Comment and Discussion

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Contents:

Hardware, Software, and Midwear Farewell to the SEALs

Women in the Brigade

Far From Sinking Our Navy

Losing Out on Carrier Radar Improvements

Tomorrow’s Fleet

Special Trust and Confidence

Decommissioning the Cape Fox

Pulled on Press—“African Navies South of the Sahara”

The Navy’s Final Frontier Fighting the PHMs A Word of Thanks

The Proceedings Puzzle Women on the Front Lines

The Naval Institute’s Annual Meeting June 1989 Proceedings Cover Sharpening the Sword of Orion No Quarter for Their Boomers West European and NATO Navies Remember the Diesel

Who Will Man the Merchant Ships? Retiring a Legend Women on the Front Lines

Carriers Sail On Battle Force ASW: M³

Bucher on the Pueblo

Personnel Puzzle

February 1989 Cover

“Hardware, Software, and Midwear”

(See K. Lamb, pp. 102-103, June 1989 Proceedings)

Commander Steven R. Ingram, U. S. Navy Commanding Officer, USS James Madison (SSBN-627)—I have no room in my ship for a junior officer who is ready for “real time decision making” as a re­sult of his “immersion in [your] total in­formation processing environment.” I want—in fact, need—leaders, warriors who I can train to fight the ship. Send no computer geeks to the submarine force!

Army or Marine Corps. Since, like the SEALs, A-6 Intruders frequently attack land targets, would Commander Pinney s next “Nobody asked me, but . . •” >^^ea be to transfer our carrier air wings to Air Force control? He shouldn’t be surprised why no one is asking him.

“Farewell to the SEALs”

(See T. Pinney, pp. 90-92, June 1989

Proceedings)

Lieutenant Seth Cropsey, U. S. Naval Reserve, Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy—In his haste to wave goodbye to the Navy’s sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, Lieutenant Commander Pinney also takes leave of the facts and logic. The legisla­tion that reorganized the U. S. Special Forces in 1986 left the relationships of theatre commanders-in-chief to SEALs, as well as to other special forces, intact. Thus, special warfare missions, such as laser target designation or direct action missions against the coastal early warn­ing or command-and-control sites of an enemy—missions that are vital to fleet commanders—remain under their opera­tional control.

Commander Pinney’s suggestion that “exclusive operational and administra­tive control [by] the Navy-Marine Corps team” should be a standard of military effectiveness creaks with age and ignores the reality of the unified command sys­tem the United States has lived with since 1947.

The politically shortsighted proposal to transfer the SEALs to another service would deprive the Navy of a key asset no one else can replicate; would do so de­spite the fleet’s requirement for deployed SEALs; and apparently, judging from the tone of his article, was offered in a snit because the span of naval control has been reduced.

Even less convincing is his argument that since SEAL missions are often di­rected toward targets on land, they would really be more properly conducted by the

Lieutenant Commander Bill McRaven, U. S. Navy—As a member of the U. S- Navy’s sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, I was appalled by Lieutenant Commander Pm^- ney’s article. The logic he uses to con­clude that SEALs should be assigned to the U. S. Army is fraught with error and misconception. Most notably, he fails to recognize that naval special warfare (NSW) encompasses much more than just SEALs. The SEAL delivery vehicle teams and special boat squadrons (wh*¹ their respective active-duty and reserve boat units) would both be difficult, if ^n0t impossible, to transition to the Army-

He correctly details the events leading to the creation of a unified commander for special operations (CinCSOC), telling how fragmented special operations forces (SOF), suffering from incompetence an bad organization, came under pun*¹ scrutiny. However, he neglects to men

tion that throughout the congressiona

investigation into the status of U. S. ^sP^e cial operations forces, the Navy SEAL were considered a model for other SOr- to emulate.

This came as no surprise to the SEAL because we work in support of the fl^eeI' NSW’s primary missions (amphibious operations, strike warfare, and maritime foreign internal defense) are directly h^e to support fleet combat operations. It^wa* this support that kept Navy SEALs we trained, well armed, and well financed by the Navy. It is also this support that i integral to the very nature of what Com mander Pinney calls “naval-oriemed sp^e cial operations.”       ,

Commander Pinney’s view of nava oriented SOF seems to be limited to un derwater demolitions in support of a amphibious ready group, a mission feels is “not a rational use of the ex ten sive, costly training that the Navy ha invested [in the SEALs].” What could ^ more rational than ensuring the success an amphibious landing force? We hav done this mission for more than 40 years-

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^and we take a great deal of pride in our ^ab'lity to reconnoiter the landing beach Successfully and direct the troops ashore. ⁰ suggest that explosive ordnance dis­posal (EOD) or Marine reconnaissance '^eams could do the mission overlooks the doctrinal responsibility of the Navy with J^espect to an amphibious landing and ^ails to appreciate the training necessary *° conduct this mission in wartime.

Also, there is more to naval-oriented OF than just amphibious landings. Can Pc Marines conduct sneak swimmer at- ^,acks against enemy shipping? Can EOD execute maritime sabotage? Who will ^elp communicate with the carrier battle &oups to provide “eyes-on” intelligence ^ar>d warning, battle damage assessment, ^and laser target designations for naval ^aircraft? ... the special-operations- ^Capable Marines? No! The Navy SEALs MU!

presence of SEALs on board Navy and submarines provides an in­special operations force capable .¹ conducting a wide variety of missions 'deluding coastal patrol and interdiction Beirut), amphibious operations (Gre- ^nac*^a), and special operations (central Mainland area of operations). This power ^Pr°jection is essential to conduct effec- ,^lve special operations in today’s low- ^,r|tensity environment. Were we to be- ^c°me entrenched in an “Army only” ^c°mmand whose logistic pipeline extends ^bnly as far as the shoreline, our ability to ^act to international crises would be se- ^ere*y diminished.

The Navy and its SEALs have a sym- fo°tic ^re'^at'^onship. To suggest that any ^rce could conduct maritime special operations without daily fleet training and Xercises shows lack of understanding of ^e basics of naval special warfare. And ? 'Uply that moving the SEALs to the ^rmy would simply involve relocating Personnel and equipment shows no ap­preciation for the SEAL himself. We ,^e the highest respect for the Army, its |ssion, and its capabilities. But we cined the Navy and that’s where this pAL intends to stay!

^aPtain Thomas N. Lawson, U. S. Navy, manding Officer, Naval Special ^arf^are    Center—Lieutenant                Com-

^ander Pinney has looked at the current °Uirnand and control (C²) structure for ^a-air-land (SEAL) teams; concluded at there are resulting problems; and °Posed a simplistic, easily understood, "h wrong answer.

Mis initial premise is that the nature of ,^Va* special warfare operations has auged, driving a revised C² structure.

Not so! Naval special warfare, like all other warfare communities, has re­sponded to the changing threat through­out the world and has developed new tac­tics and weapon systems to counter that threat. Operations in the Persian Gulf gave naval special warfare a chance to employ new tactics in support of fleet operations.

U. S. Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command (USCinCSOC) (currently Army) has command of all continental U. S. (CONUS)-based spe­cial operations forces (SOF), including naval special warfare forces. Just as all theater CinCs do, USCinCSOC exercises those responsibilities through his service component commanders. For naval SOF, that individual is Commander Naval Spe­cial Warfare command, who has opera­tional control of CONUS-based naval special warfare forces and administrative control of all naval special warfare forces. A Navy flag officer commands Navy forces in both fleet and joint special operations. He is a Navy echelon-two commander, directly responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for preparing forces to carry out the full spectrum of naval special warfare operations and for coordinating the theater CinCs to provide forces for operational taskings.

