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The Naval Institute published the JJjSvvers of Fleet Admiral Vladimir ‘ikolayevich Chernavin, Com- j ander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, lQfiUr questions in the February ” Proceedings.
_ Subsequently, Admiral C. A. H. r°st, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval . P*-“rations and President of the aval Institute, was asked to answer ’Uestions from the editors of the ®Vlet Navy’s professional magazine rOrskoi Sbornik. Admiral Trost’s esPonses were published in the Sep- ^n>ber issue of that publication. n°se questions and answers are re- pr,nted here.
°rskoi Sbornik: Relations between at'ons are not something static or in- uriable. They are subject to change.
0 you believe that the relations be- 'Veen the Soviet Union and the United Jates of America have changed for the ^tter in the last two to three years? If y°u do, in what way is this change ar|ifested if applied to the navies of !!Ur two countries? r°st: For nearly four decades, rela- louships between the Soviet Union, the atjons of the Warsaw Pact, and the ^uited States and the nations of NATO ere, if not static, somewhat predict- 'e- While a spirit of detente did in- J-tWene from time to time, we were e'l aware that we could count on ag- 8fessive and offensive force deploy- ^nts far beyond what might be an j*Cceptable norm needed for defense.
, °w, because of the commitment of j e leaders of the United States and °viet Union to improving relations, iind their achievements at two summit 'Meetings, the world is in the midst of an important period of change that c°uld become a most important chapter 'n future histories of our time. Presi- ent Bush has already spoken eloquently on his hopes for continuing Improved relations with the Soviet union.
As a mariner, my assessment is that 8°od relations between countries are u>lt on a foundation of mutual underhanding and respect. Our navies know each other well and respect each other’s capabilities at sea. This has been so for some time. Since 1972, we have had an Agreement on Preventing Incidents at Sea. As long ago as 1975, we exchanged ship visits and will do so again soon. I would expect that we will continue to operate, often in proximity, in ways that will continue to manifest the professionalism and mutual respect we have both come to expect of one another. And, in a very real sense, the exchange of views on the pages of the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings magazine and Morskoi Sbornik is, in itself, evidence of improved relations between our great countries.
Morskoi Sbornik: Two years ago, you wrote in one of your articles on the U. S. naval strategy that the Soviet Navy was superior to that of the U. S.
and that the magnitude of its operations was constantly growing. What facts can these statements be substantiated with? Trost: When we assess naval capabilities, we must first consider fleet size. By that 1 mean the number of warships that could be made available to carry out the missions assigned in times of crisis. Given the differing missions and required operating areas of the U. S.
and Soviet navies, overall numbers are important. No matter how capable a given U. S. ship may be, it can only be deployed in one area at a time, and several are required to keep one deployed. Certainly, in terms of numbers alone, when I wrote the article to which you refer two years ago, the Soviet Navy was larger than the U. S. Navy. It remains so today. My conclusion was, and continues to be, that based on its sheer size, the Soviet Navy is a very formidable force. In the ensuing time your tremendous shipyard capability has continued to turn out modem capable warships of every class.
But numbers alone are not the full measure of naval capability. Quality and individual unit firepower count for a great deal. How modem and effective
As part of current efforts to open lines of communication between the two countries, U. S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Trost reviewed a contingent of sailors with Soviet Admiral Mikhail Nikolayevich Khronopulo, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet, in October 1989 at Sevastopol.
are a fleet’s weapon systems, how dedicated and well trained are its personnel? How many weapon systems does each ship possess? How formidable is each ship individually? How effective are its defenses and damage control capabilities? These are all factors that experienced seamen use to reach judgments about the strength of a foreign navy. Of course, a final and most important consideration is a navy’s operational performance at sea. When I add these considerations into the size of your Navy, I again conclude that the Soviet Navy is an extremely strong and capable Navy.
The range of capabilities represented by your new classes of handsome, well armed, and very robust combatants— Kirov, Udaloy, Sovremennyy, and wide array of missile-armed small combatants—is very impressive. So is your growing capability to take tactical aircraft to sea. The Afiev-class aircraft carrier, the forthcoming Tbilisi class, and its successor, an even larger aircraft carrier, represent a new Soviet capability we are following with great interest.
