Where Is the SSN Going?

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Merging technologies hold promise for landing the capabilities of the Navy’s ^tack submarines. Before the design work Jj!¹ ^e Seawolf (SSN-21) is completed, the ^^avy must decide on the SSN’s future roles tp u missions to take advantage of new _r ^chnologies, especially in light of expected ^es°Urce constraints.

The nuclear-powered fast attack submarine (SSN) is °ne of the most effective offensive weapon plat- _ll)(j forms ever produced. Its ability to conduct highly tyj fP^endent covert operations against a variety of targets shj ^devastating effect makes the SSN arguably the capital °f U. S. naval forces.¹ Owing to the integration of a tj_1e ^e'^ranging array of engineering and scientific designs, ^t'⁰naj^,°^^ern SSN has achieved a quantum leap in opera

I the tica

^ln offensive naval war-fighting operations

,_n capability during a relatively short period. Integrat- &*** engineering designs and the SSN crews’ growing expertise has enabled SSNs to approach preemi-

a|_t^^trategie arms-control negotiations could significantly 1^ ^r 'he future use of SSNs, which must assume new roles _0p^a ^hion to those outlined by former Chief of Naval clg^hons (CNO) Admiral James D. Watkins in his arti

pom

essarily drive the design of major weapon systems into multi-use roles. In cost alone the SSN represents a major asset that will be scrutinized on a cost-effectiveness basis. This discussion will concern possible additional roles for the SSN and the leading-edge technologies that can make them possible.

Acoustic sensor performance, sound quieting, reliabil­ity, and survivability most often determine the design of an SSN. State-of-the-art technology is incorporated as a by-product rather than as a design objective. Engineering improvements have been and, most likely, will continue to be incremental rather than revolutionary in nature. In an age of supercomputers and superconductivity, mag amps and transistors have only recently begun to give way to engineering applications of digital technology. Yet when reviewed from an engineering systems approach, it may be more desirable in some cases to design from a reliabil­ity standpoint rather than from a cutting-edge technology framework. However, there are several applications of as yet unproven laboratory initiatives that may prove fruitful.

Future Scenarios

^he Maritime Strategy.”² Fundamental questions

^ w^rnin§ the SSN’s future include:

i^hati

:or

_Scena-.there roles applicable for use in limited-conflict

i ^y 'hat are unique to the SSN? reso ' * ^lhese roles play a major part in the commitment of er_a.^Urces associated with the design, production, and op- k‘⁰ⁿ of the Seawolf (SSN-21) or its follow-on? Po\y^{CCaUse t}*^1e by nature is not ideally suited for |n_en?^r Projection, there must be a concerted effort to aug-

tw *.         ----- *“ •* ^l,MI'^vT^v' ”                        ----------- * ----

appji^^entlal uses in low-intensity conflicts. The judicious

applications will the SSN have in a post-strategic-

^arnis

i . Control world? Are

^aarios (terrorism-related, Third World, Eastern Eu-

^nt hs potential uses in a superpower confrontation with

'cation of limited national defense resources will nec­

With an initial operating capability projected for the mid-1990s, the Seawolf and its follow-on must be consid­ered as a platform for use in the year 2000 and beyond. The most likely scenarios for future uses of SSNs (in addi­tion to ASW) would necessarily involve some or all of the following ingredients: accessible coastal features; power projection ashore of men, materials, and weapons; covert intelligence gathering; and risk.

Plausible scenarios exist whereby an SSN may be used effectively against a terrorist, Eastern European, or Third World objective. However, as in the case of the Persian Gulf nations, geographical practicalities may prevent opti­mal use of the SSN. Inasmuch as the threat of an SSN may serve to accomplish many objectives (as in the case of British intervention in the Falklands), the SSN sometimes serves more as a psychological facilitator of objectives rather than a practical one. The use of an SSN in a low- intensity conflict must take into account what ASW threats are present. In the case of a Soviet client state, or in a state

plex target recognition features for transmission in

real­

time airborne reconnaissance of an area, possibly before an amphibious assault, in which surprise is a major factor

uld

in c°ⁿ'

