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The creation of the Senior CAG concept was prompted in part by the failure of some air wings to achieve acceptable levels of readiness or mission accomplishment. This concern triggered discussions within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav), which resulted in the creation of two innovative programs.2
The first was establishing the Naval Strike Warfare Center at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, the primary goals of which were to improve air wing training and develop a strike leaders’ attack training course emphasizing strike warfare planning and execution.
The second proposal—the Senior CAG—was a significant change in air wing organization and management. To support this change, more than 40 flag officers were solicited in 1984 for opinions on the eligibility, selection criteria, and recommended training of future air wing commanders. In early 1985, OpNav briefed the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) on proposed new alternatives. Support for a new concept was so overwhelming that guidance from a 30 July 1985 SecNav-OpNav meeting stated that the “concept evaluation” was unnecessary and directed a new CAG program to be implemented fleet-wide.
A captain with at least 23.5 years of service, the air wing commander would no longer be subordinate to the carrier CO, serving instead as the senior air expert and reporting directly to the battle group commander. (Later guidance directed that the CAG would report to the carrier CO for “additional duty”—administrative matters relating to shipboard operations.) The plan stated that all new senior wing commanders would be in place by the end of fiscal year 1988.
Two senior captains were selected to introduce the program. The individuals had previously served as air wing commanders under the old selection system and were immediately assigned new senior air wings, one each in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. An extensive training pipeline was developed to supplement the new wing commander’s aviation experience with broad exposure to all war-fighting areas, the pipeline now encompasses 9-12 months of intensive training in air, surface, and subsurface warfare. During this period, the original name “Super CAG” was dropped and the position was referred to as the “Senior CAG.” The Chief of Naval Operations recently directed that Senior CAGs will be referred to simply as “CAGs.”
The CAG is now augmented by an assistant air wing commander, or “Deputy CAG.” (Two warfare deputy commanders were proposed initially.) The selection for Deputy CAG was limited to aviators from the fighter and attack communities, and training was directed toward producing an airborne strike leader in all carrier warfare areas.
At the official introduction of the first Senior CAG in January 1986, Vice Admiral Robert Dunn, then- Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet (retired in May 1989 as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare), reflected on the potential impact of the new program: “Today ... a new era in carrier warfare commences. The carrier striking force is now expected t° achieve an increased level of effectiveness in line with tn realities of the 80’s and 90’s. . . . The program has a ready brought improvements. We now have a wing com mander who can be a dedicated tactician while the ne" Deputy CAG can specialize in airborne leadership. .
In 1988, all carrier air wings had a Senior CAG ia place, and by the end of the year, CAG air wings ha deployed to the North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Wes ern Pacific, and Indian Ocean. Additional air wings ha since completed predeployment work-ups or major tl
exercises.
Organizational Relationships
The organizational learning curve for the new estabhs ment was steep initially, and obvious conflicts follow with regard to command responsibilities and reporti s Staffs were dramatically reorganized and unusual relati ships were established between the carrier post-aviati ^ command department heads and the air wing. New multiple variations of air wing management subseque ^ emerged as the organizational complexities of the program became familiar and amenable to those dire involved. . -y
Although most of the first Senior CAGs previon^ served as air wing commanders (“commander CAG their new positions as direct subordinates of the & ^ group commander prompt totally new relationships key ship and embarked staff officers. Ship and staff ^ cers find that they no longer deal exclusively with tn ^ wing commander, but rather increasingly with the assistant air wing commander—the Deputy CAG- Air wing staffs are often inflated to cope with the a f responsibilities within the composite warfare comma organization. The new CAG program was established ^ limited guidance as to new reporting responsibilities ,s specific staff functions (i.e., What is the Deputy C ^ job?). Varied organizational diagrams have s{ evolved as the new CAGs create their own indepen ^ organizations and direct specific staff functions. Tin1*', wing staffs, staff functions, and organizational re ships are different among the 13 carrier air wings- ^ The previous system: Before 1986, air wing cornn^G ers were directly subordinate to the carrier CO. The s worked with the carrier operations and staff air °Per jjQns- officers on aircraft employment for tactical execi* ^ Simultaneously, he dealt personally with the ship s a
ship’s strike operations division for the planning scheduling of aircraft for various evolutions. ^ 0-
Nine squadron COs reported directly to this wing ^ mander for tactical operations, aircraft employ a(j. squadron training, and aircraft maintenance issues. dition, the CAG dealt with administrative problems ^ as ship’s space allocation, habitability, cleanliness- shipboard watches.
