SUBCV: A Marriage Made in the Deep

The first minisubmarine, Unit 1, silently leaves her mother-                                                         ¹¹

ship. One of four manned submersibles carried on board, she represents a revolutionary force multiplier in submarine war-                                                                                                                  _f

fare. While the mothership lies in wait, Unit 1 can move deep                                                     _s

into the high-threat environment to search, to localize targets, to relay target information, or to attack. And the ability of manned submersibles to confuse the opposition gives the sub­marine-carrier a tactical flexibility approaching that of the aircraft carrier and her air wing.

Genetic engineering of hybrids—crosses between two separate organisms to create an offspring with particular characteristics of each parent—has P^r°ved beneficial in many areas. Perhaps it is time to com- ^lne the aviation and submarine genera to create a new ^sPecies of weaponry, the submarine-carrier (SUBCV). The ever-increasing Soviet submarine threat has at- ^racted the attention of the entire antisubmarine warfare ^amily. Jhe U. S. undersea community is finding that its ^nopoly on silence is diminishing quickly and those °^ve the surface are also noting a greater difficulty in ^cquiring and maintaining contact with Soviet subs. Tech- .°gy may be approaching the physical limits of passive ^c°ustic detection as we know it, and the adversary con- ⁿUes to become quieter, creating its own hybrid, that of ^e deep-giving, formidably armed, silent species.

To counter this “Red Star” species, the United States is jSloping the Seawolf (SSN-21). Designing the ultimate j, ^an underwater machine will take time and money, but _e ^e SSN-21 allegedly will be a quantum leap over current Wipment. Even if the progress proceeds as planned, °'^vever, the Navy will still have put all of its eggs into °^ne basket.

_f Consequently, it could benefit from developing another _:'^,rni of subsurface combatant. Because a conventional would do little to advance the U. S. position, the _c^ayy should espouse a new concept. This system would _c ^mbine the advantages of the independently operated air- ^{a t} that are launched from conventional aircraft carriers ⁿ 'he stealth of the submarine. Designed as a SUBCV,

this unit would consist of a large mother submarine and a number of employable submersibles operating from the host ship. These manned submersibles would be deployed much as a carrier operates its airwing and used to detect, classify, and attack opposing submarines.

Underwater Attack Squadron 2 (UAS-2) had operated with her mothership in numerous exercises, but the threat of actual confrontation with the Soviets had always been simulated. Although his ten officers and 20 enlisted had blended well into the larger sub’s regime, the officer-in­charge of the detachment wondered how his four submers­ibles would perform under actual combat conditions. The hours of practice and drills would surely pay off; never­theless, this was a novel way of conducting undersea war­fare and the unknown was probably the worst enemy.

It is evident both new equipment and tactics are neces­sary to counter the future Soviet submarine threat. “Un­dersea dogfighting”—close-in encounters with rules dif­fering from those previously followed—is one such tactic.¹ The presence of the SUBCV in subsurface warfare would allow many sorts of tactical flexibility in a dog­fight-type situation. The mother submarine’s method of launching these minisubs might imitate that of the Soviet India-class submarine or, perhaps, use an opening cargo bay, much like the U. S. space shuttle. Upon release from their mother ship, the autonomous submersibles (SVs) would be able to search, localize, and possibly attack, in addition to relaying target information to the mother sub.

use

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strosity, the Oscar nuclear-powered guided-missile marine (SSGN) (length 492 feet, beam 58 feet).

In his novel Silent Hunter, Charles Taylor states, have yet to achieve the sophistication in materials or te

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nology to send a ship of ‘Imperator’s’ [his 900-foot tional submarine] size to sea . . . however it is becom¹

Unit 1 prepared for launch on a communication mission and would receive updated tasking from overhead satel­lites. This operation allowed the mothership to remain submerged and decreased her risk of detection. The two- man crew, having received their briefing, entered the cockpit of the smaller submarine. On their signal, person­nel from the mother ship flooded the holding bay and gave the SV its final systems check. At launchtime, the overhead enclosing the submersible was opened slowly, reducing any transient noise emissions, and the minisub floated gradually upward, not activating its propulsion systems until it was well clear of its home. Sonar indicated no unfriendlies, so the SV continued to the surface to receive the latest message traffic. Upon completing the mission the SV’s inertial navigation system guided the unit home.

The minisubs themselves would be manned versions of the currently envisioned submarine remotely piloted vehi­cles with expanded sensors and weapon capability. Per­haps a crew of two, a “pilot” and a “tactical coordina­tor,” would provide the makeup. The effectiveness of small submersibles was demonstrated in World War II; however, little has been done to examine the offensive capabilities of such a system since the 1950s. Recent evi­dence suggests the Iranian Navy is using minisubs for of­fensive harbor operations and the Soviets to invade Swed­ish waters.² An obvious expansion of the SV’s role, one would conclude, would be ASW.

A propulsion system using superconductors, which would provide acceptable speeds in a small package with minimal acoustic signature, could be designed to power such a unit. The unit would also need to be able to sprint and drift and to move fast enough to provide tactical ad­vantage (evasion, pursuit, wide-area coverage). Conceiva­bly, noise from the minisub could trigger an offensive action by the opponent, which would reveal the enemy’s position to the stalking mother submarine without recipro­cal detection.

The minisub would have both passive and active sonar capabilities. It could be outfitted with a towed array and ASW aircraft on-board processing equipment to optimize space. These units could be equipped with deployable noisemakers and jammers to confuse the opponent and mask own-ship noise. The capability to deploy sonobuoys would add flexibility and allow the minisub to support surface and air ASW assets where geopolitical conditions would not favor the latter to operate.