Insertion of Sensors: Mobile or fixed acoustic and n°⁸

⁷                                                                                              do or

vertical-launch tubes. These sensors would be

self-

vehid^e'

contained, the SSN serving solely as the delivery

security would preclude the use of more conventional¹

logy

an^d

here would be in the application of miniaturization speed functions, which would enable an on-station SSi^N function as a fully self-contained surveillance platro ^ Advances in covert transmission capability would e^na the exchange of vital information with the typ^{e c} mander or higher, in near real time and without

comp^r°'

where ASW resources have been obtained on the world market, this consideration is significant. However, in most circumstances the determination of the SSN’s utility must often take into account the SSN’s unique abilities versus possible compromise.

There must be an objective evaluation, in the near term, whether there are any limited-intensity scenarios in which this major capital asset is worth committing. This does not rule out the opportunistic use of an SSN should the situa­tion arise. Rather, this evaluation should determine whether there should be a force-wide expansion of certain capabilities for which an SSN would be best suited. Other­wise, we may be pressed to justify the modem SSN’s costs for use solely in a superpower confrontation. Aircraft car­rier battle groups have been used as a flexible instrument of policy in a Third World setting (Libya). Is there, or should there be, a commensurate role for the SSN?

Advanced Technology Applications

In the contexts of low-intensity conflict and continued superpower confrontation, there are a number of cutting- edge technology applications for the future SSN. These technologies are in most cases immature and subject to extensive development. In other cases, the areas men­tioned would require extensive adaptation for the more demanding environment of SSN operations. In all cases, the adaptation of these technologies will be driven by the national military policy perspective of the SSN’s use.

Land-attack Cruise Missile Delivery: Although this op­tion already exists, there is promise for further refinement and advancement in leading-edge technology. In the area of target recognition, such technologies as parallel com­puter processing, gallium arsenide sensor fabrication and quality, and neural networks offer opportunities for ad­vancement. Parallel processing, integrated with extremely sensitive sensors, would improve the system’s ability to recognize a valid target in real time. Gallium arsenide quality control and neural network integration would pro­vide a means of overcoming difficult target location prob­lems (e.g., against a movable target). The ability to update and reprogram given land-attack cruise missile missions in real time would provide great flexibility for the SSN’s strike options. Giving the cruise missile the ability to rap­idly change targets and loiter in an area would enhance the missile’s value in a changing political/diplomatic situa­tion. Cutting-edge technology would necessarily involve high-speed, covert transmission and receipt of a large amount of data from shore-based mission planners to de­ployed SSNs.

Robotic Vehicle Delivery: To take advantage of the SSN’s covertness, remotely operated or autonomous ro­botic vehicles could be delivered from torpedo or vertical- launch tubes, either ejectable or swim-out. The vehicles should be capable of clearing the launch platform before activating/broaching the surface, minimizing the risk of detection to the SSN. Possible uses of robotic vehicles include:

► Submerged harbor or coastal surveillance: The vehicle could perform a counting function only, or perform com­

real

time or near real time. Data transmission would have to p^e designed to preserve the integrity of the SSN, or the vehi­cle could be wholly autonomous and transmit indepen dently to airborne or spaceborne sensors. The vehic could also be interrogated for data.

► Airborne reconnaissance: After clearing the SSN sum ciently, or after a predetermined time delay, a robotic airborne reconnaissance platform could perform a

Technological advances in low observables (stealth) co¹ produce a vehicle that is almost impossible to detect ) radar. Target recognition ability, including low-light te vision, two-color infrared imaging, and neural networ ■ could provide the technological basis for success. , ► Disabling of mines: An autonomous or remotely pil°^te vehicle could be used to disable or destroy empl^ace, mines or conversely, to lay mines. Target recognition ^a advanced sensors (sonic, ultrasonic, fiber optic, magnct>^c' infrared) could play a major role.