Finally, it goes without saying that your very large and increasingly modem submarine force is an area of vital interest to me. The Akula, Sierra, Victor III, and Oscar classes represent a substantial improvement in submarine effectiveness. As a career submariner and a student of naval history, I am particularly mindful of the tremendous potential of such a large and capable submarine force and the threat those submarines pose to our ability to support allies across the oceans. We have had the experience of two World Wars to learn this lesson. We have, I believe, learned it well, which is why maintaining an outstanding antisubmarine warfare capability is my number one warfare priority.
Morskoi Sbornik: Several aspects of the new naval strategy currently adopted in the United States, as well as the organization of the U. S. Navy, have been criticized both in the United States and by some of its NATO allies as being obviously offensive. Have there been any changes in this respect with a view of enforcing a more defensive posture as a result of positive international developments? What are the specific indications to this effect, particularly with regard to the organizational structure of the U. S. Navy? Trost: When you ask about a more defensive strategy, I must respond forcefully by reminding you that our national strategy has always been defensive. During the last 40 years, the United States and its allies have constructed an interlocking series of alliances and understandings based on defending our way of life from a large and growing Soviet military establishment that far exceeds credible defense requirements, and the political ideology of communism that is avowedly antagonistic to the values and interests we consider essential.
The maritime component of our national strategy calls for operations distant from the United States mainland to deter and defend against threats to democracy and our political and economic interests worldwide. Most of those vital interests are across the oceans—our European allies are overseas, our key trading partners in Asia are overseas, and our important Asian allies (Japan and Korea) are overseas. This is geographic reality. The only way we can defend those interests is by deploying our Navy close to where those interests are. One cannot defend in distant areas without actually being there. We must be able to stand between the threat posed by the enormous military forces of the Soviet Union and our friends and allies and be prepared to defend them. I consider this to be sensible planning.
Again and again in the postwar era, we have found that having our forces at sea, instantly ready to respond to crisis, has made a difference. This posture is a forehanded response to uncertainty. It also meets the need, not just of the United States, but of all peaceful nations, to maintain free and unfettered access to the seas upon which their prosperity and freedom depend.
When critics mistake this forward posture, which is intended to deter and defend, for being, as you say, “ . . . obviously offensive . . . ,” it makes the point that the offensive or defensive nature of a strategy is in the eye of the beholder. For example, I have read that your avowed military doctrine is defensive. However, to our allies and friends who must themselves live and work within the range of impressive Soviet naval, air, and ground capabilities, and who are unsure of Soviet intentions, your strategy appears quite offensive.
Morskoi Sbornik: As was reported by the U. S. military media, 85% of available “Tomahawk” missiles are intended to be used against on-shore targets. According to military experts, including some in the West, this is evidence of the improved offensive capabilities of the U. S. Navy. What could
you say on this account? ,
Trost: The first thing I would say, as told Marshal Akhromeyev when he vis ited the United States last year, is dja our current U. S. Navy cruise missile capability was developed as a deterre • in response to Soviet targeting empha" sis on our aircraft carriers. Before we had “Tomahawk” missiles, essential y tactical aircraft launched from the aircraft carrier were our only medium-t° long range strike capability from sea- Once the Soviet Union concentrated targeting against these assets, we ft1 compelled to develop a dispersed, sea based strike capability as a deterrent- We have now done that, but it is on 3 in response to a precipitating Soviet ^ action. And that is why we say that w were following the Soviet Union’s lea in developing our cruise missile technology. Although we had, in the 1950s, a very successful program f°r cruise missile development and emp10- ment, it was cancelled. The sinking 0 the Israeli destroyer Eliat in 1967 wit Soviet-designed missiles brought home to us very clearly the threat those iWs siles represented. Since then, events in the South Atlantic and Persian Gulf have confirmed that ships must be pre pared to defend themselves at sea against all varieties of cruise missiles- They have also made clear the advan tages and deterrent effect of maintain ing a sophisticated and precise cruise missile technology. Because it is a superb marriage of advanced technology and today’s requirements at sea, Tomahawk provides the United States a deterrent against violence or terrorism by an opponent, anywhere w the world, who might be disposed to initiate conflict. Further, it provides a commander with a long-range weapon to defend his force against oppoS ing surface threats, before they are within range.