The Senior CAG system: In contrast, the CAG now ?erves on a parallel with the other major positions in the attle group and on many occasions is viewed by the battle fjjoup commander as the staff air advisor. (See Figure 1.) .116 CAG spends much more time “on deck” coordinat- In8 tactical employment issues with the embarked battle i°uP staff than his predecessor in the previous CAG sys- ttt- Consequently and by design, the previous CAG’s °e of strike leader is relegated to the Deputy CAG, nose training is specifically tailored toward airborne xPertise in each carrier aircraft type. The Deputy CAG’s F unary responsibility is that of airborne strike leader, so , e deputy spends much more of his operational day in the ilr than does the CAG.
■he addition of a Deputy CAG reduces much of the /"j’s burden of normal, routine shipboard issues. This r°v>des the CAG with ample time to devote most of his wing staff relationships are quickly resolved because of the carrier CO’s and the CAG’s determination to make the new program work. The concerted efforts of these two people ensure acceptable ship-wing relationships and cause many unique air wing staff organizations to develop.
Air Wing Organizations
The air wing organization is now recognized as a major command in the battle group structure, thus many CAGs are assigned roles in the composite warfare commander (CWC) structure. Others are assigned as a strike warfare commander in various offensive war-fighting doctrines and report directly to the officer in tactical command (OTC). Whether he is assigned a major CWC responsibility or not, the new air advisor soon observes that the in-
Figure 1 Organizational Relationships Before
Embarked Fla|
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| 1 1 |
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| 1 | —i—i i—i—i—i—i—i | ||
Air Wing 1 Staff I | Squadrons VF VAL VAL VAM VS VAQ VAW H | |||
Embarked Fla;
DesRon Cdr
Deputy
CAG
pi
°Pei
der
V
Th,
attem;
If, ll0r> to the precise tactical execution of the air wing, is regard, the Deputy coordinates shipboard space and rters issues through the carrier’s executive officer, rafi°nal issues on and around the carrier with the car- air operations officer and air officer (Air Boss), and 1q., ron training or maintenance matters directly with the hadron COs
djr„ e level of success in each new air wing structure is OffjC V attributable to the personalities of the key senior ers involved. Controversy concerning ship and air
creased direct tasking from the battle group commander requires more frequent responses from his staff.
Air wing staff manning, however, has changed little since the inception of the new CAG program. Eight officers were assigned to the old CAG staff to fill various billets. The addition of the Senior CAG increased the staff to nine. Under the previous CAG staff structure, the wing staff operations officer served not only as assistant air wing commander, but was also responsible for extensive coordination of aircraft use and employment with the car-
r°^di
rier strike operations officer and squadron operations officers. Lieutenant commanders fill air wing operations, antisubmarine warfare operations, intelligence, and maintenance billets; two landing signal officer (LSO) billets are filled by lieutenants. Only recently has an additional billet been added for antisurface/strike warfare. In the new air wing organization, even more officer manning appears to be necessary.
Senior CAGs have directed temporary increases in their staffs to cope with the shortage of staff officers. As many as four lieutenant commanders have been drawn from subordinate squadrons to support major warfare areas, and on occasion CAGs have requested a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) aviator from a shore-based patrol wing.
In some cases, extra officers are used only during major operations, but most CAGs have permanently drawn one or two officers from a fighter and/or attack squadron.
tional headquarters on board the carrier, the CAGs divi £ their time monitoring tactical evolutions in the CDC.1 flag war room, and the tactical flag command centerWing commanders find it necessary, therefore, to crea their own tactical watch officer to stay abreast of deve °P ing tactical situations. This is especially true for air wing in which the CAG is assigned a major CWC commas ■ the ASUWC for example. . .
Although staffs vary from wing to wing, most air w organizational structures have evolved as illustrate Figure 2. ,-r
The air wing tactical watch officer (TWO), called ^ ferent names in different air wings, is normally a 0 . hour watch stood by senior lieutenants or junior lieuten commanders selected from each of the squadrons by wing commander. The total number of TWOs varies nine to 12. With ongoing training by the CAG an
I^TAG^dminJ
(ADDU LSO or ASW Ops)
CAG ADDU
(YNCS or ADDU
LCdr)
Wing Staff Organization
—Before—
Deputy CAG
AAW Ops
squadrons.
Note: AAW operations officers are currently
These officers join the assigned ASW operations officer to coordinate all three major warfare areas—ASW, antiair, (AAW), and antisurface (ASUW). One Senior CAG who was assigned as a CWC major warfare commander developed a semi-permanent operational staff of five lieutenant commanders for AAW, ASUW, ASW, electronic warfare, and MPA/Air Force B-52 operations. This team worked exclusively from the carrier’s combat decision center (CDC).
