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cially trained for the mission continued, specialized units were oped for CSAR; with the end of h°stl^ ties, though, the legendary efforts units such as Helicopter Combat SupPc’ Squadron (HC)-7 passed into history- did the desire to maintain a unit dedicate to CSAR. .£
Since that time, all branches of armed services have been involved ^ many low-intensity efforts where need for CSAR at sea has been obvio • but never acted on.
Today the Navy maintains a rese
squadron, HC-9, that carries on the
of the concept would be a w-r CSAR unit. In times of conflict the u could deploy as part of the fleet with mission of CSAR. The three basic c L ments of the unit would be: .-p
► As mother ship, an amphibious s with a flooding well deck such as ^ Austin (LPD-4)-class amphibious trao ports, dock, or the Anchorage (LSD--
Today the United States finds itself in the arena of show of force and gunboat diplomacy, sometimes known as low- intensity warfare. This should never be thought of as synonymous with low-risk warfare; dangerous missions and heavy casualties are frequently involved. The U. S. Coast Guard, recently challenged in terms of its very existence, could be put to effective wartime use by taking advantage of its most widely known capability—search and rescue (SAR). The Coast Guard could deploy its people and equipment in a combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort.
Best known for their ability to save people in all types of weather and diffi
A Coast Guard unit could be formed specifically for combat SAR. Small boats, HH-60 helicopters (facing page, top), and an amphibious mother ship with a well deck would make up the team. The ship would remain with the fleet; the boats and helicopters could rescue survivors in the water or on land.
cult conditions, Coast Guard units are involved, on an almost daily basis, in full-time SAR work—both in the air and on the surface. The CSAR plan would combine Navy assets with Coast Guard personnel, machines, and knowledge. This would contribute not only to national defense, but also to other areas, including training of regular and reserve units from all branches of the armed services.
Events in Vietnam illustrate how the CSAR concept could be effective:
As the Navy stepped up attacks, an increasing number of its aircraft were shot down. Wing commanders found themselves deploying platforms not equipped for the job of SAR in a hostile environment. Soon field ingenuity (and necessity) fostered armed and armored CSAR helicopters, modified on an as- needed basis. The Air Force also found the situation difficult and hurriedly created an aerospace rescue service, complete with tactics and support. Both services crewed these helicopters with men who were highly dedicated but not spe-
As the war devel-
tradition. (Many of HC-9’s crewmen formerly served in HC-7 and other CSAR squa rons.) Yet if the difficulty the Navy experienced in trying to activate reserve rid sweepers during the Persian u operations is any guide, it is unlikely ln HC-9 will be used in anything other t a full-blown global war. The Air rot does maintain a group dedicated to SP cial operations and CSAR, but the h>8 glitz world of special operations ta ^ precedence over CSAR—witness cancellation of the HH-60 Night Ha helicopter. The Air Force also has disadvantage of not being a nautical vice; you can train a pilot to land °n ship’s deck, but you can’t train a hehc I ^ ter to resist salt corrosion or meet the sP cial demands of constant overw"
fight- .ing
Recently the Navy has been opera in active environments where the p°s bility of CSAR use has been tremend<’u^ As in the past, the idea has been to W° ify existing platforms to fill the SAR 10 | This concept is dangerous and in a to war environment is foolish. I am no any means an expert on the antisubma warfare (ASW) capabilities of a fleet ^ the one deployed in the Persian Gulf- I can see the danger in using hehbo ASW assets as CSAR/attack aircraU And it simply does not make sense to P a multi-million dollar sensor plath like the light airborne multipurpose V tern (LAMPS) helicopter in harm’s way
The Coast Guard could help. The bas
comp^
being able to work close to shore. '1Ur to six 44-foot rescue boats now
by the Coast Guard. These boats are
eXtr,
Ws
'•lass i
the • Uoc'c landing ships. The purpose of b^iyPhibious ship would be to “piggy 4|Sq SAR boats in its well deck and d *° Work helicopters from its flight t9ge ■ The amphibian also has the advan-
k Ol beina "11,1.■ 11, \>v,rl’ tti '
Used
e,r,ely rugged and have exceptional ► Four HH-60 helicopters fitted to operate in a combat environment.
Working together, these elements would form a solid and capable CSAR team. The main part of the team would be the amphibious ship. She would operate on the outer edge of the task force while remaining within the protective veil of the fleet’s ASW and antiair warfare assets. From this position she could launch helicopters and small boats for various CSAR missions. If a battle-damaged aircraft went down, the small boat crews could aid helicopters in the search for survivors. This could be very advantageous in darkness or when the airborne assets were involved farther away. The same scenario could exist in the event an aircraft went down shortly after launch or a crewman fell overboard. A CSAR ship could conduct a search-and-rescue mission without having to thin out the task force commander’s specialized assets.