Your readers are most likely aware that it exists in several variants, deployed on both surface ships and submarines. Tomahawk is versatile. It ca be configured for different missions. Moreover, because its firepower is d* tributed over an array of platforms, l( provides the fleet commander unprece dented flexibility in selecting options necessary to match the requirement with the level of threat. Without dou • its combination of precision guidance and long range represents an improve capability to hit targets ashore. This employment is an excellent example 0 Tomahawk’s contribution to naval war fare. But we should not forget that d not intended to, and indeed cannot by
Self, replace manned tactical air. To- ^er, tactical aircraft and cruise mis- es constitute a formidable deterrent rce and extraordinarily flexible arm national security.
^Orskoi Sbornik: As is known, the °viet Union has repeatedly come for- ard with a proposal to limit naval ac. 'ties and to extend confidence-build. § measures to include these activities.
nen do you think a positive U. S. esPonse could be expected to these ^°viet proposals?
r°st: For the two centuries of our **stence as a nation, we have been the °st consistent proponents of what the nted jurist Grotius called mare °erum, or the ocean as the great com- n°ns of man. In that sense, free use of ne seas is an inherently democratic °ncept. As such, it has been opposed j.'storically by nations that sought to ’hit the unimpeded use of international "'aters.
To a seagoing naval officer, confi- .ence-building measures that restrict reedom of movement or require bur- ensome disclosure run counter to this |h°st fundamental international concept ’ freedom of the seas. We have, over and over again in our history, been "'tiling to defend that principle when °’hers have attempted to limit freedom the seas. The war with the Barbary
Pirates, the War of 1812 and our entry into World War I were all, in some measure, related to our determination to maintain and assure freedom of the seas.
It is my understanding that a main objective of confidence-building measures is to prevent surprise attack. Another related objective is to avoid inadvertent conflict that could result from large-scale exercises being misread as preparations for invasion and triggering a mobilization spiral. Proponents of these measures often refer to the period of August 1914 as one example of that phenomenon. Confidence-building measures may indeed reduce the threat of an exercise being used to mask an invasion or to avoid a misinterpretation of army movements. But they are simply not applicable to the maritime environment.
At sea, such measures are not necessary, because first, the concept of freedom of the seas already permits either side to observe and monitor the other’s activities on the high seas, so that no surprise or misinterpretation should occur. Not only that, it is unrealistic to believe that the Western Alliance would elect to start a conflict by conducting a surprise attack from the sea. Unlike armies, navies cannot suddenly lunge across the frontier of a country and invade. When one considers the scale
Though this U. S. Spruance-class destroyer is closing on the Soviet aircraft carrier Baku, the Soviet Union remains ahead of the United States in fleet size. “But numbers alone are not the full measure of naval capability,” Admiral Trost told Morskoi Sbornik.
of material preparations and long-term planning that precedes any attempt to invade Eurasia from the sea, such as the June 1944 Allied landings in Normandy, it is clear that such a capability is far beyond the means of any navy or alliance in the world. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how naval exercises could cover a surprise attack or accidentally cause war. This just does not make sense.
What does make sense is careful and prudent conduct of operations at sea. Since 1972, when our nations signed the Incidents at Sea Agreement, we have seen a reduction in the kinds of incidents that formerly occurred at sea. Recently, in Washington, we had the annual meeting of our respective delegations to review the past year’s events. It was very cordial. I also understand that other countries are seeking to use that accord as a model for their own interaction with the Soviet fleet at sea.
Finally, I must emphasize that U. S. vital interests and our naval commitments are global. Many of our allies and those with whom we have important economic ties are littoral states linked to us by sea routes that must pass through waters proximate to the Soviet Union. We can accept no restrictions on our freedom to transit or operate in those waters. If you were an ally of a country that voluntarily curtailed its ability to be at your side, how would you react? As it happens, a majority of the Soviet Union’s allies can be reached by land. But such are the differences between the defense concerns of our two nations.
Morskoi Sbornik: In the next two years the strength of the Soviet armed forces will be reduced by 500,000 people. Subject to reductions will be every service of the armed forces, including the navy. With nuclear and conventional arms reductions under way, the naval weapon systems will be acquiring an ever more destabilizing nature in the framework of international security.
And that is what is beginning to be recognized in many countries, including the members of NATO. What do you think about the prospects of possible reductions in the U. S. Navy and on reaching any agreements in this area? Trost: At the outset, it is important to understand that I strongly reject the idea that navies or naval weapon systems are or will become destabilizing. To the contrary, I have found in discussions with leaders around the world that U. S. naval forces are a welcome presence, because they are a force for stability. It is widely recognized in the Free World that the main interest of the United States is regional stability and peace, and that forward-deployed naval forces have contributed to maintaining that stability. We are seeing the effects of a lessening of tensions in various regions of the globe, which has helped to foster a worldwide environment embracing human rights, democracy, and free enterprise.