With the transfer of planning and bud­get execution authority for all SOF from the services to USCinCSOC starting with Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)-92, there are some unknowns— i.e., how will the funding flow, who will account to whom for expenditures, and what communications process will de­velop with service systems commands. Those areas will be worked out by rea­sonable people, with Navy influence and considerations.

Naval special warfare is a viable part of the Navy; it always has been and al­ways should be. An interservice transfer of the naval special warfare community to the Army solves nothing and would only create problems.

“Women in the Brigade”

(See K. M. Klein and J. E. Good, pp. 103­108, April 1988; M. Camilleri and J. J. Taipey, p. 22, July 1988; L. J. Hertzog and W. M. Triplett, p. 93, December 1988; M. H.

Smookler, p. 27, May 1989 Proceedings)

Yeoman Chief A. F. Sue Fischer, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I take exception to Se­nior Master Sergeant Smookler’s conclu­sion that “the U. S. Navy is neither ready for nor deserves women.” He obviously does not know about the long history of women of the Navy since 1908. The Navy has always had farseeing men who

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have placed the Navy at the forefront in the use of women in its forces: e.g., Navy Doctor William Paul Crillon Barton, who in 1811 recommended that the Navy en­roll female nurses; Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels who in 1916 authorized the enrollment of women in the Naval Reserve Force; Admirals Randall Jacobs and John H. Tower who in 1941 worked on the legislation to permit women to enter the Naval Reserve; Admirals Louis Denfield and Thomas R. Sprague, who in 1946 authorized the preparation of legis­lation for the appointment and enlistment of female personnel in the regular Navy and Marine Corps and their reserve com­ponents; and Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt who in 1972 paved the way for today’s Navy women. In World War II, for in­stance, the Navy would not settle for women as an auxiliary or separate corps as did the Army (Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps [WAACJ/Women’s Army Corps [WAC]) nor only as a civil service as in the case of the Army Air Corps pi­lots (Women’s Airforce Service Pilots). The Navy insisted that women—both officer and enlisted—would be fully inte­grated into offices, shops, and schools.

Sergeant Smookle'r’s frame of refer­ence is a service that was created after World War II; it does not have the 200- plus years of history and tradition (of which women are justly proud) that its sister services have. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Air Force was established, “comparing the WAF [Women in the Air Force] with the WAVES [Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service] became almost an obsession with Air Force leaders,” ac­cording to Major General Jeanne Holm, U. S. Air Force (Retired). That has to say something about the Navy’s integration of women.

The lack of history and tradition, as well as the absence of an older generation of active, reserve, and retired members, certainly allowed the Air Force to be more open to current and future develop­ments for its service, including the use of women. Nevertheless, Air Force women did not come to their present status with­out some conscience-raising among Air Force men. I would guess that there are no more “professional/military opportu­nities open to women in the Air Force” than there are in the Navy. There may be different kinds of opportunities, perhaps— but not more.

By and large, the articles and com­ments in Proceedings about the Navy women are evidence of well-thought-out, constructive criticism. Every profession, military and civilian, is composed of three basic groups of people: the few who, perceiving the signs of the times and becoming impatient to effect change, rush forward; the few who, ironbound m the status quo, see all change as threaten­ing; and the many who patiently build the foundations for the future of their organi­zations. The first group dreams of what might be and flies; the second group digs in its heels and clings to the ways ‘ we have always done it”; but the third group balances the two, slowly and solidly moving its organization forward by draw­ing the best from the daring of the f>^rst and the traditional approach of the sec­ond. How else did we reach the moon- As a retired Navy woman, who serve from 1951 to 1971, I can say that I was always treated as an equal by U. S. Navy and Royal Navy men—officers and en­listed. For career military men an women—both officers and enlisted—the key to equality is and should be profes­sionalism—keeping abreast of the need of the service and one’s specialty; under­standing the written and unwritten rules of the road; and acting with sincerity, honesty, and fidelity. The treatment we receive as professionals depends on tn way we perceive ourselves as profession als. It’s as simple as that!

“Far From Sinking Our Navy”

{See M. D. Goldberg, pp. 22-25, March 1^989;

A. K. Hayashida, pp. 29-33, May 1989

Proceedings)

J. David Brown, Head of Naval HistoP cal Branch, Ministry of Deft^lU ‘ ’ London—A Washington friend first dre my attention to Tom Clancy’s piece J The Washington Post. As an ancient a^via tor, my gut reaction was to disbelieve a J good of our upholstered drainpipe dwe ers. On reflection, though, I had to rec ognize that ozone-free, nonnoise-p⁰*¹^ ant, alcohol-friendly, and biographies ) degrading as we know them to be, tn 7 have upheld the honor of the White sign. But now Clancy had recognize them as tactical talismen, as well as ecu logical exemplars.

Commander Goldberg rightly ^rest°^rt\, the balance: Most of our submariners a less than gods, just as yours are not bn technocrats. But he went over the top- states that while the U. S. submafU “the capability to defeat any enemy l* order] to defeat our alliance,” “the d ish submarine force [only ?[ exists V. marily to defend Great Britain, ideas may have been stimulated by P^rl ’ but they are not accurate. Our boats g forth in the name of NATO and, while

Raters they patrol may be closer to Lon- aon than they are to Washington (though ⁿ°t to Holy Loch), the work is done as ^^uch for the protection of Luxembourg, Ottawa, and Reykjavik as it is for our °^Wn seat of government. Our full-time commitment and service on behalf of the alliance are second to none. We, and all he other navies, will be proud to have Commander Goldberg “on the team.”

ship’s midsection, from the 02 level to the second deck, and installed newly- constructed ship sections, one of which weighed 65 tons. Using replacement modules for ship repair was a natural for Ingalls, which pioneered modular con­struction in the United States 20 years ago.

“Battle Force ASW: M³”

‘Losing Out on Carrier Radar Improvements”

j^ee S. C. Truver, pp. 118-119, April 1989; C. Truver, pp. 30, June 1989 Proceedings)

Tomorrow’s Fleet”

(See S. C. Truver, pp. 302-318. May 1989 Proceedings)

Carriers Sail On”

(See D. J. Pay, pp. 57-61, June 1989

A,

oceedings)

0,

ennis F. Knecht Vice President ofPub- ^l< and Industrial Relations—We noted '°Ur outstanding May 1989 Naval Re- J?^eiv issue. However, a point made in ^c°tt Truver’s piece requires some clari- ^lea,*on. His discussion of repairs made ⁰ⁿ the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) ^slates that the effort “will see the first use replacement modules’ to repair entire ^ctions of the ship.” The accompanying Photo caption calls the work the “first- !p^Ver use” of such replacement modules. h‘^s is not the case.

