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Today, the Navy tends to see technology as a panllj cea, to cover an increasingly formidable Soviet ^ Third World threat. Further, if technology itself1 good, then advanced technology and increased comply1 must be even better. The Navy expects breakthroughs111 _ variety of technologies to alter warfare radically: ocea, inevitably will become transparent (not just more tran:
Early in the 14th century, the English philosopher William of Occam (Ockham) proposed that, of all the possible explanations for certain political phenomena, the simplest explanation should be considered first. If this drive for the simplest solution is carried into the field of technology, the Navy might begin transforming scientific breakthroughs into usable hardware in a more timely fashion.
cent); and aircraft, in time, will become invisible (notJuS harder to find). But history has a different lesson. In eral, progress in war fighting has been evolutionary, ^ spite revolutionary advances in science.
The process of transforming new technology into I1L’^ fleet hardware can be visualized in terms of a rose bush- need of periodic pruning. To ensure the vitality of the ne
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c Te point in pruning the rose bush is not to cut for >g’s sake, but rather to cut back to the point of best , ^'hood of healthy future growth, on a plant sized to
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adequate nourishment. Many new programmatic will appear on many warfare mission branches, but . e of these will have to be pruned away routinely to ”v'de the remaining ones energy to blossom. Pruning c also cut away some of the non-flower-producing 1Je'-in other words, the fiscal overhead. This may en- StJ e new ideas to reach the fleet more quickly. Over time, Reding generations of healthy technological improve- c^ts should make the enemy’s task increasingly diffi- Ijj*' To execute such a pruning plan, Occam suggests the T"-the essential tool—for cutting away the unneces- eonsider the simplest solutions first.
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Icon’s blossoms, we must make routine, yet radical cuts technology bush. Using Occam’s rule of simplicity iBi°Ur “razor,” we can develop a long-term plan for pruned explore some improvements that might be ex- from its use—such as faster infusion of new techies into the fleet, for example.
dls "'s rule of simplicity notwithstanding, the simple but ^Pointing fact is that the cutting edge of technology v 'ntle to do with fighting at sea on a day-to-day basis, tioVertheless, advanced technology should provide us op- C(jns for fighting future wars. For that reason, the cutting C(^e of technology needs to be defined and controlled ’lnuously by war fighters—not technologists— *'ng the least complex ways to overcome the threat. I,, th°ugh advanced technology is important to our war- i anting capability, it doesn’t have much to do with fight- w 'foelf. Xhe Navy fights with what it has in hand—not tech* 'S on fo£ P'er or 'n foe laboratory. Reading the high- Ofj advertisements in Proceedings or other defense- ir|(,Cnted magazines, the operator can easily become mes- lj r'Zed into thinking that tomorrow’s system is the solu- ■j,to today’s problem. But it always seems as though the efficiently enough to be installed on a plane, ship, or submarine it is no longer on the cutting edge. The fleet sailor knows this. But many critics create unwarranted gloom when they proclaim that brand new fleet hardware is obsolete even before it is installed.
This dilemma appears all the more acute because— rather than match the Soviets system for system—the United States generally has relied upon technology to maintain parity or achieve superiority. The fallacy lies in comparing real hardware systems, just being installed, to the latest theoretical advances in science. Of course, the system that has taken several years to engineer and develop is rendered obsolete in any such comparison. But the real test of capability is matching the newly installed system to the current and anticipated threat.
It usually takes several years to engineer a brassboard with the reliability and maintainability required for fleet operations. That period from idea to fleet hardware can be considered the turnaround time (TAT) and is dictated by neither law nor regulation. If we are to succeed in heavy reliance on technology, TAT is one of the variables that must receive careful attention.
The Occamesque emphasis on simplicity never loses sight of the goal of tactical effectiveness. For example, it is wrong to view the 60-mile, surface-to-surface Harpoon missile as a real weapon system unless means exist to find it a target. Harpoon was delivered about a decade ago, but the problems of over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) still remain for the surface fleet, despite ample technological development in such fields as unmanned aviation vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). To date, neither industry nor the Navy has successfully developed RPVs concurrently with the missile that requires the OTH-T.