Because the air wing is not normally provided an opera-
Deputy, these officers serve as wing tactical actio -fes cers (TAOs) in the carrier’s CDC. Their tasking rl^ .^ji- them to update the wing commander, his staff, an vidual squadron COs on developing tactical sltuoVjde The CAGs’ expanded operational experiences P [n them with the expertise to fine-tune existing doctr1 ^eIji addition, their extensive training pipeline he Ps ^gjr avoid single aircraft type parochialisms and dedic ^,ar primary effort toward improved multi-mission cai fighting. The key is to eliminate previous aviatio
The
commander of Carrier Group Four, then-Rear Admi-
ha’
iVe spent as many as ten years away from tactical flying
an air wing.
<ASW,
force
(A ~
r^C);
ce,
Ways.
In the Pacific Fleet, for example, a specific warfare
Zander for strike warfare (STWC) was instituted to
JJ'Unity biases and look at the entire battle group picture.
ra* Jerome L. Johnson (now a vice admiral and Contender Second Fleet), who worked up many of the Senior AG air wings for deployment, amplified these advance8 in 1988: “The Senior CAG program has provided ne battle group with a staff that thinks ‘multi-mission ,Varfare’ . . . and multi-mission warfare is the primary Mission of every aircraft entering the fleet today.”
CAGs still focus their attention primarily on tactical Solutions, but now, as the chief air advisors for the battle "r°uP commanders, they have more time to orchestrate the Solutions from different perspectives.
Time really makes a difference in the revised CAG pro- ®ram: The new air wing staff has more of it, and can place heater emphasis on the planning, coordination, and prep?® execution of air employment than could the carrier u °r CAG under the previous air wing system. This is j"sPecially true in the case of nuclear carriers, where COs
Mth
More time and greater tactical emphasis is placed in the ea of air employment by a senior aviator with current air lng experience. For this reason alone, the new CAG pro- ®raili is a good idea.
Does the Senior CAG Fit In?__________________________
The revised CAG program was introduced into a fleet in >ch each major command captain was assigned as a aJ°r warfare commander. When the Senior CAG conk ^ Wa$ introduced, it was difficult to determine where he 5J; fit into the system.
the CWC concept is the primary war-fighting organiza- n used in all carrier battle groups. As expressed in cur- f^ fleet doctrine, the CWC concept is primarily for decnsiye tactical sea control. Three subordinate inlanders conduct force defense as the antiair warfare f.funder (AAWC), antisurface warfare commander ,.bUWQ, and antisubmarine warfare commander
C). Assisting the CWC are coordinators managing sensors and assets: the air element coordinator tio . ^ an<f electronic warfare coordinator (EWC). Addi- , Ual coordinators assist the ASW commander as the heli- I cn 6r e*ement coordinator (HEC) and submarine element Ml °ordinator (SEC). (See Figure 3.)
I ash ”ens've operations concerning projection of power W\ mn0re’ surgical overland strikes, and coordinated, long- §e war-at-sea strikes do not come under the CWC con- Tf but are closely controlled by the OTC in various
c°m
pla
^’ coordinate, and execute the long-range war-at-sea de °verland power-projection missions. Ironically, this tjQVeMpment occurred simultaneously with the introduc- qug °f the Senior CAG, thus the air wing was subse- p| nt>y assigned this role. Battle groups in the Atlantic ^ have also adopted the STWC concept.
'be fS^n'ng the many CWC commands has varied among battle groups. CAG assignments have included the
STWC under offensive doctrine and the ASUWC in the CWC structure. Traditional assignment alternatives are illustrated in Table 1.
Senior CAG Options
Many alternative CWC assignments have been observed since the introduction of the Senior CAG. Each focus on the CAG’s assignment to a key position in the fleet war fighting organization.
Option 1. Combining the STWC with CWC doctrine: One alternative is to include the strike warfare commander as a fourth major subordinate command of the CWC structure, thereby creating an offensive and defensive organization. The CAG, in this position, plans and coordinates all strikes ashore or at sea, as requested by the three major track commanders for AAW, ASUW, and ASW. The STWC is the central guy who blows things up.
This alternative simplifies the fleet war-fighting organization for offensive/defensive warfare and makes one responsible warfare commander for all strikes, e.g., quick- reaction war-at-sea, long-range war-at-sea, and projection of power ashore. The STWC can accomplish the same task if combined with ASUW in existing CWC doctrine.
