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Over the years, an emphasis on procurement and logistics has spawned a businessman’s approach to military affairs, accompanied by an entrepreneurial code of ethics. A code of military ethics is needed to preserve the principles upon which our armed forces were founded.
The U. S. armed forces have been invaded by business ethics. The adoption of entrepreneurial practices at the expense of traditional military values has proved disastrous.
This process began during World War II when General George C. Marshall was the Army’s chief of staff. In his book To Serve with Honor, Richard Gabriel explains:
“Faced with the necessity of pulling together the multiple centers of economic and social power to fight the conflict on a grand scale, Marshall turned to the only model available to him which had some experience in the field of organization and was consistent with the values of democracy and free enterprise—the embryonic business corporation.”1
Prior to World War II, the military was a closed society. Interaction between the civilian populace and the armed forces was limited because of the military’s relatively inconsequential role in the political-social order and the small number of standing regular forces. The lack of broadcast media also contributed to this “ideal” setting. At that time the military was similar to a “church or priesthood with a morality and ethics of its own.”2 The traditional “duty, honor, country” was a sufficient statement of the code of ethics for a professional military where most of the officers were educated at the two service academies.
World War II saw a 30-fold increase in the size of the armed forces. The need to organize these forces and to draw all our war-fighting resources together caused us to look to industry. This organizational expertise undoubtedly enabled us to persevere and ultimately mobilize our nation in the face of imminent disaster. But this was no without long-range costs. President Dwight D. Eisenho"' er’s farewell warning of the “military-industrial c0111 plex” foreshadowed more subtle changes than we have realized.
The new demands of the nuclear age and the appare^ success of corporations, or the entrepreneurial approach t efficiency, was manifested in the rise of systems analyslS’ which took firm root in the military.3
In the postwar years, the United States maintained an expanded military establishment. In addition, the reduc tions that did occur were temporary. A large cadre of0 society was placed in military reserves that were to ans'f the call again in five years. The war years had inextrica ; linked the military and society. The services could n longer support their ranks with professional career solclie and professionally educated officers. Obligatory mihta > service drew many liberally educated individuals from a areas of society and regions of the country into a care they might never have considered otherwise.
From a war-fighting perspective, the adoption of ma[o entrepreneurial practices, values, and ethics has been ru'a ous. Nowhere was this more evident than in Vietnam- an attempt to provide all its officers with combat com mand, the Army, as a rule, rotated officers out of urm after six months, while troops served 12. In addition, minimize replacement costs, the military adopted a Pr° gram that fed individuals, rather than units, into the r2 placement stream.” This practice was modeled after t automobile industry’s system of replacing spare parts- former auto executive, Secretary of Defense Robert M Namara had made his impact on the military.
The Impact of “Business As Usual’’: In Vietnam, 1 ® institutional ideal failed, not the members. Regardless the “fraggings” and refusals to fight headlined in 1 press, as well as the lack of resolve on the part of I*1 government and the civilian population, the overwhelming majority of troops in Vietnam sought to maintain the perception of the military ideal.
The increasing specialization and division of lay within our technological society is paralleled in the mi* tary where managerial expertise is glorified at the expense
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of heroism and leadership. Yet the indicators of success for managers are often the biggest detractors from leadership and the common good in the military. Take, for example, the requirement to report unit readiness. Commanders often feel obligated to report inflated readiness levels for their units in tune with the philosophy of their superiors. This need to be in line with the rest of the units detracts from a commander’s personal integrity as well as the unit’s efficiency. If the commander reports readiness correctly the unit might receive the personnel or supplies it needs to enhance operational readiness. Instead, the troops are required to work additional hours with insufficient assets in order to bring readiness closer to the level the commander reported; this way they will ensure that his reputation does not suffer compared to his contemporaries’. What of the commander who takes over an “ailing” unit (undoubtedly left that way by the preceding commander who nonetheless was able to make himself look outstanding) and attempts to work it into an efficient organization? Unauthorized absence rates and the public mistakes of the subordinate officers (while the commander attempts to train them) can lead to poor marks for the new commander if evaluated in a business-oriented, managerial fashion.4 But which style of leadership should the profession espouse philosophically?
People often use the term “careerism” in a negative sense when referring to the U. S. military. Most often, they are referring to the officer who goes along with the system to get ahead. Promotion is the measure of success in the military. Without it, one cannot continue to function in the profession. Frequently, officers interpret this requirement as an end in itself. Thus, they see putting selfinterest ahead of the general interest as the safest way to ensure continued employment.
One danger of this philosophy is the conservatism and the acceptance of institutional norms at the expense of liberal thought that have stifled the military over the years. This conservatism can impact on professional competence. In his book The Best and The Brightest, David Hal- berstam cites the example of General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Wheeler agreed with President Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the reserves during the Vietnam conflict even though it was public knowledge that General Wheeler thought mobilization was imperative to invoke the national will and to preclude the “partial commitment” he feared most.5 If the general or flag officer, who has the least to lose, is swayed by the institutional conservatism, what real hope exists for the young officer with innovative ideas and aspirations for the profession?