No good reason exists for the failure to develop a weapon system and its targeting capability in parallel. Both systems fall well inside the cutting edge of technol-
front, both need routine pruning, or else the TAT becofl11
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their way to the fleet. In an economic sense, long
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ogy. My sense is that the operators did not place sufficient demands on the technologists. Even today, the mid-range RPV program is being stretched and a crucial part of the program—recovery of the vehicle at sea—remains a low priority. In the absence of a capable built-in targeting device for surface ships, the procurement of surface- launched Harpoon is giving way to the air-launched version, whose long-range targeting is provided largely by its carrying platform.
In this case, the TAT for the OTH-T is still unresolved. In the U. S. Navy, TAT can be a crucial element (or at least a pacing factor) in the ability to win at sea. Laboratories must develop advanced technologies that work with other fleet systems and are suitable for combat. Where required, parallel developments, such as OTH-T for Harpoon, must be programmed. The new technologies and the bureaucracy that acts as their conduits to the
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too long and battles can be lost while systems languid .
can be thought of as an opportunity cost paid by our s3 j ors, whenever they do not receive the best our labs 3 industry have to offer.
Today, the TAT is about 10-20 years for major terns. When the Soviets can buy technology—as in Toshiba case—or gain it from the West in other less
Jays, this may be too long. Inevitably, even with many a'Shly classified or “black” programs, the tactical advan- ta§es brought by new technologies are short-lived. Thus, °Ur ability to field new systems rapidly may be just as '^Portant as our ability to find innovative tactical applica- 1|(>ns for scientific discoveries. Pruning relatively weak Pr°jects harshly may be the only way to achieve early :el‘very 0f the strongest ones to the fleet. The defense lndustry should be an important partner in this, using the Substantial capability of its laboratories. Furthermore, the ^tracts for high-risk systems that can make significant 5tical differences should share that risk fairly between and the contractor. Industry should receive premi- IJrils for decreasing the TAT.
. ^op-level war-fighting requirements (TLWRs), intro- ^ced recently by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 0r Naval Warfare (Op-095), set forth macro war-fighting J°als against which to measure performance. These, in Urn, help set budget priorities for research and develop- ?ent efforts. The Navy, for example, could develop a for protecting its access to space, in light of an National Soviet antisatellite (ASAT) system.
In the current political environment, where Congress has prohibited all testing in space for several years, alternate technologies may have to be explored. For example, either aircraft or cruise missiles might attack Soviet ASAT systems on the ground. Having the ability to launch replacement satellites rapidly—perhaps distributing the original capability across many smaller payloads—might provide the same access to space. Each of these measures, alone or in their assorted combinations, requires vastly varying degrees of technology. And to ensure high enough confidence in our use of space, it is likely that several systems would have to be deployed simultaneously.
Another example of a TLWR that might use advanced technology in an innovative manner concerns protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Here, the TLWR might set an objective for the Navy to protect the SLOCs so that a high percentage of merchant ships reach their wartime destination during a resupply operation. The TWLR would not state how much, if any, advanced technology might be used to achieve the objective.
A conventional high-technology approach would likely view convoy protection as closely related to battle group
« . objective should be to apply technology appropri- so that the operational goals are achievable. In this (.j^Tl example, for instance, the Navy would have to de- y ..c °n the best use of technology: f;0r° support a system similar to the recently canceled Air
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protection. Such an approach would require many Aegis antiair warfare ships to shield each 100-ship merchant convoy, in addition to antisubmarine warfare capable ships to reduce the torpedo and submarine-launched cruise missile threat enough to meet the loss limitations set by the TLWR. Such an approach would divert highly capable combatants from other duties. And if Congress were approached to replace the battle force strength lost to the SLOC-protection mission, this approach would prove to be unrealistic, at least in today’s fiscal environment.
A more elegant solution might involve the application of Occam’s razor. Instead of the protecting combatants, the merchant ships themselves might actually be the most suitable and cost-effective candidates for new technology. Any proposed solution should also consider other related factors, such as the meager base of merchant seamen and the ever-decreasing number of U. S. merchant ships. Various advanced technologies could be used in the design of a class of unmanned merchant ships that could be constructed rapidly. Losing several robot ships—built in quantity, sailed in large convoys, and controlled by a small crew of sailors or airmen—would be far less painful than the loss of one contemporary crew, ship, and cargo.
