, p. 162; Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, pp. 117-118.
"Brian Green, “ICB Consensus?" Air Force Magazine, May 1989, p. 18; Medalia, “Midgetman Small ICBM," pp. 225-247.
"Jean Couhat, Bernard Prezlin, and A. D. Baker III, eds., Combat Fleets of the World, 1988/89 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 690; Norman Polmar. Ships and Aircraft of the V. S. Fleet (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 1987) nn 473, 486-488. '
14Combat Fleets, pp. 199-200, 207-208; and Dalgleish and Schweikart. Trident, pp. 310-319. There are inter-alliance arguments on behalf of the D-5 as well. Were not the 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs stationed in Europe relatively preferable as mobile missiles based in the continental United States? In light of the current Bonn-Washington-London conflict about the "triple O" modernization, were the strategic and political tradeoffs worthwhile, and were they cost effective (let alone necessary)? Finally, the British will also realize all the advantages of the D-5 in their own Trident program. Although there are important reasons to restructure the entire alliance so that the British—with or without French cooperation, but under multilateral control—might perform theater defense duties abandoned with the cruise missiles, Pershings, and possibly, the Lance, this article can only raise those questions. However, see James L. George, "The Triad After INF and START,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1988, pp. 112-119, and Dalgleish and Schweikart, Trident, pp. 321-326, for an analysis of the previous political history hereof and possible variations of institutionalization.
On i June Dr. Dalgleish became the first-ever civilian professor of military science; he is teaching national defense policy in the Army ROTC program at Arizona State University, where he previously taught political science. A Columbia University and University of Colorado graduate, as well as a Fulbright Scholar, he served in U. S. Army counterintelligence in West Germany. He is a previous Proceedings co-contributor with Mr. Schweikart.
Dr. Schweikart is an associate professor of history at the University of Dayton. Before receiving his PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 1984, he had two books published, the second being Trident, co-written by Mr. Dalgleish.
Win, Lose, or Draw
in the early 1970s I was stationed on board the USS Waddell (DDG-24) during refresher training (RefTra). Damage control drills were conducted constantly; all situations were simulated.
In the passageway outside sick bay, one of our boatswain’s mates was stopped by a chief from the RefTra team. The chief, using a piece of chalk, drew a large circle on the deck. Turning to the boatswain’s mate, he said, “Sailor, this is a simulated hole in the deck. What action do you take?” The sailor thought for a few seconds, took out his own piece of chalk, and drew two parallel lines through the center of the circle. Looking at the chief he said, “That’s a simulated board.” Taking care to stay within the two lines he calmly walked away.
Hospital Corpsman First Class T. M. Brown, U. S. Navy
h