We certainly welcome the possibility of real reductions in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that, notwithstanding the reductions you have cited, Soviet ground forces will remain preponderant in Europe. President Bush’s plan announced at the NATO summit this past 29 May is aimed at redressing this land and air conventional force imbalance.
Hopefully, that proposal, which sets land-based force ceilings, will lead eventually to conventional parity on the ground in Europe. Nevertheless, even then, basic asymmetry will remain between the Soviet Union’s military posture and that of the Western Alliance. The Soviet Union is the dominant military power on the continent and will always maintain the ability to generate forces from the East. NATO must therefore maintain a countervailing ability to reinforce from the West. These reinforcements must ultimately come via sea and air from North America. This requires NATO control over the seas to ensure a credible defense of Western Europe. A credible defense based on parity in existing forces and in the capability to reinforce those forces is the only guarantor of a stable and balanced Europe. The real threat to a nation’s sovereignty is territorial occupation, which can only be accomplished by armies. In Central Europe,
Today’s U. S. naval personnel, such as these boatswain’s mates on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN- 69), approach their profession with vigor, competence, and teamwork. Admiral Trost calls the members of the volunteer Navy “the best and brightest sailors I have seen. ...” no matter what the force levels and force posture might be eventually, the possibility of that threat arising from the East must always be considered by NATO. That threat can only be met by NATO armies and air power. But it is sea control that can allow NATO military power to be brought to bear with the reinforced strength necessary for defense.
Because of that, reductions of U. S. or NATO naval power hardly seem warranted. Nevertheless, because of the improved relationship between our two
countries, and the enunciated Soviet foreign policy of cooperation and Po11 ical resolution of regional problems, it was judged a tolerable risk to reduce the size of our Navy. We will be retir ing an aircraft carrier and 33 antiair warfare surface combatants and transferring another 24 frigates to the reserve forces. In recent months, we have already decommissioned 16 olde antisubmarine warfare frigates. For tti foreseeable future, we will maintain our deployable carrier battle groups at only 14. It is important to appreciate
°ur ship retirements will involve
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Ces that, while admittedly older, are j!Verseas operational commitments. In act’ many of them will be on forward eployments right up to the time they C°mmence preparations for inactivation.
^°fskoi Sbornik: In an interview to (Xl Power magazine in October 1988 '°u said that “Navy force architecture 1 * calls for at least two nuclear esCorts for each CVN (nuclear-powered jfcraft carrier) in service. We are now Point where that is only marginally
the
j-h S. Navy intends to launch another ™gram of building nuclear-powered
^r°st: An excellent professional ques- i0n. You may be aware that last year I inounced we would be concentrating me of our research efforts on the ^vantages of electric drive propulsion systems. It is my hope that our next generation of surface warships will be e ectrically propelled, but it is not yet c car whether the prime movers for the ^ectrical generators will be gas tur- lncs or nuclear reactors.
You are correct in assessing that JJdear power does offer enormous ^vantages, particularly for submersible ^Pulsion systems. For the surface feeL advantages of nuclear propulsion <’r aircraft carriers are both its freedom 0 mobility gained by the carrier liber- atec* from the necessity for frequent !ePlenishment, and its additional capac- 'fr to carry aviation fuel and fuel oil
'PS. This provides battle groups built ar°Und a nuclear carrier a great deal of gtstic autonomy.
^°rskoi Sbornik: For several years '°u have been in the positions of highest authority in the U. S. Pacific Fleet, pere Commander-in-Chief Seventh met. What, in your opinion, is the j^Planation for increased activities of U. S. Navy in the Northern Pacific ari(f for exercise areas approaching the poast of Kamchatka and the Soviet Far hasp T
rost: It is true that I have been privileged to serve as commander of the • S. Seventh Fleet. It was one of the ^ost satisfying tours in my career. But j^0u should not omit that, when called ack to Washington to assume my pre- ^ent duties, I was in command of the jmantic Fleet. In both ocean areas, the u- S. Navy maintains forward deployments to deter and defend against the threat to our allies in proximity of the Soviet Union. On those deployments, we have certainly continued to exercise with our allies, Japan and South Korea, in the northern Pacific regions, and with our Northern European allies in the North Atlantic. Such exercises are important aspects of maintaining the collective ability of the alliance to maintain an effective defense.