Special Operations Force Insertion: Although ernpN)' ment is hampered by limited capabilities, this SSN capability may need to be generally upgraded. Space r^e strictions limit the number of SEAL (sea-air-land con| mando) or other forces that can be carried and inserte ■ Lock-in/lock-out procedures for at-sea dispersal and P^r° cedures for swimmer delivery vehicle use require revie ■ This mission is of less value for SSN employment tn other roles.

Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Delivery: The S ^ could serve solely as a delivery platform for RPVs, i^nste‘j_n of a more integrated employment of robotic vehicles- this case, the RPVs could be laser- or radio frequenw controlled from sources outside the SSN, possibly junction with special operations force troops.

acoustic sensors could be delivered by either torpedo heft

This function could be particularly useful in areas livery vehicles.

HarborICoastal Surveillance: The leap in technoi

■ _and

mise. This may require redesigned communication surveillance suites. In addition, the SSN should be ab ^ operate in a reasonably hostile environment against a viet client state, or a state that has a marginal ^c°^aS_t^,is defense capability. Of all the options mentioned, function would place the SSN at the highest risk, thus objective would need to be of sufficient value to vva such a risk.      ₀f

Tactical Oceanographic Research: An emerging at®⁸ _s study called “Chaos” could provide an excellent imP^c

erns. This science holds promise for explaining natu- •lier °^Ccurr'ⁿ8 phenomena such as ocean currents, eddies,

Hist' ^^eat Popular interest is current work by an array of 'his' ^Ut'^{ons on} superconductivity. Possible applications of ti^p ^chnology in an SSN would have to be balanced with Future Operations U), ^c°^sts of the peripheral support systems required to tl)_r ^e superconductivity feasible.³ If material break­er | ‘^{n cera}mics and copper oxides occur, the need ^arge-scale cooling support networks may be reduced,

fo

more fully understanding and tactically exploiting the ^ans- Chaos involves the mathematical analysis of

mingly chaotic, random events to discern repeatable ratter — rally

^fmoclines, and their effects on sound propagation. th_e^entUally ^^baos could provide a basis for understanding re- I?'³’ ^cnv'^r°nment, from the ocean floor to the outer ^rain ^{6S tbe eartb s} atmosphere. The study of ocean ter- and its effect on tactical use of the ocean also holds ^lse for future applications, and could yield unex- ^ed dividends in submarine employment.

Technologies

Of,

at shallow operating depths. An increase in transmission rates, along with covert receipt, make blue-green laser re­search worth pursuing.

Supercomputers, mini-supercomputers, and super­minicomputers will, of necessity, play a major role in the future of the SSN. Very large-scale integration chips offer a means of performing the rapid computations required to perform a myriad of ASW-related functions. Because of the need for computer programmability and high speed, the future SSN will require some form of parallel com­puter processing to handle the amount and breadth of data available.⁴ Self-noise monitoring, synthetic-aperture ar­rays, over-the-horizon targeting, advanced capability tor­pedo optimization, analysis of oceanographic data, and basic fire control will add to the increased need for relia­ble, high-speed computational power.

The inherent strength of an independently operating SSN is its ability to conduct operations covertly with mini­mal outside support. It can deliver conventional weapons

<_r^0bably not eliminated. Discussion of heat transfer or SSjy , §^er>eration applications of superconductivity in an 1e^_r ,^are P^r°bably premature on the scale required in the ^drtTl- Owing to the engineering difficulties associated S$N[ ^ar§^e-scale incorporation of new technologies, the ^aPplj₍!^riay ^{be a} generation away from substantial, if any, In I- ^l0ris superconductive materials.

^-ping ^whb the covert strengths of the SSN, laser °ff_er ^nications, especially in the blue-green spectrum, ^e Possibility of passive receipt of communications

The potential mission of special-operations troop insertion points up the need for pre-design planning. If this becomes an SSN role, the overall mission capability must be upgraded, which in turn will influence greatly the design of future SSNs.

hul'

uses for the SSN. The Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class

where he received a B.S. degree in mathematics in 1978. He ^ser^_tj_c$

iari^ne

the USS Providence (SSN-719), USS Billfish (SSN-676), and as a ta^c°

such as land-attack cruise missiles with a marginal risk of counterdetection if all environmental factors are exploited. The SSN can remain in a standby position near a target state of interest almost indefinitely, limited only by food supply and materiel status. The flexible strike options of SSN cruise-missile targeting yield the same advantages as air-launched strikes or surface ship-launched strikes, but the risk to the SSN is greatly reduced.

