Th '
high 6 lncreas'n§ complexity and cost of ethnology weapons appear to be lndu'ng Problems for the Soviet military- iriteil’tria' complex. According to U. S. NJence analysts, the development
Seem <luisi
earh "' operational in mid-1988.) By of tL ^8 the Soviets had produced 11 SiJ!^-2 Blackjacks.
s for Soviet military programs to be lengthening. In fact, the ac- -„,s 100 *'mes f°r Soviet advanced sys- (] (, are comparable to the times for recen S^sterns—10 to 15 years.1 Two %a( oexamples of this are the Blackjack marjnglc bomber and the SS-N-23 sub- h e'launched ballistic missile. date'.|/' analysts continually revise the ,ey expect the Tupolev-built Black- opg’ .e largest bomber now flying, to be Strate10na>- analyst for the U. S. lea„ ®lc A>r Command said that her col- has |CS are not certain why the testing that n!tec* *or so long, but she theorized Probi e Soviets may have encountered Wltb the aircraft’s avionics.2 beCarn reP°rts indicate that the aircraft
completed in 1985; four are now built, and the fifth was launched earlier this year. As of early 1988, however, no Delta IV had gone on patrol because, apparently, the SS-N-23 has reliability problems. Western intelligence now estimates that the missile will “complete testing” in 1988.
In the Soviet Union, the defense industry appears to be operating almost at full capacity. The high levels of defense spending, in turn, have progressively slowed national economic growth rates, since the most productive resources are channeled to the military at the expense of investment in industries that are essential for civilian economic growth. In turn, the neglect of the civilian industrial sector has led to a low standard of living, overall low productivity rates, inefficient use of resources, transportation bottlenecks, and slow technological development.
The shortage of skilled workers is another key factor affecting the Soviet military-industrial complex. As high-tech equipment is introduced into the civilian and military sectors, the demand for these men and women increases, but, because of the declining birth rates of the cityliving, Russian-culture people and the increasing birth rates of the rural, Asiatic population, the supply of skilled workers is dwindling. (Few rural Asians in the Soviet Union enter the more technical educational institutions.)
These factors will have considerable impact on the Soviet military establishment, especially the navy, which has an insatiable appetite for high-tech systems and for skilled workers and sailors.
These economic conditions have led to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s economic perestroika or “restructuring.” Because these efforts threaten a great many “rice bowls” of Soviet political and industrial leaders, they are not universally acclaimed, but, if successful.
The problems associated with introducing high tech into operational forces know no political bounds. The Soviet’s new Blackjack bomber, for example, has been seven years in flight testing and already is called a hangar queen in some circles.
193
modernization. If they do, weapons procurement programs
son#
may
be stretched out, some lower Pr'l,r1^ military activities may be reduced' both may happen.”
But, as the Department of Defense anal) sis is quick to point out,
“Soviet defense spending has con11^ ued to rise annually even thro r Gorbachev’s tenure [since
The Soviets often have led the West in applying new technology to military systems. This T-80 tank, for example, is fitted with reactive armor.
their impact will be felt keenly in the Soviet military-industrial complex.
While it is not clear exactly how Gorbachev’s policies will affect the military establishment, it should be noted that since 1980, the fraction of the Soviet gross national product spent on defense has increased from an estimated 14-16% to about 15-17% in 1987.3 And although the allocation of resources will certainly change within the Soviet armed forces, there is no indication that this rate of spending will decline.
Further, the distinction between the Soviet civilian and military economies is not always clear—at least to the West. Most shipyards, for example, provide housing and social amenities for their workers. The scope of this effort may be seen in the Nikolayev and Kherson shipyard complexes (and possibly others), which have civil construction capabilities even larger than those of the local, government-owned city construction organizations. Another example is that while the U. S. defense industry can contract for commercial or military components in the open market, the Soviet defense industry cannot do this as easily (and in some cases not at all). Within the Soviet military-industrial complex, segregation and secrecy reign. Soviet military-industrial facilities often will produce relatively minor, nonsensitive components and parts.