_H during the restoration of the missile- ttaged USS Stark (FFG-31) in 1987­¹ Ingalls removed damaged areas of the

(See P. D. Voss, pp. 52-59, January 1989;

G. H. Montgomery, p. 25, March 1989; J. C. Mosier, J. H. Richards, and J. G. Stavridis, pp. 20-25, April 1989; W. J. Holland, p. 28, May 1989 Proceedings)

Commander Gerard M. Fuller, U. S. Navy—Commander Voss presents a thoughtful article on a subject of critical importance. Although there are some weak arguments, he does suggest some organizational changes that require fur­ther examination. I am fascinated with those young aviators who would become the antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC) watch officers for the carrier commanding officer (CO). It makes you wonder who will fly the missions and how the mandatory eight hours of daily crew rest will accommodate these new responsibilities. Another revelation oc­curs with the improvement in tactical communications, which naturally derives from getting the destroyer squadron (DesRon) out of the way. Commander Voss states that “ComDesRons [Com­manders Destroyer Squadrons] are sur­face warfare experts”; therefore, they should only be assigned as the antisurface warfare commander (ASUWC). Using that logic, the air warfare expert who commands the aircraft carrier remains the airfield manager. The nuclear-powered

newly constructed module was installed in the Stark to repair her Persian ^(,u|f damage

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attack submarine (SSN) skipper, who is the submarine expert, naturally becomes the battle-force ASWC.

But is the problem with the person in charge, or with the organizational con­cept itself? A cynic might argue that the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept has degenerated into a vehicle to provide every senior officer in the battle group or force with some authority be­yond his own ship, squadron, or wing. Responsibilities overlap, resources are jealously guarded, and the KISS (“Keep it simple, stupid”) principle is lost in the confusion. An objective observer might say that as war at sea has become more complex, we merely try to divide the problem into more manageable pieces. Either way, the result is the same.

The author recommends realigning the zones for ASW defense, and this point has merit. The Pacific Fleet (PacFlt) is leading the way in innovative ASW con­cepts. The PacFlt theater ASWC man­ages the ASW game by areas similar to those discussed. Maybe we should take the idea one step further. Commander Voss notes that the ASW zones do not

correspond with the zones for defense-m- depth in other warfare areas. Instead ot keeping our current air, subsurface, and surface orientation, we should match all of our zones, then align our battle force command organization with them.

I suggest in the outer zone we fight the outer air battle and attack surface ships and submarines with long-range missiles Depending on threat axis and the size the zone, more than one outer-zone com­mander might be required. The SQQ-°^yj equipped Ticonderoga (CG-47)-d^asS cruisers are candidates for outer-zone commander. The middle zone, which is the crossover point for the air battle, is ^a must-kill area for submarines. It becomes the area of concentration for the DesR°ⁿ commander. The inner zone comes unde the aircraft carrier CO’s control.

The U. S. Navy is famous for attempt ing to solve problems through reorgan^{[1] [2]} zation. In ASW our success will depen more on our technology and tactics than on our organization. Today, our surface ASW capabilities are improving. L°ⁿ^ range towed arrays and the other detec tion, processing, and display systems are revolutionizing ASW. We need to sustam our progress despite the austere fiscal c ¹ mate that we all foresee. ASW must m main our number-one priority.

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COMMISSIONED?

Decommissioning the Cape Fox

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take a drug test in front of a credible wit­ness, Admiral Nimitz probably would have gone to the head, not through the overhead.

Special Agent Edward J. L. Jex, Naval Investigative Service (NIS)—Similar questions concerning the integrity of an officer’s word have arisen in the law en­forcement profession, which also enjoys a “special trust and confidence.” Several points come to mind.

First, I am not aware of any proviso stating that once granted, this special trust and confidence cannot be tested. It may be comforting to think that offenses such as drug abuse can be rooted out of the officer corps by means that are less intrusive than testing, but I do not care for the alternatives. Testing the tissues of a pilot killed in a crash is not the time to discover that the officer had a drug prob­lem. Officers and enlisted personnel hold the lives of their shipmates in their hands. A high moral tone alone will not ensure the safety of those lives.

Second, both Summers and Heinl equate special trust and confidence with special privilege. While military and law enforcement officers deserve a good deal of respect, they cannot be held above the law. If anything, they should be held more accountable. If this accountability includes testing with urine samples and polygraphs, so be it.

Third, Summers and Heinl are obvi­ously concerned with the effect that re­quiring officers to prove their integrity will have on leadership. Many lead from a position of “superiority,” but ten years’ experience in federal law enforce­ment has led me to believe the best lead­ers lead by example.

Fourth, for those who agree with Sum­mers and Heinl that the officer corps should not be required to prove its integ­rity. I offer the sad news that the officer corps has itself to blame for its integrity being called into question. During my six years with the NIS, I have investigated officers ranging in grade from WOl to 0-10 for crimes including fraud, forgery, theft, extortion, rape, and espionage. In most of these cases there was enough evi­dence to convict the officer. Yet often lit­tle or no action was taken because the court martial of an officer would be detri­mental to the command’s morale. No doubt it helps morale when an enlisted member of the profession goes to prison for the same violation for which his divi­sion officer receives a nonpunitive letter. The officer corps must hold itself ac­countable for its actions in the strongest terms if it wishes special privilege to ac­company its special trust and confidence.

Ensign Arthur R. Thomas. U. S. Coast Guard—I think when all is said an done, the simple fact is that Lieutenant Unger received a lawful order from ^a superior and she failed to obey it- was in error. For anything meaningful to come out of this incident, she shorn have obeyed the order as countless other officers have done. She then could ha'^e worked out her problem through the chain of command. I doubt that a lieuten ant in the Navy would make much hea way changing this policy. But if it that important an issue to her, she cou have submitted her resignation and save herself and her service from this divisive issue.

tasked with drug enforcement and mili­tary operations.

The Cape Fox, commissioned on 22 August 1955, was home-ported in New London, Connecticut, until 1965, when she was moved to Rivera Beach, Florida. She has seized more than 250,000 pounds of marijuana and arrested 60 people for attempting to smuggle contraband into the southeastern United States. Other major seizures include the Miss Connie; the Ecopesca IV, which was carrying 35 tons of marijuana; and the Lyniv IV, car­rying 80 tons of marijuana. In the early 1980s the Cape Fox moved to Key West and continued drug interdiction, enforced fisheries laws, conducted surveillance off the coast of Grenada, and assisted ship­ping in the Gulf and Florida Straits.

Showing the flexibility the Coast Guard is famous for, the cutter was often assigned unique tasks such as providing security for the USS Key West (SSBN- 722) during her visit to Key West, assist­ing the Environmental Protection Agency with the infamous tug break of dawn and the New York garbage barge, and con­ducting aids to navigation support.

The Cape Fox and the other 95-footers are being replaced by the 110-foot Island- class patrol boats. The Cape Fox now will be transferred to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.

Pulled on Press—“African Navies South of the Sahara”

(See p. 5, March 1989 Proceedings)

Moskow

From; Colonel S. I Wodka, Special De­partment 5-A To: Chief, KGB

1.    Honored to report concernink cen­sored section “African Navies South of the Sahara,” March Proceedings, "pulled on press per security review.”

2.     It most puzzlink. Suggest you direct Cultural Attache for Sweetness and Light in Washington D.C. to arrange hackink of appropriate computer for pulled arti­cle, to answer following:

►  Who has navy south of Sahara we not knowink about? What Yankees tryink to hide?

►  Has dictator of Equatorial Guinea in­creased flotilla from 120 to 175 canoes? Did we sell used gunboat September Purge to Congo, financed by Soviet loan at 42% reduced to 5% if boat insured by Lloyds?