“Self-Interest”—The Value of Business: Business ethics in our free enterprise system are dictated by cost-effectiveness which, in turn, is directed solely toward making the largest profit. At best, the businessman’s pursuit of self-interest subscribes to the theory of situational ethics, which means that an individual judges ethical behavior exclusively in terms of information and knowledge available at that moment. No ethical precept acts as a reference point. In the worst case, this system negates ethics in that the highest value is given to the pursuit of self-interest- The presumption is that this pursuit will conglomerate int° common interests and values at the corporate level. Over the years, the military has institutionalized this concept o business ethics.
Values and Ethics: The military’s institutionalization 0 business ethics has left the armed forces with no set 0 ethics at all. Rather, it has nurtured the entrepreneur^ spirit of “every man for himself.” Military men an women, the officer corps in particular, see themselves as professionals in the same sense as lawyers, doctors, arj teachers. A large number of officers and men probaby still see the “profession of arms” as a vocation, similar *0 cer, I often used this analogy when discussing program* with prospective candidates. And they frequently returns from training saying that the commitment to the officer corps was more closely akin to a vocation than a busings* career. Apparently, we still are able to inspire our officef candidates with that sense of selflessness. But perhaps* over time, the reality of the institution erodes this zealmeaningful code of ethics is needed to preclude a profeS sional malaise in the military.
The ethics of our society, and in particular the businesS community, are certainly influenced by political and e°° nomic factors. Yet society expects the military to maintam itself as a treasury of the more traditional national value (e.g., service and sacrifice to preserve and maintain 0 democratic way of life).
If the military is truly to be this treasury of values, itlS
important to understand the concept of moral values an ethics. In Beyond the Battlefield (Pergamon Press, 1981/’ Sam Sarkesian states these philosophical concepts:
“Moral values derive from culturally based propos1 tions or generalizations about what befits or does no befit the behavior of human beings . . . moral value* make up what we are as persons . . . failure here |S drastic, not just unfortunate. Ethics is, in part, the behavior expected of individuals to conform to these culturally based guidelines. Ethics also presumes that indi- V|duals seek enlightenment. . . and critically examine their behavior in that light.”6
This definition of values and ethics illustrates the need o develop a set of military ethics. Our allegiance to the °nstitution of the United States should make it clear that We are sworn to uphold the common good. The maintenance of those cultural values does not allow for entrepreneurial self-interest.
Members of the military claim to be members of a pro- ^ssion, and most civilians see the military as a profession. et the military profession is set apart from that of a doc- 0r or a lawyer by its lack of a unique code of ethics a§ainst which members can measure their own performance. The willingness to make the ‘‘supreme sacrifice” 1,1 the defense of our country is noble and must not be minimized. The traditional values of ‘‘duty, honor, coun- jJT ’ remain a noble concept as well. But in a world that as grown up in a more self-interested perspective, these jmphemisrns provide little guidance in doing the right mug in selfless defense of the common good.
Elements of a Code of Ethics: Individuals do not enter a Profession from an ethical vacuum. The same applies to 6e military. Recruits and officer candidates bring to the military sets of personal ethics they have developed over Peir entire lives. The cultural values of American society ave perpetuated such concepts as the importance of life, equal justice, and freedom of expression. The military, through its members, develops the root of its beliefs and attitudes from within the social-political system. In spite of its inherent authoritarian nature, the U. S. military is supportive of democratic values.
One argument against the adoption of a code of ethics would be that it must be specific in order to meet all possible circumstances. This argument confuses ethics with law. Ethics give the individual a choice. Law, on the other hand, prescribes obedience to a rule and removes the choice. The law of the military says that we must obey the legal orders of superiors. A code of ethics would provide guidance about the moral manner in which to carry out the law; it would reinforce the idea that good purposes cannot be carried out by ethically dubious means.7
The basis for a code of ethics has existed within the military in various forms for years. Numerous documents, such as the enlistment oath, an officer’s commission, the Code of Conduct, and the Secretary of the Navy’s Standards of Conduct, have alluded to various ethical norms for military officers and men. However, these do not provide a single repository of our ethical standards, nor do they provide for review under a code. Rather, the military relies on the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to punish offenders of the codified military law, and on the fitness report to weed out those individuals who do not measure up to its interpretation of virtue within the profession of arms.
than 200 years without one. The argument over ways a code would be enforced is not easily resolved. Undoubtedly, if the military adopted a code, the UCMJ would require review and revision to codify the law, in view of the potential repercussions of breaching a code of ethics. Officers and staff noncommissioned officers could summon professional boards of review to deal with reported infractions. Violations of a code of ethics are not violation of law, but they indicate that an individual has discarded some of the moral obligation that he or she accepted upon appointment.
The armed forces must move away from the institutionalized practice of entrepreneurial ethics, to preserve the principles upon which they were organized. No one person can postulate a code of ethics for a profession; any potential code must be drawn from the national ethic embodied in each of us.