In the Pacific, we have noted the continued improvement of the Soviet Pacific fleet. As a consequence, we have in recent years become more concerned about our defense requirements in the northern Pacific. The state of Alaska, particularly the Aleutian Islands, is sovereign U. S. territory that is not far from the regions you mentioned. We have already had to fight once in this century to free them from occupation. In view of the considerable challenge posed by the increasingly capable forces at the disposal of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, I consider our exercises in the Northern Pacific to be prudent measures in defense of our national territorial integrity, our Pacific allies, our neighbor Canada, and our vital oil sea lines of communication from Alaska to the lower United States.
Morskoi Sbornik: The principles of personnel acquisition for the U. S. and Soviet armed forces, as is known, are different. What advantages and disadvantages do you see in the U. S. system of recruitment?
Trost: In the postwar era, within the United States we have had both conscription and the all-volunteer force.
We are convinced that the volunteer force is better. We know that every young sailor we recruit is joining us by choice. They are well-paid but not sufficiently well paid in comparison to the hardships and family separations caused by life at sea. Rather, they are motivated by patriotism, by a commitment to maintaining peace in the world, by a desire to learn new technical and leadership skills, and by a desire to see the world. As a result, we are a Navy of motivated, highly competent and incredibly hard-working men, and women.
Last year when Marshal Akhro- meyev visited the United States, he spent several hours on board the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), where he had the opportunity to see firsthand the independence of thought, professionalism in action, and technical competence that made that entire aircraft carrier and its air wing function as a team. In my opinion, those advantages make the volunteer force a better approach than conscription. Today, we have the best and brightest American sailors I have seen at anytime in my career.
Morskoi Sbornik: Probably, any officer in the navy, first appointed to a ship, will conceive himself in the role of her future captain. What is being done in the U. S. Navy to train officers for the task of commanding a ship? What stages in the service career must be succeeded before an officer could be appointed captain?
Trost: Command at sea is the essence of our profession. Our command training is based on a broad professional education, which begins the day a young man or woman becomes a midshipman or an officer candidate, continues with even greater intensity on commissioning, and extends through an officer’s career. Each commanding officer seeks to instill in the young officers under his command a love of the sea, a commitment to flexibility and initiative, and a respect for the standards of professional excellence that make the naval service a most demanding and most fulfilling profession.
When I began my active service, we had a system that tended to keep a young officer on board one ship for several years. During that time, the best officers would be given increasingly greater responsible jobs on the same ship. We called that system “Fleeting-Up.” Over the last 20 years we have evolved what we believe is a better approach aimed at producing the best commanding officers possible.
In our Navy, a young officer begins his service with extensive and rigorous professional schooling, followed by three to six years at sea. During this crucial formative period, an officer earns his warfare qualification as a submariner, surface warfare officer, or aviator. In the course of his early career, he will serve under several commanders, in different ships, with increasing responsibility and authority. Before each key point in his progress, when he has accumulated enough at-sea experience, his record will be reviewed by an impartial board of senior officers, which will weigh his potential for increased responsibility and authority.
It must be highlighted that these boards are different from promotion boards.
The boards to which I refer are specifically constituted to screen officers best fitted for assignments such as department head, executive officer, and ultimately, commanding officer. Those who do not measure up will not go on in that career path, although they may
have talents that will suit them well for another.
Moreover, with each assignment, the officer returns to a school program specifically tailored for the duties he is about to assume. Then, throughout his assignment, his performance at sea is closely monitored by his commanding officer. Finally, after a rigorous process of written and oral examinations, only the best and most professional officers are selected for command at sea. En- route to their ships, they are given more dedicated schooling. Once there, they are expected to exercise initiative in command, relying on their professional knowledge, experience, and highly developed capacity for independence of thought and action to lead their crew and operate their ships.
Ultimately, it is their finely honed sense of judgment, developed through years of duty at sea, on which they rely. Before assuming command, a typical destroyer, frigate, and submarine commanding officer will have commonly served as a division officer, department head, and executive officer, in different classes of ships in different oceans. When it comes time to command, he will bring to the assignment all the insight, energy, and professional wisdom gained from years of increasingly demanding assignments at sea.