►  Is Bourkina Fasso havink navy? Is that why USNI magazine censored? If so, we cannot sell another leaky gunboat there, start arms race between Bourkina Fasso and Niger. Now, only ships south of Sa­hara are “ships of desert”—camels. Please don’t hit on head with champagne

bottle to launchink.

We will get this information. Still lack of security in U. S. Still U. S. citizens sellink secrets for money. Still big reli­ance on computers for storink and trans­mission of secret informations. Yankees never hear of transmitting high secret in­formations by protected couriers. Too lazy, hung up on electronic gadgets. Not sly bears. Our problem is still absorbing all informations we get.

James Hugh Powers ■

“The Navy’s Final Frontier”

(See A. Skolnick, pp. 28-35. January 1989.

G. B. Thamm, p. 31, March 1989; A. Skolnick.

p. 29. June 1989 Proceedings)

Captain John Lacouture, U. S. Navy (R^e~ tired)—One could say that 20-25% jj the U. S. Navy’s current combat capabi - ities depend on satellites. This takes into account inputs from the extremely accu­rate space-based global positioning navi gational systems into the navigation ⁰ ships, planes, submarines, and missiles- the complete dependency of the Navy ^0,1 space-based communication satellites t worldwide command, control, and com munications; information from weather satellites that portray worldwide weather conditions for tactical operational an

Planning purposes; and, perhaps most of ^a data from current and future recon­naissance satellites in both defensive and offensive combat operations.

Yet although it receives more of its oombat capabilities from space systems Pan the other services, the Navy contrib­^utes fewer funds to space-based projects Pan any space-user government agen- ^Cles> civilian or military. Worse still, ig­noring all examples from history, the '/^avy has so far abdicated to the Air ^0rce a chance to have an equal role in banned military capabilities in space.

Today the primary threats to the sur- ^ace Navy’s existence in war are enemy ^reconaissance satellites that can accu­^rately locate and target our naval forces "Pfh a continuous barrage of long-range bruise missiles and ballistic missiles. "^ese missiles, equipped with explosive fixtures similar to those the United fates used in Vietnam and the Soviets ^rePortedly used in Afghanistan, could "Ppe out all topside weapons, planes, ^antennae, and personnel.

The U. S. Navy urgently needs to ^Ct)^uip its ships with the capability to see and target low-flying reconnaissance sat­^e ntes and ballistic missiles and with the JjNuired weapons to destroy these feats, which would be especially preva­in places such as the Norwegian Sea.

In addition, the Navy must be prepared to spend additional funds to defend and replace vital U. S. satellites. Defen­sively, this can be accomplished both passively and actively; weapons from ei­ther surface ships or manned or un­manned space vehicles could provide ac­tive defense. Moreover, the Navy should be able to launch satellites, either from some of its ballistic missile submarines and/or from specially configured ships or planes.

As time marches on, space will change from a locale for combat support systems to a locale for offensive and defensive military war-fighting vehicles. The Air Force already realizes this and has as­sumed the mission of controlling and operating all space combat systems, start­ing with the country’s only antisatellite program, which is launched from the F-15 airplane, the Strategic Defense Initi­ative space-based vehicles, and its aero­space plane. Even within the Air Force, it has taken years for that service to con­sider space as a mission whose impor­tance requires a commitment equivalent to that given the Supreme Allied Com­mand (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Military Airlift Command (MAC). Much credit for this policy switch can be given to recent Air Force Secretary Edward C. Aldridge.

General Larry D. Welch, Air Force Chief of Staff, has set forth the following claims for the importance of the military control of space: “Spacepower will be as decisive in future combat as airpower is today,” and “we must be prepared for the evolution of spacepower from combat support to the full spectrum of military capabilities.” Furthermore, all Air Force operations from the various unions, SAC, TAC, and MAC, have agreed on this new policy, even though the money required to implement it will mean that they will have to defer or cancel some of their im­portant future programs.

In the meantime, the Navy, the current prime user of space systems, with re­quirements for controlling space over the world’s oceans, must itself program and fund space programs to ensure this con­trol. Top Navy leaders should put their money behind their words. They should call in the heads of the other major Navy components—air, submarines, surface, and Marine Corps—and get them to ac­knowledge and agree to the urgent need for establishing a core Navy space mis­sion, equivalent in importance to their own and with a constituency leader. They must agree to this need even though the money needed to implement the space mission will require the unions to reduce forces and defer or cancel some of their

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envisioned programs.

In preparation of this, the Chief of Naval Operations should put together a high-level policy team with space-experi­enced representation to establish what missions the Navy should accomplish in space and what hardware and funds would be required—to determine the roles of space in the Navy and the Navy in space.

Once agreement on objectives and costs has been established within the Navy, the Navy should take its case to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to gain approval of Navy require­ments for space war-fighting missions and capabilities. This will undoubtedly be a bitter battle, since the Air Force has decreed space missions, especially war­fighting missions, to be solely its turf. But the Navy cannot permit this to hap­pen and must be accorded its own very important war-fighting role in space.

“Fighting the PHMs”

(See M. E. Butcher, pp. 104-107, April 1989 Proceedings)

Jan Paul Hope—It continues to amaze me that our naval officers expend so much intellectual capital and taxpayer resources on PHMs. Lieutenant Com­mander Butcher would spend even more scarce resources adding an advance base ship in an attempt to make PHMs useful, and outlines an 11-step tactical method for PHM operations in antisurface choke point control.

Of course a more effective and less costly tactical method for antisurface choke point control would be embodied in Commander Butcher’s first step if it were changed to read: “Reconnaissance aircraft would detect, identify, and local­ize contacts, and then would fire Har­poons at these targets” (emphasis added). This would eliminate the need for the following ten steps, the six PHMs, their logistics base, and an advance base ship. We could buy more maritime patrol aircraft with the money we save by elimi­nating the PHMs. We all have seen the pictures of the Long-range Air ASW- capable Aircraft (LRAACA) armed with a dozen Harpoons—not to mention the June Proceedings cover.

Maritime patrol aircraft can fly a 500- mile strike mission in slightly more than an hour compared to ten or more hours for PHMs. A P-3 or future LRAACA could fly a 1,500-mile strike in less than five hours. PHMs cannot reach 1,500 miles without slowing down and refuel­ing twice from replenishment ships. After an antisurface strike, a P-3 or a LRAACA can be reconfigured for antisubmarine warfare for the long-term campaign against submarines. PHMs cannot be re­configured for anything, and after a>^r power has eliminated the surface targets in the first few hours, the single-mission PHMs will have nothing to do.

PHMs cost too much for their limited naval warfare capability. We should gi^ve them to the Coast Guard for antidrug op­erations or scrap them.

“A Word of Thanks”

(See C. Britc, p. 65, January 1989 Proceedings)

Philip E. Prinz, Sr.—My son had the good fortune of serving in the U. S. Navy from October 1984 until December 1989-

While on board the USS Marvin Shields (FF-1066) he called home from Australia and invited me to join him on a “tiger cruise” from Honolulu to the ship’s home port of San Diego. Having served in the U. S. Army and being al­most totally ignorant of seagoing ways, accepted his invitation somewhat app^re' hensively.

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I now count that experience as one of *ne highlights of my life. The time spent °ⁿ board was an experience that any par- ^eflt would enjoy totally. We were allowed participate in ship's activities and were

instructions on all phases of the orvin Shield's operation. I was even flowed to stand watch with my son.