'Richard A. Gabriel, To Serve With Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics an Way of the Soldier (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 60.
2Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield (New York: Pergamon Press, 198 ■ 205.
’Ibid, p. 206. . . |
4MGen Clay T. Buckingham, USA, “Ethics and the Senior Officer: Institute Tensions,” Parameters, Vol XV, No. 3, p. 26. -j),
’David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1 - pp. 599-600.
6Sarkesian, Beyond the , p. 201.
’Eugene Hillman, C.S.Sp., “Military Duty and Moral Scruple,” America, 3 c ber 1987, p. 193.
Major Buckingham, a Marine Corps pilot, is currently assigned to G-l, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Prior to that, he attended the Cana 1 Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto. His other duty static have included Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)-24 at MCAS Kane° Bay, Hawaii; offtcer-in-charge. Officer Selection Office, Boston, sachusetts; and MAG-26, MCAS New River, North Carolina.
“General, have you ever
of
General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) was a man of awesome credentials. Not the least 0 these was his ability to spellbind an audience, whether it consisted of one or 1,000 mestner*2 listeners. I first heard him in Melbourne, Australia, in March, 1942, at an off-the-record Pre
conference following his escape from Corregidor, in the Philippines. After two hours of listening^
the Greatest Man in the World (of the moment), an Australian reporter said, “If that man is as g° as I think he is, God help the Japs.”
MacArthur was conspicuously lacking in one quality: humor. Nowhere in the MacArt speeches (which, absent the orotund delivery, don’t bear up well under the test of time) can one t< anything approaching the light touch of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s little-dog-Fala speech, or Ad Stevenson’s opening line in his speech to the Alfalfa Club after his crushing defeat in the preside ^ tial election of 1952: “A funny thing happened to me on the way to the White House
Late in life MacArthur discovered self-parody, and found it to his liking. As far as I know, he first used it in a speech at his
82nd
birthday party, a black-tie gathering of his comrades from the Southwest Pacific days, which was held annually in New Tor' Waldorf-Astoria hotel. The previous summer the general had returned to the Philippines, scene of his greatest glory, in a special pm provided by President John F. Kennedy. Robert M. White II, a liaison officer in Brisbane in 1942-44, now a Missouri newspapL editor and publisher, gave me this account of MacArthur’s speech, including the indicated pauses he used so effectively:
“When that great jet airplane . . . taxied to a stop . . . there at the Manila airport . . . they stretched out before me a red carp and ... at the foot of that carpet was the most beautiful . . . Filipina . . . girl ... I ever saw.
“I never felt younger ... as she put a garland of flowers . . . around my neck . . . and kissed my cheek . . . and said ■ ■ ' ‘Welcome to the Philippines.’ And then suddenly ... all the years of Methuselah . . . settled on my shoulders ... as she aduc
. . . ‘Have you ever been here before?
Evidently General MacArthur liked this response to his opening lines because, ten months later, he tailored them to a m auspicious—and public—occasion: his reception of the highest honor, the Sylvanus Thayer Medal, bestowed by the U. S. Mi*lta” Academy, from which he had graduated at the top of the Class of 1903. MacArthur’s ties to West Point were the stuff of history- ‘
had been the superintendent, 1919-1922. He had listened to the Army-Navy game via short-wave radio at the height of his
war
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against Japan. He kept up a correspondence with West Point football coaches, and he knew the names, weights, and talents ot1 players 40, 50 years after he graduated.
The voice had an old man’s rasp—he was 23 months from his death bed—but he poured the accumulated emotion of his 83 yea into what may be remembered as his finest speech. Again, he opened on a light note: I
“As I was leaving the hotel this morning ... a doorman asked me . . . ‘Where are you bound for, General?’ and when replied, ‘West Point,’ ... he remarked . . . ‘Beautiful place. Have you ever been there before?”’ ,
The spontaneous roar of the Corps of Cadets is recorded on tapes obtainable at the MacArthur Library in Norfolk. The idLa A few weeks ago I was talking to a friend, a respected historian, about MacArthur’s fascination with self-parody. He called a N ^ days later, and said, “It’s nothing new. Look on page 72 of MacArthur’s autobiography.” Sure enough, MacArthur, writing 10 former aide on 13 May 1919, is describing his Rainbow Division’s return after the brief post-war occupation of Germany:
“We reached New York on the 25th but where-oh-where was that warm welcome that they told us of? Where was that howims mob to proclaim us monarchs of all we surveyed? Where were those bright eyes, slim ankles that had been kidding us in 0 dreams? Nothing—nothing like that. One little urchin asked us who we were and when we said—we are the famous 42nd asked if we had been to France.” ,
Do these yams diminish MacArthur? Of course not. The only persons put down are probably forever unidentifiable. MacArthur ^ wartime chief of staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, said in a 1946 interview, “The thing to remember about Doug|a MacArthur is this: he always wins.” Not quite true on some occasions after 1946, but in this case, yes. He had a good story, and h made the most of it. .
Robert Sherrod