Option 2. The CAG as combined ASUWC-STWC: Several of the initial Senior CAGs were assigned as the ASUWC in the CWC organization, traditionally the weak component of the CWC. When a carrier or destroyer is assigned to that role, the actual surface watch task is relegated to the tactical action officer (TAO) in the CDC. The TAO of an individual ship is too busy to control a credible surface picture for the entire battle group.
In contrast, the air wing can develop the track and surveillance of all surface units as ASUWC and then (when directed) plan, coordinate, and execute the strike against designated targets as the STWC. However, in cases where the CAG is the ASUWC, the wing must draw several individuals from subordinate squadrons and even shore establishments to create a staff in the carrier’s CDC to maintain the surface plot.
One advantage of this alternative includes designating one strike commander for all surface tracking, surveillance, and combat engagements. Because the CAG normally controls the best assets to track surface units (aircraft) and the best expertise to plan a strike (the air wing), he may be the preferred candidate for ASUWC. Many who favor this option acknowledge that this assignment places the CAG as a major warfare commander in the only real war-fighting structure in the fleet and keeps him on a parallel with the carrier CO, cruiser CO, and destroyer squadron commander.
Unfortunately, the air wing is inadequately staffed to manage an ASUWC assignment, and drafting squadron officers only depletes subordinate squadrons of their assigned talent. If the CAG’s assignment to ASUWC is made only to give relevance to the Senior CAG program as a major command, it is unnecessary. Furthermore, the CAG is too involved in all warfare areas to devote his efforts to one specific warfare command.
Option 3. Senior CAG as AREC: Many of the duties
the carrier’s air operations officer. If the air wing were assigned as the AREC, the conflicts that often arise con ceming requests for limited aircraft would be more et ciently resolved. The CAG is thus the logical choice 0
assigned to the air element coordinator’s are synonymous with responsibilities of the air wing commander:
“The Air Element Coordinator is a resource manager and warfare planner ... an advisor to the OTC/ CWC, [who] ensure[s] that the aircraft are used effectively and, [who] keep[s] apprised of aircraft availability, maintenance readiness, configuration and weapons loadout. ...”
the AREC. ..
Unfortunately, assigning the CAG as the AREC wou not identify the CAG as a major warfare commander. » sides, why change the current system when it has wor' so well in the past?
and support aircraft
CAG organizations will continue to evolve well into next decade. Many such organizations have met with s cess and have been duplicated in other Senior CAG wings. These successful designs have resulted in strl
Conclusions
The AREC duties include:
—develop! ing] tactics —ordering tankers, SAR launched
—return to force procedures —apportioning aircraft to warfare commanders
Figure 3 Composite Warfare Commai Organization
AAWC
ASUWC
| | ASWC^ | |
1 r | 7 |
1 | l |
|
|
Individual Ships and Aircraft
Figure 4 Recommended War-fighting (Offensive and defensive)
OTC/CWC
| Table 1 | Warfare Commander Assignments |
| ||
AAWC | ASUWC | ASWC | STWC | AREC | EWC |
Cruiser CO Carrier CO | Carrier CO DesRon Air Wing | DesRon Carrier CO | Airwing | Carrier CO | Flag |
—planning and executing power projection —planning War at Sea strikes —establishing flight schedules”5 These tasks are normally conducted by the air wing staff. However, CWC doctrine states that the carrier should be assigned as the AREC. In this regard, the carrier’s strike operations officer is assisted by the air wing to plan air assignments before daily carrier operations. During actual air operations, aircraft are reassigned through the carrier’s CDC by the ship’s TAO and, on occasion, by
-STWC/AREC-
CAG
support from battle group commanders and carrier ^ However, the CAG staff is undermanned by at leato officer billet. Drafting subordinate squadron ofnc support even temporary operations is a short-term r but not a solution. . ^ the
In contrast, the new air wing is more effective ^ carrier strike operations officer billet merges w r^jS CAG staff and becomes the CAG operations 0®C^arrief ngle individual would perform the duties of bot
si
strike operations and CAG operations when
deployed'
alte,
*ati
Natives would improve standard war-fighting organi- °nal integration. This combination modifies the exist- § CWC structure because it is the most understood and Jeferred. The three existing subordinate CWC commands j u‘d function similar to current procedures by maintain- track on all air, surface, and subsurface targets r°ughout the battle group area. Each command would ')|v'cfc continuous locating information, threat priorities, attack designations to the OTC. n addition to the AAW, ASUW, and ASW command
os
elsu
additional lieutenant commander billet, formerly CAG derations, would remain on the staff as the A AW opera- tlons officer.