I can well imagine the inconvenience paused to the ship’s company by having b civilians on board. Nevertheless, j\^Vcryone was friendly and helpful. The Navy gained firm supporters in me and . others who participated, and will con- jnue to get a high rate of return on its 'ivestment in tiger cruises.

‘Bucher on the Pueblo”

[See L. M. Bucher, pp. 38-39, February 1989 ^M- Karcher, p. 20, April 1989; P. R. ^chratz, p. 76, July 1989 Proceedings)

P^eu>enant Michael J. O’Donnell, U. S. °ast Guard Reserve, Commanding Offi- ^(</ CGRU Vessel New Castle—The re­^Cent series of articles in both Proceedings ^ald Naval History on the environment events surrounding the seizure of the _t ^Ueblo (AGER-2) illustrate the greatest ^rror that a junior commander can have; ^at he can do his best but still be sacri- ^1Ced to “political” expediency. The oral istory recollections of the admirals, Published in the Fall 1988 issue of Naval ‘story, demonstrate a remarkable de- “^ree of finger-pointing and an operative jUirimand philosophy of “It wasn’t my _o^ault!” From my view, near the bottom ⁽he command totem pole, these efforts ⁰ tot inspire my confidence in the se- ^l0rs whose orders I must follow.

. ¹ appreciate your giving Commander °yd M. Bucher, U. S. Navy (Retired), _r^r°tiinent space in both periodicals to ^•^sp°nd to the admirals’ remarks. I tUldn’t help noticing in the original re­spective that no one seemed to have _c °^ught about interviewing the on-scene ^tmander about what went on 20 years H° ^°^{U t0} ^'^{m t0}  himself,

j the admirals far away, comfortable l flag quarters, were sought out to ^^rumph that Commander Bucher was Jl^nt'ⁿg in the qualities expected of an I^U-’er _ancj commanding officer of the

pjTh^c fictitious Lieutenant Commander tjj ‘"'P F- Queeg is, in the popular mind, _c ^e archetype of the ineffective ship’s Utmanding officer. And yet, in the . ^Urt-martial sequence of The Caine (Herman Wouk, Annapolis, MD: _CQ^ayal Institute Press, 1987) the defense tinsel avers in his summation, “. . . no ^an who rises to command of a United

States naval ship can possibly be a cow­ard. And . . . therefore if he commits questionable acts under fire the explana­tion must lie elsewhere.”

The admirals are careful to avoid the word “coward,” yet the totality of the series of interviews suggests this unthink­able term applies properly to Commander Bucher. But to what degree are the givers of orders accountable for the results of those orders? And what sort of leadership philosophy will arise from the instinct for the rather self-serving career preservation that seems so typical— and so proper?

I am privileged to command a highly dedicated, thoroughly competent, and widely respected group of sailors, and I am confident that my superiors would not squander that resource through either venality or cynicism. But I suspect Com­mander Bucher felt the same about his crew and his superiors. My subordinates, officer and enlisted, are tremendously motivated, and my job as commanding officer is to guide, channel, and encour­age that motivation. I want to believe that my commanders view me the same way.

But your oral-history retrospective has introduced doubt in the integrity of the givers of orders, raised by those very of­ficers who issued the commands. I sup­pose my unease could easily be written off to the fact that I don’t have the big picture (lieutenants are, almost by defini­tion, little-picture officers). But I keep thinking of a bitter observation by a vet­eran of a soggy foxhole in Southeast Asia, an ironic comment on Douglas MacArthur’s farewell speech: “Old sol­diers never die . . . but young ones do!”

I came away from the series of interviews with the strong sense that the admirals did not understand the hazards of Com­mander Bucher’s job—and frankly didn’t much care. Admiral John J. Hyland’s ingenuous comment that “I don’t know what ... the Soviets do about the trawler that’s right off Norfolk. . . .The Pueblo had an identical role working for us” suggests some sort of gentleman’s agreement about the role—and toler­ance—of intelligence-gathering ships. And perhaps it works at the U. S.-Soviet level. But North Korea doesn’t care about such niceties. And what is worse, the one glaring fact that everyone seems to ignore in the post-season quarterbacking of our preparedness is that they got away with it! The North Koreans still have the ship. We did not retaliate. They gave up noth­ing and absolutely humiliated the United States. The U. S. reaction, with the Navy in the lead, was a total wimp-out, except to find the scapegoat sacrifices necessary to appease the gods of flag selection boards.

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“The Proceedings Puzzle”

(See J. A. Hickey, p. 142, April 1989 Proceedings)

W. F. Brill—This correspondence in no way is intended to fault this puzzle, since it was restricted to 42 clues and served its purpose of providing fun for Proceedings puzzle solvers.

I just wanted to inform you of the addi­tional enjoyment 1 received by discover­ing a few additional ships’ names.

Bell (DD-587) Camp (DE-251) Case (DD-370) Deede (DE-263) Defiance (PG-95) Downes (FF-1070) Drew (APA-162) Goss (DE-444) Hamlin (AV-15)

“Women on the Front Lines”

(See B. J, Coyle, pp. 37-40, April 1989; M. E.

Nelson, R. H. Brubaker, and T. P. Gallagher,

pp. 24-26, July 1989 Proceedings)

Lieutenant J. B. Yodzis, U. S. Navy, Ex­change Officer, Ecole Naval, Brest, France—I don’t argue with Commander Coyle’s assertion that the combat exclu­sion rule for women needs to be changed. It should be changed—but in a way that would clarify the current limits and keep women from serving in positions where their presence will be a liability.

There are a number of good reasons, many of which have been argued in Pro­ceedings, that support this view. The most critical one is a point that Com­mander Coyle concedes—the disparity in physical capabilities between the sexes. In combat (the only valid context for this discussion) ships will suffer battle dam­age. Strength, endurance, and speed are needed to save the ship and shipmates. Both can survive or be lost by a margin of seconds. In this regard, the relative phys­ical weakness of most women is no trivial matter. A woman possesses about 60% of a man’s strength—a potentially decisive difference. Suppose, for example, the crew of the Stark (FFG-31) had been 40% weaker. Anyone who saw pictures of that ship’s exhausted damage control teams on the fantail can easily visualize that dif­ference causing another monument to be sitting on the bottom of the Persian Gulf- In pointing out that there are some men who are weaker than some women, Com­mander Coyle makes a good point i you believe that two wrongs make a right. Proponents of an expanded combat role for women often employ such an equation. Instead of compounding the problem, let’s get those weak men into the weight rooms or into jobs where their lack of strength is of no consequence- In determining fitness tests for specific billets, experience shows that politics will dictate standards. For example, f'^re departments found few female appli^cants who could pass the test of draggiⁿ§ weighted dummies a certain distance within a specified number of seconds- So, the test was promptly declared to be sexist and the standard was lowere ■ Common sense tells me that this may b^e costing lives today.

The stakes for the armed forces are even greater than for fire departments, combat, even a close second is dead las • A role for women in combat decrease our collective capability and shorn > therefore, be avoided.

(Continued on page

78)

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Comment and Discussion

(Continued from page 34)

The Naval Institute’s Annual Meeting

Lieutenant William S. Ramshaw, U. S. Navy—I recently attended the Naval In­stitute’s Annual Meeting in Monterey, California. It made me realize that I am more than just someone who sends in his membership dues once a year and re­ceives a magazine in the mail. As a direct result of attending the Annual Meeting, I feel that I am truly a part of a real organi­zation that has a viable purpose and pro­vides a valuable service to its profes­sional members.