As for weaponry, the minisub could project disabling firepower with a Mk-46-size torpedo. It may be possible to design a “tagger” weapon, a piece of equipment that would be fired from the submersible, adhere to the oppo­nent, and provide a homing signal or noise amplifier for mothership-launched torpedos. This would be akin to laser-guided bombs used by the tactical aircraft commu­nity. If laser technology improves, perhaps the minisub might illuminate the opponent for a laser-guided torpedo.

Entrance into unfriendly waters, with expectation of enemy contact, brought tension throughout the SUBCV. All four minisubs were readied and armed with warshots.

With each unit assigned a separate sector, good premia sion planning was a necessity. The coordination °i mothership crew and detachment was evident as they ployed all four units in silence. Each SV carried a Mk~> torpedo, a tagger-torpedo, and noisemakers. Unit 2 the designated active sensor and would ping at prebrU'j¹' times. The other submersibles, along with the motherslnp' had their towed arrays deployed and would renin¹¹¹ passive.

The technological ability to support such a minisub >^s already available. Aircraft inertial navigation systems ate small enough to fit in the limited space on board these S’* and provide the required accuracy for the limited periods-^ hours—the minisubs would be employed. The technolog) of such sonar systems as the helicopter community’s lig^¹ weight dipping sonar or conformal arrays might be bate line models for sensor systems. Lightweight acoustic ^af rays are also available and provide high detecti⁰¹¹ capabilities. Current life-support systems already in would support the minisubs’ mission.

The mother unit would be able to carry and supp¹. many minisubmarines. These might either be positioned [ⁿ tandem with two forward of the sail and two aft, or all S might be stationed behind the sail. These submersible should be completely encased to reduce flow-induced te^s onance during the mother sub’s transit, and allow for ^ cess by maintenance, service, and control personnel. ™ mechanism for launching the submersibles would have ^tL avoid alerting the opposition. Covert insertion operati°ⁿ of Soviet SVs in Swedish waters provide evidence that tb may be feasible.     ^

With these considerations, what must be the size such a submersible carrier? The Soviet India-class au*¹ iary submarine holds two minisubmarines in a piggyk^aC configuration, both of which may be encased during ^st°j age. The India class is approximately 350 feet long ^aIJ has a beam of 33 feet. Each submersible is approximate 50 feet long. Consider, then, the largest submarine in ¹¹ world, the Soviet Typhoon. She is about 560 feet 1^0,1J with a beam of 82 feet. With modification, the Typb°° could probably carry four minisubs without any length ing or widening of the basic unit. Even these giants of¹ deep could be as silent as smaller units, as evidenced ' the admirable acoustic qualities of another Soviet m⁰¹¹

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clearer that the United States will eventually need a ^ marine with Tmperator’s’ capabilities to maintain ^s6 power in the true sense of the word.”³          .

In almost all undersea scenarios, the United St® would be outnumbered. To succeed in the task that ^ U. S. maritime strategy outlines for nuclear-powered tack submarines (SSNs), the U. S. SSN force achieve greater than a 1:1 kill ratio against the Sovte^ Assuming acoustical status quo, the U. S. advantag^e

attack will be negated as soon as the first weapon is . water. Thus, the quieter U. S. submarine may not ,^Q(1 up against a pack of opponents. A force multiplier, ^erefore, is required for the United States to maintain the ^P^er hand. The SUBCV would multiply forces without ^easing overall units.

mother submarine deploying several SVs would be ■^e both to detect threats and deliver weapons from multi- ;^e directions. During attack, weapon-delivery platforms ‘^u'd surround the opponent, increasing the U. S. kill ^ability. The threat of the minisubmarines to the oppo- Would require the attention of Soviet attack subs and ,'8ht induce the Soviets to waste weaponry against tar- °ther than the higher value SSNs. Response to the SV _:j^Uldd also entice the Soviet SSN into revealing her posi- ^0,1 and allow U. S. submarines to acquire their targets

Vasily.                                                              ,

ue submersibles would expand the mother sub s mother unit, which would act as receivers, would provide additional tactical flexibility.

After two hours of no contact, returns were picked up on Unit 2’s emission. Unit 4, closest to the echo, passively determined the contact to be a Soviet Akula-class SSN. The Akula had turned to investigate the source of the ac­tive sonar and was unaware of her numerous opponents nearby. Unit 4 closed within 2,000 yards and fired her Mk-46 at the Akula. The surprised Soviets initiated eva­sion maneuvers and returned fire at Unit 4; however, the action was too late to avoid the U. S. torpedo.

Listening to the action was a Soviet Oscar-class SSGN that was in company with the Akula. She closed on Unit 2’s position and fired at the submersible. Unit 3 had been trailing the Oscar and launched a tagger at the Soviet. The tagger imbedded itself in the Oscar’s anechoic coat­ing and was activated on impact.

§_re ⁿ area in two ways. First, their ability to achieve ^er depths than conventional submarines would allow 0)^ ^access to more sound transmission paths. And sec- K ^.^u*PP'ⁿ8 th^e minisubs with passive and active sonar tipi_e '**ty would permit simultaneous exploitation of mul- . ^s°und transmission paths through analyzing lateral ti₀ °ⁿgitudinal differences in mother sub and SV opera- big ^a| Planes. A multistatic concept, in which a submersi- ^ould provide an active ping to the other SVs and the