This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
in r^Cre *las ^een considerable debate Canada and elsewhere concerning e Canadian government’s proposal to ^ obstruct up to 12 nuclear-powered at. submarines. Groups ranging from ^ntinuclear activists and socialist politics through the submarine community 0 die U. S. Navy have openly criticized the idea.
d proponents of the program suc- ^eed, the Canadian Forces will acquire , aIe-of-the-art submarines and bottom- used sonar systems. If the opposition Prevails or taxpayers balk at funding e submarine program, then Canada must find an alternative mechanism for Protecting Arctic waters from the intru- °ns of Soviet submarines. In addition, anada will have to find ways to exer- |J'Se its sovereignty over the Arctic ar- Uipelago using a combination of politi- al>. legal, economic, scientific, uitary, and quasi-military means. If anada alone cannot muster a credible uderwater naval capability to protect e Arctic Ocean surface and subsur
face, it will be forced to do so in cooperation with friendly nations.
Canada has relied on collective defensive arrangements since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defense Command nearly 40 years ago. There are other bilateral agreements between Canada and the United States.
In the Arctic Ocean region of immediate concern to Canada, four nations, excluding the Soviet Union, have legitimate interests. Canada has archipelagic lands, waters, and air space. The land is sparsely populated by an aboriginal people whose historic life-style must be protected. There is increasing economic activity in the area based on petroleum and mineral resources. There are also scientific, environmental, navigation, and security issues that require governmental action.
The United States has similar interests in Alaska, and Denmark bears such responsibilities in Greenland. The British have deployed nuclear-powered submarines to the North Pole, revealing their intent to protect the North Atlantic sea lines of communications from a flanking operation through Arctic waters by Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. There is also the matter of an ice-covered bastion for the Soviets’ submarine-launched ballistic-missile forces.
NATO should counter the use of the ice-covered Arctic waters by the Soviet Union or any other hostile party by forming an Arctic naval command to be based in northern Canada or northwestern Greenland. The tasks of the command would include surveillance and patrols of surface and subsurface areas where opposing force submarines are likely to operate. The command would also install, operate, and maintain a bottom-based sonar system, as well as the necessary command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities.
The NATO Arctic command would be responsible for operations north of latitude 60°, from longitude 40° east to 160° west and up to the North Pole.
All participating nations would contribute staff to the command headquarters on a rotating basis. The operational assets would include a mixed squadron of nuclear-powered and conventional attack submarines. The U. S. and Royal navies would contribute the nuclear-powered submarines; the navies of Canada, Britain, and Denmark could contribute the conventional boats to operate in the area’s ice-free choke points. Four or five submarines could conduct summer operations, while only nuclear-powered units would be used during the other seasons in peacetime. The individual submarines would not be mixed-manned because of differences in operating procedures and national security concerns. The bottom- based sonar unit could be staffed by a mixed crew drawn from the four navies.
The command would also need a fixed-wing maritime patrol squadron drawn from Canada, the United States, and Britain. Each nation could contribute one or two aircraft detachments and appropriate logistics on rotation. Search-and-rescue services would be tasked to specific nations, while national support units would meet logistics and maintenance requirements.
An Arctic NATO command would close a major gap in the NATO maritime defense system for the North Atlantic. The command structure and assigned forces would be state-of-the-art, and with experience, the tactical capabilities would reach a high level of readiness. The command would not threaten Canadian sovereignty and would honor the legitimate pursuits of the four participants. This is not a revolutionary proposal; it follows precedents long embodied in the NATO command structure, the standing naval forces in the Atlantic and the English Channel, and the airborne waming- and-control fleet. A NATO naval command in this region clearly would be preferable to the status quo. It would give the Western nations a means of responding coherently to a sophisticated opponent prepared to use the Arctic Ocean to further security and political goals antithetical to their own.
Colonel Wentzell is a lawyer practicing in Comer Brook, Newfoundland, and the reserve deputy commander of the Newfoundland Militia district headquarters. He is a previous contributor to Proceedings.
Pr
feedings / April 1989
53