The recent addition of a dedicated ASUW and strike Operations officer is perfect. The prerequisite training for hls officer should include courses in joint-coordinated str'ke operations, Air Force-Navy coordinated operations, anT Tomahawk-Harpoon missile coordinated tactics.
This will expand the air wing operations staff to include a c°mmander and three lieutenant commanders with excise in AAW, ASUW, and ASW. Both the air wing s*aff intelligence officer and maintenance officer billets Pould be upgraded from lieutenant commanders to commanders.
The tactical watch officer concept is a strong manage- nient device and has been adopted in some form through- °ut each air wing.
These changes will eliminate the requirement for tem- P°rary staffs, improve the new major commands capabili- es> and solidify the staff organization.
Introducing the Senior CAG into the CWC structure (Created additional assignment alternatives and specific °ncern that he be recognized as a major warfare comber. Regardless of whether or not he is assigned a ^ajor position, his place in fleet war-fighting structures °nld be clearly defined.
j ^signing a CAG to the ASUWC role necessitated the ‘ation of an undermanned staff. An air wing is not prop, y staffed or equipped with sufficient facilities to con- vUct this mission. Consequently, the CAG should not dee his primary attention to one specific warfare area, but *ler should be placed in a position to ensure adequate air Section to all warfare areas. A simple combination of
a fourth warfare commander should be established to lre that each warfare commander has the necessary l0Craft to accomplish his mission. The Senior CAG is the D(fr1Ca* choice for this role. He will reduce the conflict that ]n ^Uy develops regarding demand for limited aircraft. ^J^a(iitional CWC doctrine, the air wing would be the tlj -C, but elevated to warfare commander status rather a" coordinator.
^ y including the STWC doctrine, this same commander „ "Id then provide the air power to strike necessary tar- ^ once the individual AAW, ASUW, or ASW com- p0 "dcrs request the strike and the OTC decides offensive er was appropriate. This strike-AREC command d serve as the weapon or main battery for each of the ^are areas. This provides one guy to blow things up. ade° ensure that this major warfare commander has an CRiate command center on board the carrier, the existing strike operations spaces or even the flag bridge could be assigned to the air wing. They would be equipped with increased communications and intelligence networks (including the joint operations tactical system [JOTS] and the Navy tactical data system console, which would provide direct access from the AAW commander, ASUW commander, and ASW commander to the Strike-AREC commander.
This recommendation combines several warfare responsibilities into one logical organization. A combined offen- sive/defensive alternative is illustrated in Figure 4. This revised organization would be simple enough in single carrier battle group operations. When multiple carrier groups join to form a battle force, the OTC (who would always be the CWC) could designate subordinate carrier groups as major warfare commanders responsible for one specific area.
Still, only one wing commander would be the senior STWC/AREC, responsible for aircraft allocation throughout the battle force and would normally be on the flagship with the OTC. Alternate STWC/ARECs would be assigned as they are in the other warfare areas, and may be tasked with individual strike planning or air assistance to a specific warfare command.
The battle group commander must retain the flexibility to decide specific assignments and locations of his major warfare commanders, offensive and defensive. This proposed war-fighting organization clearly specifies where the CAG fits into the grand scheme of things.
It was disclosed by a former battle group commander, formerly the commanding officer of a nuclear carrier, that he was initially very skeptical about the value of the new CAG program. After completing work-ups and an extended deployment with one of the first Senior CAGs, he said, “Senior CAG . . . never leave home without it.”
Controversial discussion continues among those unfamiliar with the new air wing structure. It is time to get on with the program. It is here, it works, and our war-fighting capabilities are better for it.
‘U. S. Naval Communications Message from Commander, Naval Air Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet ComNavAirLant to Atlantic Fleet carrier groups, carriers, and air wing commanders, 22 October 1985.
Memorandum from the Staff of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, “Restructured Air Wing Concept,” 20 August 1985.
3Ibid. •
“ComNavAirLant Message, 10 January 1986.
’Austin E. Chapman, “Senior Airwing Command,” lecture at Naval War College, Newport, RI, 22 January 1988.
Author’s Note: This article was derived from responses by battle group commanders, carrier commanding officers, and initial Senior CAGs worldwide to a lengthy questionnaire about the Senior CAG program.
Author of “Battle Force ASW: M3” in the January 1989 Proceedings, Commander Voss is the commanding officer of the East Coast S-3B Fleet Replacement Squadron (VS-27). He was recently selected for captain. In November, he graduated with distinction from the Naval War College, where he served as an advanced research associate. He has served in S-3 squadrons and commanded VS-30 in the Saratoga (CV-60).