Problems Are Our Business

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suh ' • ^{1 l}he latest-generation Navy ^arine-launched ballistic missile

)> will cost an estimated $35

'an f'rst director, to a mostly civil- tiv_e „ ^)UP °f technical and administra-

tHi^rsonnel b, ^S,0a-'

ance system used by other sys- to be reduced to one-sixth the

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^ had

^e size; fire-control, launcher,

Jbm ________________________

no_v‘⁰.ⁿ' This cost and Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red October, ljC_e ¹¹ gave civilians an inside look at board a “boomer,” have tfnj.^bt the Trident to the media’s at- _p'⁰ⁿ- But how could such a large Pr<ibf^{aiTI av0K}l the type of technological My ^{C,TIS anc}* publicity involving the T|,_c jJ*^ssHe and Abrams M1A1 tank? be]j ^<luse Armed Services Committee te„- >t is solely because of the Stra- 4 Systems Program Office (SSPO) ^sPec'^t!| ^rnana2^crncnt philosophy.¹ Of ^adrr|^la '^nterest is the way SSPO has te_Ck'^nistered the cutting edge of

Q^0|°gy.

“_Sp? ¹⁷ November 1955, SSPO (then full ^Was formed and charged with W_ea^^esP°^nsibi 1 ity for the new sea-based dat^^{11 s}ystem program. Before this Re,, Primarily because of the Killian °Pm ’ "’bich recommended the devel- listi_c^ent.°^{y a} 1,500-nautical-mile bal- ^re_cte(j^ITI,ssil^e system, the Navy was di- sy_s, ^to design a sea-based support te_rrne/^or the liquid-fueled Jupiter in-

i;,j₀r ^late-range ballistic missile. The time _u^tccbnological innovation at that ofn^rmed from a group of 20 naval >y tb_tt ,.^antf 20 civilians, hand-picked into a vertical, singular, jus ^J.'°riented organization. SSPO iirj _t^^lntained a near-perfect track rec- Jaunch °^U®b four generations of ship- Hrid _re.^c<f ballistic missiles (SLBMs)

|>4vj_g ^ated subsystems (fire control, instil *°ⁿ’ 8^u'dance, launcher, and test Ucr_ea^rt1Cnf^at'^on), driven by the need for '?eq accuracy and range, and real­tor Jk ^tecbnological innovations.

•he ,7 first SLBM, the A-l Polaris,

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and navigation support systems had to be transformed from land-based designs to sea-based designs; and a solid- propelled missile had to be developed. Since then numerous other technologi­cal innovations have been transformed into reliable working hardware, includ­ing an electrostatically supported gyro navigator, a variable-energy launch- eject system, and stellar sensing capa­bilities for the guidance system. The House Armed Services Committee noted that this last innovation, housed in a stellar sensor device, “presents the most serious producibility concerns in the Trident 11 program.”² This is largely owing to a chip that can only be processed at a yield rate of about five percent. SSPO also concerns itself with the manufacturing process, which turns the innovation into reliable, quality hardware—on time and within cost.

SSPO’s motto—“development can be done on schedule, invention cannot”—is only one of many reasons it has prevailed in times of mismanage­ment horror stories about government and industry programs. Trident II’s technological innovations directly affect military strategy because of the mis­sile’s “hard-target kill” capacity and increased accuracy. Because many of the newest innovations cannot actually be proven until system testing, which begins this year, some critics argue that the need for Trident II has not been justified.³ Nevertheless, SSPO has taken its mission to heart and has de­livered working hardware to the fleet.

What is unique about SSPO is its attitude toward problems. I have sought out and reported actual and potential problems to SSPO for the last three years. SSPO contractors had a hard time understanding the openness in dealing with problems required by SSPO management, but they are slowly coming around. SSPO believes that problems are a given in any large un­dertaking. When there are no problems to report, it may be time for an investi­gation. Everyone from the director of SSPO down to the working-level engi­neers lives by the credo that problems should not be hidden and are most eas­ily solved when discovered early on and brought to management attention. Even then, cost and schedule will be jeopardized if need be to combat the problems. This is not a whistle-blower attitude per se.

I participated in an SSPO captain’s inquiry into a serious problem with one major contractor who had not met all delivery schedules. After a lot of high- level government and contractor offi­cials presented their cases, and it be­came apparent that the contractor was indeed in trouble, the captain called for a short break. After much debate and criticism during the break, the captain called the meeting back to order and summarized his thoughts. In the SSPO tradition, he stated that SSPO should assume full responsibility for the prob­lem, and then verbally reprimanded his personnel for not making everyone

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^lnRs / October 1988

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