Morskoi Sbornik: You have been with the U. S. Navy for almost 40 years, a term of considerable proportions. Most likely, there were both gratifications and pains. To avoid a bitter ending to the interview, let’s not touch upon the pains. Looking back through your Navy career, which period is the most pleasant to recall?
Trost: Every naval officer, in any navy, has special moments and memories that, for him, mark his service. I am no exception. When I put to sea, for the first time in command, as commanding officer of USS Sam Rayburn (SSBN-635), then one of our newest ballistic missile-carrying submarines,11 was a particularly satisfying moment, had fulfilled one of my deepest and longest held aspirations—command at sea. In particular, I remember the camaraderie of a wardroom at sea. ItlS hard to explain to people who have never gone to sea. That closeness is very special.
When I assumed command of the Seventh Fleet and later the Atlantic Fleet, I felt that same bond with the men and women of those far flung forces. Together, we were embarked Wj a genuine effort to preserve and defen the peace. We were successful, but I can never lose sight of their sacrifices’ day after day, and their superb professionalism that made it possible.
Again, since assuming duty as the Chief of Naval Operations, I have had the great pleasure to work with the hne men and women who are the heart an soul of the United States Navy. It is
vve
published our Maritime Strategy in open literature. Sincj;
then this document has been the subject of controversy
Officer to Officer
On 12 October 1989, Admiral C. A. H. Trost, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, addressed 1,150 attentive officers, instructors, and general staff at Grechko Naval Academy, the Soviet equivalent of the U. S. Naval War College. Grechko is the only institution of its kind in the Soviet Union. Following are excerpts from Admiral Trost's address.
My visit to your country is part of a program to enhance mutual understanding and reduce tensions between our two countries. It is a privilege for me to be the first chief of a U. S. military service to visit in continuation of the program which has seen exchange visits by our respective ministers of defense and senior military leaders. . . .
As my Navy celebrates its 214th birthday tomorrow, I think it is interesting to note that both of our modern navies had very humble beginnings. In each case, our navies began with small boats crewed by a handful of daring and dedicated sailors, who were tasked to sail in harm’s way against a much more powerful adversary. The early fleet of Peter I, with victories on the nearby lakes, Ladoga and Peipus, and the river Neva, established a heritage of excellence that remains apparent in your Navy today.
In my country’s struggle for independence 70 years later, an able young naval officer named John Paul Jones would carve a similarly glorious tradition of victory at sea, also against a vastly superior foe, and become the father of the United States Navy. Today he rests in a crypt beneath the chapel dome at the U. S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, surrounded by mementos that record his accomplishments. Among them is a ruby red cross, the Order of St. Anne, which was awarded to him by Catherine II for his service on the Black Sea as a rear admiral in the Russian Navy. I should think that few men, if any, could achieve such distinction and rank in two navies and serve with such val°r You and I as military men can appreciate such things. • ■ '
I want to discuss several topics so that you know exac v how I feel on some subjects that I think are of our mutu interest. My comments are of value to you only if I sPea with complete candor, naval officer to naval officer. Entp J rhetoric or mindless propaganda benefit no one. If we are succeed in our efforts to reduce tension, we must each aa derstand the position the other takes on issues of mutu interest or concern.
A few years ago, as I am sure you are well aware,
both
in my own country and around the world. The U. S. Mad time Strategy is the maritime component of the over3 U. S. national security strategy. It is not a war plan. Not1 it a document that outlines a predisposition of naval forC to wage war. The Maritime Strategy is a concept, repe;1 concept, of operations for the effective global employee of naval forces to protect the interests of the United State and our allies and support our national policy objectives- is the same strategy that the United States has pursued in1,1 name of peace for the past 40 years, and is based on thrc’L fundamental tenets.
The first tenet is deterrence. Its purpose is to deter an. potential adversary from either attacking the United State[1] and our allies, or attempting to undermine the economic a11 political interests on which we rely. The strategy is sun1 ciently broad to cover the employment of naval forced across the entire spectrum of conflict, ranging from gl°ha nuclear or conventional war down through regional con flicts in peacetime and in crisis. .
Second, the strategy is built around a network of a**1' ances. Since World War II the United States has establish agreements with over 40 countries to provide mutual sect1 rity for common defense. The strength is not in the militaO power of any one individual but the combined strength 0
!heir knowledge ‘es% carrying c ay and nisht. t
°ffen.
and sacrifice, flaw- ut their responsibilities jn stations around the ^Ofld, that so impressed Marshal nkromeyev and Admiral Makarov hen they came to visit Admiral ./owe last year. It is the same people at make my job as the Chief of aval Operations so fulfilling. [2] *
even before their recent adoption of a ‘‘new defensive doctrine.”