The ship could also be used to rescue the survivors of a damaged or sunk merchant marine ship, and could play an important role in an amphibious invasion. In the latter case, the surface elements could be used to rescue survivors of damaged landing craft, while the helicopters could work inland to bring back aviators downed while on air assault missions (the use of small boats for amphibious rescue is not a new idea; the Coast Guard used them to rescue soldiers during the Normandy landings).
The next element of the CSAR team would be the small boats. These are tough little vessels with a self-righting and self-bailing capability. We have all seen the breathtaking photographs of these boats breaking the bar in very rough surf—testimony to the courage and ability of their crews. Using the small boats for CSAR could free up more combat- oriented ships and aircraft to carry out their missions. The well deck of the mother ship could easily be configured to dry dock up to six of these hardy boats. While on board, the crews could maintain and prepare each boat for upcoming missions. When the need arose, the ship would drop her ramp to flood the well deck and the small boats would be deployed. The 44s would have to be fitted with a communications package that would enable them to talk to the mother ship, CSAR helicopters, and the downed aircrew’s survival radio. On these same frequencies would be ground units and strike/tactical air units as needed for support.
While it is true that a 44-foot boat (or even the 45-footer the Coast Guard is planning) could not keep up with an over- the-horizon assault, its purpose would not be to keep up. It would rescue non-aviation personnel whose ships had been damaged, sunk, or put adrift. It would keep the high-speed approach lanes of the air cushion landing craft (LCACs) cleared of wreckage and survivors. In this age of over-the-horizon assaults, such an asset could be of tremendous use to a Marine air/ground task force commander.
The third member of the effort would be the HH-60J helicopter. Aside from being an excellent aircraft with a good background, it has the advantage of being multiservice, which makes the availability of spare parts and support much greater.
In terms of preparing the aircraft and crews for combat, the “hardening” of the HH-60 could be done in peacetime. Each aircraft assigned to potential CSAR use could be prefitted with armor plating and weapons mounts that could be removed and stored in a “mount-out” locker. The aircraft could easily be prefitted with mounts for an ALE-39 chaff/ flare dispenser, the ALQ-156 (or AAR- 47) missile detection system, an ALQ- 144 infrared jammer with “black hole” exhaust suppressors, and a UHF/VHF/ FM radio such as the ARC-182. When the call came, the gear could be quickly bolted on and the helicopter deployed. In fact, such bolt-on precautions should be taken for any Coast Guard aircraft slated for use in Maritime Defense Zone actions or in any other environment where it could encounter the deadly surface-to-air missile launchers now scattered around the world (and possibly on terrorist- controlled merchant ships).
Another interesting possibility that could come out of the HH-60 mount-out concept would be a standby CSAR avia-
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anti
the bad guys is wrong. To send a fleet to a far-away sea without the p1 SAR coverage is wasteful of men equipment. This concept could give people of this country more bang tor buck than many other programs. It sound hokey or far-fetched, but CSAR concept could save Dad one ^ when his shrimp boat was sinking far( shore, and a week later pull someone of the sea after his A-6 aircraft took ba damage while on a punitive strike agal one of our “little” enemies. f,
A combination of CSAR historical P^ spectives and innovative thought c ^ lead to a joint-service development CSAR tactics. To remain outside combat arena could spell the end ot ^ Coast Guard as we know it, but to J in and try to become a coastal Ra would be just plain dumb. This nat^y needs to become adept at low-intej1 conflicts, and this is where the ha Guard belongs. f.
It’s time the Coast Guard stepper! 1
■viceS
then1
tion unit that could function on a daily basis like any other Coast Guard aviation unit, except that it would be placed in a combat status when needed. When the need arose the unit could add its mount- out gear and take up a position on an already deployed Navy ship. This would give the Navy quick and ready access to a CSAR unit at times when it would be impossible or impracticable to bring the entire CSAR unit on line because of time constraints or secrecy. This would also eliminate the worry and publicity of having to call the Navy HC reserve squadron to active duty.