Since attending the Annual Meeting, I have been strongly recommending to my friends that they attend at least one Naval Institute function, to meet some of the professional staff. It was helpful for me to realize that the backbone of the Naval Institute is comprised of its active mem­bers—people who come from all parts of the country.

June 1989 Proceedings Cover

“Sharpening the Sword of Orion”

(See J. F. Roscoe and D. L. Hall, pp. 93-95, June 1989 Proceedings)

Rear Admiral W. R. Smedberg IV, U. S. Navy (Retired)—The authors make a seemingly compelling case for adding some defensive and survivability capabil-

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ities to the P-3C Orion. What we so often forget, however, is that nothing comes for free. The “P-3C Orion” sidebar that accompanies the article aptly defines the P-3C’s mission: ‘‘detect, classify, local­ize, track, and destroy enemy high- performance submarines.” These func­tions are listed in order of priority. The fact is that today’s P-3C cannot even de­tect submarines. Surely nine out of ten antisubmarine warfare sorties by P-3Cs occur only after another system, such as the integrated undersea surveillance sys­tem (IUSS) accomplishes the initial de­tection and classification. Then the P-3C follows up to localize, track, and, in war­time, destroy. The situation is getting worse. With the IUSS system losing its ability to detect quiet submarines, the P-3Cs (as well as tomorrows Update IVs and Long-range Air ASW-capable Air­craft [LRAACA]) will have even fewer cues to fly on.

So before we devote a lot of effort to “Sharpening the Sword of Orion,” we’d better make sure it has a sword to begin with. If there are some extra dollars, weight, and volume available, I’d devote them to providing the Orion with some basic detection effectiveness—i.e., a pri­mary mission capability—before worry­ing about such survivability measures as the authors suggest.

William T. Brockman—Commander Ros­coe and Lieutenant Hall make a persua­sive case for providing greater firepower for the P-3 Orion and follow-on P-7. I am somewhat confused, however, by the essay’s accompanying photo and caption and the issue’s cover. Both show an Orion looking very mean, indeed, with Harpoons, Sidewinders, and (on the cover) a gravity bomb. The professional

note recommends a Sidewinder capability but makes no mention of a current one.

Were the photos of the well-arme Orion taken at some sort of trial, or does a Sidewinder capability now exist? Sue a capability would certainly give pause to

a potential attacker.

Editor’s Note: The intimidating Ora’¹¹ pictured in our June issue is the on . Navy P-3 to brandish such a battle dress The aircraft, painted in the new ^tac,,La^ grey color scheme, hails from the r Department of the Force Warfare A‘^r craft Test of the Naval Air Test Cente • NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. P^^ol.°f. rapher Mark Meyer captured the J^[3]‘ loaded, combat-ready Orion on 30 N vember 1988 during tests evaluating < Sidewinder as a defensive weapon J patrol aircraft. VP-8 in Bruns^^,c ^ Maine, helped with the weapons lootl‘> depicted in the photos. Lieutenants Warlick and Dave Wagner piloted Orion. Commander Pete Patrick ^sen^_st as mission commander. The weapons ■ platform successfully launched a 3“ winder for the first time on 4 Novein 1988. That launch is pictured here.

*7

“No Quarter for Their Boome^rS

(See J. L. Byron, pp. 49-52, April 1989. C Carver, pp. 24-28, June 1989 Proceedings)

Commander Michael C. West,₍ Navy—I was stunned to read: So , strategic ASW [antisubmarine war a

against U. S. SSBNs [nuclear-power

fleet ballistic-missile submarine], ' _g ever, merits little attention because ⁰            .

superior ability of U. S. SSBNs ¹⁰ lyj . . . and avoid inferior Soviet A forces.” How can this be?        _rjvy

I am not a submariner, nor am I P

Remembering the Diesel”

(See R. T. Ackley, pp. 96-100, July 1989

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^to the inside scoop on the relative merits (and hence vulnerabilities) of U. S. ver­sus Soviet submarines. I have, however, jollowed the Walker, Toshiba, and K°ngsberg fiascos as closely as open sources allow. I also wonder if Captain “yron read the recent article in The Washington Post describing encounters between U. S. and Soviet submarines. On the U. S. boats the first indication was sound of receding propeller noises.

Putting the relative merits of U. S. and soviet submarines aside, it is patently foolish to dismiss the abilities of one’s f°es or potential foes. I'm sure Rome ^sfept soundly with the knowledge that all 'hose warm-weather pachyderms could ^never make it over the Alps!

“West European and NATO Navies”

(See N. Friedman, pp. 130-141, March 1989 Proceedings)

Captain John J. Hyland III, U. S. Navy ^u- S. Naval Attache, Paris—1 would like *° compliment you on the 1989 Intema- honal Navies issue and to correct an error ^ln the discussion of the French Navy. On page 134 the statement "The entire ^rench SSBN [nuclear-powered ballistic- 'jUssile submarine) force is stationed in b^e Gironde estuary. . .” is not correct.

entire French SSBN force is, in fact, ^s'ationed at the lie Longue SSBN base ^near Brest. ^{[4] I,}

developing this technology? Can we af­ford to allow other nations to take the lead in the technology and capabilities inherent in conventional submarines? The answer to all of these questions must be an emphatic “No!”

The U. S. maritime strategy outlined in 1986 by Admiral James D. Watkins, then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), does not mention diesel submarines. The world situation has changed since that strategy was made public, but Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, the current CNO, is not changing the direction of the subma­rine force.

The nuclear-powered submarine is a powerful weapon that is useful for super­power conflicts. While we must maintain its capabilities, many missions do not require them. The submarine force can be even more versatile by building a more economical diesel-powered submarine.

The tighter defense budget will inevi­tably lead to cuts in the number of Navy ships, aircraft, and men. Diesel subma­rines can fill the gaps created by these cuts and offer a more flexible response in a crisis. Congress recently authorized building the Seawolf (SSN-21) for more than $700 million, which will give the Navy the most capable submarine ever built. That is the baseline cost and more units should drive the cost down, but the cost will again increase with optional items and improvements developed be­fore actual construction. Just how many SSN-21s Congress will fund is unknown.

Diesel submarines are less costly; for example, the West German TR-1700 costs about $200 million. A U. S. Navy design would cost roughly the same and provide at least three highly capable sub­marines for the cost of one SSN-21. Die­sel submarines require fewer personnel (about 35 vice 125), and intensive nu­clear training would not be required. The cost of replacing diesel submarines in time of conflict would be less than that for replacing nuclear submarines, as would be the political ramifications of losing a diesel submarine in peace or in war.

The diesel subs would conduct some of the tasks now assigned to aircraft and sur­face ships, and would supplement nuclear submarines and their missions. Diesel submarines would be forward deployed close to where they will inevitably be needed, which will obviate long, slow transit times. Small diesel submarines would be perfect in the reconnaissance and surveillance role. Forward deployed, they would provide a new choke point weapon that does not require extensive manpower or resources to keep on sta­tion. The larger diesel submarines would (~

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also replace some of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces from the surface and air communities tasked with patrol­ling choke points and defending foreign ports. Aircraft are not nearly as effective at choke point patrol as submarines, and aircraft patrols are more manpower­intensive. In addition, the ability of the U. S. Navy to deal with the smaller na­vies in the Western Hemisphere would be greatly increased by using locally based diesel submarines.