The ability of an SSN to insert robotic and remotely piloted vehicles requires more examination. Although technically feasible, the predisposition of military plan­ners toward this role is less clear. Limited uses of a few specially configured SSNs for robotic vehicle insertion is possible, but a full-scale upgrade of force-wide SSN capa­bility to include robotic delivery probably would be re­sisted. Purists would resist most departures from strategic ASW from a Maritime Strategy standpoint. However, from the perspective of justifying the enormous fiscal commitment embodied in maintaining the SSN fleet, this area of debate could become pivotal. Robotic vehicle de­livery has promise as an add-on capability, but not as a major design objective. Likewise, the insertion of acoustic and nonacoustic sensors on a force-wide scale is probably not an effective use of an SSN. Limited adaptations may be feasible, but such sensors are a major design criterion.

Increased capability for harbor/coastal surveillance fits the Maritime Strategy better than the other options. A major upgrade in installed communications and surveil­lance suites can be justified from both a strategic and a low-intensity conflict perspective. A force-wide ability to respond to volatile situations with little or no alteration in installed capability would give more flexibility in all man­ner of low-intensity conflicts.

Insertion of troops and tactical oceanographic research are roles that would probably be given case-by-case treat­ment. Should a consensus exist to elevate these options to a higher status, the force-wide changes would probably be minor. However, in the area of troop insertion, this would exacerbate a shipboard berthing situation, which already is marginal in SSNs. Although seemingly inconsequential, the addition of multiple troops could require some major alterations in design space considerations.

The preeminent question facing the designers and oper­ators of future fast attack nuclear submarines is what rok^s these platforms can be expected to fulfill well in the 2Is¹ century. The tendency is to postulate the future of a gi^ven weapon system, and then find roles to justify its existence’ Potential future uses of the SSN must be thoroughly exam^­ined for feasibility and desirability to prevent the eh°^r' mous cost of redesign at a later date. The costs of desigⁿ' ing, fielding, and maintaining any class of SSN will, l>k^e all modem weapon systems, continue to escalate, pr°^^a bly at a rate far outstripping inflation alone. At $2 billi°ⁿ per copy, which is the price tag put on the Seawolf y some, a national military strategy must delineate multip¹ has reached maturity in what future improvement is p°^sS1 ble. The Seawolf and its follow-on hold the key for in^c°^r porating leading-edge technology, but before final dec¹ sions are made on which technologies will be explode > the following questions must be answered. If the Mariti^nlt’ Strategy is to be pursued into the 21st century, what le^v of commitment will be assigned to the SSN force? ond, given that level of commitment, what will the ad tional roles of the SSN be vis-a-vis uses in a nonstrateg context? Third, what will the commitment be, both m¹ tarily and politically, to the use of SSNs in low-inten conflicts? Finally, are those scenarios that may P^r°^v'_ai opportunities for employing SSNs worth the operatic*¹¹ risks and do they fulfill national objectives?

'William S. Lind, “The Maritime Strategy—1988, Bad Strategy?’’ L’. S. Institute Proceedings, February 1988, p. 59.                                                     _ellt

²Adm. James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy,” special supp^^e published by the U. S. Naval Institute, January 1986.                     .

³Col. James E. Mrazek, USA (Ret.), “Superconductivity: Super Opport^ufl1 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, p. 114.                      . _?Vl

⁴Dr. Thomas K. Donaldson, “In Search of the Iron Whale,” Sea Techn° November 1987, pp. 35-38.

Commander Urioste left active duty in October 1987 and is now apP ^ tions manager for submarine programs at General Electric Aerospa^ce• y was commissioned through the NROTC program at Tulane Univ in

instructor in the Tactical Training Department of the Naval Subn^1, School.