But the most important element of the team would be the crew. For the type of mission 1 am proposing, each crewman would have to be specially prepared. As for the basic aspects of SAR, none are better qualified than the Coast Guard, but the aircrews would still go through a combat-training school. It would be excellent if each enlisted crewman could attend the U. S. Air Force pararescue school after completing the Coast Guard’s rescue swimmers course. This would prepare them for many of the rigors they might encounter during combat and provide them with valuable training in areas they would not be exposed to in regular Coast Guard training, such as gunnery and land survival. As for the pilots, their training should include the survival, escape, and evasion course offered by the Navy. There is also a tremendous pool of knowledge in the members of HC-9 at Naval Air Station North Island, California. These experienced airmen could share their knowledge in a series of training sessions. The Coast Guard also currently has exchange tours with the Air Force SAR units, and these should be continued: they provide information for both services and they keep Coast Guard pilots in an environment that trains for combat. The Coast Guard has some inhouse experience of its own, in its pilots who were sent to Vietnam on exchange tours with the Air Force.
The complete CSAR unit has obvious advantages, but it is also plagued with one serious drawback. In times of deep budget cuts it would be almost impossible to justify the cost of a unit that has only a wartime mission. Fiscal reality demands much more from an investment than the ability to save lives during wartime. With this in mind, the following suggestions could possibly soften the blow of the budget man’s ax:
► The amphibious mother ship would be loaned to the Coast Guard by the Navy. This would allow a valuable asset to stay on line while offering its use to all active and reserve units. She could be home ported at the Coast Guard’s reserve training center at Yorktown, Virginia, and maintained by a skeleton crew. This crew would act much like an inspector/instruc- tor staff in a reserve unit. The ship could be used by both active and reserve units on an as-needed basis. (Perhaps even better, or more realistic, would be an interservice agreement placing the ship in a CSAR role while she remained a Navy vessel. Where the all-Coast Guard ship might seem like fancy window dressing and a potential nightmare to the acquisitions people, a letter of agreement would probably be more flexible.)
► The ship could be used for training cruises by Coast Guard Officer Candidate School and NROTC programs. The service academies could easily find a use for such a vessel during their training. The well deck would provide a valuable tool for Marine Corps Reserve units training for amphibious deployment, while the flight deck could be used to keep helicopter pilots of all services in tune. The deck could be used for practice without having to pull a regular unit off line, and it could be used when the Navy HLT was booked or too small. The flight deck would also offer an excellent tool for the training of landing signal officers of the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps.
► In times of local crises, the ship could be used as a filler if any Coast Guard districts found themselves underequipped. It could deploy on random Seventh District drug-interdiction raids, with its full complement of helicopters and small boats.
These suggestions would help to stay the budget ax by proving the ship’s utility in a true joint-service venture. To keep the ship trim for her intended CSAR mission, she could participate in the combined-arms exercises held in various parts of the world.
There would be, in addition, another important issue to consider: material support for both air and surface units. Because the small boats would be maintained in the well decks, the ship would no longer be used as a landing craft transport and the extra room could be converted into support repair shops and temporary medical areas. In an all-out crisis the ship could even be pressed back into its amphibious role.
An attractive feature of this CSAR concept is that everything required already exists. Other than paperwork and idea sharing, the whole system could be put on line in a very short time. To claim that the V-22 Osprey aircraft would be a far better SAR platform is fine, but with the current pull on the defense spending reins, that aircraft will probably be a long time coming. The HH-60J helicopter is
on the way and paid for. The bolt‘d items are all currently on the shelf. a the ship has long since been coninl'j’, sioned. The people—the most va'ua resource—are constantly working 111 peacetime SAR arena. The plan, like an. of our numerous potential “small tin11- enemies, is ready when they are. W the future may hold bright promise ^ such an advanced craft as the V-22. ^ does not offer any guarantee that our versaries will be as patient. ,,
But what of defense politics? Will Navy think we in the Coast Guard afe tempting to strip it of some of its con' muscle? How loud will the Air Fot^ howl if we propose to add naval guns sky it already strives to control?
None of the above-mentioned
tions ever need be raised: the concep aimed at U. S. inability to contend ,n^ low-intensity environment, not at ha ® the Coast Guard become a major p aj^ in a global war. I would like to see Coast Guard pitch in where it is 111 needed: on the small side of those ^ little wars that have plagued this w° for the last 20 years. To think that intensity conflict is simply a matter popping in a few Green Berets to mop ,
ward and told the other armed ser that if they have to go out, we’ll get back.
Ensign Jennings spent six years in the Marine as an infantryman, and graduated from the ||, Guard Officer Candidate School in October 19 ^ is currently assigned to the U. S. Coast Guard ^^ quarters Office of Navigation Safety and Watc Services.