The idea of the submarine as a war­fighting machine is being overshadowed by the supposed need for more speed. Submarine officers gladly acknowledge the need for speed, but will also sacrifice speed for stealth. And diesel submarines are inherently quieter than their nuclear counterparts.

The United States has not built a diesel since the launch of the USS Bonefish (SS-582) in November 1958. Given the advancement of technology in submarine quieting and sonar capabilities since then, a diesel submarine built by the United States now would be extremely capable. Renewing U. S. research and develop­ment of diesel submarine technology will not only provide us and our allies with better diesel submarines, it will enhance the capabilities of our nuclear-powered submarines.

The three remaining U. S. diesel sub­marines will soon be retired after more than 30 years of service. Now is the time to start building replacements.

“Who Will Man the Merchant Ships?”

(See E. J. Higgins, pp. 34-37, February 1989, E. J. Bender,"p. 100, April 1989 Proceedings)

Petty Officer First Class Antonis Pauaqiotareas, Hellenic Navy—Com­mander Higgins correctly states that by the year 2000 the shortfall of mariners would increase to 12,000. The merchant marine industry is an important force to the commerce and defense of any nation- Nevertheless, the U. S. Merchant Marine has been declining ever since World Wa 11. To improve this situation two things must change: the training of merchan mariners and the job opportunities.

The way to attract young men an women is to diversify their education a both the officer and rating levels. The merchant marine officer should be a sea man as well as an engineer, a shippm® executive, or a scientist. Similarly, m rating should also be double-skilled.

I propose that the U. S. Merchant Ma fine Academy and the six state-run man time academies be kept open, their fun

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I ■ ■ ■ ■

t 1989

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|ⁿg and staff increased, and their facilities ■mproved. 1 also suggest that there be re­search centers and a think tank in engi­neering, operational, and scientific mat­ters within or near the academies.

Furthermore, the curriculum of the neck officers should be diversified. They jnust graduate double-trained. At the Texas Maritime College (which I at­tended) business and science courses are ^available to the deck officers who gradu- ^a[e with a marine transportation, marine science, or marine biology degree. The academies should expand these courses and offer degrees or specialties in port °Perations and management, ship broker­age, maritime law, pleasure boat broker­age and operations, oceanography, off­shore drilling operations, etc. These °PP°rtunities would increase the job op- t'ons of graduates and provide the indus­^try with a better trained staff.

Also, job opportunities for marine en- 8'neers are much better since they are also mechanical engineers. This degree ^Can be improved by adding courses, if Possible, to include naval architecture, ocean engineering, electrical and elec- ^tr°nics engineering, etc. Similarly, rat- 'Ogs in merchant ships must diversify 'heir skills. It is to the benefit of the ship­yards and the marine industrial services ⁰ employ such people and use their tech- "'cal experience.

fob security is a main factor that dis­courages young people from entering this Profession; therefore it must increase. A ^arge number of merchant mariners drift ^r°^m company to company looking for ^ernployrnent. The maritime industry must p^Se these people when they are ashore. ^0r example, it would be ideal for a sea­man to work on board a ship four to six jjjonths per year and then be employed in he shipping company’s office or as an ^extra hand during dry dockings. This also _f^W°uld give someone else the opportunity ⁰ Work on board a ship.

In regard to job opportunities, the lue-water U. S. merchant fleet must j^Pand. This has not been happening ^ecause of the high cost of paying an all- ^erican crew. To remedy the situation, a partly foreign crew would greatly re- ^Uce the operating cost of a U. S. vessel ^and increase its competitiveness. (It is not ^e Point to suggest in what percentage or ^0ri what positions foreign seamen could ^replace Americans.) We must never for-

that the prime mission of a merchant hip is for the owner to make a profit by Unsporting goods from one location to

another.

Also, it is well known that the U. S. jajerchant fleet is old. Ships must be re­P aced with modem, diesel-powered, automated vessels. A healthy and ex­panded blue-water fleet will provide the jobs desperately needed. It will also pro­vide the kind of ships that military plan­ners want. The ships will be ready when­ever the country needs them.

The decline of U. S. merchant ships since World War II was caused by the government and the unions because they refused to adjust to the prevailing eco­nomic conditions. For example, Western

European ships continue to sail despite high costs of living. This is because Eu­ropeans build their ships in Far East yards, part of their crews are foreign, most of their ships are new, and they have the facilities to provide the support and knowledge they need. In addition, they have the support of their govern­ments. This is what the United States lacks. It should reconsider its policy soon before the problem becomes worse.

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bringing, much less as an active

“Who Will Man The Merchant Ships?”

(See E. J. Higgins, pp. 34-37, February 1989;

E. J. Bender, p. 100, April 1989 Proceedings)

Captain Robert W. Kesteloot, U. S. Navy (Retired), former director Strategic Sea­lift Division in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and study director of the Transportation Institute’s manpower study—As the originator of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) Breakout command post exercises (CPX), I share Com­mander Higgins’s skepticism that man­power for the full activation of the RRF is adequate and ready. There are several reasons this does not appear to be so, however. The lack of personal contact with the individuals whose names were provided by the unions to the general agents as available and ready is one. Another are forces competing for the same manpower in a real-world scenario.

History shows that when world ten­sions rise and we provide military and economic aid to our allies, shipping re­quirements rise early. But until commer­cially available shipping proves to be in­adequate, or until the President declares a national emergency, the RRF will not be activated. As demand for U. S. bottoms to carry military cargo rises, cargo rates will increase accordingly. This will cause ship operators to activate their own laid- up ships, which will reduce the man­power pool upon which the activation of the RRF relies.

At the time of Breakout 1985 (an Octo­ber exercise involving 74 RRF ships), the Maritime Administration (MarAd) rec­ords show that 98 of the 491 privately owned ships in the U. S. fleet were inac­tive. Because of the age of ships in the inactive fleet at that time, an average crew size probably would have been about 40 crew members. That means that 3,920 mariners probably would have been drawn from the seafaring manpower pool before the RRF was ever ordered into activation. How very different the results of the Breakout 85 CPX would have been if we had been smart enough at the time to realize that our manpower pool was depleted before we ever started.

We must revise the scenarios for future Breakout CPXs. We should assume that demand (and cargo rates) have caused the reactivation of inactive, privately owned ships and the manpower pool has de­creased accordingly. To achieve any va­lidity in the exercise, unions and general agents must participate. Attempts to con­tact individual mariners must be made. Then we will see what sort of a commu­nication problem exists! Incidentally, the statement that “the principal lesson learned from Breakout 85 was the need for improved communications” referred to communications between MarAd, the activation sites, and, to a lesser degree, the general agents. This problem was solved by the rather simple and relatively inexpensive solution of buying a number of facsimile machines. Although the un­ions maintain accurate files on active mariners, this communication problem pales in comparison with the difficulty of contacting thousands of inactive mariners who may not have sailed for years and whose personal data files may be woe­fully outdated.

The latest goal for the size of the RRF is to have 142 ships by 1992, consisting of 104 dry cargo ships, 36 product tank­ers, and two troop ships. This further exacerbates the problem. On the other hand, there are currently fewer inactive ships in the private sector; MarAd listed only 37 as of August 1988, the time of the latest available data. The reason is clear; most were either sold into the RRF or scrapped.