Another factor that slows the Soviets’ acquisition of technology is their need for Western technology (and in some cases components) to upgrade their own industry. This creates a heavy demand upon the limited “hard currency” available to the Soviets, forcing them to supplement legitimate purchases with quasi-legal means and increased intelligence collection. (The Toshiba-Kongsberg transfer of
propeller milling machines to the Soviet Union was an example of this acquisition effort.)
The Soviet-U. S. agreement to ban intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles as well as potential results of the strategic arms reduction talks (START) will temporarily reduce the burden on the Soviet defense-industrial complex, as certain types of weapons (or at least some numbers of them) are eliminated from production schedules. But one must exercise caution in such calculations, because the ruble (and dollar) costs of nuclear weapons tend to be much lower than conventional systems; rather, the gains in the treaty-mandated weapon reductions could be in freeing plant and test facilities for production, and releasing skilled technicians and engineers for other military projects.
Perestroika may change the way that the Soviet military-industrial complex does business. Production rates may slow or, in some cases—such as INF missiles— stop entirely to permit the plants to be modernized to reduce skilled labor requirements. Moreover, while the Soviets have long standardized the components for weapons (especially tanks and ships), they may make an even greater effort in this regard.
Some academic experts opine that economic perestroika will lengthen procurement schedules: the difficulty in applying advanced technologies to Soviet industry will mean that the most capable military managers and engineers will be siphoned off to the civilian sector. Also, there will be more emphasis on exporting weapons to earn hard currencies. All of this will increase the friction between the civilian and military economic sectors.4
The official U. S. Department of Defense view of the Soviet economic situation notes:
' ‘The Soviets . . . may need to moderate the growth of their military spending and to funnel additional resources to the civilian sector to help sustain the momentum of industrial
1984], and defense allocations remain at levels high enough to at for continued modernization of USSR’s military forces.”5
. ,ucfr
Modernization may be the key w _ analyses. Over the past decade, the viet Union has out-produced the bn> States in almost all categories of mm j weapons. Even if the Soviets reduce ^ tain military production rates in faV°r f making qualitative improvements shifting resources to the civilian see they could still maintain quantitative periority over the United States °r Western alliance.
There is ample evidence that the ets have, in fact, long had a quahta modernization program. This may ^ seen in the recent fitting of reactive a ( to Soviet tanks (which at this m0lfl.J may be immune to virtually all sp®c
So'd'
ati
ized Western antitank weapons). the
est generation of Soviet tactical aircr . and several recent Soviet submarme
vancements.
,)«>-
U. S. analysts and military and P0^ cal leaders attempting to understand developments in the Soviet mm . industrial complex would do well to ^ in mind that the West’s standards f°r j itary effectiveness may not be unive ][]. and that the Soviets, at times with atl^ ferior technological base, have oftefl ^ the West in the applying technology military systems. This has been pain^e|.
obvious in certain Soviet missile.
\or
lite, torpedo, and submarine deve ments. It is a pattern likely to conh
‘“Soviet Union Experiencing Lengthy Act) Times,” Aviation Week, 2 May 1988. p- ' * ' 2Maj. Fran Early, USAF, quoted in Ibid.
3This is about two-and-one-half times the cf spending of the United States, which, V, tltf has a much larger gross national product Soviet Union. .cof'
‘‘These academic experts appeared before as get mittee of the House Foreign Affairs Cotnnu1’3 y.^.’ Paul Mann, “Soviet Economic Reform '
Transformation of Entire Military,” Aviation May 1988, p. 19. P
department of Defense, Soviet Military C : Assessment of the Threat, 1988 (WashingK>n' Government Printing Office), pp. 35-36. , giji1
6See, for example, John Engelhardt, oCtA
Design Philosophy,” U. S. Naval Institute "r ings, October 1987, pp. 193-200.
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Proceedings / Octob®f