In response to question five, the CNO spoke of ‘‘confidence building measures restricting freedom of movement or requiring burdensome disclosure.” He later stated that confidence building measures may indeed have some benefits but noted that they “are simply not applicable in the maritime environment.” (underlined in original). The editors dropped the words ‘‘requiring burdensome disclosure” and eliminated the entire underlined thought that confidence building measures are not needed at sea. Those views of the CNO are in direct opposition to Soviet arms control proposals which would require advance notification of naval exercises or deployments. Apparently, they are not ready to accept such an answer.
In an interesting nuance, the editors modified their earlier statement of question six. When submitted, it read ‘ ‘in the next two years the Soviet armed forces will be reduced by 500 thousand people.” When printed in Morskoi Sbornik, the question read “. . . the Soviet armed forces including the Navy’ ’ would undergo such reductions. Perhaps, in the months between the development and publication of the questions, the reality of personnel reductions has hit the Soviet Navy.
Finally, in his response to question six, the CNO pointed out that ‘‘for the foreseeable future we will maintain our deployable carrier battle groups at only fourteen.” The Soviets dropped the word “deployable.” Because of their different readiness concepts, the past practice of keeping many non-deployable ships in the order of battle, and the currently decreasing level of forward deployments, the word “deployable” may not seem as important to the Soviets as it does to the U. S.
Navy. These are the differences that make negotiating arms control agreements difficult.
e alliance in which each member shares the burden of ®fense. Granted, the United States is the leader in these a hances. In the coming years I expect to see many of our a lies begin to assume greater responsibility for the common . efense. This may be particularly true with NATO. I think it ls Important to note that in the 40 years that NATO has fto°d united and kept the peace in Europe, there has not een a single aggressive act by any one of its members a8ainst a nation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
Third, and probably least understood and possibly most Vv°rnsome to potential adversaries, is the premise of for- 'vard deployment.
Now, some argue that forward deployment poses an of- ensive threat. Among them is Marshal Sergei F. Akhro- ^yev, who, on a visit to the United States in the summer 1988, looked me in the eye and said, “You, you’re the Pr°blem. Your navy and bases surround my country and
Admiral Trost, here on board a Black Sea Fleet S/avfl-cIass missile cruiser in Sevastopol, visited eight naval installations in two of the Soviet Union’s 15 republics. He logged more than 3,000 miles within the country during his six-day tour in October 1989.
threaten the security of the Soviet Union.” My response then and now is the same. The U. S. strategy is not intended to threaten anyone. Geographic reality is such that many of our allies and trading partners are located on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. If the United States is to participate effectively in mutual defense of our own and our allies’ interests, it is imperative that we have forces deployed close to regions of potential conflict. In that last several years the United States has placed increased emphasis on the role of naval forces in forward deployment because of the changing international environment. Since 1950, there has been a 60% decrease in both the number of overseas basing facilities and number of host countries for our forces. But there has been no decrease in our overseas interests. Quite the contrary, the United States relies more heavily on overseas trade than ever. Forward deployed naval forces give us the flexibility and mobility to continue to protect these interests. They are only a threat to someone who would intend to threaten our interests or those of our allies.
The second topic is naval arms control. The purpose of any negotiation for arms control must be a meaningful improvement in the security posture for all participants. While force reductions may reduce government spending, that cannot and should not be the principal focus. The goal must be improved stability. Unfortunately, I think our respective definitions of stability are somewhat different. The writings, speeches, and proposals of some of your leaders lead me to believe that you view stability as being synonymous with predictability. Predictability, if it means that restrictions are placed on the movement and composition of ships on the high seas, can foster a climate ripe for deceit and
[1]nsive force, deployments.” The editors ^Ply fendered that as, “. . .we pere faced with Soviet and Warsaw acl armed forces.” Evidently, they Ure unwilling to acknowledge the past
s>ve nature of Soviet force posture
Dit°R’s Note: In response to the first T?slfon posed by Morskoi Sbornik,
^ niiral Trost spoke of the ’ ‘past four codes" and said “we were r(:ed with Soviet and Warsaw Pact of-