Only existing technology would be required in most aspects of robot ship construction. Since there would be no need for human accommodations, a ship of modest size could be built quickly with a ferro-concrete hull. Gas turbine generators already on the shelf might best supply electric propulsion. More advanced techniques would be required for some autonomous systems, and some circuits, such as ship control, would have to be fail-safe. Yet the technology required would be far less complicated than that needed to construct a new class of Aegis ships. Several of the automated cargo ships could be built—both as a proof of concept and as a way to guarantee the ability of several shipyards to build them rapidly during mobilization. The yards might even stockpile critical, unique, or long lead parts, such as efficient propellers, in advance of a crisis.
Such an attempt to search for a solution that efficiently uses the cutting edge of technology could actually change the terms of the TLWR. Robot ships, if built in great numbers, could sail in convoys, where their sinking could create a greater liability for the enemy than a disadvantage to the allies. For example, a submarine attack against one or two autonomous robot ships in a convoy would create a flaming datum, marking a starting point for deliberate ASW search and counterattack. The loss of an irreplaceable submarine and her trained crew would be a costly tradeoff for 20,000 tons or so of cargo. Thus, the use of robot ships would bring about a radical downshift in the ratio of protecting forces to those convoyed. In fact, the entire escort and control mission could be conducted by P-3s in areas of primary submarine threat.
Such a use of Occam’s razor in finding a simple solution to a complex problem attempts to make resupply more achievable and the ASW campaign more effective at the same time. As used here, “simple” is a relative term. Designing the first autonomous merchant ship would not be a simple process, but it should be easier than designing a new class of warships. The Navy must rethink other war-fighting problems, as well—searching for the most appropriate, and generally simplest, uses of technology Discoveries in basic scientific phenomena, made 'n government and industry laboratories, work their way t0 the fleet all too infrequently, according to operational!)' oriented naval officers who are familiar with lab work that corresponds to their technical graduate education. Theje officers had participated in adequately funded projects 'n the mid-1970s, using highly advanced technologies in sys' terns that were projected to attain initial operational cap;1' bilities ten years later. Yet, three years after some of these systems should have already returned from deployment; there was no development program, and no likely pieceS of hardware were in sight. Not every laboratory prograj” fails to come to fruition, of course. The common thread i'1 these cases was the highly advanced nature of the tech' nology being pursued. The major stumbling blocks & still not clear, but perhaps someone needs to tend m°re closely to the desired fruits of the research and develop' ment process.
These officers have been called “bridging techno!0' gists,” voluntarily trying to span the gap between the 1^ and the fleet. But they were only participants—n° leaders—in the process. They must become leaderS’ trained to wield Occam’s razor as a pruning tool. recent project, for example, had been in research for m00' than five years, with more than a million dollars expend1 on it. When queried, the scientists could only suggest thJ their goal was probably another two years and anoth° million dollars or so away. But from an operational Pel. spective, the brassboard device they had developed cun have been used that afternoon in the Persian Gulf—! may have saved some lives. Admittedly, that sort of pr°xl mate use was not what they originally had in mind, bli that makes the point all the more important. The operat0'5, must step forward to prune and harvest, preventing vallU' ble projects from either going to seed or languishing in ^ lab.
Cutting away projects that slow the TAT of the bdtLr ideas is the job of the bridging technologist. Eventual!)’ new pieces of knowledge can be brought to the figW,nj fleet through the coaxing of these operationally orie1111 civilians and officers. Nevertheless, the Navy will c°° tinue to fight with what is on hand—not what is due to w
shaped to fit tactical needs. The energy and resources
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the government must not become diluted by too u111 ■’ projects. Pruning with Occam’s razor, by diligently cU ting back to the simplest solutions, will help ensure vital technology becomes useful hardware.
Dr. Libbey is a former member of the U. S. Naval Institute B°ard j Control and has published several articles in Proceedings. He rece' , his doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy as the v Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar in Naval History. He is a captain >n s U. S. Naval Reserve and works in industry as a senior require^1 analyst.