But numbers alone do not tell the story. In reality, the total numbers have been fairly static and most changes have been in status and, most importantly, in types and sizes in the private fleet.

U. S. Oceangoing Merchant Marine (Privately Owned)

October August 1985  1988

The numbers in the table do not show an increase of 1.5 million deadweight tons in the active fleet, nor do they reflect the decrease in crew size of about 15 crew members per ship in the new addi­tions. These reductions have been ac­complished by newer, but more auto­mated, ships of greater capacity and a willingness on the part of the maritime unions to reduce crew size. The net result is a further reduction in the mariner man­power pool.

The proper course of action at this point is to reduce the size of the RRF. In 1984, the goal for the size of the RRF was set at 77 ships (61 dry cargo and 16 tankers). At the time it was stressed that this was only an interim solution to the strategic sealift problem. The govern­ment acknowledged that the long-term solution relied on a return of the United States merchant fleet to a robust status able to serve as a naval auxiliary in time of war. Since then, the RRF goal has in­creased in successive steps from 77 to 116, to 136, and finally, to 142 in 1992- All the time, the manpower pool has been shrinking. If we cannot man the ships, then we should dispose of the older and less militarily useful ones.

The proper answer is that we must have a strong Merchant Marine. If J* takes subsidies, then we should subsi­dize. The relatively few dollars required, estimated to be two to three billion dol­lars a year, are highly leveraged dollars because they would permit us to execute our forward defense strategy for which we pay one hundred times that amount in our annual defense budget. The need f°^r an RRF of some size will probably exist for a long time because there are specia types of ships needed that will probably never exist in our commercial fl^eet' These include roll-on/roll-off ships, crane ships, offshore petroleum discharge ships, fleet replenishment ships and, p^er" haps, troop ships. With the exception o these specialized type ships, we shorn return reliance in our ability to execute the forward defense strategy back ^tl’ where it has historically resided—in th^e U. S. Merchant Marine.

“Retiring a Legend”

(See J. F. Lehman, pp. 60-64, January 1989.

F. Duncan, pp. 94-100, April 1989 Proceeds’

Lieutenant Commander Mark A. Hiigh^eS' U. S. Navy (Retired)—Ns a former mem­ber of the “military priestly order’ ^re ferred to by former political appointee’ John Lehman in his shrill and reckless grave dance/self-inflicted backslappmg- feel compelled to speak briefly, if I m^ay' for another former member who regretw bly is otherwise unable to respond:

“Sir, 1 may be dead, but I find it vast y preferable to be a dead patriot than a l'^vC piss-ant.”

Speaking for myself, I am incredulous that Mr. Lehman, didn’t learn in his up naval officer, to show a modicum of ^{1 e} respect due to Admiral Rickover.

I too spent a bit of time with the adm¹ ral in 1981, and frankly agree that tn® most accomplished man was due for ^xe. tirement. But while it is one thing to dutt fully, albeit forcefully, retire a moⁿ|^ mental workhorse, it is quite another thump one’s hollow chest about it P^u licly. Such behavior is not only ^se demeaning but downright embarrassing especially because Lehman waited un the admiral’s death to publish such men less gossip.   -

“Women on the Front Lines”

(See B. J. Coyle, pp. 37-40, April 1989 Proceedings)

“Personnel Puzzle”

(See C. H. Becraft, pp. 41-44, April 1989 Proceedings)

Robert J. Keevers—For the first time in ^1,1 y memory Proceedings published arti­^cles with a “him and hers” linkage. But what are they really saying? And who has ^a fair chance to say it? Only a few active- duty officers have both the time and incli­nation to oppose “progress.” The fash- ¹⁰ⁿ is to arrive at the “right” answer— Quality for women in the services. To ^Say otherwise is to risk career damage. It ^Seems not to matter that the issues at hand should not be judged by an applause [Ueter or a popular referendum. Nor does ¹¹ seem to matter that the combat role for Women so ardently sought is not em­braced by likely foes or combat-tested ^allies. Who really knows best and what do they say?

Commander Coyle’s second sentence states, “The Navy’s goal should be to assign women to any billet for which they Qualify and volunteer.” Let me assume ^lhe statement relates to a prime personnel 8°al, not the actual mission of the Navy. Now return to the first sentence: “It is ⁿ°w time for the Navy to try to have overturned the law that excludes women ^,rom combat and combat-related assign­ments.” Now jump to the companion ar- bcle’s first page, third column, under the Caption, “Combat Exclusion Laws and Policies.” Ms. Becraft states, “There is ⁿ° U. S. law that prevents women from serving in combat. There are, however, statutory provisions. ...” Something dere is disingenuous. The issue is not one °f unplanned or unavoidable combat, but of forging naval units designed to win. Note also the inequality that attends Women’s participation. Their role is vol­Untary. And the term “qualified” is a o°pout. Women need not be highly quali- ied or as qualified as men, merely qualified.” And the assured presence of ^a few men to help with physical chores surely wouldn’t jeopardize “equal pay °r equal work.”

The authors actually make telling Points, but with camouflage. Point one is he recognition of a declining pool of males. Point two finds the performance °f women, in peacetime, after adjust­ments, “on a par” with men. Does it fol- °w that the basic problem cited calls for ornogenized composition of combat Units? If winning wars is the issue, I can htnk of no better prescription for defeat ^and no more abject surrender to igno- ranee. The ideological views of the mili­tant feminists should not be allowed to dominate the pragmatic views of those most knowledgeable about winning wars. Note, for example, that “although VQ-3 is part of the nuclear strike forces, it was somehow designated as noncombat duty, so women could be assigned to it. ” What motivated this happenstance? A shortage of males? Commander Coyle concedes that “peacetime operations are an imper­fect indicator” but does not hesitate to label former Secretary of the Navy James Webb’s judgment on this issue an “ab­surdity.”

Throughout both articles there is men­tion of “resistance” to the enlighten­ment, which service secretaries and Con­gress have had to overcome. The reasons for this resistance are not enumerated. Instead we are advised to adjust to a changing culture. But do our enemies understand this? Or are they simply smil­ing? I find it curious that the Marine Corps earns the label of “most tradition bound” as the foot-dragger in all of this. Someone should recall that tradition is intimately intertwined with victory.

We are told that women should not be denied the opportunity to serve their country in combat. We should ask if these same women have assured themselves that combat would be their most effective contribution. If experienced commanders disagree with the fashion setters, there are at least three explanations:

► The military men are biased and there­fore inadvertently in error.

►  They are unpatriotic and deliberately shunning a military advantage.

►  They are right.

February 1989 Cover

Richard L. Corrin, Jr., Chicago Council of the Navy League—I believe you owe the membership of the Naval Institute more than a small paragraph of informa­tion about the subject of your cover on the February Proceedings. I had the plea­sure of meeting Commander Tony Wat­son in February 1988 when I visited his submarine, the USS Jacksonville (SSN- 699). Even though it was his day off the ship, Commander Watson came on board to visit with us.

Commander Watson is a real role model in Chicago. He grew up in one of the worst housing projects in the city. He is a product of the Chicago public schools, which are rated by some as the worst in the country. The Chicago Trib­une did a front-page story on Tony Wat­son in its 2 July 1989 Sunday feature sec­tion. Tony Watson shows what you can achieve when you work for it.

Tbank you for giving. Again and again.

tStJpl American Red Cross

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